The Pruissophile needs help
- Thread starter Nietzsche
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I'd at least assume more territory if not a dominant position within the German-speaking lands. He just managed to wank it into an (almost) national unification.
IMO and others Imperial 'Germany' is just a fancy new name for Prussia, after all.
IMO and others Imperial 'Germany' is just a fancy new name for Prussia, after all.
Bismarck's goals are deceptively simple: Break the Austrian dominance in Germany and install Prussia as the pre-eminent German power. Unification was just a bonus, and would get more people on Bismarck's side, like the nationalists, and of course the ambitious Hohenzollerns.
Well, we know he wanted to break the power the Russians held over the Germanies, and that was one reason (besides liberalism) that he convinced King Wilhelm I not to take the German Crown in 1848.
Basically, besides breaking Austria, he wanted to stop foreign influence on Germany, and let Prussia dictate what was best for the Germanies.
Basically, besides breaking Austria, he wanted to stop foreign influence on Germany, and let Prussia dictate what was best for the Germanies.
OS fan
Banned
Unfortunately I forgot who exactly, but either Wilhelm I or Bismarck himself was very sad on the day before Versailles, because "this would be the day when Prussia will be buried". The point is: From then on, Prussia indeed was part of Germany. And as long as Germany wouldn't be defeated (and maybe not even then, as history proved us), this fact wouldn't change.
PoeFacedKilla
Banned
well considering Bismark died in 1889 it was probably Kaiser Wilhelm who said that.
Nietzsche
Banned
^You lot up here have missed my point. I mean -Prussia-, not a Prussian-dominated Germany, but Prussia herself. What were his ambitions, aims?
You, however, have hit the nail. Now, what were his aims? Where did he wish to expand? Increasing the membership of the Zollverein to include Holland and Belgium? Perhaps some of Scandinavia?
Or would he look to Britain for an alliance to isolate France further? Ect, ect, ect.
Hmm, I got your point, but I really thought primarily his thinking was keeping Prussia dominant over the Germanies, and keeping foreign influence out. Bismarck did not care for a navy, did not really care about colonies, only about making Prussia the dominant power of Mittel Europa. This is really the extent of the ambitions that I know of...
If he included Denmark, and other nations in the Zollverin, maybe he could have furthered Prussia's goals.
If he included Denmark, and other nations in the Zollverin, maybe he could have furthered Prussia's goals.
He was talking about the treaty in Versailles 1871, Franco-Prussian war, the declaration of the German Empire. Neither Wilhelm the I, or Bismarck saw the dark of day at the end of the Greatwar.
He wanted to expand the Zollverein into the other German speaking territories, not necessarily into foreign countries. The Zollverein in 1848 was just one of many German customs' unions, and although it was one of the most preeminent, Austria was excluded as was the Catholic south; parts of the north were even excluded as Ernst Augustus of Hannover had created his own customs union that included some northern states as a rival to the Prussian dominated customs union.
As for Germany, even if we exclude unification, his long term aims were still to put Prussia in a predominant position and to push Austria out everything. He probably desired to see the whole of Schleswig under Prussian control. I'm not sure if he had any actual territorial ambitions, considering in his brand of conservatism he saw himself as a knight of sorts serving his king, who was divinely appointed. Sure, Prussia made huge gains after 1866, but I think it was mostly the trauma of the situation and a way to ensure he had full domination of the north: annexation of Hannover and other northern states who had supported Austria was just a bonus. I guess I could see Bismarck aim to take over Brunswick, if only to connect the Rhineland provinces with the east.
Alliance wise? Russia. If we are dealing with Prussia only, it's anachronistic to view France as a sworn enemy. 1867 was not 1914, and France only made a good propaganda enemy in the case of German unification. When you take that off the table, you may see that France could be a suitable ally for Prussia. Napoleon III may be a bit too liberal for Bismarck's taste, but it doesn't mean they can't do business. I expect Bismarck in a Prussia only scenario may try to toe a middle course between the despotism of the east and the more liberal regimes in the west. Britain would be a friendly country, if only because of the ties the English and Prussian courts had, not to mention the familial connections.
Bismarck wasn't initially aiming for German unification, but he was definitely aiming to reshape the Confederation. Assuming no unification, you probably see Bismarck scheming to oust Austria and make the King of Prussia the hereditary President in lieu of the Austrian Emperor. These events became tangled up in the waves after 1866, though, and it's a little difficult to separate them.
