Normandy 1943

[Julian]

Always enjoyed these threads and I think its been a while since the topic was last discussed, so let's run through the number again.

So the setup is that at the Second Washington Conference (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Washington_Conference) the US and British decide on a modified strategy from OTL - the opening of a Second Front in France following the invasion of North Africa. The British agree to this plan on the basis of a US promise to expand the upcoming landings in North Africa (Torch) to include Bizerte and divert US divisions and shipping from the Southeast Pacific to New Guinea (20%) and Northwest Europe (80%) - Operation Cartwheel is cancelled as a result.

The US begins the appropriate planning to have a 90 division force in Europe by 1943-44, constructing shipping to support the landing, and shifting training and deployment schedules of existing divisions. Equipment for Free French and Brazilian divisions is shifted to US divisions instead. The North Atlantic Campaign is also altered, with the Allies intensifying efforts to clear shipping lanes to the UK.

So in late 1942 (November) Super Torch goes ahead and Tunisia is overrun in a coup de main. Rommel has to evacuate Libya in early December, losing 20% of his forces (Though conversely German divisions and aircraft destroyed in OTL Tunisia stick around). Stalingrad goes ahead and from reading Endgame at Stalingrad by David Glantz I think I can say with confidence that it still ends about as OTL. In any case, winter on the Eastern Front ends with the Soviets going over to the defensive in spring 1943 to prepare for a German offensive in the summer.

So the Germans start getting intel in spring 1943 that an invasion is going ahead somewhere - the big question being, where? Judging by how well Mincemeat went IOTL, I think the Allies do a great job simulating a building in the Med while completing their setup in Europe. So the Axis ends up with its reserves all over the place. Even in France, German reserves are spread to cover the South, Southwest, North, and Northeast.

Worse, Von Runstedt (Commander of OB West) had little faith in the Atlantic Wall or defenses at the beach. His belief was that his armored reserves should be kept in depth to launch counterattacks later, essentially abandoning a sizeable lodgement to the Allies.

Of course, the Germans could cancel Citadel and start shifting divisions West. However, this runs into two problems. One, Citadel was seen by Hitler as well as his non-military inner circle as a political necessity to shore up the confidence of the Axis allies (Who after Stalingrad were already considering a separate peace). Two, the Soviet government's intelligence had its fingers on the pulse of German strategic decision making via several spy rings. If Citadel gets cancelled, the Soviets are sure to go on the offensive - a bloody affair, but one which will tie down everything the Germans have in reserve and more. IOTL after allthe Germans had to strip everything but Italy bare in 1943 to keep the Eastern Front afloat.

I could keep posting but there's a lot to discuss already, take it away people!

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not equipping the French army is a non starter. But, I don't see it making a important difference here.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Always enjoyed these threads and I think its been a while since the topic was last discussed, so let's run through the number again.

So the setup is that at the Second Washington Conference (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Washington_Conference) the US and British decide on a modified strategy from OTL - the opening of a Second Front in France following the invasion of North Africa. The British agree to this plan on the basis of a US promise to expand the upcoming landings in North Africa (Torch) to include Bizerte and divert US divisions and shipping from the Southeast Pacific to New Guinea (20%) and Northwest Europe (80%) - Operation Cartwheel is cancelled as a result.

Operation CARTWHEEL as we know it was as much a product of the dropping of the 1943 invasion. Reducing the plans for the S Pacific in 1943 to a holding action frees up a lot of cargo shipping and material sent to support the offensive.

The US begins the appropriate planning to have a 90 division force in Europe by 1943-44,

May not be necessary. OTL the US committed a little over sixty infantry, airborne, and armored divisions to NW Europe & invading Germany. Another half dozen were used in Italy. The decision to reduce the number of Army ground forces divisions from 150 to 90 had to do in part with expanding the Army Air Force & Service Forces, so it may not be wise to stick to the original plan

constructing shipping to support the landing,

The German submarine offensives in the spring and summer of 1942 disrupted ship construction schedules. Cargo and amphib construction was postphoned to increase escort construction. Of course postphoning further offensive operations in the Mediteranean frees up the bulk of the amphib fleet there. By July 1943 there was enough of that to support Op HUSKY, which put a army group ashore across seven beaches in Sicilly vs five in the OTL Op NEPTUNE.

and shifting training and deployment schedules of existing divisions.

