Stuka's used on precision strikes on London during the Blitz?

Inspired by this video


What if during the London Blitz Stuka's were used during the night to launch precision strikes on targets such as power stations, Buckingham Palace, Downing St etc.

This would involve a Staffel of He-111's, Ju-88's or Do-17's bombing a certain area with bombs and flares to light up the target allowing a staffel of Stuka's to then attack a surgically hit the target.

Would this work?
Would it be effective enough?
What if this was used against the docked ships in Portsmouth and other ports within the Stuka's range thus crippling the RN?
What would the effects on the morale on the populace be seeing Buckingham Palace or Downing St carpet bombed like this?
 

Garrison

Donor
Inspired by this video


What if during the London Blitz Stuka's were used during the night to launch precision strikes on targets such as power stations, Buckingham Palace, Downing St etc.

This would involve a Staffel of He-111's, Ju-88's or Do-17's bombing a certain area with bombs and flares to light up the target allowing a staffel of Stuka's to then attack a surgically hit the target.

Would this work?
Would it be effective enough?
What if this was used against the docked ships in Portsmouth and other ports within the Stuka's range thus crippling the RN?
What would the effects on the morale on the populace be seeing Buckingham Palace or Downing St carpet bombed like this?
And how are the medium bombers achieving this accuracy in the first place to deploy the flares? Also said flares will illuminate the Stukas, which can't attack from high altitude. And the idea of this tactic achieving serious damage is farfetched. We know from OTL that the result of using Stukas and other similar close support aircraft by night was nothing more that nuisance value. The Stukas had a hard enough time hitting docked ships in daylight, unless someone helpfully painted a Red Cross symbol on them to help with aiming, I can't see them hitting much by night.
 
About a fifth of the Stuka force was destroyed in the week beginning Aug 11th 1940. If they continue to be committed against targets that are not on the coast but require an additional twenty minutes over England, the numbers will not get better.
 
It has been my understanding that the Battle of Britain showed that not just the Stuka, but the concept of dive-bombing in general was useless against targets defended by abundant anti-aircraft guns. It had something to do with diving straight at your destination for the last 20 seconds of your run, therefore presenting an unmoving target for every gun in it's vincinity. By the end of the war, the only dive bombers stil in service were those of the navy because by design there was a limit on the number of AA guns you can encounter on an enemy ship. Massively deploying Stukas against a well-defended city in 1940 would only serve to hammer this lesson in sooner.
 
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Garrison

Donor
Wasn't they using radio direction beams called Knickebein?
Which the British disrupted in short order, and they weren't that precise to begin with, as well as having limited range. Even if medium bombers dropped flares that would still only indicate an area and as I mentioned would tend to illuminate the Stukas. The only time I can recall flares being successfully used for a precision attack was Taranto, the Royal Navy was able to achieve complete surprise in the absence of radar. In strategic bombing Pathfinder operations drastically improved the accuracy of Bomber Command, it was still far from precise and even the introduction of airborne radar such as H2S couldn't achieve pinpoint accuracy. The Luftwaffe did use the Stuka in night operations but they never tried any sort of precision strikes, at least not until they deployed their first generation guided weapons and the Mistel bomber configurations. Either of those might do the trick, but the guided bombs were subject to jamming and Mistel was a sitting duck for night fighters, not to mention that none of those were available in 1940. They could have built Mistel sooner I suppose, but in 1940 the Luftwaffe would have baulked at wasting what were still frontline airframes to build them.
 
What it boils down to is at night, the Stukas can't find their targets. In daytime, the Stukas are the targets. All the WW2 combatants quickly learned that divebombers cannot operate in circumstances where the enemy can effectively fight back. Enemy fighters eat them for breakfast, any significant amount of enemy AA will chew them up and spit them out.
 
The US Army Air Force used two purpose built dive bombers in WWII. Both having dive brakes and sights specifically for dive bombing.

The First was the A24A. This was a based on the Navy SBD design, the modifications being principally the tail hook excluded, and a loess robust landing gear. These were used by the US 5th Air Force in the Pacific 1942 - 1944. Replaced in 1944 by new single engine models configured for carrying heavy bomb loads. Lacking dive brakes those models were used in shallow dive attacks for precision strikes. The early deliveries were first assigned to the 91st Bombardment Squadron that fought on Java from February or March 1943 attacking Japanese ground and sea targets. The survivors were transferred to the 8th Bombardment Squadron of 3d Bombardment Group. Later in 1942 the A24B models were delivered from the US. These served occasionally in combat, but due to short range and small bomb loads (500kg maximum) they were mostly used as target tugs and other training.

