Workable Goblin wrote:
As the title says, what happens if Vanguard 1 launches before Sputnik 1? For the sake of argument, suppose that this is because Soviet leadership develops similar fears to Eisenhower re: the legal regime for satellite overflights, and so slow-walks their satellite program so that the Americans will launch first and establish that free flight is permitted (more of a concern for the Soviets, in fact, because their satellites must cross American territory, whereas American satellites do not). The Naval Research Lab, as IOTL, doesn't know what the Soviets are or are not doing, so they go ahead with their program more or less as they did, and end up launching some time in 1958, followed by Sputnik 3 (which is Sputnik 1 here). What next?
First of all in TTL when does Vanguard launch? The overall program had been underfunded and consistently behind schedule so that those involved were very much afraid they would not in fact meet the "deadline" of December 1958. (IGY= July 1957 to December 1958) So the question is how long do both side 'hesitate' before one or the other actually flies? Both the US and USSR had announced they would orbit a satellite during the IGY and everyone expected that the US would do so first. But we've got Eisenhower retarding the US effort, (Project Vanguards priority and budget make that pretty obvious) due to wanting the Russians to go first and TTL the Russians want the US to go first so ....
(Any bonus points if they both are hemming-and-hawing and then the Brits toss up a minimum satellite while this is going on?
)
As an aside motivation wise I don't think the overflight issue would be very compelling. Sure the 'overflight' question was an obvious one but really as you note any launches from the USSR would have to fly over someone's territory so the 'fear' of going first can't be that great as its going to happen no matter what. Next it can be made clear that such an overflight is not an option due to orbital mechanics so any complaints are obviously arguing with the laws of physics not those of man. Lastly, and most importantly, keep in mind that both the US and USSR had agreed to launch a satellite during the IGY. This actually amounts to legal permission to overfly each other because of the parameters of orbital flight. So had either one really been worried about the question of over-flight it would have been brought up at some point in IGY discussions. It wasn't.
Under the circumstances questioning anyone's 'right' to overfly a nation would be rather pointless and open to international ridicule. (Which makes you wonder why it was supposed to be an issue for Ike in that case???)
Take a moment to recall that a major reason that Soviets did what they did in the early Space Race was to win PR points with the US and while Sputnik 1 was 'low-hanging' fruit it still gained measurably in that goal. More so than anyone had anticipated in fact. Vanguard going first was exactly what the US public and government (heck the world) was expecting to happen. We did not however believe the Russians were as advanced as we were and from this complacency several other lines of thinking were in place as well.
The Soviets were well aware that the US had self-hampered their efforts and while they fully understood the US "could" launch a satellite at any time, (the Army Jupiter-C launch of September 20, 1956 was leaked to the press and as the listed performance was very close to orbit it would be obvious that this flight COULD have produced a satellite launch) that they were concentrating their efforts in a very low-key program was rather obvious.
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http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3341/1)
In this case as per OTL they gain a pretty substantial PR boost by being first and playing off American complacency which they lose if the US actually does go first. So the question is what do they actually gain by not going first?
One aspect I can see them considering if they thought about it enough is they are going to have trouble in the near future if the US 'panics' about the current missile technology gap. While the USSR is on the cusp of deploying the R7 in reality it is a marginal system at best and they need time to bring better missiles on-line which with the current US missile programs (Thor, Jupiter, Atlas and Titan) will still have an early advantage over. But those programs as of 1957/58 are going slower than one would assume they could even with a "high" priority. NOT grasping that low-hanging fruit might very well allow those programs to languish while the USSR can take the time to push its own programs forward. As the US is slow-leaking both the satellite effort but also its missile effort by not obviously upstaging the US early on the USSR feeds that complacency rather than shatters it.
Anyway, in essence if the leadership of the USSR thinks a bit longer term they could actually gain from a delayed space race.
