Better Tiger Tank Usage

[Deleted member 1487]

Given that IOTL the Tiger tanks lost at least 41% of their numbers to mechanical issues and generally crappy employment. There were also the lack of recovery vehicles that could handle the Tiger, so if they broke down, they were pretty much done for. Then there was the ill advised Tiger II, which made the mechanical issues of the Tiger I look tame in comparison, just as the Tiger I was becoming more reliable. So assuming the Germans took more practical look at the Tiger I, how would they use them and what effect would it have?

My list would include the following:
-No Tiger II, just keep the Tiger I in production until the bitter end

-More Bergetiger recovery vehicles; even using 10% of chassis for recovery vehicles would at least cut in half losses to mechanical issues, resulting in a net savings of combat units

-Don't employ them too early or in bad terrain; IOTL the first use near Leningrad get them ambushed by infantry and captured, allowing the Soviets to develop counters for them. They should have held off until Spring 1943; they would be a surprise and would have much more use in the Steppe than in the swamps of the North. Perhaps hold them back until Kursk and use them there for the first time as a surprise.

-Keep their use limited to Army Group South; diverting them to Africa and other areas was a mistake IMHO; having them in areas with flat, wide open terrain for maximum effective usage of their main gun would be the best use for them; perhaps limited usage in Italy would be alright, but they were best used against the Soviets IMHO and perhaps in France after Normandy.

These are the main points I could think of, do they hold up and if so can anyone think of other options? What effect would these changes have?
I think one would be that they can more combat usage out of them if they aren't being constantly lost to non-combat causes and the Soviets would be behind in their development of counters to the Tiger if they don't appear too early and give up their surprise.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Combat_history

The Tiger was first used in action on 23 September 1942 near Leningrad. Under pressure from Hitler, the tank was put into action months earlier than planned. Many early models proved to be mechanically unreliable; in this first action many broke down. Others were knocked out by dug-in Soviet anti-tank guns. One tank was captured largely intact, which allowed the Soviets to study it and prepare a response. A battalion of Tigers was deployed to the Don Front in the autumn of 1942, but arrived too late to participate in the attack to relieve Stalingrad, (Operation Winter Storm). It was subsequently engaged in heavy defensive fighting in the Rostov-on-Don and adjacent sectors in January and February 1943.

For the African Campaign they strike me as more of a logistical burden than a great help and would be more effective on the mainland against the Soviets and later in the Italian campaign to preserve surprise and to keep them better supplied and less likely to be lost to mechanical issues.

In the North African theatre, the Tiger first saw action in late 1942 near Robaa Tunisia. In the ensuing battle, a battery belonging to the 72nd Anti-tank Regiment of the British Army equipped with six-pounders knocked out three Tigers.[23] As the campaign continued, Tiger tanks would continue to appear in limited numbers. Their heavy armour and armament let them dominate in the open terrain of North Africa, but they were never deployed there in large quantities.

 

[Vjacheslav Malyshev]

The Tiger is pretty much a flawed tank, there is only so much you can do with it.

 

[Sanderford]

The problem with the Tiger, in the end, was less in how it was handled and more in numbers. Germany built, what, three thousand Tigers? America built more than sixty thousand Shermans.

 

[Mookie]

Make its armor sloped and angled.
It would make indestructible for the contamporary tanks and weapons.

 

[BlairWitch749]

their use in 1942 accomplished nothing of note

if you held them back to making their appearance at the 3rd battle of kharkov the change is fairly modest

how many did they lose between debut and kharkov off my head I don't think it was more than 100

if you put 100 more tigers at kursk does that change anything?... maybe if they went to AGC and Kluge works out a better plan of attack they actually get off their start lines; but would that be enough to fulfill the original battle plan of a major double envelopement; I really really doubt it due to lack of follow up infantry and ammo shortages that started appearing by the 5th day without AGC moving from their depots at all

more likely Manstien (who got more of the better AFV's) is able to keep possession of the battlefield longer so the tactical tally is much more favorable, but given the still tremendous numerical disparity the result doesn't strategically change much there


If you remove the losses that were due to insane deployment (which is extremely difficult to categorize; maybe 10-20 percent) and create any additional IDK 1000 tiger I's instead of any tiger II's or jagdtigers I can't project how much longer that would extend the war.....8 weeks if they are employed brilliantly on the eastern front... maybe

 

[Vjacheslav Malyshev]

Make its armor sloped and angled.
It would make indestructible for the contamporary tanks and weapons.

