Lenin dies on the Eve of October

So on the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin decided to leave his hideout to go to the Smolny Institute to convince the Central Committee to launch a full on insurrection against the government (Up until that point Trotsky was set on keeping his actions defensive).

On the way there, he got into some aggressive political discussions with the streetcar driver right as some loyalist soldiers passed by, which they luckily ignored. Say they recognized him, a gun was pulled, and Lenin dies. What goes down next? Keep in mind that Trotsky intended to wait until after the Second Congress of Soviet approved a seizure of power (Lenin wanted a fait accompli).
 
So on the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin decided to leave his hideout to go to the Smolny Institute to convince the Central Committee to launch a full on insurrection against the government (Up until that point Trotsky was set on keeping his actions defensive).

On the way there, he got into some aggressive political discussions with the streetcar driver right as some loyalist soldiers passed by, which they luckily ignored. Say they recognized him, a gun was pulled, and Lenin dies. What goes down next? Keep in mind that Trotsky intended to wait until after the Second Congress of Soviet approved a seizure of power (Lenin wanted a fait accompli).

That's certainly an interesting question, that was heavily discussed in soviet historiography, but has fallen into oblivion since then.

In OTL, the Bolsheviks overthrew the provisional government on the very same day the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets took place, to avoid a government backlash.

Had they waited for the Second Congress and a formal decision to overthrow Kerenski, this would have given the revolution a lot more legitimacy.

The Bolsheviks had the majority in the Congress, and with their Left-Social Revolutionary allies they completely dominated it. The absolute majority of workers and soldiers, and millions of peasants, supported the Bolshevik party.
Delegates for the Congress had been elected before the 7. of November, so technically it made no difference if the Bolsheviks, supported by the Left-Social Revolutionaries, overthrew Kerenski before or after the Congress. However, if an official Congress decision had been made, it would not be seen as a "Bolshevik Revolution", but as a "Soviet Revolution". The public immage would be radically different There could never have been a myth about the " (Jewish) Bolshevist Coup" in this scenario.

On the other hand, it is a risky move. Lenin feared a massive government backlash, and rightly so. Had an official decision been made by the Congress, you could allmost innevitably expect a crackdown, a ban on the Bolshevik party and possibly even the soviets as a whole, and lots of blood on the streets of Petrograd and Moscow. The Bolsheviks knew that they would win (or technically, allready had won) the majority in the Congress, and that the Congress would authorize a revolution. They had very good reasons to go through with the revolution before the Congress though.

Personally, I think they should have waited. The Bolsheviks had a lot of expierience in working in illegality, and such an action by Kerensky would have massievly de-legitimized burgeois-democracy as a whole. Mass sypathy for the forces of socialism (the Bolsheviks and Left-SR's which, together, allready had the majority of the population and allmost all workers on their side) would result and maybe (just maybe) the civil war could have been won sooner.

However things could have gone down a different path aswell. If the Kerenski government cought the central commitee, the Bolshevik party could have been de-capitated. The results are unpredictable...
 
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@Alexniko,
you seem to take for granted that a Congress, even with a Bolshevik majority, would decide to remove the Provisional Government and arrogate all power to itself.

We should not forget that Lenin's strategy was opposed by some Bolsheviks, too. Zinoniev and Kamenev both had the guts to speak out against a putsch, but I am not sure they were the only ones who had second thoughts.

Also, the organization of elections to the Constituent Assembly had already begun. Absent modern demoscopic research, nobody had anything more than very vague predictive ideas about its outcome and everyone likes to delude themselves before such a pivotal election, so again I'm not sure even a Bolshevik-majority Congress of Soviets would automatically put its emphasis on removing the Provisional Government from the picture when the end of its term was already in sight even by its own plans and schedules.

I am not at all certain that fear of a government crackdown was the main incentive here.

One ought not forget the course of the war in this picture. The Germans had taken the Estonian islands, and Lenin and others were very afraid of the consequences of a German conquest of Petrograd, too. Hurrying things up also meant preserving the last chance one had to struggle for control over the army so as to make it happen that your own side was "laying down the arms" and entering negotiations, instead of operating under the circumstances of Kerensky offering the ceasefire and Germans wreaking havoc in Petrograd.

