Deleted member 1487
Given that IOTL the Tiger tanks lost at least 41% of their numbers to mechanical issues and generally crappy employment. There were also the lack of recovery vehicles that could handle the Tiger, so if they broke down, they were pretty much done for. Then there was the ill advised Tiger II, which made the mechanical issues of the Tiger I look tame in comparison, just as the Tiger I was becoming more reliable. So assuming the Germans took more practical look at the Tiger I, how would they use them and what effect would it have?
My list would include the following:
-No Tiger II, just keep the Tiger I in production until the bitter end
-More Bergetiger recovery vehicles; even using 10% of chassis for recovery vehicles would at least cut in half losses to mechanical issues, resulting in a net savings of combat units
-Don't employ them too early or in bad terrain; IOTL the first use near Leningrad get them ambushed by infantry and captured, allowing the Soviets to develop counters for them. They should have held off until Spring 1943; they would be a surprise and would have much more use in the Steppe than in the swamps of the North. Perhaps hold them back until Kursk and use them there for the first time as a surprise.
-Keep their use limited to Army Group South; diverting them to Africa and other areas was a mistake IMHO; having them in areas with flat, wide open terrain for maximum effective usage of their main gun would be the best use for them; perhaps limited usage in Italy would be alright, but they were best used against the Soviets IMHO and perhaps in France after Normandy.
These are the main points I could think of, do they hold up and if so can anyone think of other options? What effect would these changes have?
I think one would be that they can more combat usage out of them if they aren't being constantly lost to non-combat causes and the Soviets would be behind in their development of counters to the Tiger if they don't appear too early and give up their surprise.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Combat_history
For the African Campaign they strike me as more of a logistical burden than a great help and would be more effective on the mainland against the Soviets and later in the Italian campaign to preserve surprise and to keep them better supplied and less likely to be lost to mechanical issues.
My list would include the following:
-No Tiger II, just keep the Tiger I in production until the bitter end
-More Bergetiger recovery vehicles; even using 10% of chassis for recovery vehicles would at least cut in half losses to mechanical issues, resulting in a net savings of combat units
-Don't employ them too early or in bad terrain; IOTL the first use near Leningrad get them ambushed by infantry and captured, allowing the Soviets to develop counters for them. They should have held off until Spring 1943; they would be a surprise and would have much more use in the Steppe than in the swamps of the North. Perhaps hold them back until Kursk and use them there for the first time as a surprise.
-Keep their use limited to Army Group South; diverting them to Africa and other areas was a mistake IMHO; having them in areas with flat, wide open terrain for maximum effective usage of their main gun would be the best use for them; perhaps limited usage in Italy would be alright, but they were best used against the Soviets IMHO and perhaps in France after Normandy.
These are the main points I could think of, do they hold up and if so can anyone think of other options? What effect would these changes have?
I think one would be that they can more combat usage out of them if they aren't being constantly lost to non-combat causes and the Soviets would be behind in their development of counters to the Tiger if they don't appear too early and give up their surprise.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Combat_history
The Tiger was first used in action on 23 September 1942 near Leningrad. Under pressure from Hitler, the tank was put into action months earlier than planned. Many early models proved to be mechanically unreliable; in this first action many broke down. Others were knocked out by dug-in Soviet anti-tank guns. One tank was captured largely intact, which allowed the Soviets to study it and prepare a response. A battalion of Tigers was deployed to the Don Front in the autumn of 1942, but arrived too late to participate in the attack to relieve Stalingrad, (Operation Winter Storm). It was subsequently engaged in heavy defensive fighting in the Rostov-on-Don and adjacent sectors in January and February 1943.
For the African Campaign they strike me as more of a logistical burden than a great help and would be more effective on the mainland against the Soviets and later in the Italian campaign to preserve surprise and to keep them better supplied and less likely to be lost to mechanical issues.
In the North African theatre, the Tiger first saw action in late 1942 near Robaa Tunisia. In the ensuing battle, a battery belonging to the 72nd Anti-tank Regiment of the British Army equipped with six-pounders knocked out three Tigers.[23] As the campaign continued, Tiger tanks would continue to appear in limited numbers. Their heavy armour and armament let them dominate in the open terrain of North Africa, but they were never deployed there in large quantities.