So to this question ( Napy's period on Elba ) I can tell you some curiosities about it : first of all there are his residences, Villa dei Mulini ( the town one, located in the historic center of Portoferraio ) and Villa San Martino ( the larger, surrounded by greenery, a few kilometers from the island's capital towards Procchio - Marina di Campo ) then we have the splendid Teatro dei Vigilanti
at the beginning his relationship with the population was very tense, in fact before his arrival he asked to control the circulation of weapons owned by local veterans of the Grand Army, he also tried to make friends of the locals, with the presentation of the new flag ( designed by himself ) white with a red band, inspired by the grand ducal merchant flag, to which three golden bees were added ( the French cockade will also be replaced with another with the new colors ) all with the aim of decreasing resentment towards the French ( which was on the rise ) demonstrating that he would arrive as one of them rather than as a foreign ruler ( even if it must be said that Napoleon, as a precaution, secretly landed at the Warehouses to carry out a brief inspection, and only on the day following May 4th 1814 at 3.30 pm he officially landed for the first time in the main port of his new dominion )
among his main works there was a complete reform of the administration and the local Navy ( given that technically Napoleon ruled over almost the entire Tuscan archipelago, excluding the island of Giglio and Capraia ) so was important for communication and the economy of the principality, as soon as he arrived he transformed Portoferraio into a large open-air construction site : an underground conduit was built to avoid flooding of the streets ( which were widened, widened and paved, also to adapt them to the passage of the imperial carriage ) he gave instructions for the exploitation of the mines of Rio ( which had fallen into disuse ) I dedicate great attention to the improvement of the road system to connect the various island towns to each other, public hygiene also receives its attention, so much so as to require the owners of houses without latrines to take action in this regard within two months, otherwise they would have to pay a heavy fine, finally, in true Napy style, he wasted no time in forming and training a tiny army to be used to fight banditry and as a police force
However, I would love to see Napoleon making a mess in Greece, since by doing so he would solve two problems in one: first of all he would remove one of his personal regrets, secondly it would force the great powers to include the Ottomans in the system of the Council of Europe with at least 30 years of advance ( given that his actions in the Balkans will certainly create huge discussions between the powers, it is that they cannot easily be resolved by giving Greece back to the Ottomans and then pretending nothing happened regarding Russian policies in the region ( which in this period were based on strengthening the Danubian principalities, Serbia and any possible minor rivals of the Sublime Gate )
Resolving the land / property ownership question earlier would perhaps help some.
The ideal would be a reconciliation between the émigrés and the idea of emigration vs. those that stayed behind and the idea of the revolution. Obviously there's no real way to make the émigrés whole again: at best, as Louis XVIII did IOTL, he can release whatever émigré properties and lands which are still held by the state, but would only be a small section of the émigrés who were effected. The Indemnity Bill wasn't a bad idea, as it helped settle ownership questions and attempted to make the émigrés 'whole' again, but one can see why giving them almost 1 billion francs in government bonds that would eventually have to be repaid out might cause issues: it essentially meant that when they were paid out, the rest of France would be footing the bill.
If at all possible, Louis XVIII should try and temper extravagance of his initial court. In his initial return, he reestablished the old Maison du Roi as it had been in 1789, and it's positions were essentially reserved for the old nobility, with émigrés having priority. The Marquis of Dreux-Brézé even harbored plans with Blacas to restore the ettiquette of Versailles in all of it's minutiae within the Tuileries. There was also a rush for nobles to attempt to claim military titles: Louis XVIII commissioned close to 400 general officers, all émigrés, and many of whom had never ever commanded troops in battle. The main reason they wanted such commissions was primarily for the right to wear a military uniform at court, rather than long trousers worn about town, which they considered bourgeois. Uniforms at court had been popularized by Napoleon's court, but it was also the typical uniform of the princes at this point too.
