1 January 1942. Fort Canning, Singapore.
Lieutenant-General Percival opened the meeting with wishing everyone a happy new year. The fact that the meeting was taking place in a heavily defended and protected Operations Room while a Japanese air raid was going on didn’t help promote a feeling of joy around the table.
Lieutenant-General Percival’s Chief of Staff gave the initial round-up of the situation.
The situation in the Soviet Union continued to be difficult to summarise. The Soviet’s efforts to push the Germans back from the gates of Moscow continued, but there was a lot of fighting in Crimea which looked difficult for the Russians. The situation in North Africa remained unchanged. The Eighth Army were resting on the borders of Tunisia, while which way the French North African holdings would go, was awaited with great interest.
The Japanese invasion of the Philippines continued apace, with Manila likely to be occupied soon. The Americans and Philippine troops continued to resist, but were preparing for a siege on the Bataan peninsula. Reinforcements on the way to the Philippines were being redirected to Australia, where the Americans were beginning to build up a base of operations.
The American Asiatic Fleet had withdrawn from the Philippines to the Dutch East Indies. Discussions were on-going about the Americans, British, Dutch, and ANZACs working together. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hoped to create an overall command, but details were still being worked out about just where exactly the boundaries of this command would be. General Auchinleck had been approached to be overall commander, but hadn’t agreed until he had complete clarity about what and who was involved.
There were a number of sticking points. Auchinleck argued that India-Burma-China were all interlinked because of the Burma Road, which meant that these three theatres should have one overall commander, but that would lead to difficulties in appointment, India couldn’t come under the overall command of a Chinese or American, no matter how senior. Likewise, excluding Australia and New Zealand from the ‘ABDA’ area would complicate matters for such a generalissimo, as these two countries would be essential parts of the logistical network for working in the southeast pacific. The disadvantage currently for the Americans was that most of their fighting force in the region was miniscule and hard pressed.
Auchinleck had expressed private doubts to both Prime Ministers Churchill and Curtin about having General MacArthur in charge of any British or Empire forces. Cooperation before the war had been ‘difficult’ to say the least. The Prime Minister at the Arcadia Conference in Washington had been keen to show the Americans his desire for united commands, something that Auchinleck understood as being necessary. However, he was arguing for a separate South East Asia and Pacific command. South East Asia would include British, Dutch, French and Australian/New Zealand holdings. Pacific Command would be the American zone of influence, including the Philippines. Auchinleck, and other senior officers were worried that the Americans were attempting to undermine the role of the European empires.
At this point of the meeting there was a discussion about the Americans, British, Dutch, and ANZACs working together. This began to get a bit heated, but Percival felt that enough time had been spent on the matter that was not in their control anyway.
The Chief of Staff then gave an update on the situation in Borneo. He reported that the Indian troops were being pressed hard by the Japanese, but giving a good account of themselves. Their orders were to fall back to Dutch territory and keep up the fight from there as long as possible. The Royal Navy had been carrying supplies to Pontianak for the Dutch to take forward to the Indian troops. There was no way to know just how much trouble the Indian troops were causing the Japanese, but it seemed to be tying down at least a Regiment of Japanese troops. The Dutch reported that their submarines had managed to sink at least three of the Japanese freighters which wouldn’t be able help their efforts in the future.
After another few comments about various matters, Lieutenant-General Percival asked his senior commanders to give an update on the situation, beginning with Lieutenant-General Mackay (GOC II Australian Corps). Now that the Australian 9 Division were fully deployed, their GOC Major-General Leslie Morshead had been working with 8 Division’s new (acting) Major-General Cecil Callaghan to come to full readiness. Mackay’s estimation that it would be the end of the month before 9 Division would be fully prepared hadn’t taken into consideration Morshead’s men’s previous experience. They had been involved in battles in North Africa and Mackay could see the difference between the two Brigades of 8 Division and the four Brigades that had joined II Australian Corps from the Middle East. Mackay felt that another couple of weeks, after Corps level exercises, would be all it would take to declare his two Australian Divisions fully operational.
