Plausibility of US recapture of Wake Island in 1943
- Thread starter danwild6
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The Marshall Islands were seized to provide land based air power to cover the fleet during their approach to seize the Marianas. The Marshalls themselves would have been isolated by the airbase on Betio.
I suppose that airbase and the garrison on Tarawa could have been isolate and bypassed like Wake, or Rabul but I don't think the Navy`s doctrine was there yet.
I suppose that airbase and the garrison on Tarawa could have been isolate and bypassed like Wake, or Rabul but I don't think the Navy`s doctrine was there yet.
The US overestimated the threat from the Gilbert's against the flank of the trans Pacific offensive, it underestimated the difficulty in capturing Betio island. The other islands in the Tarawa atoll were easy money, so In hindsight Betio could have been isolated & the Gilbert's still nuetralized as a flank threat.
Wake had some small utility as a recon base but lacked the large anchorage & sq kilometers to make a large base.
More islands in the Marshals & elsewhere might have been by passed had it been understood how weak the Japanese fleet really was.
I wonder if in hindsight, and I stress, in hindsight, the USN could have simply made their offensive Wake Island - Iwo Jima - Okinawa / Formosa route, bypassing Marianas altogether?
Right, I was more address the point of why Tarawa and not Wake. Japan's capture of Wake relegated it to a strategic backwater, of little value, to the United States. The Marianas became a means to both get bomber bases for the B-29 program and to isolate Imperial Japan's forces in SE Asia, the Philippines, and China by controlling the sea lanes.
As I tried to point out earlier, Wake lacked the large sheltered anchorage or sq kilometers for a airbase of any significant value. Its useful as a reconnoissance base, or a transit station in 1941 standards. But, Wake could not handle the volume contained in the 1943-45 fleet train or the quantities of aircraft. I'd have to do a bit of measuring to see if there was enough space on the islands for a B29 class runway. Iwo Jima has the same basic problem, there is no large sheltered anchorage. It lacked the coral reefs and atoll island structure that made for breakwaters.
The islands captured in the Marshals provided some value as forward bases for the more important Marianas operations.
In 1949 the island had 7000 feet runway. A look from a nautical map at least betrays a very shallow lagoon. Naturally, in a Marshalls-Wake-Iwo Jima - Okinawa operation the strategic bombing campaign could only commence after capture of Okinawa. But then again, in June 1944 these islands were quite defenseless compared to situation further down the road, and there's no plausible way IJN could extract the US forces from there. Iwo Jima had enough air field space for at least the historic five fighter groups.
Part of the Wake Contractors job was to dredge out the harbor for ships and subs plus build a seaplane ramp. The coral was tough and between that, lack of equipment and slow deliveries of supplies none of this was completed. Guam on the other hand had a very nice harbor and plenty of room for large airstrips so it made a LOT more sense to take that...
I won't dispute excellent qualities of Marianas as logistics base, but if it were possible to bypass them, it would mean even better opportunities to outflank Japanese Empire and to cut her economic lifelines decisively. In real life when playing with real men (and few women), it's more tempting to take gradual and logical approach, though.
I trained on Tinian island in 1984, & spent a couple weeks on Guam. The differences in scale between those & Wake are enormous. I suspect just the several runways and taxiways on Tinian had more square kilometers than all the sans spits of Wake combined.
Sure, 'if it were possible'. But it was not, even with the large fleet train. That still required very large anchorages and shore facilities. Had the fleet train not existed the time required for the Central Pacfic offensive could have been extended a year or more. The USN would have had to build up larger forward shoreside and port facilities in Micronesia, and rotate ships back to Oahu and the US more often.
A careful examination of the Pacific map/s might give some insight into the question of flanks and approaches. That connects directly to the logistics question, specifically the days a cargo ship is tied up delivering each ton. This was a serious problem with the S Pac campaigns.
The lagoon at Wake might be lucky to take more then two or three decent sized ships at best. Definitely not cruisers, carriers, or battleships, even back in WW2.
By contrast, Apra Harbor on Guam is large enough that in more recent years it's rare but not unheard of to see a Nimitz class CVN plus escorts occasionally going into port there once in a while.
McPherson
Banned
It is not until late 1944 that the USN solves the problem of transferring heavy and large loads of ammunition AT SEA underway from ammunition ships to warships. Before then they had to have secure anchorages where transhipment of ammunition between anchored ships was possible. THAT was why Betio, That was why bases in the Marshal and Gilbert Islands. Believe me, if Chu'uk or Rabaul could have been grabbed off, then sure a straight shot to the Philippines and Manila Bay and thence to the East Coast of China follows. Otherwise the Japanese air defense network of island airbases has to be neutralized and alternate anchorages seized as advanced logistics nodes as was done in the RTL..
The recapturing of Wake would be a symbolic victory at best and symbolic victories were not worth the lives
this goes into some detail, from the AAF perspective, about the distances & reasonings involved.
https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/1-50/AFD-090602-087.pdf
https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/1-50/AFD-090602-087.pdf
Might Wake have been recaptured if the Guadalcanal operation not have happened? I don't recall what the plans were for the 1st Marine Division in 1942. Retake Wake sometime after the victory at Midway. Wake could provide a place to gain experience with an amphibious operation. Though is the risk (opportunity?) of the IJN interfering greater or lesser than at Guadalcanal?
McPherson
Banned
Wake does nothing to bring the IJN into an attrition battle or to carry the war forward. Guadalcanal was made to order for it.
McPherson
Banned
There is a reason Wake does not factor.
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-4eAL1vrTW...AHQY/9TTMeB-U354/s1600/Eniwetok+to+Ulithi.png
It simply is too small to support any tasking larger than an air outpost and/or forward submarine posting. All of the US logistics is oriented toward the Hebrides and into the Solomon Islands axis. The attack axes is NE not SW.