What if German naval construction not slowed down?

What if German naval construction not slowed down? The Derfflinger enters service in 1915 not 1916. The Bayern is ready in time for Jutland and Baden shortly afterward. The 2 Sachsen class battleships, 4 Mackensen class battlecruisers and the 1 of the "Ersatz Yorck' enter service in 1917. What will the German navy do? would the battle of Jutland be any different? Will she try again in 1917 with the additional ships? Will Britain stop construction of the Admiral class battlecruisers? Post-war will there now be 4 Hoods?
 

Riain

Banned
It Wasn't a lack of ships that hampered Germanys navy, it was first and foremost the atrocious command arrangements followed by the poor naval geography. More ships will still be poorly sited and commanded.
 
What if German naval construction not slowed down? The Derfflinger enters service in 1915 not 1916. The Bayern is ready in time for Jutland and Baden shortly afterward. The 2 Sachsen class battleships, 4 Mackensen class battlecruisers and the 1 of the "Ersatz Yorck' enter service in 1917. What will the German navy do? would the battle of Jutland be any different? Will she try again in 1917 with the additional ships? Will Britain stop construction of the Admiral class battlecruisers? Post-war will there now be 4 Hoods?
As Riain said, it doesn't do much for the Germans.
Jutland might be either better or worse tactically for Germany, bit strategically, it will stay the same. German ships stuck in ports, Britannia Rules the Waves.
Hood's will likely be completed. At least two anyway. Modifications post Jutland may be better or worse depending on Jutlands results.
Post war, it means Britain has four big modern ships, so WNT will be different.
The tonnage limit may be 40,000, instead of 35,000. Other differences obviously, but will likely be explained later.
 

Riain

Banned
Dunno, but I wouldn't be surprised given the way the different fleets and naval stations successfully worked to deny the Flanders station resources of all kinds. To give an overseas station more ships or other resources would mean pulling them from other commands of equal rank and status, requiring a decision from the Kaiser himself.
 

SsgtC

Banned
What if German naval construction not slowed down? The Derfflinger enters service in 1915 not 1916. The Bayern is ready in time for Jutland and Baden shortly afterward. The 2 Sachsen class battleships, 4 Mackensen class battlecruisers and the 1 of the "Ersatz Yorck' enter service in 1917. What will the German navy do? would the battle of Jutland be any different? Will she try again in 1917 with the additional ships? Will Britain stop construction of the Admiral class battlecruisers? Post-war will there now be 4 Hoods?
Ok, elephant in the room question. What ISN'T getting built if the ships are completed? With completed ships, what isn't getting manpower in order to crew them?

It's not a zero sum game for Germany. If they build these ships, that means they're not building something else. If they're completed, that means the manpower for them is coming from somewhere. Or it means that new recruits are getting assigned to the Navy instead of the Army to man the ships instead of fill out divisions.

Finishing the ships has an impact on the Army and the ground war. That's a lot of resources going to the Navy that IOTL went to the Army. How much is that going to affect the ground war? I can't imagine it would be a positive
 
Could be. I'm unclear why a larger overseas fleet was not built, and better naval statins in the colonies. The bickering?
AFAIU it was Tirpitz.

Prior to even the first Naval Law of 1898 Wilhelm II was rather fond of the "Jeune Ecole" of cruiser warfare and favored cruisers for the thought/dreamed of expansion of the navy.
But Tirpitz "convinced" him of his interpretation of Alfred Thayer Mahan, that the rank and prestige of a nation - and its ruler - depends on its number of Battleships, unfortunatly (?) forgot to care about the geographic prerequisites for such Mahanian politics : bases.

But what do you need oversea bases for, if you also induce an operational doctrin - or rather religious mantra - of "THE ONE DECISIVE" battle, may it be at day or night, that will "fix" ... paralyse your assumed main opponent in world politics - GB and the RN in the waters of the North Sea.


Imperial Germany needs a excuse to conquer Norway well before 1914.
Thats pretty drastic, ...
Would agree on that.

But ... what about some "basin rights" on the norwegian coast ? Narvik ? Trondheim ? ... or "leasing" some fjord for a base, perhaps doing so on Iceland ?
Possible attraction for the scandinavians :
  • economic development of some otherwise rtaher neglected backwater region (for one)
  • perhaps some "support" for becomming independant (Norway 1905)
 
Could be. I'm unclear why a larger overseas fleet was not built, and better naval statins in the colonies. The bickering?
How much overseas fleet do you need for a few islands and jungle swamps? The naval war is going to be won or lost in the North Sea. Even without Mahan it is obvious. A bigger overseas fleet is more to wither on the vine.
 

Riain

Banned
The naval war is going to be won or lost in the North Sea.

In terms of battles yes, but there is still plenty of work to do off Flanders, in the Baltic and the eastern North Sea without a decisive battle. This is the basis of the klienkreig strategy, where the riskflotte threat keeps the RN battlefleet of the back of these light forces as they fight their little campaigns. Its like trench warfare at sea.
 

Riain

Banned
But ... what about some "basin rights" on the norwegian coast ? Narvik ? Trondheim ? ... or "leasing" some fjord for a base, perhaps doing so on Iceland ?

Because it will need to be defended so heavily. The light forces from Flanders fell back on the shore guns as a standard tactic, these guns kept the RN 8 miles away from the cost at night and 16 miles away in daylight, within this range the RN was being engaged so struggled to conduct their tasks.

If a base was not closely linked to mainland it would struggle to be defended from the British, who would land troops nearby and throttle the base knowing the HSF wasn't strong enough to come to its aid.
 