It wouldn't take long for a counter to developed, not mention the sides are still weak.

 

[Julian]

I've been trying to look on axis history and other sites for the losses due to breakdowns for Tiger battalions in small scale counteroffensive like Watutin, III Panzer corps breakthrough to Korsun, etc. My gut feeling is that they were still fairly bad, especially considering that in Russia a day's rain or short thaw would create quite a bit of mud, but I haven't found anything definitive. There may also have been the problem of concentrating Tigers into a few battalions, increasing the strain on logistics and repair/recovery. Thoughts?

 

[BlairWitch749]

I've been trying to look on axis history and other sites for the losses due to breakdowns for Tiger battalions in small scale counteroffensive like Watutin, III Panzer corps breakthrough to Korsun, etc. My gut feeling is that they were still fairly bad, especially considering that in Russia a day's rain or short thaw would create quite a bit of mud, but I haven't found anything definitive. There may also have been the problem of concentrating Tigers into a few battalions, increasing the strain on logistics and repair/recovery. Thoughts?

how else would you deploy them besides independent battalions; they can't keep up with IV's and Panthers due to being slower/not crossing bridges/suspension can't cope with long road marches

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I've been trying to look on axis history and other sites for the losses due to breakdowns for Tiger battalions in small scale counteroffensive like Watutin, III Panzer corps breakthrough to Korsun, etc. My gut feeling is that they were still fairly bad, especially considering that in Russia a day's rain or short thaw would create quite a bit of mud, but I haven't found anything definitive. There may also have been the problem of concentrating Tigers into a few battalions, increasing the strain on logistics and repair/recovery. Thoughts?

Yeah, the concentration allows for concentration of maintenance resources and support units. They were so few that I doubt the concentration made that much of a negative impact; as Blair said given their limitations concentration into independent battalions is pretty much baked into their doctrinal utility; they were breakthrough tanks and in a pinch mobile pillboxes to hold off superior number of weaker enemy tanks to sitting in a good defensive position. I've read criticisms that they weren't concentrated enough IOTL and they would have been more effective in multiple battalion usage at critical points like Kursk.

It wouldn't take long for a counter to developed, not mention the sides are still weak.

Weak compared to what? The sides could have been sloped too.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Armour

The Tiger I had frontal hull armour 100 mm (3.9 in) thick and frontal turret armour of 120 mm (4.7 in) compared to the 80 mm (3.1 in) frontal hull and 50 mm (2 in) frontal turret armour of contemporary models of the Panzer IV.[4][6] It also had 60 mm (2.4 in) thick hull side plates and 80 mm armour on the side superstructure and rear, turret sides and rear was 80 mm. The top and bottom armour was 25 mm (1 in) thick; from March 1944, the turret roof was thickened to 40 mm (1.6 in).[3] Armour plates were mostly flat, with interlocking construction. The armour joints were of high quality, being stepped and welded rather than riveted and were made of maraging steel. This made the Tiger immune to the American Sherman tank's frontal attacks with its 75mm gun.

The nominal armour thickness of the Tiger reached up to 200 mm at the mantlet.[7]

their use in 1942 accomplished nothing of note

if you held them back to making their appearance at the 3rd battle of kharkov the change is fairly modest

how many did they lose between debut and kharkov off my head I don't think it was more than 100

if you put 100 more tigers at kursk does that change anything?... maybe if they went to AGC and Kluge works out a better plan of attack they actually get off their start lines; but would that be enough to fulfill the original battle plan of a major double envelopement; I really really doubt it due to lack of follow up infantry and ammo shortages that started appearing by the 5th day without AGC moving from their depots at all

more likely Manstien (who got more of the better AFV's) is able to keep possession of the battlefield longer so the tactical tally is much more favorable, but given the still tremendous numerical disparity the result doesn't strategically change much there