Anyway, the obvious and immediate impact of Vanguard going first is that there's no Space Race, at least not as we know it. There may be some panic over the fact that Sputnik 3 weighs almost literally a thousand times more than Vanguard 1, but it's going to be severely blunted by the fact that, well, we did go first. Although there might still be some fears around a missile gap and similar things, there almost assuredly won't be the fears about a science gap or an education gap that developed IOTL. And that would certainly have massive ramifications on the educational system, on science funding in the United States, and possibly even on the country at the highest levels, considering how narrow the 1960 election was.
Ah, but hold on a moment! Keep in mind that when American's "win" we tend to rest upon our laurels and significantly more so when we think the "other guys" are significantly behind us... So when the 'next step' takes place, (recall Mercury needed NASA, which "needed" Sputnik to push through) and Gagarin goes up (probably pretty much to OTL's schedule) the US panic THEN rather than earlier but are faced with the issues of having delayed for longer TTL. So even if the US gets the first satellite it would be pretty straightforward to have the USSR orbit the first man on schedule.
So the space race may be delayed but it's not obvious it won't be just as hectic once the Russians DO manage to 'one-up' the US. And even if the "missile gap" doesn't become an issue during the election, (it might not as without Sputnik the US simply isn't that worried about the issue) Nixon still has to face a lack of support from Ike and the Republican party. Of course without the butterflies of being beaten up by Kennedy over said 'missile gap' should narrow things down but Nixon had to over-extend himself to make up for the support he didn't get.
And we can't ignore what the consequences are if it IS Nixon instead of Kennedy let alone the lack of "space race" pressure after the election itself. (ie: If Nixon is President does he go all out for invading Cuba or does he hesitate as the 'plan' was getting less and less 'deniable' and more and more just an excuse to have the US invade directly which is exactly the OPPOSITE of what he and Eisenhower had originally authorized. That would have a significant impact on world opinion and US PR which the USSR orbiting the first MAN is going to feed into)
However, let's leave that aside for the moment and focus on the effects on the space program. No Sputnik means there's much less pressure to reorganize the American space program in 1958 and 1959, but I would most certainly not rule out the formation of a civilian space agency anyway; Eisenhower had a nearly pathological dislike of having the military and particularly the Air Force running things, and setting up an agency that's completely outside of the military bureaucracy is an obvious way to address that. Besides, it will soon become obvious that there are plenty of civilian missions--weather observation, Earth studies, commercial experimentation (a la Telstar), astronomy, planetary exploration, and so on--where the military running things is not just unhelpful, but actively harmful given their different priorities compared to civilian users and customers of space missions. So I could certainly see a civilian agency appearing by the mid-1960s, and perhaps even before the election.
Actually while Eisenhower was pretty gung-ho for a "civilian" space program the actual ability to have one was questionable at the time. Without the Sputnik panic it isn't obvious he'd get the overall support to push through "another" government agency against military and Congressional opposition. At this point the Air Force was still fighting hard to get all "space" related activities under its control and the Army and Navy were pushing back to the extent they could with their own programs. Eisenhower could see the advantages of orbital observation but that was always going to remain with the military and CIA. The Navy was pushing communications and weather, (and the Air Force was actually not supportive of this use and was fighting to have the Navy drop it, not because they didn't see a 'use' but because they weren't interested at the moment and didn't want the Navy to move forward with the idea!) while the Army was backing the Navy and trying to regain some longer range missile work.
A "civilian" run program is going to have only a limited effect on the actual, (rather than possible) utility for the military and this is a major reason the military initially opposed the formation of NASA. For the majority of military purposes a "civilian" agency provides no benefit and in fact is a danger due to budget and priority conflicts.
And the entire US missile effort was on a fairly slow-burn development until the very late 50s. Both Atlas and Titan were "priorities" but had not yet at full development pace. That took Sputnik and the "missile gap" to push so that development went from Atlas-A to D/E in around two years.
