Mandate of Syria and the Lebanon joins Free France in 1940

[Sport25ing]

General Mittelhauser, the military governor of Syria-Lebanon, wanted to join the British in the fight against Germany, but it later obey the new French government orders and switched to the Vichy - What if it didn't?

If Mittelhauser had disobey the Vichy government orders and joined the Free French, could most of the Middle East events during WWII be butterflied? And what forces could the French present in Syria use for the North African campaign (after switching most of its equipment with British-made due to logistic purposes, of course)

 

[Catspoke]

Some options:

The Free French could use those forces to try and flip Dijobouti from Vichy in 1940.

A free French force for Greece in 41.

A free French force for Operation compass, OR optionally: OTL, the British had to wait encircling Bardia, because the 4Th Indian was transferred to southern Sudan, here the French could be sent instead, keeping 4TH Indian in Libya.

 

[raharris1973]

Geez, the French commanders in Syria all sounded ....Alsatian?

Mittelhauser in 1940

Dentz at the time of surrender to the British in spring 1941

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Geez, the French commanders in Syria all sounded ....Alsatian?

Mittelhauser in 1940

Dentz at the time of surrender to the British in spring 1941

It is kinda funny how many commanders who fought the Germans had very German names, like Eisenhower (I imagine it was initially Eisenhauer) and Auckinleck.

 

[Lascaris]

For one thing Free France just inherited an army of 86,000 men since we are talking about the time of the armistice. And this is almost certainly followed by Djibouti so add another 8,000 men to the mix. Plus the Marine Nationale ships in Beirut.

 

[Kaiser of Brazil]

It is kinda funny how many commanders who fought the Germans had very German names, like Eisenhower (I imagine it was initially Eisenhauer) and Auckinleck.

And the French general who was in charge of defending the Ardennes and later signed the armistice in 1940 was named Charles  Hutzinger, if I didnt know better I would think he was a German plant from how incompetent the French defense in his sector was.

 

[Post]

And the French general who was in charge of defending the Ardennes and later signed the armistice in 1940 was named Charles  Hutzinger, if I didnt know better I would think he was a German plant from how incompetent the French defense in his sector was.

When I first started reading about WW2 (in my early teens) a lot of names confused me, not just the French ones mentioned, but also names like Guderian and Warlimont, which sounded French to me.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

For one thing Free France just inherited an army of 86,000 men since we are talking about the time of the armistice. And this is almost certainly followed by Djibouti so add another 8,000 men to the mix. Plus the Marine Nationale ships in Beirut.

I tend to concur with this analysis. For clarity, I assume this thread postulates Mittelhauser's decision as occurring after the signing of the Armistice on 22 June and before Operation Catapult on 3 July 1940. I also assume it is widely publicized.
In French Somaliland, the military commander, BG Paul Legentilhomme denounced the decision to seek an armistice on 18 June and vowed to continue fighting Germany. After Mers-el-Kebir, he lost the support of his subordinates and the political leadership of the Protectorate and was forced into Exile to join the Free French on 2 August. If the Mittelhauser decision is made as postulated; this sequence of events is reversed. French Somaliland is firmly in the Free French camp.
In Indochina, Governor-General Georges Catroux also opposed the Armistice, and although relieved by the Vichy Government on 25 June, refused to leave office until 20 July. I have little doubt Catroux would have quickly joined Mittelhauser and Legentilhomme in this scenario.
The question then is whether Operation Catapult would have gone forward as in the OTL. There would be a strong hope that French North Africa, and with it the French Fleet might join the renewed fight from exile against Germany. I think the analysis then shifts to focus on that point of discussion.

 

[yulzari1]

Whatever the decisions of the top echelons the base level is illustrated by how few French soldiers left in Britain chose the Free French and a special German authorised convoy had to be sent to Morocco in 1940 to return the bulk to French service and similarly the bulk of the French soldiers of the Army in Syria and Lebanon also chose to return to France rather than join the Free French in 1941.