If you remove the losses that were due to insane deployment (which is extremely difficult to categorize; maybe 10-20 percent) and create any additional IDK 1000 tiger I's instead of any tiger II's or jagdtigers I can't project how much longer that would extend the war.....8 weeks if they are employed brilliantly on the eastern front... maybe

Further attrition of Soviet armor reserves would have certainly helped; given that there were only about 156 Tigers at Kursk IOTL another 100 is a major amount and would have been very helpful if properly employed. Potentially the extras, if backed up by Bergetigers, can be employed to attrit the Southern part of the Soviet post-Kursk offensives worse than IOTL, allowing a better stabilization post-Kursk in Southern Ukraine.

Given that the Tiger II had nearly 700 units and was at least 30% heavier, the lack of disruption and lower unit cost due to experience building that type would have probably resulted in more than 1000 extras, provided the factory isn't bombed.

 

[BlairWitch749]

so 1200-1500 more then (assuming no bombing or they build them in a safer place like Silesia)

100 more at Kursk certainly helps if they are deployed in a well thought out manner. If we augment them onto Manstein (giving him 2-3 more heavy battalions) it probably stops the 48th Panzer Corps from getting bogged down and allows the 3rd panzer div and GD division to maintain their advance; they are probably able to keep possession of the battlefield after Hitler cancels the offensive instead of being instantly driven back which in otl cost them hundreds of damaged but salvagable tanks (many panthers in particular had their tracks sheered off by mines but could have been repaired, there were also lots of T-34's which could have been repaired and reused too)

I agree that a better performance there (ie losing less badly) gives them more options to stem the tide in the south in the follow on offensives; not stop the Russians of course but not be driven AS far back AS quickly

 

[Vjacheslav Malyshev]

Weak compared to what? The sides could have been sloped too.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Armour

Which would require a total redesign.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Which would require a total redesign.

As would frontal sloping; once you get into that, you might as well go for a Tiger II style armor layout minus the increase in thickness that would increase the weight.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I agree that a better performance there (ie losing less badly) gives them more options to stem the tide in the south in the follow on offensives; not stop the Russians of course but not be driven AS far back AS quickly

With the slower retreat and greater recovery of AFVs at Kursk and during the Ukrainian withdrawal, it seems like the Soviets would suffer worse in their offensives, which limits their ability to encircle as many Axis forces in 1943, which draws out that campaign even further. Would it prevent the Soviets from crossing the Dniepr first and enable the Axis to establish a defensive line on the river? If so what does that mean for the rest of 1943 if the Axis can establish a coherent defensive line for as few months?

 

[BlairWitch749]

With the slower retreat and greater recovery of AFVs at Kursk and during the Ukrainian withdrawal, it seems like the Soviets would suffer worse in their offensives, which limits their ability to encircle as many Axis forces in 1943, which draws out that campaign even further. Would it prevent the Soviets from crossing the Dniepr first and enable the Axis to establish a defensive line on the river? If so what does that mean for the rest of 1943 if the Axis can establish a coherent defensive line for as few months?

The Russians already took tremendous losses in those southern offensives; but the difference was they accomplished something in driving the germans back a great distance; and most importantly kicked them out of the mineral producing regions in the donets basin

A Kursk where the Germans come out 1000 tanks ahead (extra casualties inflicted by the properly deployed tigers plus tanks recovered by keeping possession of the battlefield at Kursk longer) of OTL probably means the Russians don't get across the Dneiper by the end of the year

However, the Dneiper didn't swell that winter, and the largess of lend lease gave the Soviet's incredible mobility and the option of attacking and crossing from unexpected directions. The question then becomes would the Soviets who would have been more heavily handled suspend operations for the winter to recover or still persist in their attacks

A setback like this is interesting because it could mean the western allies capture all of germany proper first which might have interesting effects for the first stage of the cold war (forex the western allies might relocate every last scientist of interest and all airplane models out of the soviet zone)

 

[AdA]

