BlondieBC
Banned
True. I had a old Civil War game once that made the point that when it rated Generals such as Lee, it is rating the entire command staff and calling it one man. We forget that far too often when we write history books.
Who Had the Better Generals, the Union or the Confederacy?
- Thread starter Anaxagoras
- Start date
True. I had a old Civil War game once that made the point that when it rated Generals such as Lee, it is rating the entire command staff and calling it one man. We forget that far too often when we write history books.
History Learner
Banned
Which is my point; he saw opportunities that were not to be had and ultimately ended up as costly failures. That by 1864 he couldn't realize it was next to impossible to carry entrenched positions with frontal assaults is astounding.
Hitting a fortified line, even if it is in different spots, is still hitting a fortified line.
Which is why I said he almost did, as contemporary reports by him and his subordinates assumed they were running into a Confederate rearguard at first.
Which again shows a startlingly lack of intelligence gathering, and ignores the fact Grant was de-facto Army commander at that point.
Gordon and Longstreet didn't collapse Grant's flanks?
I'm not sure what you're trying to argue here? Grant preforming a poor maneuver was my point.
I'm doubtful that Grant couldn't have pushed harder here, as Lincoln proved willing to accept ~60,000 losses.
I don't doubt Lee didn't know it was bait, but he still managed to spring the trap in such a way as to throw Grant's plans to hell, as Gordon Rhea notes:
During the night of May 20-21, Hancock began his diversionary march. When Lee learned of the Union movement, he concluded that Hancock was spearheading an advance to Richmond and threw a part of the Confederate army across Telegraph Road, closing the main highway south to the Federals and severing Hancock from the rest of the Federal force. Growing increasingly concerned over Hancock's safety, Grant directed Meade to evacuate his entrenchments at Spotsylvania Court House and rush to Hancock's assistance. Once again, an operation that Grant had begun as an offensive thrust was assuming a decidedly defensive tone.
I'm not sure what you're arguing here, Lee beating Grant to the next position and successfully withdrawing are what I said?
Gordon Rhea:
Grant was overall commander, and failure on the part of his subordinates is a failure, at least in part, on Grant.
As I said, somewhere in the vicinity of 60,000 and close to the total size of Lee's Army at the start of the campaign.
Then you are still wrong.
Total Overland Campaign casualties for the Union were 55,000, which is still significantly lower than the forces available to the Confederates.
Beyond that however, from a pure cold-blooded analysis, the Union could take heavier casualties. 55,000 is about 45% of the army, while Lee's 35,000 represented well over half of his own forces (54%). Part of being a commander is knowing when it is acceptable to spend the lives of the men under your command, and be willing to do so if necessary. Grant had more men, more material, and more reinforcements he could call upon, and so he used them. That's part of what leading an army entails.
And the key difference between Grant and the other commanders of the war who suffered heavy casualties (and in particular the butcher in charge of the AoNV) was that he succeeded.
Despite what the Lost Causers might tell you, leveraging the advantages your side has is what being a good commander is actually all about.
No. The flanks were attacked, but collapsing an army's flanks requires a lot more than a partially successful attack. Longstreet's came far closer to successfully collapsing a flank than Gordon's admittedly, but he was promptly shot by his own men and ultimately failed.
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History Learner
Banned
Casualty estimates for the Union range from about 54,000 to 65,000, which is why I said in the vicinity of 60,000.
Not really, as contemporary reporting shows; as I mentioned earlier, Lincoln thought he was heading towards defeat in November as late as August. The ability of a nation to mentally sustain heavy losses is almost always far shorter than its technical ability to do such, and Grant as supreme Federal commander completely failed to realize this political aspect of the war.
At what, exactly? He did manage to get across the James, true enough, but utterly failed at his objectives in the campaign to destroy Lee and take Richmond. Ultimately it came down to Sherman to restore Northern morale, and see the war through.
What?
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Yes, estimates go up to 65,000. Actual records show 54,000. One of these is more reliable than the other.
Yes, due to the length of time the war was going on Lincoln was worried about losing the election. This is irrelevant.
At winning the war. Yes he didn't take Richmond or completely destroy Lee's army, but the entire campaign set in motion the events which resulted in both those events happening by April of the next year.
Yes, and you will note Longstreet was promptly shot by his own men and his big attack accomplished precisely squat. Subsequent Confederate attacks were repulsed as Hancock's Union forces had rallied. So again, no this is not a collapsed flank.