In this context, it is even more questionable to me that a Congress without a prior putsch would have simply followed the lead of those around Lenin, especially with him himself dead. It is one thing to condone the seizure of power, and then not put up resistance when those who have seized power decide to make peace no matter the cost. It is quite another thing for the Congress to rally behind this explicit agenda itself, forwarding it and justifying the removal of the Provisional Government with the necessity for "Peace" without preconditions. Yes, Peace was popular, but would the Congress really formulate a blank cheque for anyone? I suppose not. I suppose it would go with some Zimmerwaldian "no annexations, no indemnities" string attached (and everyone in their right minds knew that this meant No Peace since the Germans would not go for it, maybe not even the Austro-Hungarians). So even with the Defencists in a minority, the Peace faction might still not have found a clear common position. Without a clear common position, would they really decide to topple the Provisional Government weeks before the CA should convene?
 
@Alexniko,
you seem to take for granted that a Congress, even with a Bolshevik majority, would decide to remove the Provisional Government and arrogate all power to itself.

We should not forget that Lenin's strategy was opposed by some Bolsheviks, too. Zinoniev and Kamenev both had the guts to speak out against a putsch, but I am not sure they were the only ones who had second thoughts.

The Bolshevik party was the main advocate for a soviet republic, instead of a burgeois-democratic one. The party would never abandon the idea of "All power to the Soviets" in favour of "All power to the Burgeois Parliament". So it is pretty obvious that an overthrow of the Provisional Government was going to happen no matter what. The controversy was exactly when this overthrow was to take place. The Bolsheviks had the absolute majority in the Second Congress all by itself. Together with the Left-SR's they completely sidelined all the burgeois parties. A decision for the overthrow of Kerenski would be made earlier or later, and, considerint the situation, it would happen earlier (aka at the Second Congress).

Also, the organization of elections to the Constituent Assembly had already begun. Absent modern demoscopic research, nobody had anything more than very vague predictive ideas about its outcome and everyone likes to delude themselves before such a pivotal election, so again I'm not sure even a Bolshevik-majority Congress of Soviets would automatically put its emphasis on removing the Provisional Government from the picture when the end of its term was already in sight even by its own plans and schedules.

The organization of the CA elections had been going on for months allready. The Provisional Government repeatedly postphoned them for completely arbitrary reasons. No, the end of Kerensky's term was not clearly in sight

I am not at all certain that fear of a government crackdown was the main incentive here.

One ought not forget the course of the war in this picture. The Germans had taken the Estonian islands, and Lenin and others were very afraid of the consequences of a German conquest of Petrograd, too. Hurrying things up also meant preserving the last chance one had to struggle for control over the army so as to make it happen that your own side was "laying down the arms" and entering negotiations, instead of operating under the circumstances of Kerensky offering the ceasefire and Germans wreaking havoc in Petrograd.

Which basicly ends in a crackdown on the Bolsheviks aswell. There were fears that Kerensky would give Petrograd to the germans, hoping that they would "clear up".

In this context, it is even more questionable to me that a Congress without a prior putsch would have simply followed the lead of those around Lenin, especially with him himself dead. It is one thing to condone the seizure of power, and then not put up resistance when those who have seized power decide to make peace no matter the cost. It is quite another thing for the Congress to rally behind this explicit agenda itself, forwarding it and justifying the removal of the Provisional Government with the necessity for "Peace" without preconditions.

Again, the Bolsheviks were the main advocate for a soviet republic AND they held the majority in the Congress. And considering the situation (germans in front of Petrograd), there,'s allmost no doubt about that.

Yes, Peace was popular, but would the Congress really formulate a blank cheque for anyone? I suppose not. I suppose it would go with some Zimmerwaldian "no annexations, no indemnities" string attached (and everyone in their right minds knew that this meant No Peace since the Germans would not go for it, maybe not even the Austro-Hungarians). So even with the Defencists in a minority, the Peace faction might still not have found a clear common position. Without a clear common position, would they really decide to topple the Provisional Government weeks before the CA should convene?

A Brest-Litovsk esque peace was the only choice the Bolsheviks (or any russian government for that matter) had (as you said yourself). As allready said, the Bolsheviks had the majority in the Congress and a solution would be found.

On the controversy of when, how and if peace should be made with Germany, I suggest you to read "Strange and Monstrous" by Lenin. It's very informative.
 
