WW2 China questions

[BBadolato]

So I've been reading up on China in WW2 for the sake of my undergrad history thesis. Apparently John Service though that Nationalists would be in serious trouble if the Ichi-go offensive had taken Guangxi. I know we all talk about Japanese defeat in WW2 could they have ever beaten the Nationalists at all considering how bad the Nationalists where in terms of military and political strategy.

Second related more to what I talk about in my thesis could the U.S have ever decided to actually support the Communists over the Nationalists, considering the U.S began to see the Nationalists for the dead weight they were, and that the Communists where making serious overtures for aid from the U.S. Granted I don't believe that a Communist China would be an outright ally as the U.S might want but still on much more friendly terms than OTL.

 

[mlp]

1. I've also read how if the Nationalists were given more time they would've definitely beaten back the Japanese. I don't know how long Ichi-go lasted, but I have my doubts considering there still was a certain level of US/UK support for the KMT throughout the war.
2. The Sino-Soviet split only happened after Stalin's death; before that time it would be extremely adventurous for the US to suddenly start supporting the CCP, when they were extremely small compared to the KMT pre-1945 and a collapsed Nationalist government means India becomes vulnerable to more attacks.

 

[BBadolato]

1. I've also read how if the Nationalists were given more time they would've definitely beaten back the Japanese. I don't know how long Ichi-go lasted, but I have my doubts considering there still was a certain level of US/UK support for the KMT throughout the war.
2. The Sino-Soviet split only happened after Stalin's death; before that time it would be extremely adventurous for the US to suddenly start supporting the CCP, when they were extremely small compared to the KMT pre-1945 and a collapsed Nationalist government means India becomes vulnerable to more attacks.

Well It's the not the support for the KMT that i'm questioning, it's do they use it. I wonder just how competent could the Nationalists ever be. John Service was an American diplomat who reported in his criticism of the nationalist government, that foreign aid for the nationalist where either used for non-military purposes, or horded.

The Sino-Soviet split is tricky, the final could be said to have occurred in 1956, but there still were some aid going such as the Soviet-Nuclear advisers who left in 1960. To the best of my knowledge Mao had started to craft a CCP with a policy that disregarded the Moscow during the Long March that discredited the 21 Bolsheviks who were educated in Moscow. Mao also had issues with a united front with Chiang and even started to turn towards the U.S if only because Soviet aid was both lacking and unfeasible.

Mind you I view the Mao the same, how I now view Ho Chi Minh when people talk about "lost chances" for them to be U.S Allies. Both where Communists, who framed their immediate goals in nationalist ideals, and may have been willing to accept U.S aid at the least, as allies it would be out of the question, but they could be accepting of the U.S if our cards where played right. During WW2 there was consideration and suggestion by the U.S to have the Communists as either part of the government or to back them and the liberals over the Nationalists.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

There was serious concern at the time that Ichi-Go might have knocked China out of the war. Some American officials even went as far as to consider the situation hopeless. Of course, as we know now that wasn't the case, but the damage to the KMT's war effort was serious (probably contributing to Mao's victory in the coming years) and had it been directed toward Chungking instead of Vietnam, who knows what would have happened.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

There was serious concern at the time that Ichi-Go might have knocked China out of the war. Some American officials even went as far as to consider the situation hopeless. Of course, as we know now that wasn't the case, but the damage to the KMT's war effort was serious (probably contributing to Mao's victory in the coming years) and had it been directed toward Chungking instead of Vietnam, who knows what would have happened.

Given that the KMT not only survived, but then launched their own offensives that wrecked the IJA right up to the end of the war, Ichi Go did not mortally wound them. What was the major problem was the ChiComs getting to withdraw into Soviet occupied Manchuria to rest and escape the horrible beating they took in 1945 from the KMT and get all the surplus Soviet weapons they needed to defeat the KMT. The period after the war with Soviet help for the ChiComs was the major factor in the defeat of the KMT. Also the support the ChiComs built in the countryside during their fight with the Japanese got them greater traction than the city support for the KMT, especially given the KMT notorious corruption.

