Adm. Hart, and his subordinate, R. Adm Rockwell, had done their best with the resources they had available to prepare the Asiatic Fleet for war, the ships of the fleet had been dispersed as much as was realistic, Holding the Houston close to Manila as much as possible hoping the Pensacola Convoy would arrive with her radar. The understregnth 4 Marine Regiment and the base AAA defenses were inadequate to provide defense for one base, let alone all three of the Asiatic Fleet's bases in the Manila area. The Asiatic fleet was short service vessels for fleet train; He was short tankers, Fleet Oilers (Which the entire USN was short of), a Submarine Tender, Destroyer Tender, A Repair Ship. Hart had even worked out plans of action with the ABDA allies. What else could Hart have done.. Oh yes.. the USA's big problem, Douglas MacArthur..
Don't have to tell me, I'm one of his most ardent defenders on this board. And
I despise how little recognition he gets. I've said this before: "If there was a better pre WW2 4 star in the USN, I do not know him." Hart frankly, is so underrated, unknown, compared to what he did with his command, and as the PRESIDENT of the General Board 1936-1938, that to be cold, it's
criminal.
(To be blunt: He was the president of the Board that pretty much authorized/directed/started: Iowa. ESSEX. Gato, Fletcher... Want me to go on? Asiatic fleet under his command never lost a ship at sea.)
All five brothers served on the same ship, and all five brothers went down with her when she was sunk. It's a major part of the reason why the US Armed Forces doesn't allow siblings to serve in the same unit anymore, iirc.
It's also the reason behind Sole Surviving. And the USN
remembers. There's been TWO ships so far (current is a Burke) named for them.
While I believe that there is general agreement that events in what is to the British the Far East, and the Americans the Pacific and Philippines. Are going to be different to what they were IOTL, tho the extent of this is totally in the decision of our author. The following has to be considered, if the decision is that the Japanese opening moves are the same or very close to those of OTL, it will take time for the divergence to evolve. One thing is however given, that if the Japanese elect to go against the British, Hong Kong will fall. It had already been written off by the British establishment, civil and military, they just hadn't told anyone.
I've commented on this, but 7 (roughly two regiments of
good troops) battalions are there. Just pulling a regiment of them out, and sticking them in Burma or Singapore is a MAJOR change. (and they held the Japanese for 3 days, not too bad)
If the British manage to hold a significant portion of Malaysia and Singapore, then I believe that Sumatra at least, and possibly Java too, will be retained out of the DEI. And with these two in Allied hands, there is little chance of the Japanese conducting a significant campaign in Papua New Guinea. Japanese air attacks against Singapore, are given a different air officer commanding, going to be very costly for the Japanese. And without access to the oil from the DEI, the Japanese war machine is rapidly growing to run out of the vital resource of modern war.
Holding Singapore is easily doable. The biggest issue, really, is Percival didn't train what he had, and didn't have any real stiffeners. We have Monty in charge of the Ground units, plus at least (IIRC), good combat experienced divison. Singapore falling frankly, unless Japan is willing to write off other areas, isn't likely at all. Remmeber, 25th Army only has 2 divisions, and they're bog standard Japanese semi motorized, at
best, Frankly? One (I THINK it's the 8th, come to think of it, or is that PWR?) combat experienced infantry division of the Commonwealth that's ably led and supported, can stop them cold halfway down. With them as "core" to form some colonial troops (and the Indian divisions could fight, btw) Yashamaria will be lucky to get 10km past the Thai border.
Singapore Falling, frankly, isn't really
likely. Not even if the Burma Army comes with the 25th. It's not enough. Monty's task is simple: Hold the Japanese NLT 25km from Singapore's North Shore, keep Japanese out of that. Do that, Singapore holds.
And if it holds, Burma falling is iffy, very.
On a side note in regards to amphibious warfare, while the British unlike the USMC, didn't have such an enfaces on this aspect, they did do some vital work. The origins of both the LCT and LST, were British designs, and Britain was the first nation to produce such vessels. And it was the Japanese who in 1935, with the Shinshu Maru produced the first primitive LSD. It was just that the Americans had the industry to produce the shipping needed in significant numbers.
RR.
Actually, the US had the
first designs, for all the future L series of craft. We just didn't build it. Shinshu was a modification of a cargo/draft.
And it doesn't matter if you have the 'craft'
doctrine is the key. Britain (to some extent) thought "good enough for now" and didn't really
think about the issues. Partly, because they didn't expect to be invading anywhere where they couldn't find an undefended beach, partly because they hit the point of "defense first"
USMC was the only group (and to be
fair, it wasn't so much that the USMC was thinking war, as much as finding a reason to remain in existence, study Hoover's view of them) that did it, then pushed for FltEx, and desgins. It also neatly dovetailed with US planning, so the Marines were given carte blanc to do so. Britain's war plans had no real consideration for the issue.