Yes stopping the transfer of the US 45th ID, 82d AB, & 2d Cav to the Med. Allows restarting the ground forces portion of Op BOLERO. Ditto for much of the 9th, 12th & 15th Air Forces strength sent to the Med in early to mid 1943. Transfering the 1st, 3rd, & 9th ID from the Med to the UK provides three divisions with extensive traning in amphibious warfare and one landing each under their belt.. Add in the US 5th ID in Iceland and the 28th ID in the UK and there are eight well trained US divisions ready. The Brits can come up with a similar number of infantry & armored divisions, so a initial army of 15 divisions is not difficult to locate. Additional forces from the US and Canada are possible, but I'm to lazy right now to look them up.

Equipment for Free French and Brazilian divisions is shifted to US divisions instead.

That material was not committed until the latter half of 1943. Beyond that liberated French territory became a source of motivated and in many cases trained soldiers. Having a pool of equipment and supplies set aside for this is a smart move.

The North Atlantic Campaign is also altered, with the Allies intensifying efforts to clear shipping lanes to the UK.

Executing Op TORCH splits the escorts between two routes. If there is negligable follow up in the Med. then escorts can return to the North Atlantic routes

So in late 1942 (November) Super Torch goes ahead and Tunisia is overrun in a coup de main. Rommel has to evacuate Libya in early December, losing 20% of his forces (Though conversely German divisions and aircraft destroyed in OTL Tunisia stick around).

Even if you dont overrun Tunisia the Allied force there can be reduced to a holding force. Once the Allies invade NW Europe the Germans are going to lose interest in that region.

Stalingrad goes ahead and from reading Endgame at Stalingrad by David Glantz I think I can say with confidence that it still ends about as OTL. In any case, winter on the Eastern Front ends with the Soviets going over to the defensive in spring 1943 to prepare for a German offensive in the summer.

So the Germans start getting intel in spring 1943 that an invasion is going ahead somewhere - the big question being, where? Judging by how well Mincemeat went IOTL, I think the Allies do a great job simulating a building in the Med while completing their setup in Europe. So the Axis ends up with its reserves all over the place. Even in France, German reserves are spread to cover the South, Southwest, North, and Northeast.

As they did OTL. Of course the reserves are much smaller in mid 1943. Of the field forces and static garrisons that existed in June 1944 40% either did not exist or were in the east in June 1943

Worse, Von Runstedt (Commander of OB West) had little faith in the Atlantic Wall or defenses at the beach. His belief was that his armored reserves should be kept in depth to launch counterattacks later, essentially abandoning a sizeable lodgement to the Allies.

In the summer of 1943 the construction of coastal fortifications was just starting & most simply did not exist. The ports were the only defended locations, with little more than observation posts on most of the beaches. By the summer of 1943 the Cotientin Penensula was defended by one static & two infantry divisions, vs the five of June 1944. There were no armored divisions posted within six hours march of the Normandy. beaches.

Of course, the Germans could cancel Citadel and start shifting divisions West. However, this runs into two problems. One, Citadel was seen by Hitler as well as his non-military inner circle as a political necessity to shore up the confidence of the Axis allies (Who after Stalingrad were already considering a separate peace). Two, the Soviet government's intelligence had its fingers on the pulse of German strategic decision making via several spy rings. If Citadel gets cancelled, the Soviets are sure to go on the offensive - a bloody affair, but one which will tie down everything the Germans have in reserve and more. IOTL after allthe Germans had to strip everything but Italy bare in 1943 to keep the Eastern Front afloat.

...

The German leaders certainly have a tough choice here.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Of course, the Germans could cancel Citadel and start shifting divisions West. However, this runs into two problems. One, Citadel was seen by Hitler as well as his non-military inner circle as a political necessity to shore up the confidence of the Axis allies (Who after Stalingrad were already considering a separate peace).

Much of Hitler's military inner-circle advisors were also advocating for the attack on the Eastern Front, even if they weren't advocating for Citadel specifically. Whether that would be true if there was a genuine expectation of a landing in France (which represents a much greater military danger to the Reich then one in Sicily) is rather uncertain.