This probably means the Jupiter never sees service, and the Air Force may not deploy the Thor to England they may instead cancel it given their dislike for 'tactical' missiles as opposed to 'tactical' aircraft nuclear weapons. (The Air Force had not liked the idea of IRBM or short range nuclear missiles in the first place and had resisted starting the Thor program. When given the Jupiter as well they initially were not going to deploy it but the production contracts and Sputnik pushed them into deployment) TTL the Air Force may go ahead with not deploying the Jupiter and may in fact not deploy the Thor in any numbers or at all.
And then there's the question of what happens to human spaceflight, which of course is what most people are interested in. In this scenario, both the United States and the Soviet Union clearly could launch someone into space, as they did IOTL.
That's a bit of a leap, heck it's a HUGE leap actually because under the circumstances the US certainly does NOT have the ability yet! They need at least a workable Atlas to loft a manned flight and that's not going to be pushed as hard TTL as it was OTL without Sputnik.
Though the Atlas missile was given 'priority' development in 1954 it still was proceeding rather slowly and even the Titan missile was lacking developmental pressure. OTL Sputnik reversed this and pretty much any missile development was green-lighted and funded at this point.
(Well for the Air Force anyway, the Army was on the verge of having its missile development program fully canceled) As it was OTL the first Atlas' went "operational" in 1959 due to the Air Force basically saying the first prototype Atlas-D's set up for training were going to in fact be "operational" missiles. In reality even with the push from Sputnik the actual 'first' operational Atlas' (E-models) deployed in 1960. (They were originally scheduled for deployment in or around 1962)
While the Atlas was in theory capable of lofting a satellite, (the eighth flight of the Atlas B put the 70kg SCORE satellite into orbit OTL on 18 December 1958 but that was a 'rush' program again due to the Soviet Sputnik's) it wasn't until the Atlas-D's were removed from service in/around 1959 that they were used to launch satellites and some were given to NASA for Project Mercury. No sputnik and that's going to be delayed, possibly significantly.
And Redstone was only use OTL because the 'path' was a suborbital flight for each astronaut. TTL it probably isn't worth doing if the Soviet's put a man in space first.
Meanwhile the Soviets still have the R7 and can, (as I noted) still put Yuri up on schedule with the US significantly (and obviously) behind. So instead of a "Sputnik panic" we could see a "Vostok panic". And really they have every reason to do so especially if they 'gave-up' putting up a satellite first.
But would they want to launch anyone into space? Korolev, von Braun, Faget would surely leap at the chance, but they're not the ones making the decisions in their respective space programs. Politicians are. And will politicians really want to spend money on a stunt like throwing some men into space to see if they survive (pretty much all the early spacecraft could do) if there hasn't been a Sputnik to show that space has real propaganda value? The United States, after all, doesn't feel the need to show that they've caught up with and beaten the Soviets, while the Soviets haven't gotten a taste for showing their technical "superiority" through space activities. So...will they really fund Mercury and Vostok? Or will they instead say "No, Korolev, focus on the spy satellites. Putting a man up would just be a waste of rubles we could spend on something else?" or the equivalent? I could see either one happening, honestly, so I'm really not sure.
Manned flight was the 'obvious' next step in propaganda so the POLITICIANS will be the ones pushing for it. Keep in mind that at this point it is not as clear as you think which has the higher utility manned or automated. The military at this point on both sides were backing manned space flight as well because it was NOT clear which was the more versatile. The 'problem' here is it is going to be obvious that the US is behind at the point Gagarin goes up because we won't have the pressure to organize and/or optimize our space program so we won't.
Not James Stockdale wrote:
Why would the Soviets care about overflight rights so much they give up their lead to the US?
