What if Prince Sihanouk was not ousted from power in Cambodia 1970?

If Sihanouk wasn't overthrown in 1970

  • Nixon & Thieu would hesitate to do a major cross-border ground op that year

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Nixon would do the cross-border ground op anyway

    Votes: 2 28.6%
  • The Khmer Rouge would never take power in Cambodia (from Sihanouk)

    Votes: 5 71.4%
  • The Khmer Rouge would end up taking power despite Sihanouk opposing them

    Votes: 1 14.3%
  • Sihanouk would go back to 100% Viet appeasement mode, ignore domestic opinion

    Votes: 1 14.3%
  • Sihanouk would try to get Viets to back off/out of Cambodia in early 70s, get PRC help

    Votes: 4 57.1%
  • Sihanouk would try to get Viets to back off/out of Cambodia in early 70s, PRC, USSR ignore him

    Votes: 1 14.3%

  • Total voters
    7
Information borrowed heavily from wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodian_campaign

As of early 1970, Cambodian discontent with the heavy Vietnamese presence in the eastern portion of the country had built up to explosive levels, leading to mass demonstrations by urban and educated Cambodians.

While monarchical head of state Prince Sihanouk was on holiday, the government of his appointed Prime Minister, Lon Nol, supported and sponsored these demonstrations.

Per wiki:
While Sihanouk was abroad in France for a rest cure in January 1970, government-sponsored anti-Vietnamese demonstrations were held throughout Cambodia.[7]: 56–57  Continued unrest spurred Prime Minister/Defense Minister Lon Nol to close the port of Sihanoukville to communist supplies and to issue an ultimatum on March 12 to the North Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia within 72 hours. The prince, outraged that his "modus vivendi" with the communists had been disturbed, immediately arranged for a trip to Moscow and Beijing in an attempt to gain their agreement to apply pressure on Hanoi to restrain its forces in Cambodia.[4]: 90 

The PoD is something happens between March 12th, and March 18th to prevent the next dramatic event that occurred in OTL:
wiki sayeth:
On March 18, the Cambodian National Assembly removed Sihanouk and named Lon Nol as provisional head of state. Sihanouk was in Moscow, having a discussion with the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, who had to inform him mid-way in the conversation that he had just been deposed.[11]: 558  In response, Sihanouk immediately established a government-in-exile in Beijing allying himself with North Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge, the VC and the Laotian Pathet Lao.[5]: 144  In doing so, Sihanouk lent his name and popularity in the rural areas of Cambodia to a movement over which he had little control.[12]

Sihanouk was revered by the Khmer peasantry as a god-like figure and his endorsement of the Khmer Rouge had immediate effects in rural areas (Silhanouk was less popular in the more educated urban areas of Cambodia).[11]: 558 

As we can see, the conflict between Sihanouk on the one hand, and Prime Minister Lon Nol and Cambodian Assembly on the other hand escalated from zero to 60 MPH super-fast, became irrevocable, with Sihanouk and Lon Nol immediately condemning each other to death, and caused Sihanouk to do a complete 180 in his attitude toward the Khmer Rouge, who had killed members of his family previously.

The difference in this ATL* is Lon Nol, while still pushing his anti-North Vietnam agenda as far as he can take it, ultimately accepts Sihanouk is an indispensable figure, who can ruin everything if not brought on board. So, Lon Nol restrains his own anti-Sihanouk allies and sympathizers within the anti-Vietnamese movement in the National Assembly, and prevents them from meeting to hold a vote to oust Sihanouk. He also frantically messages Sihanouk to update him on the crisis and urge the necessity of him coming home to listen to the people's demands as the only way to calm things.

Based on news updates from Cambodia and frantic phonecalls from Lon Nol, reinforced by calls from royal relatives that Lon Nol encourages, Sihanouk speeds drastically speeds up his itinerary, making a brief office call with either Kosygin or Brezhnev or possibly even Soviet Foreign Minister to convey the message, "restrain the Vietnamese" and flying on to Beijing to do the same thing with Mao or Zhou Enlai or Lin Biao and then flying home.

When he arrives home I imagine he would try defuse tensions with the Vietnamese or certainly not order Cambodian forces to escalate things by trying to take material action to follow the departure ultimatum, but he will also be seeing the national fervor to stand-up the Vietnamese. He can mobilize peasant demonstrations in support of himself, and possibly dismiss Lon Nol, but it won't organically make the anti-Vietnamese frustration die-off.