However disliked the Vichy government might have been the French population, as a whole, still regarded it as the legitimate successor to the government of France and were unwilling to risk the occupation of the rest of Metropolitan France. Until Operation Torch the Vichy government was still recognised as the legitimate French government by the United States until November 1942. The Gordian knot was eventually cut by the Commonwealth and American landings in Algeria and Morocco.

I mention this because the decisions of a few top level military and colonial governors will not necessarily translate into the same action by the troops. One might also note the viscous fighting of the French forces against the Commonwealth and Free French forces in Syria for over a month and in Madagascar it went on for five months. Also in French West Africa. There is more to it than the whims of colonial governors.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

One major effect is to eliminate the Iraqi attempt to overthrow the British protectorate in 1941, and the subsequent British campaign to depose the Vichy French government in Syria. These campaigns diverted considerable British forces from the North African campaign in the spring of 1941. If these forces had been available in Libya, it's possible that Operation BATTLEAXE in June may have succeeded in relieving Tobruk.

Even after the end of the fighting in Syria in July, the entire Australian 6th Division had to be stationed there as a garrison. Thus it was not available for Operation CRUSADER in November, nor for deployment to the Far East before the start of the Pacific War.

All this is of course besides the potential utility of the French forces in Syria. It's been pointed out that very few of these troops joined Free France after the OTL Syrian campaign, but OTL their commander did not lead them that way, and they had been fighting the British and Free French for over a month. ITTL they have not fought against the Allies, and their commander have decided for them. I don't see the French commander in Syria agreeing to let any of them repatriate to France, nor to allowing the native troops to desert.

So that will add a considerable number of troops to Allied forces in that theater. Equipping them will be difficult, but they could certainly be used to garrison Iraq and Iran, and on rear-echelon duties in North Africa.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Whatever the decisions of the top echelons the base level is illustrated by how few French soldiers left in Britain chose the Free French and a special German authorised convoy had to be sent to Morocco in 1940 to return the bulk to French service and similarly the bulk of the French soldiers of the Army in Syria and Lebanon also chose to return to France rather than join the Free French in 1941.

However disliked the Vichy government might have been the French population, as a whole, still regarded it as the legitimate successor to the government of France and were unwilling to risk the occupation of the rest of Metropolitan France. Until Operation Torch the Vichy government was still recognised as the legitimate French government by the United States until November 1942. The Gordian knot was eventually cut by the Commonwealth and American landings in Algeria and Morocco.

I mention this because the decisions of a few top level military and colonial governors will not necessarily translate into the same action by the troops. One might also note the viscous fighting of the French forces against the Commonwealth and Free French forces in Syria for over a month and in Madagascar it went on for five months. Also in French West Africa. There is more to it than the whims of colonial governors.

Points well taken. However, what you mention is largely a result of the quite visceral revulsion towards Great Britain after attacking Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar. I do not believe those attacks would be made in this scenario, hence a considerable reduction in this visceral revulsion.
Flip side I do not believe your comment can be summarily dismissed. I do not have much info on the French Army, in large part because most troops rescued at Dunkirk were already repatriated and had gone into the bag at the French surrender. In Syria, French Somaliland and French Indochina the majority of French forces were colonial troops (plus in Syria one regiment [6th] and one battalion [11th] of Foreign Legion ; and one regiment [5th] in French Indochina) - all of which would probably be relatively unaffected.
Prior to Operation catapult, French Navy recalled reservists with families in both Occupied and Unoccupied France preferred repatriation regardless of political leanings. On the other hand professional French sailors and recalled reservists without spouses/children tended to favour the Free French. Likewise French Air Force aircrew leaned towards continuing the fight, while ground crews were much less enthusiastic.
I think one tremendous unstated part of your comment would be how strong of a French Government in Exile would emerge, and how quickly. I would be interested in your opinion on that.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

Several Free French generals used false names to protect their families. It makes sense that ordinary soldiers with families would feel the same fear and be less likely to join Free French forces than those with no family or no close family. And of course they may wish to stay with their families to help support them.
These personal decisions need not be influenced by acceptance of Vichy government or acceptance of Nazi legitimacy in occupied France, although that would likely be a factor

 

[HJ Tulp]

In Indochina, Governor-General Georges Catroux also opposed the Armistice, and although relieved by the Vichy Government on 25 June, refused to leave office until 20 July. I have little doubt Catroux would have quickly joined Mittelhauser and Legentilhomme in this scenario.