As for Germany, even if we exclude unification, his long term aims were still to put Prussia in a predominant position and to push Austria out everything. He probably desired to see the whole of Schleswig under Prussian control. I'm not sure if he had any actual territorial ambitions, considering in his brand of conservatism he saw himself as a knight of sorts serving his king, who was divinely appointed. Sure, Prussia made huge gains after 1866, but I think it was mostly the trauma of the situation and a way to ensure he had full domination of the north: annexation of Hannover and other northern states who had supported Austria was just a bonus. I guess I could see Bismarck aim to take over Brunswick, if only to connect the Rhineland provinces with the east.
Alliance wise? Russia. If we are dealing with Prussia only, it's anachronistic to view France as a sworn enemy. 1867 was not 1914, and France only made a good propaganda enemy in the case of German unification. When you take that off the table, you may see that France could be a suitable ally for Prussia. Napoleon III may be a bit too liberal for Bismarck's taste, but it doesn't mean they can't do business. I expect Bismarck in a Prussia only scenario may try to toe a middle course between the despotism of the east and the more liberal regimes in the west. Britain would be a friendly country, if only because of the ties the English and Prussian courts had, not to mention the familial connections.
Bismarck wasn't initially aiming for German unification, but he was definitely aiming to reshape the Confederation. Assuming no unification, you probably see Bismarck scheming to oust Austria and make the King of Prussia the hereditary President in lieu of the Austrian Emperor. These events became tangled up in the waves after 1866, though, and it's a little difficult to separate them.
MSZ
Banned
I can't unfortunately give you a source, but I recall reading that he was personally a rather fierce opponent of constiutionalism and the concept of 'seperation of powers', prefering a superiority of the executive over the legislative and judicial branches. He wasn't quite happy with the "liberal" constitution of the German Reich. I suppose he would rather keep Prussia itself a centralized, unitary state. Prussia did keep its 1850 constitution all the way to 1918 after all - IIRC, while voting in German National Elections was conducted using a secret ballot, Prussian elections were not (this harmed the socialists and liberals).
Heh, join the club, I've had similar problems with China for S & S. Anyway, I agree with SavoyTruffle: Bismarck really would have been opposed to Austria's continued dominance over Central Europe and frankly probably would have engaged in just about any means necessary to get this done, I would think.
Nietzsche
Banned
Mmm, you're forgetting Bismarck's views changed on a whim. Atleast, in public. He was a populist by no means, but the man could engineer conflicts and such like no one before or since. He seemed to greatly respect France's new Emperor, what with him sharing a meal & drink with him after the battle(Sedan, I believe).
You bring up excellent points
Hm? That's not quite true. He was initially against it, but when public opinion started to shift, he began guarantee to have the 'Most liberal constitution in all the land'.
And that's Bismarck's true colours. A bullshitter on a deity level.
That's pretty much it: Bismarck wasn't a visionary. He was a pragmatic, opportunistic politician, and in the tradition of German pseudo-Hegelian historiography, he viewed the nation and the dynasty as living, active entities. I think we can take his long-term goals as "loyalist" given his statement that he would follow Wilhelm "to the Vendee" , his willingness to compromise things he pronounced key principles earlier, his readiness to manipulate public opinion (look at his position on colonial policy, on the Social Democrats, welfare or on constitutionalism) and the many times he seemed to express a critical stance on his own achievements ("burying Prussia" at Versailles). What he wanted for Prussia - and it was always Prussia he truly cared about - was safety, stability and an unthreatened position of relative power. From that point of view, his policy makes sense. He was perfectly happy with territorial gains that did not make dangerous long-term enemies (such as Hanover or Schleswig-Holstein), but opposed land grabs both from Austria after 1866 and from France after 1871 (where he was overruled). Far from being an enemy to either Austria-Hungary or Russia, he was anxiuous to stay on good terms with both after 1866, which made his foreign policy interesting at times. At the same time, he was perfectly happy to exploit the threat of war with Russia to get his way domestically (Krieg-in-Sicht-Krise).
IMO there are three things you have to take in to "get" Bismarck's policy goals:
- He was absolutely sure he was the smartest guy in the room, and right about 80% of the time. That means he was also going to change his mind and still be convinced he was absolutely right. There is no overarching theoretical line in his policies pother than what he thinks the situation calls for.
- He was absolutely committed to supporting his idea of Prussia, which was an organic union of king, fatherland and army. He compromised everything he professed to believe in to that end.