The former Imperial Guard should be dealt with. Napoleon uttered that if he were Louis XVIII, he was absolutely not retain his guard because he (Napoleon) was the only one who could handle them. His idea was that Louis XVIII should grant pensions to the non-coms and privates, and offer promotions and transfers to those wanting to stay in the army. Instead, Louis XVIII turned the former guard into grenadiers and chasseurs and they were scattered about France's provincial garrisons. The former officers were allowed to keep a rank higher than their assignments, but they were put on half-pay.
Louis XVIII also attempted to restore the old units of the Maison Militaire. He and other royalists were obsessed with the idea that the monarchy might not have fallen if Louis XVI had surrounded himself with a strong and faithful guard. This plan wasn't fully carried out before the Hundred Days, but many of the former ceremonial units were reestablished with their old names and even old uniforms, which would be primarily staffed by émigrés as it was an easy way to reward them without disturbing the actual army or civil administration. The Cent-Suisse were restored, and in September 1814 a treaty was even signed with Bern to provide five Swiss regiments: some 6000 men that received the rank and pay of officers which cost Louis XVIII some 20 million francs.
thank you both, I will keep those in mind.
The problem, for the Bourbons, is that no matter how much they try to indoctrinate l'Aiglon into royalism, what is the most they can offer him? To be a minister? Advisor to the King? The Bonapartistes will offer him his father's throne. The Bourbons can't compete with that ... and consequently can never truly trust him in the end.
his father's throne, but he's a child of three. As Talleyrand notes to Fouché: France has seldom fared well under a regency. But also, the regent (Marie Louise) and the lieutenant-general of France (Joseph Bonaparte) are both people who couldn't even keep what they had (Lucca, Spain) when they had a loyalist army backing them. Murat is the wild card, because he and his wife both had imperial ambitions for their son, and also, he is the most militarily capable of the imperial family (aside from Eugène, who, while never making marshal and Napoléon described as "the stuff of a colonel, not a general", was far more militarily and politically capable than any of his brothers-in-law less his stepfather).
To your question about what can they offer him that's better than his father's throne? How about a better life than a "lark in a glass box" (as he described his OTL existence)?
The Bourbons are not trying to turn him into a minister or advisor, though—they are raising him as French prince who will be reared among the Bourbon princes of the new generation.
And given Louis XVIII's hatred of the Orléans line, I could genuinely see him using Frankie as a stick to whack them in line with.
They need not promise him anything but simply raise him among their own as their own.
which again, is an improvement on OTL where he was raised as a species of "other"
In 1814 the King of Rome is a little boy of three whose world has been completely shattered—formally heir to an empire that dominated both Italy and Germany, he is now a virtual orphan: his father languishes in exile and will likely never see him again, while his mother is an easily influenced dilettante who cares more for her passions than her own child. As a young child, he can be melded by the Bourbons as they please. If he sees the Bourbons as his family and the princes of his age as cousins or brothers, then their work has succeeded.
I don't find this too crazy, actually. Napoléon (at the end of his reign) took to referring to Louis XVI as "our most beloved uncle". Explaining to little Frankie that Madame Royal is the daughter of "our most beloved uncle" would likely silence any questions from him about who Madame Grudge (as the Bonapartists dubbed her) is.
Also, OTL he was raised in isolation (too old for the emperor's other grandchildren, too young for his children). Here he has his literal cousins (Louis Philippe's children), Berri's bastards with Amy Brown, likely Hortense's children will be worked in at the seams as well*.
*Hortense herself told Louis XVIII- in the only interview she ever had with him (pre-100 Days)- that she had every intention of trusting his government. She appealed for his help because she wished for her sons to be raised in the new regime rather than raised by their father in Rome to support the old regime. Then she went off to take the sea air (for her health rather than attempting to flee**), leaving her sons under royalist watch. Hortense might not have trusted the Bourbons as much as she said she did, but if it means that she doesn't have to give up her sons to an ex-husband she had come to despise (even Napoléon supported her in this decision), I suspect she'll be decked out in Bourbon cockades, shouting "vive le roi".
**although when she'd heard Napoléon had landed, her first idea
was to take the boys and flee to Martinique. She even made inquiries at Le Havre about booking passage. Unfortunately, there were no ships due to depart until later in the month.