I'm not 100% about Catroux to be honest. He gave up his resistance because the British wouldn't guarentee support against the Japanese, would this be different ATL?

 

[yulzari1]

Points well taken. However, what you mention is largely a result of the quite visceral revulsion towards Great Britain after attacking Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar. I do not believe those attacks would be made in this scenario, hence a considerable reduction in this visceral revulsion.
Flip side I do not believe your comment can be summarily dismissed. I do not have much info on the French Army, in large part because most troops rescued at Dunkirk were already repatriated and had gone into the bag at the French surrender. In Syria, French Somaliland and French Indochina the majority of French forces were colonial troops (plus in Syria one regiment [6th] and one battalion [11th] of Foreign Legion ; and one regiment [5th] in French Indochina) - all of which would probably be relatively unaffected.
Prior to Operation catapult, French Navy recalled reservists with families in both Occupied and Unoccupied France preferred repatriation regardless of political leanings. On the other hand professional French sailors and recalled reservists without spouses/children tended to favour the Free French. Likewise French Air Force aircrew leaned towards continuing the fight, while ground crews were much less enthusiastic.
I think one tremendous unstated part of your comment would be how strong of a French Government in Exile would emerge, and how quickly. I would be interested in your opinion on that.

A continuing original French Government in Exile carrying its legitimacy abroad with it would make a significant difference. Essentially there is no choice to be made between a Free French and Vichy government so that issue disappears and, without the OTL Armistice agreement, the concerns about maintaining an Unoccupied Zone also disappears as it never existed. Continuing the war against the Axis becomes a national duty and the colonies are required to maintain the war as part of the French in exile. This also brings the French fleet into action from its bases abroad, fleeing French ports so Mers El-Kebir never happens. Not to mention the French merchant fleet. The French Navy and Royal Navy are working together.

So there are French resources that can be deployed to Indo-China with British assistance and French Indo-China has the possibility of defending itself against Japanese incursions. Now the Burmese/ Malayan Japanese invasion is far more difficult and the joint fleets stand a good chance of being fit to meet the Japanese in battle at sea and winning. The purpose of the war for the Japanese is to seize Dutch and British oil resources. Their only chance of getting away with it are either throwing a long series of sixes on land or achieving a situation that leaves the USA holdings alone and keeping the war to only the British, Dutch and French Empires. Very unlikely but they have seen the USA standing aside whilst Europe falls to the Germans so there is some, very, tiny room to spin the concept to the Japanese government and military. The Soviet Union just wants any distraction to go away so, if the Japanese leave them alone they will do the same.

Regarding the OP, Lebanon and Syria would have no need to declare for the Free French as they are already, in the above scenario, part of the Allies.

 

[mike of mass]

One major effect is to eliminate the Iraqi attempt to overthrow the British protectorate in 1941, and the subsequent British campaign to depose the Vichy French government in Syria. These campaigns diverted considerable British forces from the North African campaign in the spring of 1941. If these forces had been available in Libya, it's possible that Operation BATTLEAXE in June may have succeeded in relieving Tobruk.

Even after the end of the fighting in Syria in July, the entire Australian 6th Division had to be stationed there as a garrison. Thus it was not available for Operation CRUSADER in November, nor for deployment to the Far East before the start of the Pacific War.

All this is of course besides the potential utility of the French forces in Syria. It's been pointed out that very few of these troops joined Free France after the OTL Syrian campaign, but OTL their commander did not lead them that way, and they had been fighting the British and Free French for over a month. ITTL they have not fought against the Allies, and their commander have decided for them. I don't see the French commander in Syria agreeing to let any of them repatriate to France, nor to allowing the native troops to desert.

