A New Beginning - Our 1992 Russian Federation

Note chat, the Arab spring in itself is a complex series of events but I think what the world considers imporant likely won't change much but what the Arab people consider imporant might.

By that, Iraq is still is fighting a civil war between various Shia cliques and various Sunnis with extremists front and centre gaining from it. Nouri al-Maliki's government will lead a uprising of Sunni's that Daesh will ride to power that will spread to Syria or you could say already been apart of Syria for years riding the disfranchised Syrian population.

Tunisia's brief flirtation with democracy like Egypt won't change the nature of power, unlike Egypt though at least thousands of Tunisians will be travel to Iraq seeking their promised liberation.

What has changed though could be imporant is the nature of Russia's interventions/alliances, for example if Libya's regime is kept intact you will likely see two thing's happen. One the Sahel is more likely to be stable with could affect a lot of things in Africa with the Tuaregs no longer be paid off and getting a lot of weapons for their revolt. Two you might see far more Libyans radicalised and flee to other lands like Iraq.

Egypt though I think might be experience a fair bit of change given the geopolitical situation. Egypt during the Arab spring for a brief period under Mosi did try to ride the tiger supporting the overthrow of the Assads but failed. Egypt also lost a lot influence with Türkiye's rising in Libya and turning inwards.

Here though well the US should be courting Egypt more as the largest Arab nation given Russia's attempts to move into the Arab world, Syria might be considered a bridge to far to support or if the US is really dedicated to changing Syria might see Egypt a lot more determined.
 
B)Frankly speaking, I wish that neither Elvira nor Lukashenok would occupy each other's posts. In the end it is too boring to elect the same ones
 
Russian Armed Forces (2007) I
In the slightly more then 15 years since the reform of the Armed Forces of then Russia, now the Union State a lot was changed. One key milestone was that in 2002 the 10 year plan to reform the Union State armed forces according to the reforms proposed in 1992 were mostly finished. To recap, the changes made were:

  • <Finished> reducing the armed forces to a strength of one million;
  • <Finished> reducing the number of officers;
  • <Finished> centralising officer training from military schools into systemic military training centres;
  • <Finished> creating a professional NCO corps;
  • <Finished> reducing the size of the central command;
  • <In Progress> introducing more civilian logistics and auxiliary staff;
  • <Finished> elimination of cadre-strength formations;
  • <Finished> reorganising the reserves; reorganising the army into a brigade system;
  • <Finished> reorganising air forces into an air base system instead of regiments;
  • <Finished> consolidation of military districts and the navy's fleets into four Joint Strategic Commands (OSK);
  • <Finished> the number of military units and formations in the Ground Forces were to be reduced;
  • <Finished> the number of units in the Russian Air Force(VVS) and number of air bases were to be reduced;
  • <Finished> the number of the Russian navy (VMF) units were to be cut by half;
  • <In Progress> the navy's fighting capability would be bolstered by bringing various units to 100% of their full wartime strength;
  • <Finished, though still needs work to be effective> the Navy's schools and research institutes were merged into a territorially distributed Naval Academy Research and Training Center which consists of the Naval Academy the Higher Special Officer Courses, five naval research institutes, three MOD research institutes, the Nakhimov Naval School in St. Petersburg, and the Naval Cadet Corps;
  • <In Progress> the Naval Aviation and the support units were reorganised into 13 air bases, which were merged into territorially integrated structures in a second stage. As is the case for the reformed Air Force, each new air base consisted of an HQ, support units, and one or more aviation groups (the former air bases);
  • <Postponed due to Backlash> closing down of military towns;
  • <In Progress> bringing finances under control and reducing the power of the General Staff.