Workable Goblin wrote:
Two things. First of all, they had begun a spy satellite program at the same time that they started their space program (that is, their satellite program), the same spy satellite program that would eventually lead to their Zenit satellites and Vostok. Clearly, spy satellites were very important on a strategic level for them, given that they could not build or effectively operate aircraft like the U-2 or balloons like Project Genetrix, so it would be important for them to ensure that the United States would not object to their spy satellites overflying American territory. This could be done most effectively by allowing the Americans to launch first and establish the principle that space was "above" national airspace. Of course, Eisenhower followed exactly the same logic for more or less similar reasons, so this would probably have ended in a stalemate of delay lasting into 1958, i.e. exactly what I was positing.
Secondly, the United States had a significant strategic lead in the period, and the Soviets would have been aware of this considering that the United States tended to be more open relative to the Soviets. One could very well posit that the Soviets would be careful not to provoke the United States into launching a nuclear attack, for example by undertaking an action which could be seen as a prelude to an attack itself. They didn't exactly follow this line of thinking at all times, but for something which would have been perceived as little more than a minor scientific action with some degree of propaganda value (superiority of Soviet science, demonstrating Soviet ballistic missiles, etc.) this could very well lead them to downplay their space program and be seen as followers. After all, if following still brings home the bacon of spy photographs, weather data, scientific information, and so on, then who cares if the Soviets are "following" or "leading"?
On the first point BOTH sides were aware of the advantage of spy satellites and were pursuing vary basic programs. And as such both sides were aware of the requirement for overflight rights but the Soviets had recently rejected Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal so they could fear that the American's might try to shoot down any satellite flying overhead. Realistically they understood that such an act was 1) probably beyond America's capability to do and 2) that such an act would be very provocative and well out of the 'normal' reaction from someone like Eisenhower. More importantly as I noted above both sides had already given an understood 'permission' for such by announcing an IGY satellite launch. Both nations were giving notice that not only COULD they launch a satellite but that they WOULD in fact launch during the IGY.
But that also means they both pretty much HAVE to launch during the IGY or lose face internationally. The USSR surprised everyone by launching so soon into the IGY whereas the US Vanguard was looking to be well into 1958 before it would be ready. TTL the 'waiting game' could stretch into mid-1958 and become hidden war of nerves as each waits for the other to launch first
As for the second point the problem is the Soviets pretty much can't 'downplay' their program too much as the US had been observing their missile tests and had a pretty good idea of where they stood. What we didn't know was how many they had or where they were. And having no equivalent of Vanguard the USSR couldn't launch anything less than what they did OTL so there is not real way to not show what they are capable of.
Having said that there is a logic in not antagonizing the US with as overt a play as they did OTL. Going second would have actually benefited the USSR but politically they made it pretty clear they wanted to grab the 'first' for themselves and were just as surprised as everyone else when it "exploded" the way it did. And I'll point out that OTL proved pretty conclusively that 'following' does have a major effect even if its expected. The Soviet space program never truly recovered from 'falling behind' the US one after starting out leading. While granting the 'pressure' would be less TTL and would the prestige and international recognition the internal and external pressure to use what advantage they had IMHO would have pushed them to do 'something' first at some point.
Besides, your answer reflects a decidedly post-Sputnik view of things. In 1956 or 1957 space wasn't seen as something that anyone had a "lead" in, or where a "lead" would be particularly useful. It was seen as somewhere you might be able to base spy equipment and somewhere there was some scientific interest, but not somewhere that was of any particular importance to either the Soviets or Americans beyond that. No one thought of leads until after Sputnik was launched and both sides realized that there was some significant propaganda value in achieving "firsts" in space.
Actually incorrect to the extreme though those who DID push this viewpoint were not a majority in any sense. Don't forget that the Pentagon had to issue a directive forbidding any high ranking officers, contractors or public servants from speaking of or mentioning "space programs" in order to curb public interest and political anxiety over what the aforementioned individuals were in fact saying. And one major point that those individuals were hammering home it that the nation that was 'first' in space would be first on Earth.
OTL this is what the "Sputnik Panic" was based on. "Perception" of 'following' or 'leading' is and was very important.
Randy