The most recent addition to his Corps, 18th Infantry Division were hard at work on Singapore Island, acclimatising, training and preparing defensive positions. Mackay rated Major-General Merton Beckwith-Smith highly. The Guardsman had taken over command of 1st Infantry Division during the retreat to Dunkirk and put up a very good show. He had trained 18th Division very well before the left Britain, and was continuing to do so with great effect since arriving in Singapore. Mackay believed that the Division’s readiness for operations would be achieved by later in the month. Until they were, Mackay was happy for them to remain on Singapore Island, while the two Australian Divisions continued to defend J0hor and Malacca. Mackay also mentioned that he had begun training for moving from defensive to offensive operations. The arrival of 7th Bn RTR and their infantry tanks would go a long way to giving 18th Division a real punch, just as the two Divisional Cavalry Regiment’s tanks and armoured vehicles would help the Australian Divisions.
Having previously discussed it with Mackay, Percival announced while the defence of Johor would continue to be the role of the Australians, the presence of 18th Division on Singapore Island would allow him to redeploy three Infantry Battalions from the two Malaya Brigades to reinforce III Indian Corps. In addition to the 2nd Bn Loyal Regiment, 2nd Bn Gordon Highlanders, and 2nd Bn 17 Dogra Regiment; the 1st Bn Manchester Regiment, a Machine Gun Battalion, was also being released to Lieutenant General Heath. The three Infantry Battalions, designated as 2nd Malaya Brigade under the command of Brigadier Francis Fraser, had been ordered to be ready to move on 3 January.
Lieutenant General Lewis Heath then gave the meeting his update on the work of III Indian Corps. First of all, Heath had asked Brigadier Fraser to move his Brigade by rail to the Kuala Krai to replace one of 9th Indian Division’s Brigades. Major-General Barstow’s Division had been in pretty constant contact with the Japanese for three weeks. Casualties had been heavy, as had expenditure of ammunition, especially for the artillery. Barstow was doing his best to rotate his battalions in and out of the line, but having three fresh Battalions would be a great help to him. Currently, the initial Japanese forces had obviously exhausted themselves and had been content to hold their gains. Barstow’s Divisional HQ was at the railhead at Kuala Krai.
Heath reported that he had been informed by Lt.Col. James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces) that there were reports that a Japanese force had been working its way down the east coast. With 9th Indian Division pushed back off the coast, the idea that a Japanese force was making its way south along the coast was entirely believable. As far as Heath knew at least one Company of 1st Battalion Mysore Infantry had retreated from the Gong Kedak area down the east coast. They hadn’t been in contact and Heath didn’t know whether or not they were still effective. RAF reconnaissance hadn’t noted anything obvious, but that whole coastal area was undeveloped and could easily hide even a large force from aerial reconnaissance.
Although it was still over a hundred miles north of Kuantan, Mackellar reported that there was almost nothing to stop the Japanese north of his force, which was just one Battalion spread thin over the eastern coast of Pahang State. The possibility of another Japanese amphibious attack on the east coast couldn’t be ruled out either. Heath had ordered Barstow to use 2nd Malaya Brigade to replace one of his tired Brigades, probably 8th Indian Brigade, and for them to move back to the Kuantan area. Here they could rest and refit. Having a Brigade, tired and depleted as it was, holding the airfield and resources of Kuantan would be most valuable. The previous commitment of Australian 8 Division to provide a counter-attacking force in the event of another Japanese landing was still on the table.
Heath then moved onto the situation on the west coast where 11th Indian Division were committed. After the initial attacks by the Japanese Guards Division had been repulsed, the intensity of the fighting had died down a little. There were growing indications that more Japanese troops were heading in the direction northern Malaya to reinforce the attack there.
28th (Gurkha) and 10th Indian Brigades had held the line around Gurun very successfully, but it had been a costly battle, and now had been moved into reserve at Ipoh to rest and refit. The 29th Indian Brigade and merged 6/15th Brigade were now holding a line anchored on the Muda River. Heath recorded that Major-General Murray-Lyon had been doing an excellent job of leap frogging his Brigades from one prepared defensive line to the next. The 6/15th Brigade had had just over a week’s rest at Ipoh before returning to the Muda River line. Heath and Murray-Lyon had both met with the officers and men of that Brigade and had found them to in good heart. The first probes of a Japanese attack on those positions had been recorded and Murray-Lyon was expecting that it would be another fresh Japanese unit that would be attacking.
