I also thing the whole Danzig thing is kinda out of character for the NSDAP in the early 30s, given that at some point there was broad consensus across the top of the party about getting to power through the ballot, and had given up the ideas to stage a Putsch. Hitler would most definitely not give a "blank cheque" for this sort of action.
Actually, the Nazis did seem to still be playing around in the early 1930s with potentially coming to power through "revolutionary" tactics. The Nazi Werner Best wrote the Boxheim Documents in 1931 that were a blueprint for a Nazi coup in Hesse (against a hypothetical Communist government). Hitler did of course distance himself from those documents once they were discovered.
 
However that could only last for so long, and while many had expected violence to explode between the Nazis and the government forces in Berlin, Mursberg, or Dusseldorf.​
Pro tip: If your keyboard layout doesn't support ä/ö/ü, the acceptable alternative spelling is ae/oe/ue. Not a/o/u.

Also I have no idea where "Mursberg" is supposed to be. Mursberg is a castle hill in Austria, and Mürsberg is a Chemnitz neighborhood. Did you conflate Munich and Nuremberg?
 
Last edited:
Actually, the Nazis did seem to still be playing around in the early 1930s with potentially coming to power through "revolutionary" tactics. The Nazi Werner Best wrote the Boxheim Documents in 1931 that were a blueprint for a Nazi coup in Hesse (against a hypothetical Communist government). Hitler did of course distance himself from those documents once they were discovered.
I did specify “top of the party”. There were definitely those who would have preferred a more aggressive strategy, chief among them the SA.
 
Very happy to see another Weimar TL! I really like your PoD, Jarres was one of the candidates that I had considered for my TL as well but I decided against him because I wanted to start my TL pretty much straight after WW1... The combination of Jarres and Wels is a reasonable one for achieving a solidly republican Germany, I believe! I'm most interested in seeing where this will head, consider me subscribed :)
Thanks for your support, my friend! Always glad to see another Weimar enthusiast!
 
I'm not sure why so much importance is given to the Pan-German Leauge, given that even at their peak they had only 180k members.

I also thing the whole Danzig thing is kinda out of character for the NSDAP in the early 30s, given that at some point there was broad consensus across the top of the party about getting to power through the ballot, and had given up the ideas to stage a Putsch. Hitler would most definitely not give a "blank cheque" for this sort of action.
For the first part, that is LARGELY true I believe. The idea here is without Hindenburg, the further nationalist right doesn't have their 'darling' in power for lack of a better term, and while there are some initial beliefs that Jarres will help them out anyway, his progressive move to the Centre pisses them off. In addition to this, the League putsch is ITTL more of an action by a minority of nationalistic fascists, while the broad majority is just silent and eventually quit and join the KVP, but ITTL for the sake of writing a narrative in their books and general perceptions the Constitutional Crisis is displayed as a comprehensive action by the entire Pan-German League, not by a subsection of extreme radicals led by Hugenberg.
 
Chapter 4: Trial of Fire
Chapter 4: Trial of Fire

“The split fomenting between the ideologically-motivated SA and Hitler's party-oriented SS has often sparked a conversation among 20th-century historians on if such a split may have ever divided the party between and what it may have resulted in.

The SS was undyingly loyal to Hitler and answered almost inclusively to him. By 1931, they were already replacing the SA in most official capacities, which is part of what led to friction between the groups. The SS was not only far more loyal but a more refined force as well, meant for security rather than attacks, and was a move away from the brutish and insurrectionist tactics of the SA.

The SA, on the other hand, desired to be the party vanguard. An army that would supersede every other military organization in Germany and form a Napoleonic-style people's army or a levy-en-masse. While any such scenario would be purely hypothetical, as the Nazi party would collapse after 1931, the best evidence as to the hypothetical success of such an SA levy-military would best be illustrated by the events in Danzig, that sealed their party’s collapse.”