The Soviets captured their first Tiger in January 1943. They imediatly and vigorously started working in efective counters. The resulting IS series of tanks, regarded by Hasso von Manteuffel as the best WW2 tank, went into operational service in early 1944. IF the Tiger is only used in Kursk, the russians loose six months, and it's likely that both the IS2 and the T34/85 are not ready for large scale use in the Summer of 1944 offensives.
This puts the soviets in the same situation regarding tank vs tank factors the wallies had to face, but without the compensating factors of terrain, overweelming air superiority, etc

The same should have been said about the captured Tigers in Africa, but since the wallies prefered to test their guns against (their) steel plate samples rather than actual captured tanks, the US tankers went into actions with guns that couldn't match their test performance in real actions. Add to that the fact that the wallies expected the Tigers to be used as Breakthrough tanks (therefore as offensive weapons) and failed to antecipate their use in active defense as dedicated tank hunters, and the premature use of Tigers gave the Soviets an advantage the Wallies threw away.

Regarding HvM opinion on the IS2, I would agree if they had went on with the original idea of building it as the IS-100 with the 100mm Gun later used on the SU 100 and T54.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Does any of this potentially prevent Bagration?

 

[Kou Gakei]

Does any of this potentially prevent Bagration?

No. Even if Germany somehow magically got everything correct at Kursk AND managed to defeat the counteroffensives the Soviets launched concurrently and and immediately after Kursk, by then the Soviets had gained the experience, the arms, and the supplies to constantly put pressure on Germany. Bagration was just simply a heavier application of what the Soviets would be doing regardless of how Kursk ends.

 

[sharlin]

No. Bagatron was so huge a scale and across so broad a front that unless the Germans had significant reserves, which even with smart use of Tigers (and this is Hitler giving the orders here about how and where they were deployed so good luck with that) Bagatron will still crack its knuckles before roaring in badly said German with a Russian accent. 'I'm going in dry!' before applying itself to the front lines.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

No. Even if Germany somehow magically got everything correct at Kursk AND managed to defeat the counteroffensives the Soviets launched concurrently and and immediately after Kursk, by then the Soviets had gained the experience, the arms, and the supplies to constantly put pressure on Germany. Bagration was just simply a heavier application of what the Soviets would be doing regardless of how Kursk ends.

Let me clarify; I meant that Bagration wouldn't be as much of a success as IOTL, so doesn't become BAGRATION: the offensive that destroyed AG-C.

Hear me out: basically assuming things go 'right' insofar as they could at Kursk, we combine Blairwitch's and AdA's post; the Germans have to withdraw at Kursk, but hold the battlefield for longer, so recover more AFVs before bugging out thanks to double the number of Tiger Is there, which are held back and first used at Kursk and not in Africa, so are a surprise for the Allies. The Soviets don't develop their counters for the Tiger for several months after OTL. The follow up offensive after Kursk are less successful and the Axis forces pull back in good order and avoid encirclements before stabilizing the line on the Dniepr until Winter when the Soviets breech the line; at that point the Axis forces are able to pull back and evacuate the Crimea at the same time. They stabilize against on the Southern Bug river and avoid the Cherkassy Pocket.

AG-S isn't as torn up as IOTL, while Soviet forces are more so than IOTL. When TTL's Bagration goes off AG-C didn't lose it armor to AG-S here, which can fend for itself. This, coupled with better armor and manpower reserves due to a different 1943 means AG-C escapes from being destroyed in Bagration, but is torn up. AG-N is able to withdraw in time to avoid being trapped in Estonia and then links up with AG-C to stabilize on the Niemen river in Lithuania and Riga. Subsequent Soviet offensives breech the Bug line and push the Axis back to the Dniester and to the Bug river in Poland. By this point its late in 1944 and the Soviets haven't yet reached most of Poland or cleared the Baltics west of Riga.

Is this a viable potential path?

 

[sharlin]

all it does is drag out the war for a few months longer in Europe, kill many thousands more Russians and WAllied and Germans and keeps the Camps running a bit longer so there's even less jews and undesirables left when Nazi Germany crumbles. 'yay'. This is not GOOD END. This is BAD END.