Except for the fact that Grant had carried a number of strong positions before, the hills of Chattanooga were considered to be impregnable and yet Grant seized the heights.
This would be blatantly ignoring Meade's explosion at North Anna led to Grant returning operational and tactical control of the Army of the Potomac. Thus Meade had tactical control of the AoP during the Battle of Cold Harbor. In fact, Grant issued orders to Meade to conduct a reconnaissance before the June 3rd assault which both Meade and Hancock ignored.
As for intelligence gathering, how would Grant know the condition of Lee's army? The BMI provided excellent intelligence on enemy movements and numbers but not the condition of the enemy. The only indicator of the enemy's condition was its performance in battle and on June 1st, the Army of the Potomac had a rather good day in fighting Lee's army.
I am aware of Longstreet and Gordon's assaults. However, to say that the flanks collapsed is hyperbole. The article cited on Longstreet did not include the aftermath of Longstreet's assault. When Lee ordered Longstreet's Corps to resume its attack, it was beaten off by Hancock's troops in their trenches covering the Brock Road.
Gordon's assault did hammer a division of the VI Corps in the flank, but the VI Corps did not collapse.
The only reason why the march was a comedy of errors was that the Army of the Potomac's staff failed to coordinate the commands into an offensive movement into Virginia.
Grant would have to be politically blind. Both Butler and Sigel were political clout, and had considerable political clout and relationships with Lincoln. Not to mention the fact that 1864 was an election year, Sigel was popular among German-American immigrants and Benjamin Butler was a favorite of the Radical Republicans and could not be denied a command role.
Except for the fact the modern consensus among historians is that the Army of the Potomac suffered roughly 55,000. Gordon Rhea's work on the Overland Campaign provided decisive evidence to show that this was the number.
As I said, somewhere in the vicinity of 60,000 and close to the total size of Lee's Army at the start of the campaign.
History Learner
Banned
I'm not saying Grant took 65,000 in losses, as all I've said is that his losses were near 60,000 and such cannot be denied.
Not at all, as to deny that the immense casualties suffered in the Overland Campaign did not have an impact on Northern morale is without merit.
For one, you've just de-facto conceded the Overland Campaign was a failure. As to the actual root of your point, not really; Lee remained with an Army, the city and the means to keep it supplied. It was only thanks to Sherman that the War could be won, as Lincoln would've lost re-election.
Except it forced Grant to abandon his position in favor of a movement to Spotsylvania, of course.
Hancock's line, in his own words, got rolled up. That they managed to recover is irrelevant in the face of that, as well as the fact Grant had to give up the battlefield in favor of better prospects elsewhere.
Indeed, and I could give him a pass for one or two notable examples, but instead he did or nearly did so multiple times in the campaign. That Lee was not Bragg should've been obvious, as was the fact Lee had repeatedly used such tactics before against Federal commanders to great effect.
Grant was still there, and outranked Meade; that he did not keep him on check and ensure his orders were followed is Grant's fault.
Not carrying out the reconnaissance orders is primarily what I meant.
I'll grant you Gordon didn't cause a near route like Longstreet did, but the fact that the two assaults hit Grant in flanks and that Grant was then forced to withdraw is the telling bit of the encounter.
As an army commander at the time, one of Grant's duties was to ensure such movements were carried as best as possible, up to and including doing staff work himself if needed. Bragg did such during the Kentucky Invasion, for example. Again, the fault rests with Grant ultimately.
Fair enough, and I'll concede on this.
55,000 is in the vicinity of 60,000, which as the size of Lee's army at the start of the campaign and this has been my point all along. I'm not arguing Grant took thousands of casualties more than what is generally accepted, just that this number is close to 60,000.
Anaxagoras
Banned
Not quite sure what the hair-splitting about the Overland Campaign has to due specifically with the OP.
Your initial post was "about as many". Ten percent fewer is not about as many. I'd argue it doesn't even qualify as near. And when you add in the reinforcements Lee was forced to call in to maintain the semblence of an army afterward the number is nowhere even close.
I have done nothing of the sort. I have said it wasn't a complete success. Few things are.
Erm, no. Even if Lincoln had lost the election his successor would not have been inaugurated until March of 1865, by which time the Siege of Petersburg is almost over, and the Confederacy is quite literally collapsing.
False, an attack is only successful in how much actual advantage is achieved. Longstreet's attack FAILED. It could have succeeded had he not been shot, but it was still a failure. The Union army rallied and stopped the Confederate attack. Or are you next going to claim the Battle of the Bulge was a German victory because it took a few days for the Allies to recover?
