FWIW the USMC immediately after WWI decided that it's role in the future was to be the amphibious warfare specialists, most particularly in support of WPO and seizing advance bases in the Pacific. Although, for a number of reasons, work on this in the 1920s was slow, by the 1930s the USMC spent a great deal of time and energy developing doctrine for this, with USN going along somewhat reluctantly but going along nonetheless. Equipment issues from large (landing craft) to small (cases for equipment that was salt water proof) were also dealt with. The US Army got on board in about 1938, using USMC instructors and doctrine publications to jump start its program.
The reality is that the Germans, who had some experience in WWI (Baltic Islands assault), never looked at this. The UK did sketch out some ship designs, but the doctrine and equipment effort was minimal. Japan, as expected, had two programs one for the navy and one for the army with little coordination. No doctrine was ever really thrashed out and OTL most of the Japanese amphibious assaults were either on undefended beaches, or those with minimal defenses. The one example of an defended assault was Wake, where the Japanese did very poorly against a small garrison, unfinished defenses, and with air superiority.
The reality is that the Germans, who had some experience in WWI (Baltic Islands assault), never looked at this. The UK did sketch out some ship designs, but the doctrine and equipment effort was minimal. Japan, as expected, had two programs one for the navy and one for the army with little coordination. No doctrine was ever really thrashed out and OTL most of the Japanese amphibious assaults were either on undefended beaches, or those with minimal defenses. The one example of an defended assault was Wake, where the Japanese did very poorly against a small garrison, unfinished defenses, and with air superiority.