- The Brown & The Red: Fascism and Communism in Germany in the 20th Century, Toni Greene


“Word traveled fast of the events in Danzig. Two hours after the bombing had taken place, and subsequent martial law had been established by the Volkstag, the Polish army was mobilizing in the territory outside of the free city.

Inside Danzig itself, the SA was now patrolling the streets alongside the police. Until the ‘perpetrators’ had been found there would be martial law in the city. However, the acting President of the provisional senate assured the leader of Poland, that they would be able to get things under control. However, despite the tense atmosphere surrounding Danzig, neither side had a massive aversion to open hostilities. They were not thrilled at the prospect of a battle and subsequent loss of life and probably loss of face, but there was not the same danger surrounding fighting in Danzig that was presented by the Rhineland or Dalmatian coast, the invasions of which could easily spiral into a new great war.

From the perspective of Polish commanders, if they won they had ample excuse to dissolve the city and annex it at last with little trouble. If they somehow lost, they’d just regather strength and attack again later, they had replenishable equipment and manpower, but the SA did not. On the SA side, they were absolutely hoping for a fight, even knowing they would, without a doubt, lose. Forster only cared about a glorious propaganda victory, and he based his strategy almost entirely on Gabriele D'Annunzio’s regency in Fiume. He envisioned himself and the Danzig SA returning to Germany with a hero’s welcome, having killed thousands of Polish troops in a defiant defense, something that would catapult the NSDAP to victory. In short, a fight was absolutely imminent in Danzig, which contributed to a sense of almost calm acceptance of the current situation there.

The NSDAP back in Germany on the other hand, was in a state of complete hysteria. While Hess had promised Forster an effective ‘blank cheque’ with Hitler’s stamp of approval. Hitler, on the other hand, had not written off on this. He had not heard a single word of what Forster was planning, as the Gauleiter had neglected to alert the party officials of his plan once it was set into motion. This meant when a bomb went off in Danzig, and the SA suddenly seized control of the entire city, the Nazis had to drop everything they were doing and conduct damage control. This mostly consisted of a raging Hitler attempting to get in touch with Forster who had very conveniently cut most of the radio lines into Danzig, as well as the Nazis trying to shut down their own rallies as nationalists and pro-Forster Nazis came out into the streets waving swastikas in support of the takeover, which was extremely concerning as it could lead to the Weimar taking action under the assumption that Hitler actually had sponsored the putsch. Hitler didn’t need to worry about the government coming down on them immediately, as, of all the groups who had something to gain or lose during the Danzig putsch, it was the Weimar who would gain the most out of the ordeal.”

- Republic of Weimar, by Franklin McAdoo


“Danzig was everything that the Weimar government could’ve possibly required at that exact moment. The Reich government had been floating the idea for over a year of putting out an arrest warrant for Hitler, he had a long list already of unconstitutional acts that warranted such a response but had blocked the Prussian Free State police from carrying it out. The Nazis were, at this point, still endeared to the population, and attempting to forcibly disband them could invoke resistance and give the appearance that the government was losing its grip and becoming paranoid. They needed ample justification for them to swoop in and mop up the Nazis. Thanks to Forster, they now had one. All they had to do was wait for something to give.

Both the President and his cabinet knew without a shadow of a doubt that Forster would come to one of two conclusions. He would either claim Danzig for Germany, again taking a page from D’Annunzio’s book, or he would attempt to spark a conflict in the corridor with Polish forces. If he did either of these things, the Weimar could mobilize against him and step in to restore order in Danzig. So sure enough when Forster's address to the city came through on the radio, declaring Danzig once again in the hands of Germans, the army was given the green light and marched right over the border. It was a shock to the SA in Danzig when the German Reichswehr marched in not with the intent to aid them, but to disarm and arrest them. Firefights quickly broke out between the SA and the Army, with the battle lasting just over three hours. When the news finally came through that Forster had been apprehended, the Prussian police issued an arrest warrant for the ‘masterminds’ behind the Danzig putsch, the Nazi party had now been outlawed.”