Anaxagoras
Banned
And Polk. And Hood. And Pillow. Oh, and don't forget Pemberton.
Again, the South's advantage in the caliber of its officer corps is most clearly seen on the regimental, brigade, and divisional level, not so much in corps or army level.
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Some good points about lower level officers. Another point to consider is politics. Large portions of the Democratic party opposed the war. Part of McLellan's issues were political. He was a Democrat, and opposed to hard war and emancipation.
The North had material advantages but it also had the harder task. The US had to win the war. The Confederacy had to not lose. Lee was unable to graft that point. He would focus on winning the fight at the cost of the larger picture. Gettysburg is the best example of this.
As a quick summary the CSA had 1 good army commander, Lee, and a couple of passable ones, Johnston and Kirby Smith, and a bunch of bad ones. The USA had 3 good ones, Grant, Thomas, Sherman, a couple of acceptable ones, McLellan and Meade, and a comparable number of failures.
frankly, if Winfield Scott had been 10 years younger, the Civil War would have been quite short.
The North had material advantages but it also had the harder task. The US had to win the war. The Confederacy had to not lose. Lee was unable to graft that point. He would focus on winning the fight at the cost of the larger picture. Gettysburg is the best example of this.
As a quick summary the CSA had 1 good army commander, Lee, and a couple of passable ones, Johnston and Kirby Smith, and a bunch of bad ones. The USA had 3 good ones, Grant, Thomas, Sherman, a couple of acceptable ones, McLellan and Meade, and a comparable number of failures.
frankly, if Winfield Scott had been 10 years younger, the Civil War would have been quite short.
Who had the better generals?
Union generals Burnside, Butler, Hooker, Pleasanton, Pope, and Sigel are generally considered to be some of the worst generals of the war, but outside of Virginia they repeatedly beat the Confederates – Sigel was competent at Pea Ridge, Burnside shut down most of the North Carolina coast and later beat Longstreet, Hooker performed well at Chattanooga and in the Atlanta Campaign, Pleasanton drove the Confederates from Missouri, Pope cleared the Mississippi south to Memphis, and Butler waltzed into New Orleans.
Robert E Lee was arguably the Confederacy's best, yet he never won a campaign outside of Virginia and he was beaten by Meade, who is generally considered a second-string Union general, and by Rosecrans, who is often considered one of the Union's worst generals. Jackson varied in quality - his performance in the Seven Days Battles was poor. At Brandy Station, Stuart was surprised by Pleasanton, who as noted is often considered one of the Union's worst generals. At Knoxbville, Longstreet was beaten by Burnside, who is also considered one of the Union's worst generals.
Joe Johnston was probably the best the Confederacy had in the west, and he wasn’t good enough. AS Johnston was out of his depth - he did not just fail as an army commander, he failed to be an army commander. Floyd and Pillow were cowards. Sibley led his forces to disaster in Arizona. Van Dorn did the same in Arkansas. Price did the same in Kansas, losing to Pleasanton, who is often considered one of the Union's worst generals. Polk was an incompetent backstabber; the Union did a service for the Confederacy when they killed Polk with artillery fire. Hood was a backstabbing subordinate and a total disaster in command. Bragg was one of the few Confederate generals to win battles, but he had no idea what to do with a victory and his abrasive nature helped erode what little cohesion his Confederate army had. During Early's one solo command in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 he was unable to defeat Franz Sigel, who as you may guess was also considered one of the Union's worst generals, then fatally delayed at the Battle of Monocacy, by Lew Wallace, a man far more noted for his literary accomplishments than his military skill.
Union generals Burnside, Butler, Hooker, Pleasanton, Pope, and Sigel are generally considered to be some of the worst generals of the war, but outside of Virginia they repeatedly beat the Confederates – Sigel was competent at Pea Ridge, Burnside shut down most of the North Carolina coast and later beat Longstreet, Hooker performed well at Chattanooga and in the Atlanta Campaign, Pleasanton drove the Confederates from Missouri, Pope cleared the Mississippi south to Memphis, and Butler waltzed into New Orleans.
Robert E Lee was arguably the Confederacy's best, yet he never won a campaign outside of Virginia and he was beaten by Meade, who is generally considered a second-string Union general, and by Rosecrans, who is often considered one of the Union's worst generals. Jackson varied in quality - his performance in the Seven Days Battles was poor. At Brandy Station, Stuart was surprised by Pleasanton, who as noted is often considered one of the Union's worst generals. At Knoxbville, Longstreet was beaten by Burnside, who is also considered one of the Union's worst generals.