Two, the Soviet government's intelligence had its fingers on the pulse of German strategic decision making via several spy rings. If Citadel gets cancelled, the Soviets are sure to go on the offensive - a bloody affair, but one which will tie down everything the Germans have in reserve and more. IOTL after all the Germans had to strip everything but Italy bare in 1943 to keep the Eastern Front afloat.

The Soviets more liable to wait for the Germans to strip out those forces before going on the offensive. As it was, only a single panzer corps being in the exact right place, at the exact right time through sheer chance made a difference between Army Group South merely losing at 4th Kharkov as opposed to suffering a catastrophic encirclement on top of that loss.

 

[Julian]

I think the political calculus of Citadel matters a lot. In Spring 1943, Hitler was aware that his allies were all seeking a separate peace. The only way to shore up the Axis alliance in his mind was to launch a successful offensive in the East. So I think even if Citadel isn't a go a smaller scale offensive will still occur, plans for which existed IOTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The question of Op CITADEL leads back to the German dilemma of where to place their strategic weight. Perhaps the political goals can be accomplished by destroying a invasion of Western Europe. I guess choosing that course depends on the whim of the Grofaz.

 

[Julian]

The question of Op CITADEL leads back to the German dilemma of where to place their strategic weight. Perhaps the political goals can be accomplished by destroying a invasion of Western Europe. I guess choosing that course depends on the whim of the Grofaz.

The most recent volume of Germany and the Second World War discusses the thinking behind this question in some depth. Hitler's thinking in 1944 was that he needed to win a big victory in the West - defeating the invasion - to then allow for a decisive counterstroke in the East. In 1943 the situation was reversed - win a quick victory in the East to shore up the front there, then shift West to defeat an invasion. But if a big invasion is predicted for summer 1943 then perhaps Hitler will start hoping for a decisive victory there.

The overall problem I think is the limiting factor of manpower. The Nazis don't have the resources to destroy a Western invasion and simultaneously keep the Eastern Front from collapsing. I think we end up with the same situation in 1943 we saw in OTL 1944 - Nazi Germany commits enough resources to make the Western Front a battle of attrition which it will lose within 2-3 months, while at the same time taking enough away from the East to induce collapse.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The most recent volume of Germany and the Second World War discusses the thinking behind this question in some depth.... - win a quick victory in the East to shore up the front there, then shift West to defeat an invasion. But if a big invasion is predicted for summer 1943 then perhaps Hitler will start hoping for a decisive victory there. ...

At this point my take is when Hitler was faced with these decisions he resorted to half measures, splitting the difference and covering neither option suffciently. Maybe a expert can show me otherwise, but right now I'm guessing that given the probabillity of a attack in NW Europe in the summer or Autum of 43 he'd divide the reserves in both directions.

 

[thaddeus]

would like to know how 1943 invasion of France would affect the spike in AFV and aircraft production that occurred IOTL 1943 - 1944? could they quickly be to point of no replacements irregardless of fuel situation?

(betraying a certain limited knowledge here but the logistics for their production network ... maybe not affected while fighting in Ukraine and Italy ... can operate ... but everything overloaded when fighting on their doorstep?)

 

[Julian]

At this point my take is when Hitler was faced with these decisions he resorted to half measures, splitting the difference and covering neither option suffciently. Maybe a expert can show me otherwise, but right now I'm guessing that given the probabillity of a attack in NW Europe in the summer or Autum of 43 he'd divide the reserves in both directions.

Yeah, Hitler's problem was that he was a gambler focused on winning a big victory to turn things around, but was also too timid. He pathologically took big risks but often didn't back them up appropriately. So Germany definitely ends up losing big in the East AND West in 1943.

would like to know how 1943 invasion of France would affect the spike in AFV and aircraft production that occurred IOTL 1943 - 1944? could they quickly be to point of no replacements irregardless of fuel situation?

(betraying a certain limited knowledge here but the logistics for their production network ... maybe not affected while fighting in Ukraine and Italy ... can operate ... but everything overloaded when fighting on their doorstep?)

Adam Tooze thinks that the RAF Ruhr bombing campaign of spring 1943 significantly retarded German armaments growth in 1943. If there was a shift towards transportation bombing to pave the way for invasion, this might not occur.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

would like to know how 1943 invasion of France would affect the spike in AFV and aircraft production that occurred IOTL 1943 - 1944? ...

