View attachment 863811
(Boris Yeltsin began the campaign as an absolute favourite)
Although
Boris Yeltsin ran as an independent, he was supported by Democratic Russia. Despite the fact that seven candidates were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Nikolai Ryzhkov was the only one who was officially nominated by the party. The other communists participating in the election ran as self-nominated candidates. Yeltsin was the vast favorite to win the election. Rather than coalescing around a single candidate to challenge Yeltsin, the forces of the Soviet Communist establishment instead fielded a number of candidates, with Ryzhkov being their official candidate. Since no candidate was believed to have a chance of outright defeating Yeltsin in the first round of the election, Communists hoped that a wider field of candidates would increase the odds that they could siphon enough support away from Yeltsin that they could force the election into a runoff (which would occur if no candidate captured more than 50% of the votes cast). Communists believed that the political climate in Russia might be different by the fall, and perhaps less favorable to Yeltsin. Thus, they wagered that, by the time that a runoff vote might be held, Yeltsin might be in a weaker position as a candidate.
View attachment 863812
(At first, Fyodorov's entry into the presidential race was not taken seriously by many)
Yeltsin ran as an independent candidate. His running mate was People's Deputy and former soldier Alexander Rutskoy. Despite officially remaining neutral and endorsing no candidate, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought to prevent a victory by front-runner Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev attempted to convince more candidates to run, and in the end was successful, as candidates such as
Svyatoslav Fyodorov and Grigory Yavlinsky joined the presidential race. He did this in a hope that a greater number of candidates would increase the likelihood that other candidates would be able to siphon enough support away from Yeltsin that his vote share would be under 50%, thus ensuring that a runoff vote to be held. Despite the fact that the military was supposed to have been depoliticized, its decisions were still orchestrated by the CPSU, and the military was utilized in the CPSU's attempt to stop Yeltsin from winning the election. 30 April, Colonel General Nikolai Shlyaga, chief of the Main Political Administration, told representatives of that body that the army should be working to influence the outcome of the RSFSR presidential election. Shlyaga called for the establishment of election committees and urged that servicemen be briefed on the relative merits of the presidential candidates. This was perceived to be an army-sponsored campaign against Boris Yeltsin. In early June, the Defense Ministry issued a directive to commanders in the city of Arkhangelsk forbidding "spy-democrats" from campaigning for the RSFSR presidency among military units. This blocked pro-Yeltsin forces from conducting campaign activities directly targeting military votes. Meanwhile, such campaigning in support of Ryzhkov continued to be allowed.
On the eve of the election, in what was seen as a politically motivated move, the chief Soviet prosecutor announced that he was looking into currency violations by Yeltsin. The 11 June edition of Sovetskaya Rossiya featured a front-page article written by Nikolai Trubin, the Procurator General of the Soviet Union, which denounced Yeltsin for illegal offers to sell millions of rubles for dollars at several times the official rate.This was a deal that was never implemented but for which then-RSFSR Deputy Prime Minister Gennadii Fil'shin had resigned the previous February. Actions to sway the election against Yeltsin were not perpetrated solely by officials in Soviet Union government. Conservative members of the RSFSR government also took similar actions. On the eve of the election, RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (a conservative government figure) came forward to claim that allegations that Yeltsin had appointed an alleged Italian mafioso as RSFSR honorary consul were true.
There was a significant media bias in favor of Ryzhkov. CPSU media outlets, particularly towards the end of the campaign, attacked Yeltsin, accusing him of authoritarianism and incompetence. Many newspapers also had a strong bias favoring Ryzhkov; two days before the election, Pravda published a strong attack on Yeltsin, calling him "disloyal, authoritarian and incompetent." Pro-Yeltsin publications, and occasionally anti-Yeltsin publications, were critical in their coverage of Zhirinovsky. They belittled his candidacy and characterized him variably as "possessed" as well as a "Brownshirt" (Nazi), fascist, chauvinist, and Stalinist. The coverage varied between Russia's two major television channels. The RSFSR-run RTR gave positive coverage to Yeltsin, while the central Soviet government-run ORT criticized him and provided broad coverage to the views of his opponents. ORT cast biased coverage of proceedings in the Russian legislature, broadcast a lengthy documentary on Ryzhkov shortly before the election, and also broadcast many anti-Yeltsin programs. It also largely disregarded the candidacy of Zhirinovsky in its coverage, allotting him just 2.5 hours of coverage to him against the 24 hours of coverage given to Yeltsin. On 27 April, Leonid Kravchenk, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting and the All-Union State Broadcasting Company, banned a scheduled broadcast by RSFSR TV (operator of RTR), a media entity of the RSFSR government which had been irregularly broadcasting since the previous year. It was soon reported that Kravchenk might try to violate his agreement with the Russian government and block regular broadcasts by RTR during the campaigning period, depriving Yeltsin's government of their own state media outlet to utilize as a campaign tool; however, the station was allowed to launch its regular broadcasts on 13 May. Nevertheless, in many places, local Communist authorities interfered with the signals of pro-Yeltsin broadcasts by the network. There was no signal interference experienced by ORT's anti-Yeltsin broadcasts. RTR and a few print sources were the only outlets that provided Yeltsin with positive coverage.