Additionally the 2002 added updates were actively being applied:

  • <Never Finished, but much reduced> Root out systemic corruption
  • <Finished> Consolidation of:
    • Budget
    • Suppliers
    • Equipment
    • Export organisation
  • <Never Finished, but good progress made> Key issues in the military:
    • Systemic issues preventing the creation of a true volunteer force like the Dedovshchina
    • The lack of training for professional non-commissioned ranks
    • The lack of initiative on the lower level
    • The lack of cross functional training to understand each others capabilities and limitations
    • The lack of combined arms training

From 2002 onwards the state of the budget allowed further training, both joint and independently to grow better understanding and consolidation into a combined arms defence force. While many new volunteers and non-commissioned officers were either joining the armed forces or progressing their careers in them, it would still take well beyond 2007 (with a target window of 2012 - 2017) to get the expertise up to the level of NATO. Concurrently the integration of the former Belarusian forces, as well as finishing the latest plans was still in full swing. Additionally the corruption investigations and the Active Scares had proven that an inspection of the Union State's ammo, fuel and spare parts was very much needed. The reindexing was done during 2002-2007, to a disastrous outcome. Most of the stock was insufficient, insufficiently stored, illegally sold, or perished. Hence a great modernization program to update the industry capability and stock to war level capacity. The first phase was projected at a cost of 10 Billion USD spread over the regular budget as the additional funding due the better then expected economy.

The budget for 2007 therefore was the following:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 230307.png

And as a 2002, the is also a different way to look at the budget:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 230318.png
 
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Russian Armed Forces (2007) II
In terms of military equipment, the course set by the experts under former president Fyodorov to consolidate the equipment to serve the Russian Federation as a fast, heavily mechanised, high tech response force over the vast waves of conscripted armies of the late Soviet Union was continued. This meant the list of non-infantry equipment in 2007 looked like this

MBTs:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231204.png

Artillery:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231406.png

IFV, TDs & APCs:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231438.png


Trucks continue to be consolidated into GAZ for light trucks and ATV, Ural for medium trucks, KAMAZ for heavy trucks. The specialist vehicles are still being consolidated on those variants built on current platforms. Infantry equipment as OTL → Mainly trying to switch to AK-74M, PKP replacement program started.

Post the reorganisation that finished in 2002 the Union’s Airforce was profiting for more and better equipment, but the biggest impact came from a better training schedule to the NATO standards, as well as more combined arms training. Still, much needed high capability equipment was coming off the assembly lines. Thankfully the miraculous boost of the economy allowed the Union State to continue to invest in high tech, plus the collaboration with the Space Agencies allowed for more advancement then hoped.

Attack aircraft:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231726.png


Bombers:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231753.png

AWACS:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231813.png

Fighter and Interceptors:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 231915.png
 
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Russian Armed Forces (2007) III
The 5 years between 2002 and 2007 have not been as kind to the Navy compared to the other two branches, though maintenance is active on the large surface vessels and the investment in the submarine arm is progressing nicely. The main focus beyond that is restarting training and the various reorganisations. Still, many ships are being made ready for active service, as well as some of the active production is ramping up to reflect the increased need and funding. The 2007 Navy register is:

Large surface ships (edit: updated with the 3rd Slava):
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-25 151036.png

Submarines:
Schermafbeelding 2024-03-23 232249.png

* Ballistic Missile Submarine, Cruise Missile Submarine, Attack Nuclear Submarine, Attack Submarine

The Navy is also investing into a Think Tank on the next series of large surface combatants: Should the Navy invest in them, and if so, in what capability? Concurrently new submarines were actively being designed, the Project 955 Borei class, as well as the Project 885 Yasen class. The latter duo are tentatively set for a 2010 introduction.
 
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While hopefully the union state still have the old equipment because say what you will but quantity is a quality of their own, also with the Syria being possibly the second important ally for union state in the Middle East maybe dump the old equipment there
We sold quite a bit of the old stuff to them, so they have more then OTL
So compared to 2002, we got rid of the following equipment that the Syrians could have purchased:
  • 2,600 T-62
  • 2,000 BTR-60
  • 200 BTR-70
Then they could have bought various other weapons like guns, towed artillery and mortars etc.
Edit: we might sell some
  • 2S3 Akatsiya (since we have quite a few 2S19 Msta-S)
  • MiG-29 (when MiG-35 becomes more available)
  • Su-24 (when Su-34 becomes more available)
  • Mi-24 (when Ka-50 becomes more available)
 
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You forgot Su 30 in your list, also our defence budget looks low. With all of war scares , Our budget should be around 2.5 % of our GDP.
Our airforce also looks quite small.
 