A complex question that I'll take on the fly. My guess is this would not affect production, at least until latter in 1944. OTL what ended the rise in German production was the massive bombing from mid or later 1944. What collapsed it was the attack in the German transportation system in the winter/spring of 1945.

In John Ellis 'Brute Force' there is a chart showing the increases in Allied tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany and the changes in German industrial output. The latter rises relatively unimpeded to early 1944, then levels off as the year passes. The corellation between the massive increase in bomber sorties/tons dropped in 1944 and the change in production is striking. Of course corellation does not automatically equal causuallity, but is difficult to dismiss in this case.

So perhaps the difference would be if a 1943 invasion of NW Europe increased or decreased bombing of Germany in 1944, or 1943?

 

[thaddeus]

would like to know how 1943 invasion of France would affect the spike in AFV and aircraft production that occurred IOTL 1943 - 1944? could they quickly be to point of no replacements irregardless of fuel situation?

(betraying a certain limited knowledge here but the logistics for their production network ... maybe not affected while fighting in Ukraine and Italy ... can operate ... but everything overloaded when fighting on their doorstep?)

Adam Tooze thinks that the RAF Ruhr bombing campaign of spring 1943 significantly retarded German armaments growth in 1943. If there was a shift towards transportation bombing to pave the way for invasion, this might not occur.

A complex question that I'll take on the fly. My guess is this would not affect production, at least until latter in 1944. OTL what ended the rise in German production was the massive bombing from mid or later 1944. What collapsed it was the attack in the German transportation system in the winter/spring of 1945.

In John Ellis 'Brute Force' there is a chart showing the increases in Allied tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany and the changes in German industrial output. The latter rises relatively unimpeded to early 1944, then levels off as the year passes. The corellation between the massive increase in bomber sorties/tons dropped in 1944 and the change in production is striking. Of course corellation does not automatically equal causuallity, but is difficult to dismiss in this case.

So perhaps the difference would be if a 1943 invasion of NW Europe increased or decreased bombing of Germany in 1944, or 1943?

had in mind the snafu of V-2 production that created shortage(s) of critical components and overloaded delivery network affecting aircraft production ... was projecting a massive redeployment from Eastern Front to Western doing same?

sounds as though offset by Allied reorientation to supporting invasion? (not optional decision for Allies after invasion)

an interesting offshoot of this is what ancillary "projects" of Germany never get to production? specifically the V-weapons being timed to disrupt an invasion (missed their timetable) and the rocket and jet fighters.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Those variables are difficult to predict. We can look at somewhat similar events, or study numbers & sometimes those give a indication.

As you point out, the V1 production was ready to start in 1943. Assuming it continues how will the Germans use that weapon if the Allied lodgment prevents it from launched in range of the British isles?

... and overloaded delivery network affecting aircraft production ... was projecting a massive redeployment from Eastern Front to Western doing same?

....

There was a lot of railway traffic back and forth across Germany as spent units were sent west & rebuilt units redeployed to the east, or Italy. Maybe a study of what that cost vs the gross railway traffic would give a clue? Unfortunatly I've nothing for that on my shelf, or bookmarked websites.

 

[basileus]

Macarthur will scream louder than the Screaming Eagles. Halsey, too, won't be pleased. The Japanese in Rabaul could aso try something - I can see a Coral Seas 2.0 in the making.

 

[nbcman]

Wouldn't the US trying to maximize their available divisions for a French invasion in 1943 impact future army strength? Many of the divisions that were organized before US entry as well as some of the earliest divisions which were formed post US entry had cadres stripped out to form the basis for the later divisions (about 55 divisions including the majority of the US Armored divisions). If the US is focusing on having an army ready by mid-1943, there probably will not be enough cadres available to organize any additional divisions after Sept 1942 which would remove at least 22 Infantry/Mountain divisions and about 6 Armored divisions according to this chart of when US divisions were organized. So the US will go into France early but will have an army strength 60 divisions or so-and a substantial portion of those divisions had barely completed their divisional training by early 1943. I would also expect a similar reduction in USAAF strength as well as insufficient airfields prepared to accommodate the prematurely enlarged USAAF in the UK.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

More effort would have to be made in the Battle of the Atlantic with more suitable 4 engine aircraft shifted from Bomber Command to Coastal Command earlier and the same for the USAAF

I suspect that most if not all of the Liberators would be shifted to the ASW role in 43.