In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the CPC, as its guerilla war tactics had won them popular support within the Japanese-occupied areas, while the KMT's had to defend the country against the main Japanese campaigns to take over the country, since it was the legal Chinese government, and this proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek and his troops.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War#Immediate_post-war_clashes_.281945.E2.80.931946.29

By the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the balance of power in China's civil war had shifted in favor of the Communists. Their main force grew to 1.2 million troops, with a militia of 2 million. Their "Liberated Zone" contained 19 base areas, including one-quarter of the country's territory and one-third of its population; this included many important towns and cities. Moreover, the Soviet Union turned over all of its captured Japanese weapons and a substantial amount of their own supplies to the Communists, who received Northeastern China from the Soviets as well.[48]


In March 1946, despite repeated requests from Chiang, the Soviet Red Army under the command of Marshal Malinovsky continued to delay pulling out of Manchuria while Malinovsky secretly told the CPC forces to move in behind them, which led to full-scale war for the control of the Northeast. These favorable conditions also facilitated many changes inside the Communist leadership: the more hard-line faction finally gained the upper hand and defeated the opportunists.[48][49] Prior to giving control to Communist leaders, on March 27 Soviet diplomats requested a joint venture of industrial development with the Nationalist Party in Manchuria.[50]


Although General Marshall stated that he knew of no evidence that the CPC was being supplied by the Soviet Union, the CPC was able to utilize a large number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including some tanks, but it was not until large numbers of well-trained KMT troops began surrendering and joining the Communist forces that the CPC was finally able to master the hardware.[51][52] However, despite the disadvantage in military hardware, the CPC's ultimate trump card was its land reform policy. The CPC continued to make the irresistible promise in the countryside to the massive number of landless and starving peasants that by fighting for the CPC they would be given their own land once the victory was won.[53]



This strategy enabled the CPC to access an almost unlimited supply of manpower for both combat and logistical purposes, despite suffering heavy casualties throughout many of the war's campaigns. For example, during the Huaihai Campaign alone the CPC was able to mobilize 5,430,000 peasants to fight against the KMT forces.[54]

 

[BBadolato]

Given that the KMT not only survived, but then launched their own offensives that wrecked the IJA right up to the end of the war, Ichi Go did not mortally wound them. What was the major problem was the ChiComs getting to withdraw into Soviet occupied Manchuria to rest and escape the horrible beating they took in 1945 from the KMT and get all the surplus Soviet weapons they needed to defeat the KMT.

Just how effective was the KMT as fighting force? On one hand I'm reading about moral issues and screwed priorities, but getting from this the fact the KMT still had some kind of competency somewhere. Although I'm too sure about how Manchuria gave the ChiComs room to breathe. The Communists seem to have been able to build up since the Long March, granted that didn't seem hard considering the military was restructured after serious and the initial commanders losing face.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Just how effective was the KMT as fighting force? On one hand I'm reading about moral issues and screwed priorities, but getting from this the fact the KMT still had some kind of competency somewhere. Although I'm too sure about how Manchuria gave the ChiComs room to breathe. The Communists seem to have been able to build up since the Long March, granted that didn't seem hard considering the military was restructured after serious and the initial commanders losing face.

I don't really have a good read on that. They managed to rip apart the IJA in 1945 with US help, not sure what that really means though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_West_Hunan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Guangxi_Campaign

 

[dehantp]

There was serious concern at the time that Ichi-Go might have knocked China out of the war. Some American officials even went as far as to consider the situation hopeless.

Well, there was also 'serious concern' that the U-boats may strangle he UK and starve England into submission. Of course as we now know, this wasn't the case at all ...

Maybe in both cases the situation was reported to US officials as more dire than it actually was on purpose to garner more support from America?

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

I don't really have a good read on that. They managed to rip apart the IJA in 1945 with US help, not sure what that really means though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_West_Hunan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Guangxi_Campaign

They were never able to do such a thing. Owing to supply constraints the Japanese began an "orderly withdrawal" toward the coast, and while a general Chinese offensive was in fact planned it was never actually launched.

According to this paper by LCDR Samuel Cox (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272727.pdf), Ichi-Go was a moral blow to the KMT and effectively ended American hopes for a strong, stable democratic China postwar. The loss of over 750,000 men was a blow that Chiang never recovered from, and even when the China Expeditionary Army launched a final, far more minor offensive in April 1945 the KMT were only able to offer successful resistance in one place. The war ended with the Japanese armies in China largely intact and retreating to their "bastions" along the coast and in North China to confront the USSR.