So, what does Sihanouk do in terms of accommodating popular anti-Vietnamese sentiment vs. ignoring it? And pressuring the Vietnamese to reduce their footprint and visibility on Cambodian territory, vs. tolerating their presence. Reopening the port of Sihanoukville would be seen by the urban public as a very provocative move, at least if there is visibly Communist controlled and Communist helpful traffic emanating from there, so Sihanouk would be wise to leave that alone.

And what will the pattern of covert and overt US military activity, in the air, and potentially on the ground, over and in Cambodia be in 1970? Although in OTL, the overthrow of Sihanouk and Lon Nol's open anti-communist stand, and the outbreak of direct Cambodian - North Vietnamese fighting all strengthened pro-invasion of Cambodia arguments within the Nixon administration, according to Stanley Karnow, "[e]ven before the coup against Sihanouk, Nixon was inclined to invade Cambodia."

Would the US and ARVN do an invasion of Cambodia in 1970, or any time? Would Sihanouk come to fight the North Vietnamese, leading the latter to support the Khmer Rouge? Or would Sihanouk reestablish his prior modus vivendi with the North Vietnamese?

If the latter happened, would North Vietnamese keep its distance from the Khmer Rouge and the latter movement would remain marginal, not on any real path to national takeover?

Even if so, and after the fall of Saigon in 1975, and the ouster of non-communists from the Laotian government in Vientiane in Laos in 1975, while Sihanouk could have a possible sense of satisfaction he survived by bending with prevailing Communist winds, complexity and "interesting times" would remain in Southeast Asia. Sihanouk's strategy of appeasing North Vietnam was above all based on the premise that China was the ascendant power in the region, and North Vietnam was aligned with China. How does that play later on in the 1970s when Chinese and Vietnamese relations become more oppositional, and Vietnam more aggressively courts the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute? Does Sihanouk's Cambodia tilt to the regionally and theoretically stronger China, or the nearby stronger united Vietnam?





* By the way, I see the abbreviation ITTL on this site a lot, what does that break down to? "In this time line?"
 
Information borrowed heavily from wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodian_campaign

As of early 1970, Cambodian discontent with the heavy Vietnamese presence in the eastern portion of the country had built up to explosive levels, leading to mass demonstrations by urban and educated Cambodians.

While monarchical head of state Prince Sihanouk was on holiday, the government of his appointed Prime Minister, Lon Nol, supported and sponsored these demonstrations.

Per wiki:


The PoD is something happens between March 12th, and March 18th to prevent the next dramatic event that occurred in OTL:


As we can see, the conflict between Sihanouk on the one hand, and Prime Minister Lon Nol and Cambodian Assembly on the other hand escalated from zero to 60 MPH super-fast, became irrevocable, with Sihanouk and Lon Nol immediately condemning each other to death, and caused Sihanouk to do a complete 180 in his attitude toward the Khmer Rouge, who had killed members of his family previously.

The difference in this ATL* is Lon Nol, while still pushing his anti-North Vietnam agenda as far as he can take it, ultimately accepts Sihanouk is an indispensable figure, who can ruin everything if not brought on board. So, Lon Nol restrains his own anti-Sihanouk allies and sympathizers within the anti-Vietnamese movement in the National Assembly, and prevents them from meeting to hold a vote to oust Sihanouk. He also frantically messages Sihanouk to update him on the crisis and urge the necessity of him coming home to listen to the people's demands as the only way to calm things.

Based on news updates from Cambodia and frantic phonecalls from Lon Nol, reinforced by calls from royal relatives that Lon Nol encourages, Sihanouk speeds drastically speeds up his itinerary, making a brief office call with either Kosygin or Brezhnev or possibly even Soviet Foreign Minister to convey the message, "restrain the Vietnamese" and flying on to Beijing to do the same thing with Mao or Zhou Enlai or Lin Biao and then flying home.

When he arrives home I imagine he would try defuse tensions with the Vietnamese or certainly not order Cambodian forces to escalate things by trying to take material action to follow the departure ultimatum, but he will also be seeing the national fervor to stand-up the Vietnamese. He can mobilize peasant demonstrations in support of himself, and possibly dismiss Lon Nol, but it won't organically make the anti-Vietnamese frustration die-off.

So, what does Sihanouk do in terms of accommodating popular anti-Vietnamese sentiment vs. ignoring it? And pressuring the Vietnamese to reduce their footprint and visibility on Cambodian territory, vs. tolerating their presence. Reopening the port of Sihanoukville would be seen by the urban public as a very provocative move, at least if there is visibly Communist controlled and Communist helpful traffic emanating from there, so Sihanouk would be wise to leave that alone.