- The Years of Anarchy: Germany from 1929-1932, David Schmidt
 
Last edited:
Pro tip: If your keyboard layout doesn't support ä/ö/ü, the acceptable alternative spelling is ae/oe/ue. Not a/o/u.

Also I have no idea where "Mursberg" is supposed to be. Mursberg is a castle hill in Austria, and Mürsberg is a Chemnitz neighborhood. Did you conflate Munich and Nuremberg?
Oh my god, I just realized it was Mursberg. It's meant to be Merseburg, which was a historically communist-voting state.
 
I find it unlikely that Jarres would go against Article 48. Even the Social Democrats, Ebert in particular, resorted to Article 48 in order to pass legislation, and Stresemann did not have any objections towards the article itself, given that he used it during his government to remove the SPD-KPD coalition governments in Saxony and Thuringia, and Jarres was to my knowledge more to the right than Stresemann.
This is inherently quite OOC; however, from what I could find on those who opposed Article 48, Streseman seemed to be one of the only prominent oppositionists to it. Jarres was deposed by the nazis after they came to power which doesn't necessarily make him good but it does make him not far-right enough for them. Being a part of the same party and quite close, if I remember correctly, I thought Streseman could influence Jarres into becoming more centrist as president. But idk. If you have more info on this I'd like to take a look! But I'm sticking to my scenario.
 
This is inherently quite OOC; however, from what I could find on those who opposed Article 48, Streseman seemed to be one of the only prominent oppositionists to it. Jarres was deposed by the nazis after they came to power which doesn't necessarily make him good but it does make him not far-right enough for them. Being a part of the same party and quite close, if I remember correctly, I thought Streseman could influence Jarres into becoming more centrist as president. But idk. If you have more info on this I'd like to take a look! But I'm sticking to my scenario.
Having read Stresemann’s biography, I can’t remember him being too opposed to Article 48, at least not enough for it to be mentioned prominently. In fact, he used it in cooperation with Ebert to rule during the Ruhr crisis, so I think he would quite appreciate why it is there.
 
Having read Stresemann’s biography, I can’t remember him being too opposed to Article 48, at least not enough for it to be mentioned prominently. In fact, he used it in cooperation with Ebert to rule during the Ruhr crisis, so I think he would quite appreciate why it is there.
What's the title of that? I'd like to check it out myself, as honestly, Streseman is a very interesting pre-war figure in Germany and I'd love to do more research!
 
What's the title of that? I'd like to check it out myself, as honestly, Streseman is a very interesting pre-war figure in Germany and I'd love to do more research!

Here. It’s available in the usual less-than-legal sites or PM me and I’ll send you the file.
 

Here. It’s available in the usual less-than-legal sites or PM me and I’ll send you the file.
Sorry for replying so late; thanks again dude! I've made a few edits to the story to make it somewhat more believable.
 
Chapter 5: March of the Brownshirts New
Chapter 5: March of the Brownshirts

“Hitler’s arrest was the most publicized event in German history to this day. You can still cheaply purchase century-old newspapers from the era reporting on the day it happened because of how many copies had been printed. The quickest rising nationalist in Germany had practically overnight gone tumbling down. The charges levied against him by the government included multiple ‘unconstitutional acts’ namely the inciting of political violence by way of the SA.

Hitler would have very easily been able to worm his way out of these charges, however. In later memoirs he would lament his sentence as being avoidable. He could absolutely prove he had no part in the putsch in Danzig, and his past crimes in which the SA played a large role could be definitely hand-waved if he could provide evidence of the benefit they’d brought to German public security.

That isn’t to say Hitler would have escaped prison. Even without the events that followed his arrest, the SA was still an organization responsible for extreme use of violence and civil disruption and would’ve likely been disbanded regardless, along with the Nazi party even had they not responded the way they did. However, Hitler could’ve still easily reorganized the Nazis under a different name, just as they had before, their operations would have been damaged, but not irreparable had the SA simply complied with their leader's arrest. But as we know, they did not.