Joe Johnston was probably the best the Confederacy had in the west, and he wasn’t good enough. AS Johnston was out of his depth - he did not just fail as an army commander, he failed to be an army commander. Floyd and Pillow were cowards. Sibley led his forces to disaster in Arizona. Van Dorn did the same in Arkansas. Price did the same in Kansas, losing to Pleasanton, who is often considered one of the Union's worst generals. Polk was an incompetent backstabber; the Union did a service for the Confederacy when they killed Polk with artillery fire. Hood was a backstabbing subordinate and a total disaster in command. Bragg was one of the few Confederate generals to win battles, but he had no idea what to do with a victory and his abrasive nature helped erode what little cohesion his Confederate army had. During Early's one solo command in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 he was unable to defeat Franz Sigel, who as you may guess was also considered one of the Union's worst generals, then fatally delayed at the Battle of Monocacy, by Lew Wallace, a man far more noted for his literary accomplishments than his military skill.
Georgie777
Banned
Almost all of my American friends say the Confederacy had an advantage in leadership while the Union forces had the advantage in industry.
That's kind of Southern whitewashing to be honest. Both sides had a mix of good and terrible generals, it's just that the Confederacy had more of a military service history among its political elites. Which in turn lead to a lot of infighting that certainly didn't help their war effort.
Most of the discussion in this thread has focused, quite naturally, on the battlefield commanders. However, I believe that some thought should be given to the "behind the scenes" generals where I believe the Union had a distinct advantage. I believe that generals such as Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, U.S. Military Railroad General Herman Haupt and artillery General Henry Hunt contributed significantly to the victory of the Union and were more effective than then their Confederate counterparts.
Although this thread is limited to generals, I believe that a brief word should be given to the civilian leadership of the respective armies. Although he may have had a "difficult" personality (some would say repulsive), Edwin Stanton was an effective Secretary of War unlike his several Confederate counterparts.
Although this thread is limited to generals, I believe that a brief word should be given to the civilian leadership of the respective armies. Although he may have had a "difficult" personality (some would say repulsive), Edwin Stanton was an effective Secretary of War unlike his several Confederate counterparts.
The Napoleonic Wars lasted over 12 years, during which France conquered 720,000 square miles of territory. The Confederacy had 750,000 square miles of territory, the war lasted a little over 4 years, and unlike Napoleon, the Union kept the territory. The Union had 42 ships in commission at the start of the war. Four of these were in Pensacola - the sail frigate Sabine, the sail sloop St Louis, the 1st class screw sloop Brooklyn and the 3rd class screw steamer Wyandotte. Four more were in New York - the store ships Release and Supply, plus the 3rd class screw steamers Mohawk and Crusader. Two were in Washington, the 2nd class screw sloop Pawnee and the steam tender Anacostia. That's clearly not enough to blockade the Confederacy's 3550 miles of coastline with 189 harbors and deep water rivers.
The Confederacy was not outnumbered 4:1 in total theoretical manpower, the Union had a 2.3 to 1 advantage in population. The Union started the war with less than 15,000 present for duty. The Union did have an advantage in industry, but the Confederates never ran out of guns, bullets, or powder. The Confederacy started the war better armed than you’d expect from their industry. In the wake of John Brown’s Raid, the Buchanan administration sent large amounts of guns and ammunition to arsenals in the slaveholding states and most of these military stores were seized were seized by the Confederates. They were also able to trade for military equipment until the blockade closed Confederate ports.
While McClellan had success in West Virginia, it was not against Lee. McClellan left the theater before Lee was sent to West Virginia.
Lee's aggressiveness probably saved in Richmond in the Seven Days Battles and befuddled several Union commanders, but his invasions of the Union led mainly to irreplacable Confederate losses. Neither had any real chance of getting British or French intervention and Lee had no real expectation that they would.
I'm baffled how you could blame Longstreet for the Confederacy losing at Chattanooga - Longstreet wasn't even present for the battle; Bragg had ordered him off to attack Burnside.
I'd say at the beginning of the war the CSA held an undoubtedly superior officer corps, and maintained an officer corps that did well at the tactical level for the most part. The Union, however, found/promoted good men as the war went on and had generals who had a better grasp of the strategic situation than the CSA. So initially the Confederacy, but the ratio steadily favors the Union as the war drags on.