View attachment 863814
(Yavlinski was the most liberal and progressive candidate)
The strong anti-Yeltsin campaign proved to be a successful to an extent, as many voters tired of political fighting between Yeltsin and Ryzhkov turned mainly to two other candidates:
Grigory Yavlinski, who ran as a socially and economically liberal, politically centrist and democratic-minded candidate; and
Svyatoslav Fyodorov, who ran as a center - left candidate and advocated democratic reforms, economic freedom, simple and moderate taxes, as well as worker participation in the management of their companies. Initially, Yeltsin opted to conduct a low-key campaign and avoid engaging his opponents, which was nevertheless used by Yavlinski and Fyodorov, who were much more active on the campaign trail. The liberal democratic voter base became even more split as Yeltsin kept many of his positions intentionally vague to appeal to a broader array of voters. Once again, Yavlinski and Fyodorov with their detailed political programs, were able to sway many undecided voters. The last of Yeltsin's mistakes was avoiding any debates, which was negatively received by the voters. Nevertheless, Yeltsin won the first round of elections with a safe advantage over other candidates.
First round of presidential elections:
Boris Yeltsin – 42.39%
Svyatoslav Fyodorov - 17.51%
Grigory Yavlinsky - 13.31%
Nikolai Ryzkhov – 12.23%
Vladimir Zhirinovsky – 6.55%
Aman Tuleyev – 4.76%
Albert Makashov – 2.32%
Vadim Bakatin – 0.96%
View attachment 863816
(During the campaign before the second round of presidential elections, Yeltsin was completely sure of his victory over Fyodorov, which led to his ultimate loss)
After the results of the first round of presidential elections became known, Boris Yeltsin and his election staff were reassured that the previously chosen campaign tactics were the right choice, which ultimately led to the defeat of Boris Yeltsin. During the campaign before the second round, Yeltsin once again was presented as a capable leader, a measured statesman and most importantly, an anti-establishment candidate, but this tactic was not as effective as earlier, when Yeltsin was contrasted with Ryzhkov. Against Fyodorov, such a tactic proved to be completely unsuccessful, as Fyodorov, in contrast to Yeltsin never held a significant position in the Communist Party or the Soviet Government. Furthermore, Fyodorov proposed a detailed plan on how to deal with the ongoing political and economic crisis, while Yeltsin avoided answering questions about his political ideology. Moreover, Yeltsin's avoidance of a debate with Fydorov was also negatively received by potential voters. Fyodorov in his campaign, Fyodorov emphasized his work as a sugeon in contrast to Yeltsin's political background. This proved to be a good choice of electoral strategy, as the majority of Russians wanted a new opening in politics. The highlight of the presidential campaign was
the direct debate between Boris Yeltsin and Svyatoslav Fyodorov, which was followed by millions in Russia on radio and television. The debate proved to be a disaster for Yeltsin, who, being totally convinced of his election victory, disregarded his opponent and came completely unprepared to the debate. During the debate, Fyodorov performed significantly better than Yeltsin, which completely enraged him, and in a fit of anger, he refused to shake hands with Fyodorov after the debate, which in the end determined his defeat in the presidential election.
View attachment 863817
(Fyodorov's victory over Yeltsin marked a beginning in Russian and Soviet politics)
Second round of presidential elections:
Svyatoslav Fyodorov – 52.12%
Boris Yeltsin – 47.88%
Link to wiki article:
en.wikipedia.org