Heath revealed that 1st Independent Company (OC Major Sheppard Fearon) and the Australian Rose Force (OC Captain Dan Lloyd) were working behind the Japanese lines. They were working in platoon sized forces, being supported by the Royal Navy who were using the river system for infiltration and extraction. The two forces were supported by volunteers from the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces, local European men who were acting as guides and translators. Most of the efforts of these special forces were in guerrilla tactics, making the rear area of the Japanese thrust unpredictable and tying down and ambushing Japanese troops defending their lines of communications. They also had small teams on overwatch of the roads and railway. These sent occasional radio messages when circumstances permitted. The information they were giving was worth its weight in gold, as there few other sources of reconnaissance information. Murray-Lyon’s preparations for a new Japanese attack was based largely on the information they were getting from 1st Independent Company.
Once Heath had finished and answered some questions, Rear Admiral Ernest Spooner, attending the meeting as the Royal Navy representative, gave an update on the current situation regarding the RN. HMS Prince of Wales and Nelson were currently at Ceylon awaiting the return of HMS Ark Royal, accompanied by HMS Formidable, with Hurricanes to reinforce the RAF. HMS Warspite was also on its way from Alexandria to join the other two battleships as part of Force Z. The damage to HMS Repulse had been temporarily fixed in Singapore and the battlecruiser was now sailing for the United States for complete repairs and refit, accompanied by HMS Mauritius which had been undergoing a refit in Singapore before the invasion. Spooner’s understanding was that Force Z would sail together with the two aircraft carriers in mid-January to protect them. Whether Phillips would do more depended on the situation on the Malay Barrier. The cruisers HMS Carlisle, Cornwall, Dorsetshire, Exeter, Emerald and Enterprise were all now attached to Far East Command, mostly working as escorts for convoys in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.
The three elderly British cruisers, HMS Danae, Dragon and Durban, had joined forces with the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter, Tromp and Java working under the command of Vice Admiral Helfrich. This force also had a number of destroyers from the two navies. The British and Dutch submarines were continuing to work along the east coast of Malaya and in the South China Sea to interdict the Japanese navy and transports, noting a number of successes. Light forces were also at work on both the east and west coast of Malaya fulfilling very important roles. There had been casualties due to enemy air attack, and a couple of submarines had been lost to unknown causes, probably mines.
An ANZAC force had been established to work in the Northeastern part of the Australia station. The Australian cruisers HMAS Australia, Canberra, Hobart, Perth, with HMNZS Achilles and Leander, with a number of destroyers and sloops were busy protecting the approaches to Australia through the Coral, Solomon and Bismarck seas.
Spooner then noted that the American Asiatic Fleet had withdrawn from the Philippines to the Dutch East Indies. Before the Japanese attacks, Admiral Phillips (C-in-C Far East) had spoken to Admiral Hart (USN) about the Americans working out of Singapore. In the event, Hart had chosen to work out of Surabaya on Java. The move to the Dutch territories included TF.5 located at Timor in Koepang Bay. This consisted of the heavy cruiser USS Houston, the light cruisers USS Boise and Marblehead, with the destroyers of Destroyer Division 59: USS Parrott, Pope, John D. Ford, and Paul Jones. How this Task Force and the Dutch/British force could cooperate was a matter of urgent talks.
Air Vice Marshall Pulford was aware of the criticism so often given to the RAF since the beginning of the war about the lack of air cover for both Navy and Army. His limited forces had had to be safeguarded from extinction, which is what the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces had been trying to achieve. The casualties that his crews had suffered pointed to the fact that the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were doing their part, but it was proving difficult.
Pulford was focusing on getting the Tomahawks which arrived on Christmas Eve ready as quickly as possible as the strain on the Buffalo fighter squadrons was becoming intolerable. No 3 Squadron RAAF had flown their fourteen Tomahawks to Singapore in stages from the Middle East. These aircraft were now undergoing maintenance, but the job of the Australian pilots was to help get the 96 Tomahawks ready for the fray. The 151st Maintenance unit assembled the first four within two days and were currently managing between six and eight per day. 24 were ready for operational service, having been test flown by 3 Squadron pilots. Other pilots were working with the pilots of 21 Sqn RAAF to be the first of the four fighter squadrons to convert from the Buffalo onto the Tomahawk. Unfortunately, two of these aircraft had been lost already, one in a training accident and another caught on the ground during an air raid. Realistically it would be towards the middle of the month before a full squadron would be combat ready.