He is a potent symbol that represents a possible reconciliation between the monarchy / ancien régime and the revolution / modern France.
The Bonapartistes were not very influential in the period of the Restoration. The French were tired of war and they desired peace. That doesn't necessarily mean they wanted Louis XVIII back, but he was considered the best option. While Napoleon was able to reestablish himself briefly in the Hundred Days IOTL, mainly because of Louis XVIII's growing unpopularity and blunders that had been made during the First Restoration. After his final fall Bonapartisme was firmly on the outlier of the political spectrum. Elections for Napoleon's Chamber of Representatives in 1815 led to an overwhelmingly liberal chamber and only about 80 or so members were considered out and out Bonapartistes. They were fully on the fringe throughout the Second Restoration along with the Republicans, with the major parties being the Ultra-Royalistes / Ultras, Doctrinaires, and the Libérals / Indépendants.
irony being that most Bonapartists (not the Luciens and Plon-Plon type republicans, but the moderates) were actually closer to Legitimists than the Orléanists. They simply differed over whose legitimacy.
Because the political opposition was essentially repressed during the Restoration, those upon the fringes such as the Bonapartistes and the Republicans were driven underground and into secret societies. The Bonapartistes and those opposed to the Restoration were intermingled within the Charbonnerie who are well known in Italy, but also spread into France starting in 1818. At their height, they had 20,000 members in Paris alone, and were spread across twenty-five different departments. The movement was compartmentalized into different groups, with the higher groups (Haute Sales) directly the lower groups (Private Sales) who generally had twenty members. Those in the lower groups did not know those who were within the higher groups, and none of the lower groups worked with or communicated each other. It was most active from 1820-1823, primarily attempting to carry out plots that were quashed without too much trouble by the government. By 1822, it's main leaders were dispersed and it faded into obscurity shortly thereafter.
I expect even in ATL that the Bonapartistes will likely have a rough time in the 1820s regardless. Once the King of Rome is an adult, that is where things would get interesting. IOTL, the movement sort of disintegrated in the 1830s because the July Monarchy had sort of co-opted the movement.
not exactly. Even when Joseph Bonaparte inquired from his agents in Paris in 1829-1831, there was no interest in a Bonaparte restoration. And while there were many Napoléonic names (Lannes, Davout, Soult, Mortier) in the July Monarchy's government, the July Monarchy was not what any self-respecting Bonapartist would accept. For the republican left, it was "too monarchical", for the imperialist right, it was "too bourgeois". Had it not been for Louis Philippe's gaffe of the retour des cendres, Bonapartism would likely have joined Jacobitism as a lost cause. It was the retour that lit the spark that led to the establishment of the Second Empire
Anyways: the Bonapartistes will of course desire to see the King of Rome as Napoleon II, seated upon his father's throne. I'd say the main issue is that is nothing more than an empty promise, as they sit on the outliers of the political spectrum with little influence and no ability to make said promise come true. The promise of a throne is nice, but it's just that, a promise. The Bourbons, on the other hand, will be in a position to offer the King of Rome something tangible—and depending on how he grows up and how his relationships are with the various members of the royal family, that may be the offer that he truly desires.
given that both Louis XVIII and Charles X were more than willing to tolerate a Murat regime in Naples and Elisa Bonaparte being allowed to keep Lucca* (rather than Marie Louise), I'd say that they can be extraordinarily flexible if the situation requires.
*their rational was simple: Murat/Elisa's regimes would provide a "third" avenue in Italy. Particularly one to allow French influence. They were not strong enough to maintain their grip
without French support (at least for this generation). This was driven by a neatly folding together of Charles X/Angoulême's "imperial" ambitions as well as Louis XVIII's feeling of resentment towards his Bourbon cousins in Spain, Naples and Parma. It was the 100 Days that ruined Murat's, Hortense's, even Joseph's, chances at retaining anything. Metternich told Elisa "no" OTL, but that was pre-Congress of Vienna (which will probably be "slightly" affected given that the French are holding the trump card of Boney the Ogre's heir- Metternich has a smaller stick (pun intended) to threaten the rest of Europe with)