Because it will need to be defended so heavily.
...

If a base was not closely linked to mainland it would struggle to be defended from the British, who would land troops nearby and throttle the base knowing the HSF wasn't strong enough to come to its aid.
Such a base would be "prepared/stocked" with material to support incomming ship (coal; ammo, etc.) - as well as some means for defense : guns.

It might be able to supply itself living essentials (food) from the neutral surrounding country, beside GB decides to invade a neutral, european country, that has some valid treaty with Germany for running such a base.

OTOH : wouldn't any action of GB against these base(s) not provide exactly the reason for the wished for "decisive battle" ?
 
The basic reason that they didn't keep increasing the navy is that one they where apparently at the end of what they could finance without reforms which demanded by the reichstag which was basically democracy in Prussia which was the largest part of Germany at the time and whose goverment was undemocratic and was formed to be supportive of the Junker views.
 

Riain

Banned
Such a base would be "prepared/stocked" with material to support incomming ship (coal; ammo, etc.) - as well as some means for defense : guns.

It might be able to supply itself living essentials (food) from the neutral surrounding country, beside GB decides to invade a neutral, european country, that has some valid treaty with Germany for running such a base.

OTOH : wouldn't any action of GB against these base(s) not provide exactly the reason for the wished for "decisive battle" ?

They only wanted decisive battle on their doorstep, on the ships enforcing the close blockade, they sure as hell didn't want to sail away from their defences to fight.

No German colony or overseas possession outside the distant blockade could withstand the size of the land forces Britain and Japan could send against them. The best bet for Germany to change their naval geography is on the channel coast.
 

longsword14

Banned
Prior to even the first Naval Law of 1898 Wilhelm II was rather fond of the "Jeune Ecole" of cruiser warfare and favored cruisers for the thought/dreamed of expansion of the navy.
But Tirpitz "convinced" him of his interpretation of Alfred Thayer Mahan, that the rank and prestige of a nation - and its ruler - depends on its number of Battleships, unfortunatly (?) forgot to care about the geographic prerequisites for such Mahanian politics : bases.
Tirpitz had the better suggestion anyway.
What would a cruiser fleet have done ? Require long legs, so off sea bases are even more important. In a war either they are bottled by RN's battlefleet or run-down ala Spee.
Maybe formalize army and navy combined operations to help each other out in case of a war scenario if things get stretched out ?
 
Tirpitz had the better suggestion anyway.
What would a cruiser fleet have done ? Require long legs, so off sea bases are even more important. In a war either they are bottled by RN's battlefleet or run-down ala Spee.
Maybe formalize army and navy combined operations to help each other out in case of a war scenario if things get stretched out ?

Pave the north sea with U-boats. Jackie Fisher of all people was arguably headed in this direction himself. Why waste an expensive battleship in what was essentially closed waters? Of course the technology wasn't up to spec yet. But deny the North Sea to the Brits and suddenly you have some options to get raiders or supply ships into the wider world.

Really part of me wants to see a AH where the Royal Navy built a fleet of small units to control the North Sea and a fleet of battle cruisers to manage the rest of the world. Put the theory to the test vs the German battleships.

In terms of battles yes, but there is still plenty of work to do off Flanders, in the Baltic and the eastern North Sea without a decisive battle. This is the basis of the klienkreig strategy, where the riskflotte threat keeps the RN battlefleet of the back of these light forces as they fight their little campaigns. Its like trench warfare at sea.

Oh agreed. I was responding to the need for over seas bases.
 
Ok, elephant in the room question. What ISN'T getting built if the ships are completed? With completed ships, what isn't getting manpower in order to crew them?

It's not a zero sum game for Germany. If they build these ships, that means they're not building something else. If they're completed, that means the manpower for them is coming from somewhere. Or it means that new recruits are getting assigned to the Navy instead of the Army to man the ships instead of fill out divisions.

Finishing the ships has an impact on the Army and the ground war. That's a lot of resources going to the Navy that IOTL went to the Army. How much is that going to affect the ground war? I can't imagine it would be a positive
I read somewhere that the army wasn't terribly keen on expanding the army's size before the Great War because it would've meant manning it with a largely deracinated (i.e., non-Prussian) proletariat. With I assume the army having first call on choice conscripts wouldn't an expanded navy have meant a larger politically unreliable enlisted cohort? In which case the mutiny of 1918 might have occurred in say, 1916 or 1917, making the fleet even more of a white elephant than it was in OTL.
 

SsgtC

Banned
I read somewhere that the army wasn't terribly keen on expanding the army's size before the Great War because it would've meant manning it with a largely deracinated (i.e., non-Prussian) proletariat. With I assume the army having first call on choice conscripts wouldn't an expanded navy have meant a larger politically unreliable enlisted cohort? In which case the mutiny of 1918 might have occurred in say, 1916 or 1917, making the fleet even more of a white elephant than it was in OTL.
The mutiny of 1918 had far deeper roots than "political unreliability." One of the biggest drivers was that the men of the fleet knew the war was lost, knew that they were being ordered on a suicide mission to engage the combined British and American fleets and saw no point in going to they're deaths for no reason.
 
Ok, elephant in the room question. What ISN'T getting built if the ships are completed? With completed ships, what isn't getting manpower in order to crew them?

From what I understand the heavy guns these ships required weren't being built as the army needed more artillery. Only so much can be built and the navy got the short end of the stick.

The same with crews, the army needed the men more...
 
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