The Marine Corps used the Navy SBD until the end of the war for tactical air support, finding it useful for both interdiction or deep strike attacks, and for close in front line air support.

The A36A was configured as a dive bomber and flew for over a year from early 1943 into 1944 with the 27th Fighter-Bomber Group & 86th Fighter Bomber Group (Dive). In combat in the Mediterranean it proved sucessful. Like a number of other US aircraft like the B26 it acquired a poor reputation in training pilots in the US, which did not hold up in combat operations. In 1944 the groups were transitioned to other types to replace the worn equipment, and standardize aircraft models. Those were not designed as 'dive bombers', lacking the air brakes of the A36A. Shallower dive tactics were used for those. The 9th Air Force and 5th Tactical Air Force based in the UK and France used both the P47 and P51 in similar precision shallow dive attacks on point targets, like bridges.

All the WW2 combatants quickly learned that divebombers cannot operate in circumstances where the enemy can effectively fight back. Enemy fighters eat them for breakfast, any significant amount of enemy AA will chew them up and spit them out.

This was the US Army, and Navy experience. Dive bombers could be devastating, but that required surprise and/or weak opposition. Experienced pilots could with steep dives find techniques that reduced vulnerability to AAA defense. Conversely when the USN started using proximity fuzes the highly skilled Japanese dive bomber pilots were massacred. It should be noted torpedo bombers and low altitude bomb attacks were also highly vulnerable to AAA and fighter defenses. The latter both on land and at sea. High altitude bomber attacks were useless against point targets like bridges, and moving targets like ships. So, despite vulnerability the US AAF used single engined dive bombers and diving attack techniques through WWII, as did the Navy/Marines.
 
Wasn't they using radio direction beams called Knickebein?

Wikipedia is not that bad on this one. Fundamentally, any radiolocation system has a problem in that if the enemy is smart enough to figure out what you're doing, they will have transmitters that are nearer the target and can thus successfully either jam or spoof yours. The British were smart enough, they had transmitters in appropriate places, and Knickebein and X-Gerat were rendered ineffective. Indeed, the British attempts at radio navigation - Gee and Oboe - were subject to similar German attempts at jamming, whose lack of success was, broadly, because the British had used a number of disinformation ruses to hide what they were doing.
 
The US Army Air Force used two purpose built dive bombers in WWII. Both having dive brakes and sights specifically for dive bombing.

The First was the A24A. This was a based on the Navy SBD design, the modifications being principally the tail hook excluded, and a loess robust landing gear. These were used by the US 5th Air Force in the Pacific 1942 - 1944. Replaced in 1944 by new single engine models configured for carrying heavy bomb loads. Lacking dive brakes those models were used in shallow dive attacks for precision strikes. The early deliveries were first assigned to the 91st Bombardment Squadron that fought on Java from February or March 1943 attacking Japanese ground and sea targets. The survivors were transferred to the 8th Bombardment Squadron of 3d Bombardment Group. Later in 1942 the A24B models were delivered from the US. These served occasionally in combat, but due to short range and small bomb loads (500kg maximum) they were mostly used as target tugs and other training.

The Marine Corps used the Navy SBD until the end of the war for tactical air support, finding it useful for both interdiction or deep strike attacks, and for close in front line air support.

The A36A was configured as a dive bomber and flew for over a year from early 1943 into 1944 with the 27th Fighter-Bomber Group & 86th Fighter Bomber Group (Dive). In combat in the Mediterranean it proved sucessful. Like a number of other US aircraft like the B26 it acquired a poor reputation in training pilots in the US, which did not hold up in combat operations. In 1944 the groups were transitioned to other types to replace the worn equipment, and standardize aircraft models. Those were not designed as 'dive bombers', lacking the air brakes of the A36A. Shallower dive tactics were used for those. The 9th Air Force and 5th Tactical Air Force based in the UK and France used both the P47 and P51 in similar precision shallow dive attacks on point targets, like bridges.