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You forgot Su 30 in your list, also our defence budget looks low. With all of war scares , Our budget should be around 2.5 % of our GDP.
Our airforce also looks quite small.
Good question, my answer:
  • I skipped the Su-30 for the Su-34 (Strike missions) and MiG-35 & Su-35 (Air defence - the MiG is more affordable, the other Sukoi arguably better).
  • That budget is way way more then OTL's Russia could ever afford. And while it doesn't match the USA's 500+ billion of OTL 2007, its more then 150% of OTL's number two, the UK. Its also 8.33% of our country budget. If we want a functioning state, plus investments in all kinds of areas, realistically we ought to spend less, not more.
  • You're right, it is very small compared OTL, where Russia has about 1400 fighter planes. However there is a big technology refresh that I felt was logical based in this timeline since the changes in budget allowed so. And unfortunately the timing of the crisis doesn't align with that refresh, but it's impossible to refresh in a short time. The post refresh Airforce however will be bigger then OTL, which much better planes and is close to rival the USA until the stealth planes (F-22 & F-35) come in. Hence I also pulled Su-57 forward.
Keeping clunkers from the 90-ties with low maintenance in the air will only create mock security. The nuclear forces including submarines are well funded and keep the only realistic opponents that can outfight that airforce at bay.​
Why would the union state build their tank in Ukraine ? Is Ukraine part of the union state ?
Also good question. My answer:

They wouldn't, but @panpiotr and I talked about a much tighter integration in the future. The Ukrainian military complex lies relatively bare, plus there is simply not enough money in the defence industry to both massively upscale all the technology upgrades we've been doing like:
  • the T-55 & T-72 to BR-T55 and BR-T72,
  • the T-80 into the Msta, the T-72 to S & BV (Black Eagle turret),
  • the production of Black Eagle itself,
  • the BMP-1 to BMP-2,
  • the Terminators we build,
  • the BTR-60 upgrade,
  • the BTR-80 upgrade,
  • the 2S1 Gvozdika upgrade
  • the missing spare parts, the perished stuff and the missing ammo
  • (Plus the Airforce and Navy stuff, but that is not relevant for your question)
  • Etc
So the only option I could see to further increase is the Union State leveraging the former Soviet Military Complex in Ukraine. And that's what I meant with that addendum, if we want faster Black Eagle production beyond what we're doing already, we need the Ukraine. Whether that will be with a single Union state including Ukraine (and maybe some of the Stans), or a Federation or other form of collaboration, that I leave to Panpiotr.
 
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Should we in our game pursue a model of Lukashenko - Nabiullina tandemocracy, meaning that in 2011, President Lukashenko rather than starting for 3rd presidential term, will become a Prime Minister of Russia, and Prime Minister Nabiulina will start in his place instead, then sometime in the future Lukashenko will start again to finish his 3rd term. This could theoretically allow Lukashenko-Nabiullina duo to govern Russia under their joint leadership till 2035.

A) Yes
B) No
C) Your input
The vote is almost 100%, so this will be skipped - I will go with a break between Nabiullina and Lukashenko, meaning that in 2009 he will fire her, and presidential elections in 2011 will be Lukashenko vs Nabiullina vs Navalny.
 
Producing things in Ukraine will also tie them to Russia, and provide incentive to modernize the aging Soviet-era industry there, if only so Russia will have even more incentive in turn to send more advanced hardware to Ukraine for them to build. Hell, that could even be one factor in a reverse-Maidan, i.e. a scandalous story breaks about how pro-Western actors were leaking information on advanced Russian technology and details about Russo-Ukrainian economic/military cooperation to Western intelligence agencies. Even if your average Ukrainian is ambivalent about Russia at the time, that'd still sting at their national pride, i.e. Ukrainians aren't double-dealers who'd betray their allies and partners.
 
The vote is almost 100%, so this will be skipped - I will go with a break between Nabiullina and Lukashenko, meaning that in 2009 he will fire her, and presidential elections in 2011 will be Lukashenko vs Nabiullina vs Navalny.
Navalny is too insignificant a figure, after all, he's been popular since 2016.
 
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