Also Bomber Command and the USAAF would have their bombing priorities shifted to include the destruction of anything U-boat related

Its absolutely vital that the movement of supplies be increased and be 'safer' relative to OTL and therefore the number of Sinking's decreased in 1943 in order to allow for the build up of Troops and equipment in the UK for a 1943 Overlord

To this end Torch and Subsequent Med ops would have to be curtailed and the Artic Convoys (each of which was a major Naval operation) would have to be reduced or done away with (with the upshot that those supplies would go towards the build up of forces in the UK) - Uncle Stalin will not be pleased - although opening a 2nd front in France should more than soften such a blow!

Also the Pacific may be further 'robbed' of resources and OTL ops may be delayed or not happen until later in the war.

As for subsequent ops in the Pacific - an earlier defeat of Germany would entail an earlier much larger build up of Forces in the Pacific.

Once a landing has been made and initial success achieved then I would expect peace feelers sent out to the Italians and other Allies of Germany.

Offer 'conditional' terms and they would be more willing to acquiesce

 

[Julian]

Wouldn't the US trying to maximize their available divisions for a French invasion in 1943 impact future army strength? Many of the divisions that were organized before US entry as well as some of the earliest divisions which were formed post US entry had cadres stripped out to form the basis for the later divisions (about 55 divisions including the majority of the US Armored divisions). If the US is focusing on having an army ready by mid-1943, there probably will not be enough cadres available to organize any additional divisions after Sept 1942 which would remove at least 22 Infantry/Mountain divisions and about 6 Armored divisions according to this chart of when US divisions were organized. So the US will go into France early but will have an army strength 60 divisions or so-and a substantial portion of those divisions had barely completed their divisional training by early 1943. I would also expect a similar reduction in USAAF strength as well as insufficient airfields prepared to accommodate the prematurely enlarged USAAF in the UK.

I think the problem of training cadres can be reduced by the reduction of Army forces deployed to the Pacific. The US Army's spring plan foresaw a 1,000,000-man deployment to the UK within a year, obviously curtailed by later changes in strategy. If a summer 1942 decision is made for an invasion, an initial force of 15-20 divisions is already available with OTL's resources - growth by another 40 divisions by Fall 1943 is I think fairly reasonable without putting undue strain on the Air Force or reducing training compared to OTL's. The US Army's ability to support large air group's in logistically difficult North Africa makes me think that setting up in the UK is a very reasonable enterprise.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Wouldn't the US trying to maximize their available divisions for a French invasion in 1943 impact future army strength? Many of the divisions that were organized before US entry as well as some of the earliest divisions which were formed post US entry had cadres stripped out to form the basis for the later divisions (about 55 divisions including the majority of the US Armored divisions). If the US is focusing on having an army ready by mid-1943, there probably will not be enough cadres available to organize any additional divisions after Sept 1942 which would remove at least 22 Infantry/Mountain divisions and about 6 Armored divisions according to this chart of when US divisions were organized. So the US will go into France early but will have an army strength 60 divisions or so-and a substantial portion of those divisions had barely completed their divisional training by early 1943. I would also expect a similar reduction in USAAF strength as well as insufficient airfields prepared to accommodate the prematurely enlarged USAAF in the UK.

This is one of the most difficult items to get around. I've not yet done a detailed exam of when assorted divisions were ready. It certainly would slow the training of the new divisions, tho I can't see it limiting the US Army to only 60. I would note the National Guard units were not split for cadres like the Regular Army units repeatedly were. Thats one of the reasons so many NG divisions were sent overseas in 1942.

I would note that this proposed invasion occurring in the summer of 1943 comes after nearly all the 90 ground combat divisions of OTL were authorized. Marshal made his decision to cap the US Army strength at 90 in mid 1943 & only five or six GC divisions required cadre after that. I'd have to go back to the books to see how many cadre were required between Jan 43 & Marshals cut off.