- His perception of Prussia was always a position of relative weakness. The foreign policy he ran was often hectic because he was trying to punch above his weight and knew it. After 1871, his main interest was consolidating what were, in effect, Prussian conquests. Apparently, he never quite believed that this "Germany" thing really held together of its own accord.
IMO there are three things you have to take in to "get" Bismarck's policy goals:
- He was absolutely sure he was the smartest guy in the room, and right about 80% of the time. That means he was also going to change his mind and still be convinced he was absolutely right. There is no overarching theoretical line in his policies pother than what he thinks the situation calls for.
- He was absolutely committed to supporting his idea of Prussia, which was an organic union of king, fatherland and army. He compromised everything he professed to believe in to that end.
- His perception of Prussia was always a position of relative weakness. The foreign policy he ran was often hectic because he was trying to punch above his weight and knew it. After 1871, his main interest was consolidating what were, in effect, Prussian conquests. Apparently, he never quite believed that this "Germany" thing really held together of its own accord.
I'm not sure there is much point in trying to detangle Bismarck's "German Empire" ambitions from his "pro-Prussian" ones; Prussian power was such that improving it led almost inevitably to Empire. Even the reversals and compromises alluded to above seem inevitable given the diverse social situation in Germany; he bloody well had to have made some compromise with liberalism, for instance, and cleverly did so in a fashion that surrendered a minimum of power. For one thing, as a federal union, the Empire was remarkably weak, having many parallels in its formal structure to the Confederate States; the real unity of the Empire was that the single kingdom of Prussia within it dwarfed the others--the "Empire" was indeed basically a sock puppet of the Prussian Kingdom. An advantage of this, from the point of view of a conservative authoritarian who dislikes liberalism but must tolerate it, is that its strongholds can be isolated. Another is that taking power on the Reich level by democratic means gave the democrats very little real power; to really run things they had to have leverage over the Prussian state. But meanwhile, Prussia had in its kingdom constitution an institution of reserving 2/3 of the seats in its own parliamentary legislature for the two classes that paid the upper two of three levels of a certain tax; these numbered far less than 2/3, or even half, of the populace permitted to vote. With profoundly illiberal institutions like that (one might argue that votes should be proportional to taxes paid, but actually the poorer Prussians paid a lot of other taxes not considered in assigning these parliamentary seats--much the same is true today of the US political charge that "most Americans don't pay taxes!"--they are looking just at income tax, not the whole broad spectrum of all taxes, which with a few exceptions like income tax, poor people actually pay a higher proportion of than rich) Bismarck was having his cake and eating it too.
For Prussia not to become an Empire in Bismarck's time, either he or some alternate chancellor would have to really drop the ball a lot, simultaneously blowing Prussia's chances for imperial supremacy and hurting Prussia's status as a separate kingdom. Conceivably if some alternate version of himself or some other person had been Chancellor who had some idealistic vision of Germany united but not under Prussian hegemony, or had the notion that Germany actually shouldn't be united at all, policy might have been different--but it's hard to see how Prussia would not visibly suffer, and Prussian ruling circles would rightly, from a Prussian point of view, sack such unpatriotic visionaries. Or there could be someone with Bismarck's goals but not his skill, who just blows it.
Still I suppose there is some value in asking the question--it serves to remind us, Bismarck did not know for sure he'd succeed in unifying Germany, and probably did not think in terms of that as a definite and certain goal for most of his pre-1871 career; he was indeed thinking of Prussia first and the possible goal of a unified Germany under Prussia was very much secondary.
For Prussia not to become an Empire in Bismarck's time, either he or some alternate chancellor would have to really drop the ball a lot, simultaneously blowing Prussia's chances for imperial supremacy and hurting Prussia's status as a separate kingdom. Conceivably if some alternate version of himself or some other person had been Chancellor who had some idealistic vision of Germany united but not under Prussian hegemony, or had the notion that Germany actually shouldn't be united at all, policy might have been different--but it's hard to see how Prussia would not visibly suffer, and Prussian ruling circles would rightly, from a Prussian point of view, sack such unpatriotic visionaries. Or there could be someone with Bismarck's goals but not his skill, who just blows it.
Still I suppose there is some value in asking the question--it serves to remind us, Bismarck did not know for sure he'd succeed in unifying Germany, and probably did not think in terms of that as a definite and certain goal for most of his pre-1871 career; he was indeed thinking of Prussia first and the possible goal of a unified Germany under Prussia was very much secondary.