- Republic of Weimar, by Franklin McAdoo


“The SA was in shock when the Police showed up at the Gau headquarters in Berlin to arrest Hitler and several other Nazis. Many were still hopped up on the high provided by Forster's attempted putsch in Danzig. They reportedly attempted to heckle the Police officers arresting Hitler, only managing to succeed in breaking their own noses and a near-brawl in the middle of the street. But the seeds of discontent were already being sown. Some of the SA leadership decided to wait out the storm. See if Hitler would have any orders for them when or if he released a statement. However for a large portion of them. They chose not to wait at all.

Christian Weber was among those who attempted to rile up the SA after Hitler's arrest. Weber was a notorious Nazi, and despite having Hitler’s ear, was especially known for his personal corruption and desire for self-enrichment. Weber was one of the few left after the arrests were carried out, with most of the Nazi's heads, like Himmler, Hitler, Goebbels, and Rohm, all thrown in jail. Without waiting for a go-ahead and against the advice of his colleagues, Weber threw an impromptu rally in the middle of Berlin and demanded that the SA and SS mobilize a putsch to overthrow the supposedly corrupt government. While Weber would later defend himself as a ‘proud Hitlerite’ nowhere in his original speech, which was recorded by a sympathetic director whom he had paid off, did he advocate for his leader's release instead of stressing the time for a revolution against the Weimar.

Weber, a member of the old guard of the party, was successful in recreating the Beer Hall Putsch in which he had participated almost a decade prior. He gained support quickly in Berlin. The SA in Berlin quickly converged on the police station there. At 5:00 PM shots were heard being exchanged between the police and SA. By 7:00 PM, Article 48 had been enacted by the Reichstag. By 8:00 PM, shooting was echoing in the streets.”

- The Years of Anarchy: Germany from 1929-1932, David Schmidt


Ҥ1 In the event of a State not fulfilling the obligations imposed upon it by the Reich Constitution or by the laws of the Reich, the president of the Reich may make use of the state police to compel it to do so.
§2 If public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered within the German Reich (defined in Paragraph 5), the president of the Reich may take measures necessary for their restoration, intervening if need be with the assistance of the armed forces. For this purpose, he may suspend for a pre-determined period, in part, the fundamental rights provided in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153. The period may be re-approved by the Reichstag if public order has not been restored by that point.
§3 The president of the Reich must first inform the Reichstag without delay before any and all measures are to be taken in accordance with Paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article. These measures are to be revoked on the demand of the Reichstag.
§4 If the same conditions as presented in Paragraph 2 are present, a State government may, for its own territory, take temporary measures as provided in Paragraph 2. These measures are to be revoked on the demand of the president of the Reich or of the Reichstag.
§5 Endangerment or disruption of public security and order is defined as acts that willingly violate the current laws of the Reich, especially laws pertaining to the use of political violence or violence of a political nature, thereby waiving the rights listed in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153. [1]

- The amended version of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, amended June 5th, 1928


“Many historians make out the ‘March of the Brownshirts’ as the true final putsch of early Weimar history. In an almost worryingly heroic-sounding story of the woefully out-matched SA attempting to take on the colossal giant that was Weimar Germany. Some go as far as to call out the Weimar government for its use of Article 48, despite making significant moves to have it reduced and, in the case of the SPD, outright removed only years prior. These founding myths of the far-right are not only argumentative fallacies, but historical ones as well.

The SA was not necessarily outmatched; there were hundreds of them in Berlin during the putsch, and their numbers, compared to that of the police, proved a sizeable threat. However, the march was not some glorious last stand for the SA, it was more like a dying gasp of breath for the whole movement. The SA had barely any guns between them and were woefully underprepared to take on the Police in Berlin, who were not only better trained, more experienced, and better armed. But also had predicted the SA response would not be one of calm moderation and had begun preparing for a violent civil disruption hours before the putsch happened, even warning nearby neighborhoods to vacate the area in fear of them getting caught in the crossfire. Even then, many would still die at the hands of the SA.