Pulford mentioned that 4 Sqn RAAF had spent a few days in Rangoon talking with the American Volunteer Group’s pilots to learn their tactics which seemed to be more effective than those being used by the RAF. The tactics the Australians had used in North Africa against the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica perhaps didn’t translate to fighting the Japanese. The AVG’s successes over Rangoon showed that there was something the RAAF pilots could learn from the AVG pilots at Rangoon. When the Tomahawk aircraft were operational in RAF service in Singapore it would be helpful if they could be as effective as the Americans were making of them.
The arrival of four squadrons of Hurricanes (30, 135, 136, 258 Sqdns) in mid-January due to be flown off the two Aircraft Carriers would be none too soon. Discussions with the Dutch about using their airfields in Sumatra as alternative locations for the delivery and maintenance of RAF aircraft had been approved. The problems of trying to work on the airfields on Singapore Island under Japanese attack was all too often slowing work. The loss of Port Victoria had meant that aircraft being flown to Singapore from Burma already had to use Medan as a stopover. The airfield at Palembang on Sumatra was believed to have the advantage of being out of reach of Japanese bombers.
The Air Officer Commanding went on to note that the losses to the Buffaloes since 8 December was forty-two; twenty-three Blenheim I & IV had been lost; sixteen Hudson IIs; nine Vildebeestes and two Catalinas. Losses among the aircrew were also very high, while some pilots and crew had managed to bail out over friendly lines, all too many were missing believed killed.
The RAF’s on-hand reserves of eighty-eight aircraft had almost all been issued to squadrons to make up for these losses. The current air strength was: 453 RAAF and 243, 488 RNZAF squadrons were each reduced to ten operational Buffaloes. 1 and 8 RAAF squadrons had been amalgamated and had eight Hudson IIs on hand. The Blenheim bomber squadrons (32, 34 and 60 RAF) had twenty bombers between them. The Vildebeeste Squadrons (36 and 100 RAF), thanks to reserves, were able to put up 16 aircraft between them. Likewise, 205 Squadron’s Catalinas had used replacements to maintain three on active service.
The other reinforcements Pulford had received, 12 Fleet Air Arm SeaHurricanes and 6 Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal were also reduced now to six and four. Since Christmas Day, twelve Buffaloes flown by Dutch pilots from 2-VLG-V (2e Afdeling, Vliegtuiggroep V (2nd Squadron, Airgroup 5)) were operating out of Kallang airfield in defence of Singapore, a much-appreciated help. The question which kept Pulford up at night was whether his men could keep going until the Tomahawks and Hurricanes were able to bring his fighter force up to strength.
The question was asked if Pulford had any idea about how many losses the Japanese were taking. He had to concede that fighter pilots tended to overestimate their ‘kills’ as did bombing raids of enemy held airfields. If they were to be believed then the Japanese would have lost over 200 machines (more than double his own losses of 92). Pulford believed that the losses of Japanese aircraft was probably between 120 and 140, a ratio of about 1:1.3 or 1:1.5. There was no real organisation to count downed Japanese aircraft, so there was no real evidence for his claims, but he felt the lower estimate were about right.
Pulford finished his briefing looking at bombers, which were still going to be a problem. 36 Hudons IVs had been delivered to Australia during December, some of which would be sent as replacements, or given to RAAF squadrons in Australia and the older aircraft sent to Malaya. Blenheims and Wellingtons were on their way from the Middle East, and currently in eastern India. Getting the aircraft into the area was only one part of the story, their bombs, spares and ground crew were all following by sea, so that even when the planes arrived it would be some time before they would be operational.
After the Quarter Master General had reported on the availability of various stores, Lieutenant General Percival brought the meeting to a conclusion. In his opinion, the work being done by III Indian Corps was buying time for the Australian Corps to be fully ready to either take up the defence of southern Malaya, or hopefully, to go on the offensive to regain lost territory. If that offensive was in conjunction with Bill Slim’s Corps from Burma, then it was possible that Thailand could be liberated. Until such a happy day, Percival asked his senior officers to pass on his gratitude to all the units who were doing great work under trying circumstances.