The other part of this question would be the number required. OTL the US Army won its portion of the 1944 battle of France with less than forty divisions. It invaded Germany in 1945 with approx 60. What the US actually needs to contribute to 1943 campaign depends on what the Germans counter with, and the Allied goals. OTL the Germans had fewer combat units in the west in 1943 and a lot fewer motor or mechanized units. Only after stripping reserves from the east, concentrating the unused units from the Med, and training the new units formed after mid 1943 can the Germans reach the OTL strength they had in France in 1944. So the US does not need to rush 60 infantry and armored divisions across the Atlantic right away. Second, if the strategic goal is only to gradually build up and prepare for the killer offensive in the early spring of 1944 then a lodgment of only 30 to 40 US and Commonwealth divisions is needed ashore.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

More effort would have to be made in the Battle of the Atlantic with more suitable 4 engine aircraft shifted from Bomber Command to Coastal Command earlier and the same for the USAAF

OTL it only took 24-36 operational VLR aircraft to tip the balance. Depends on who's numbers you draw on, but the Brit air wing that started covering the mid Atlantic Gap in 1943 amounted to a weeks heavy bomber losses from the raids on Germany. Monthly training losses of heavy bombers in the US rivaled the commitment to ASW over the Altantic in 1943-43.

Also Bomber Command and the USAAF would have their bombing priorities shifted to include the destruction of anything U-boat related

The bomber barons claimed it was more efficient to attack cities in Germany. I think they missed the boat by not aggressively attacking the submarine bases before they were hardened & expanded.

Its absolutely vital that the movement of supplies be increased and be 'safer' relative to OTL and therefore the number of Sinking's decreased in 1943 in order to allow for the build up of Troops and equipment in the UK for a 1943 Overlord

One of the ugly little secrets of the BoA is that cargo lost was declining in proportion to cargo sent before the end of 1942. In 1942 slightly over 10% of the cargo embarked for the UK was sunk by submarine. by the start of 1943 that had declined substantially & the average for all of 1943 was about 5%. Before the end of 1942 the race between building new ships and those sunk was won as well. Fact is the Allies were close to winning in 1942 after the easy time off the coast of the US ended in August 42. Had the Allies applied the resources of 1943 earlier they would have achieved the results of March-May 1943 earlier in September-Nov 42.

To this end Torch and Subsequent Med ops would have to be curtailed and the Artic Convoys (each of which was a major Naval operation) would have to be reduced or done away with (with the upshot that those supplies would go towards the build up of forces in the UK) - Uncle Stalin will not be pleased - although opening a 2nd front in France should more than soften such a blow!

Yes, a 1943 campaign in NW Europe justifies cutting back in other theaters.

Once a landing has been made and initial success achieved then I would expect peace feelers sent out to the Italians and other Allies of Germany.

With the Italian economy in free fall, German reserves drawn off to France, and hopefully a decisive Allied response Getting the Italians out of the war should not be any more difficult than OTL

Keep in mind that once the Allied invasion is ashore in France & a port or two operational the amphib fleet is free to be used at other locations. Leaving the Brit 8th Army in the Med. as a core force for follow on operations in the autumn/winter of 43 complicates things for the Germans & keeps options open for the Allies. if Italian capitulation waives away the need for major amphib ops there, then the amphib fleet can be used for support ops on the French coast, or part sent to the Pacific on the OTL schedule.

 

[Look More Closely Later]

At this point my take is when Hitler was faced with these decisions he resorted to half measures, splitting the difference and covering neither option suffciently. Maybe a expert can show me otherwise, but right now I'm guessing that given the probabillity of a attack in NW Europe in the summer or Autum of 43 he'd divide the reserves in both directions.

Except isn't a Western Allied landing and potential front in Northern France in the summer of 1943, considerably more of a threat to Germany than the original timeline landing in Italy in 1943 (closer and and fewer mountains in the way), and wouldn't it make sense (if Hitler can be assumed to act sensibly) for an Allied landing in Northern France in 1943 to get considerably hotter a response in terms of units thrown into the battle against it than the Original Timeline Italian landings? To my own mind, at least, it ought (if we assume a sensibly acting Hitler) to be considerably less easy to be conflicted about a 1943 Northern France landing, and considerably more easy to give it highest priority.

Where Hitler would find the additional units to counterattack in the west from above and beyond the ones employed in the original timeline Italian campaign in 1943, I'm not sure; Norway? The east, on the basis that crush the western Allies in France, and that's all that the Axis will be hearing from them there, bar bombing raids for the next few years, and the east will be able to be given undivided attention?