This was the US Army, and Navy experience. Dive bombers could be devastating, but that required surprise and/or weak opposition. Experienced pilots could with steep dives find techniques that reduced vulnerability to AAA defense. Conversely when the USN started using proximity fuzes the highly skilled Japanese dive bomber pilots were massacred. It should be noted torpedo bombers and low altitude bomb attacks were also highly vulnerable to AAA and fighter defenses. The latter both on land and at sea. High altitude bomber attacks were useless against point targets like bridges, and moving targets like ships. So, despite vulnerability the US AAF used single engined dive bombers and diving attack techniques through WWII, as did the Navy/Marines.
Japanese light AA was mainly based around the their version of the French 20 and 25mm and lacked a good 37/40mm medium gun.
I've not seen anything good said about Japanese naval or army AA numbers and control, but it's not hard to find criticism.
 
Japanese light AA was mainly based around the their version of the French 20 and 25mm and lacked a good 37/40mm medium gun.
I've not seen anything good said about Japanese naval or army AA numbers and control, but it's not hard to find criticism.

Off the top of my head is a remark by a US AAF pilot who flew the B26 in the Pacfic in 1943 & the same model in Europe 1944. He thought the Japanese were good "but the Germans played for keeps". Of course the B26 in both the Pacific and Europe usually attacked from above 5,000 feet altitude, more commonly above 10,000 feet, so this pilot was referring to the medium and heavy AA cannon. Generally 75mm caliber and above. The tactics used by the US 5th Air Force for its extreme low altitude or Skip Bombing techniques were aimed at minimizing the light AAA of the ships. Ditto for the dive bombers in the Pacific. ie: The Navy and Marine dive bombers supporting the island assaults came after weeks of attacks by the heavy bombers, and naval gunfire attacks. On larger islands like Luzon the Japanese Army ground forces were not as well defended as were most German ground forces against air attack. Still the USN and AAF took uncomfortable losses at times from the Japanese AAA.
 

thaddeus

Donor
FWIW my speculative scenario would be the BV-246 "Hailstone" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blohm_&_Voss_BV_246 unpowered, glide bomb armed with "trumpets" as the JU-87, to show confusion, the glide bomb to cross through multiple air raid zones.

during the period high altitude JU-86s were flying over GB, they would fly through multiple air raid zones, but the British quit sounding the alarms so the public was unaware, "sounding the trumpet" over multiple zones would not leave the British the luxury of ignoring the LW.

guess they could add "noisemakers" to standard bombs but that would not be picked up on radar?
 
Divebombing not really possible at night due to lack of visual queues on ground and horizon.
I find it hard to believe you'd find any pilot willing to be the first to try it out. Although a fully laden Ju87 crashing into the target would do more damage than just the bombs, so that's some sort of benefit I guess.
 
I find it hard to believe you'd find any pilot willing to be the first to try it out. Although a fully laden Ju87 crashing into the target would do more damage than just the bombs, so that's some sort of benefit I guess.
Ha, very good. 😊

Could the crew bail out once the dive is set? Or would it be impossible, either unsafe or push the plane off course?
 
Ha, very good. 😊

Could the crew bail out once the dive is set? Or would it be impossible, either unsafe or push the plane off course?

The aircrew cost more to train than the aircraft costs to build. Then you have to train new crew and build a new plane for every mission. The RAF night fighter pilots will be delighted with the slow low level targets they can find and kill. The Defiant instead of being a joke will be the first successful night fighter.
 
Divebombing not really possible at night due to lack of visual queues on ground and horizon.

Cant remember the unit, which is unfortunate since there are several different versions. But, one is that during the first couple days of the Polish campaign a small attack group of dive bombers tried diving through clouds and all hit the ground. A variation on this is the attack leader tried diving through a gap in the clouds but the mist closed in as they dove obscuring the relationship to the ground. A third version is they were not in a attack dive but the flight leader was defending in the hope of finding the cloud ceiling and then identifying the target. But the cloud had no ceiling, extending to the ground.

I've read & listened to two or three dozen stories of pilots trying to locate the ground and any land marks when visibility at night or in cloud was near zero. Even on clear Moonlite nights visually estimating a accurate altitude or general relationship to the nearby planet seems problematic.
 
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