And what will the pattern of covert and overt US military activity, in the air, and potentially on the ground, over and in Cambodia be in 1970? Although in OTL, the overthrow of Sihanouk and Lon Nol's open anti-communist stand, and the outbreak of direct Cambodian - North Vietnamese fighting all strengthened pro-invasion of Cambodia arguments within the Nixon administration, according to Stanley Karnow, "[e]ven before the coup against Sihanouk, Nixon was inclined to invade Cambodia."

Would the US and ARVN do an invasion of Cambodia in 1970, or any time? Would Sihanouk come to fight the North Vietnamese, leading the latter to support the Khmer Rouge? Or would Sihanouk reestablish his prior modus vivendi with the North Vietnamese?

If the latter happened, would North Vietnamese keep its distance from the Khmer Rouge and the latter movement would remain marginal, not on any real path to national takeover?

Even if so, and after the fall of Saigon in 1975, and the ouster of non-communists from the Laotian government in Vientiane in Laos in 1975, while Sihanouk could have a possible sense of satisfaction he survived by bending with prevailing Communist winds, complexity and "interesting times" would remain in Southeast Asia. Sihanouk's strategy of appeasing North Vietnam was above all based on the premise that China was the ascendant power in the region, and North Vietnam was aligned with China. How does that play later on in the 1970s when Chinese and Vietnamese relations become more oppositional, and Vietnam more aggressively courts the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute? Does Sihanouk's Cambodia tilt to the regionally and theoretically stronger China, or the nearby stronger united Vietnam?

* By the way, I see the abbreviation ITTL on this site a lot, what does that break down to? "In this time line?"
yes
 
Voters get three possible answers on the poll.

Don't be silly with your answers.

Basically the first two choices are a mutually exclusive question about whether the US under the scenario would or would not do the Cambodia cross-border invasion like OTL.
The second two choices are whether, or not, the Khmer Rouge would ultimately take over, if they were not loosely aligned with and endorsed by the prestigious Sihanouk, buut he was the ruler they were trying to take out, instead of the les prestigious/legitimate Lon Nol
The last batch of three are about what policy Sihanouk would try to pursue going forward if he hadn't been overthrown but had rushed himself back to deal with the political crisis brought on by mass popular anti-Vietnamese demonstrations (that implicitly threaten his rule that he needs to secure) and the risk that the demonstration or demands on Vietnamese will provoke Vietnamese attacks on Cambodia.

If Sihanouk wasn't overthrown in 1970​

  • Nixon & Thieu would hesitate to do a major cross-border ground op that year
  • Nixon would do the cross-border ground op anyway
  • The Khmer Rouge would never take power in Cambodia (from Sihanouk)
  • The Khmer Rouge would end up taking power despite Sihanouk opposing them
  • Sihanouk would go back to 100% Viet appeasement mode, ignore domestic opinion
  • Sihanouk would try to get Viets to back off/out of Cambodia in early 70s, get PRC help
  • Sihanouk would try to get Viets to back off/out of Cambodia in early 70s, PRC, USSR ignore him
 
After giving it a weekend, the poll results are interesting.

Several results have 1 vote. All choices offered on all question axes meet that minimum, with the only choice picked by no one being the idea that Nixon and South Vietnamese would can the idea of doing a cross-border invasion of Cambodia:

Nixon & Thieu would hesitate to do a major cross-border ground op that year​

The two highest scoring results are "Sihanouk would try to get Viets to back off/out of Cambodia in early 70s, get PRC help" with 4 votes and "The Khmer Rouge would never take power in Cambodia (from Sihanouk)" with 5 votes.

The latter is a nice, hopeful, optimistic outcome for Cambodia, leading to almost no prospect of a Cambodian genocide, because the Khmer Rouge perpetrators won't be able to do it on a national scale (they can cause Joseph Kony/LRA like troubles as insurgents), and no other Cambodian groups nor the Vietnamese seem interested in doing one.

The former, Cambodian pushing Vietnamese out of their country and gaining Chinese support for it, in the *early* 1970s, creates an interesting alternate Asian geopolitical dynamic, raising Sino-Vietnamese tensions earlier than OTL, *before* North Vietnamese victory and reunification of Vietnam. If Cambodia puts pressure on North Vietnamese in the border region, and the PRC presses the North Vietnamese to not fight back, going to the extent of cutting off aid to Hanoi, or putting counter-pressure on Hanoi to get North Vietnam to back off from Cambodia, North Vietnam's final two general offensive campaigns (1972 and 1975), and support of PAVN-occupied/PRG administered areas of South Vietnam in-between, especially in the southern half of South Vietnam, east of Cambodia, could be significantly disrupted. Even if not by design or intent or avowed policy, Beijing could be engaging in behavior de facto in alignment with the Saigon regime's survival interests.
 
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