When the march began at around 5:00 in the afternoon, with the sun setting, the German police were out in droves at barricades and as soon as it became clear the SA intended violent action, shooting erupted. The president was not long after contacted by the chief of police who informed him of the violence in the streets. At this point, it is also important to note another myth perpetrated by the far-right of Germany. Which is that President Jarres had planned to lure the SA with Hitler's arrest as bait. While it is true Jarres intentionally did not suppress the Nazi demonstrations earlier in the day during Forster's putsch in Danzig, it is simply untrue that he needlessly continued to put lives on the line after the arrests had been carried out. Jarres was still a German chauvinist, and he belonged to a conservative party, the DVP. While they had distanced themselves from hardline nationalism, Jarres was a far cry from an anti-Nazi. He still thought that the SA would simply stand down after their leadership collapsed, and that miscalculation would still cost him the next election. For the time being, however, it gave ample reason for the Reichstag to support Article 48 being put into action.

Article 48, even after being amended by the Reichstag in 1928, was a controversial law. It presented the potential to be harmful to German democracy and, even in its revised state, created friction, most especially between the police and armed forces. The ‘NDR’ had attempted to put the old law back in place during the Constitutional Crisis, which is what actually led to the Armed Forces disobeying the order, and likely saving the German government from collapse. There is a case to be made that Article 48 would also unknowingly save the German government during the March of the Brownshirts; however, once again, this relies upon the narrative that the Brownshirts had any real chance of overthrowing the German government. There were firefights between them and the police, yes, and sporadic shootouts persisted until the morning. But the SA never had a chance against a well-prepared and cohesive force. The ‘March of the Brownshirts’ by the time it ended sometime around 7:00 in the morning on September 23rd, would only succeed in ensuring the end of the Nazi party.”

- The Brown & The Red: Fascism and Communism in Germany in the 20th Century, Toni Greene


[1] Again, like with the economy thing from earlier chapters, I am REALLY bad with legal lingo. If anyone has better knowledge on this and could help edit, I’d be open to that, but the basics are just that the law is no longer as broadly sweeping in use, nor as centered around the president, nor does it give power to the Armed Forces but, instead to the Weimar police.
 
Last edited:
Really great stuff, I'm very much enjoying this.
I wouldn't worry too much about legal lingo. Can always argue that its a "in the spirit of", rather than direct translation of the original German text. Very interesting how its turning out. I wonder how the Poles are reacting to the Weimar intervention in Danzig. Do they see it as a legitimate means of suppressing rebellious ultranationalists, or do they suspect that its a false flag to allow the German army to occupy Danzig? In which case we may get a fight between the white and black eagles.
What was the reaction of Germans living within Polish borders to the rebellion? Or those in the Sudetenland for that matter. What is happening with the Ruhr and Rhineland? Is technology exchange still going on with the Soviets? AAAARGH so many questions you'll have to post more to answer them!

Haha little episode aside, its a really compelling story so far. Looking forward to more of it.
 
Really great stuff, I'm very much enjoying this.
I wouldn't worry too much about legal lingo. Can always argue that its a "in the spirit of", rather than direct translation of the original German text. Very interesting how its turning out. I wonder how the Poles are reacting to the Weimar intervention in Danzig. Do they see it as a legitimate means of suppressing rebellious ultranationalists, or do they suspect that its a false flag to allow the German army to occupy Danzig? In which case we may get a fight between the white and black eagles.
What was the reaction of Germans living within Polish borders to the rebellion? Or those in the Sudetenland for that matter. What is happening with the Ruhr and Rhineland? Is technology exchange still going on with the Soviets? AAAARGH so many questions you'll have to post more to answer them!

Haha little episode aside, its a really compelling story so far. Looking forward to more of it.
All in good time my friend, wait and see!
 
Top