So that will add a considerable number of troops to Allied forces in that theater. Equipping them will be difficult, but they could certainly be used to garrison Iraq and Iran, and on rear-echelon duties in North Africa.

Why would this eliminate the Iraqi Pro Nazi revolt? This was instigated by the Nazis not the Vichy regime. Were the rebels counting on Vichy France to aid or secure their flanks? I have not read anything about their strategic thinking. Most likely the revolt would still go on but be crushed more easily and quickly. Does this free up British troops that much ? Would the number of troops it frees up change outcomes in North Africa? I'm skeptical.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Why would this eliminate the Iraqi Pro Nazi revolt? This was instigated by the Nazis not the Vichy regime. Were the rebels counting on Vichy France to aid or secure their flanks?

Iraq is a long way from Axis territory, but much of that distance is Syria. In OTL, that area was nominally neutral and covertly sympathetic - Axis aircraft even staged through Syrian airfields to reach Iraq. ITTL, it is hostile. OTL, Allied access to Iraq was limited to the road from Trans-Jordan across 800 km of desert, and the port of Basra. ITTL, the Allies control eastern Syria, which is upper Mesopotamia and immediately adjacent to all of northern Iraq.

Which is to say that the strategic situation would look very different, and IMO the Iraqi coupsters would be deterred.

 

[Catspoke]

Why would this eliminate the Iraqi Pro Nazi revolt? This was instigated by the Nazis not the Vichy regime. Were the rebels counting on Vichy France to aid or secure their flanks? I have not read anything about their strategic thinking. Most likely the revolt would still go on but be crushed more easily and quickly. Does this free up British troops that much ? Would the number of troops it frees up change outcomes in North Africa? I'm skeptical.

Certainly a British infantry division is freed up for use in the MidEast throughout 1940 and 1941.

 

[Catspoke]

For one thing Free France just inherited an army of 86,000 men since we are talking about the time of the armistice. And this is almost certainly followed by Djibouti so add another 8,000 men to the mix. Plus the Marine Nationale ships in Beirut.

If the political effects that rolls from this go big the Free French way, British more patient at Mel es Keber, Dijobiti Free French, Alexandria naval squadron joins British, Dakar can't resist.

Nervous the Germans could trigger the occupation of Vichy in October of 40 vs No ember of 42 OTL. Why not the French aren't resisting, the Italians then occupying Corsica and as much of French North Africa as they can get their hands on, are too busy to do Greece, the Germans even offer the Spanish an occupation zone of southern France to join in, the Germans embroiled then deep in French North Africa, can't do Barbarossa, Japan can't declare war on USA without a compliant Vichy Indochina....

Germany locked into a forever war with Britain, Free France and all the dominions, does a brutal Poland style occupation of France for 10 years....

 

[raharris1973]

If the political effects that rolls from this go big the Free French way, British more patient at Mel es Keber, Dijobiti Free French, Alexandria naval squadron joins British, Dakar can't resist.

Nervous the Germans could trigger the occupation of Vichy in October of 40 vs No ember of 42 OTL. Why not the French aren't resisting, the Italians then occupying Corsica and as much of French North Africa as they can get their hands on, are too busy to do Greece, the Germans even offer the Spanish an occupation zone of southern France to join in, the Germans embroiled then deep in French North Africa, can't do Barbarossa, Japan can't declare war on USA without a compliant Vichy Indochina....

Germany locked into a forever war with Britain, Free France and all the dominions, does a brutal Poland style occupation of France for 10 years....

interesting take

 

[Catspoke]

interesting take

The French once they agreed to the armistice played it smart, had two governments in play, associated with either side, and could adjust to the geo political realities as they changed, easy to judge all that now, but not from the viewpoint of July 1940.

Fortunately for the French, the Germans thought, the west of Europe was stable and friendly enough to try Barbarossa to their ultimate demise.

Still think it would have been better for the French to continue to resist in summer of 1940, but once the armistice was in place, the OTL course of action of most the leaders involved was reasonable without the knowledge of hindsight.