A Brest-Litovsk esque peace was the only choice the Bolsheviks (or any russian government for that matter) had (as you said yourself). As allready said, the Bolsheviks had the majority in the Congress and a solution would be found.
But even the Bolsheviks took months, and the beating of Operation Faustschlag, to come around to accepting this.
Positing that the Second Congress would simply look the facts in the eyes and mobilise revolutionaries across the country for this bitter but necessary course of action is quite a bit unrealistic, if you ask me.

As you've said yourself, this topic has been hotly debated by Soviet historiography. With this come all the typical biases of Soviet historiography, chief among them an illusion about the monolithical will of the "Bolshevik proletariat" and the assumption that it was basically tantamount to what Lenin was formualting and pursuing.

I do not subscribe to the "Big Man Theory" of history, but quite clearly, Lenin was an exceptionally adept politician, and he was seeing quite a few steps ahead of most other people, both in Russian and elsewhere, both among the Bolsheviks and other parties. Leading the soviets into and out of and back to Brest-Litwosk was a formidable achievement (don't misunderstand me, I don't like the guy at all and I don't mean to excuse anything he did). With him dead and no coup d' état happened, the Second Congress's decisions are wide open, and so is the further course of the war with the Germans.
 
But even the Bolsheviks took months, and the beating of Operation Faustschlag, to come around to accepting this.
Positing that the Second Congress would simply look the facts in the eyes and mobilise revolutionaries across the country for this bitter but necessary course of action is quite a bit unrealistic, if you ask me.

As you've said yourself, this topic has been hotly debated by Soviet historiography. With this come all the typical biases of Soviet historiography, chief among them an illusion about the monolithical will of the "Bolshevik proletariat" and the assumption that it was basically tantamount to what Lenin was formualting and pursuing.

I do not subscribe to the "Big Man Theory" of history, but quite clearly, Lenin was an exceptionally adept politician, and he was seeing quite a few steps ahead of most other people, both in Russian and elsewhere, both among the Bolsheviks and other parties. Leading the soviets into and out of and back to Brest-Litwosk was a formidable achievement (don't misunderstand me, I don't like the guy at all and I don't mean to excuse anything he did). With him dead and no coup d' état happened, the Second Congress's decisions are wide open, and so is the further course of the war with the Germans.

I aggree with you on the peace question. It took months after the Congress in OTL, and it would take months in this scenario aswell. But the seizure if power by the soviets was going to happen for the reasons stated above. Basically everybody in the Bolshevik Party wanted this, and the Left-SR's advocated for this aswell. The only question was when.

Also, calling the October Revolution a coup detat is wrong. A coup detat is the overthrow of a government by a minority without mass support. The Bolsheviks wer neither a small minority, nor did they lack mass support (again, the Bolsheviks and Left-SR's, i.e. the factions that carried out/supported the overthrow of the Provisional Government, had the majority of the russian people and allmost all of the workers on their side). The term revolution fits way better than coup detat.
 
I aggree with you on the peace question. It took months after the Congress in OTL, and it would take months in this scenario aswell. But the seizure if power by the soviets was going to happen for the reasons stated above. Basically everybody in the Bolshevik Party wanted this, and the Left-SR's advocated for this aswell. The only question was when.

Also, calling the October Revolution a coup detat is wrong. A coup detat is the overthrow of a government by a minority without mass support. The Bolsheviks wer neither a small minority, nor did they lack mass support (again, the Bolsheviks and Left-SR's, i.e. the factions that carried out/supported the overthrow of the Provisional Government, had the majority of the russian people and allmost all of the workers on their side). The term revolution fits way better than coup detat.
I'm glad we agree on the peace question.
Let's not get distracted by terminology questions about coups and revolutions. Russia was clearly in a revolutionary transformation, I think we agree on that.

If we agree on the peace question, though, what exactly do you think is the mandate / resolution on which the Second Congress would have united with its Bolshevik/Left SR majority, and here I ask specifically what you think the Second Congress would have formulated as directives with regards to the behavior of military forces, the organization of CA elections, and the establishment of Milrevkoms, CheKa etc.
 
I'm glad we agree on the peace question.
Let's not get distracted by terminology questions about coups and revolutions. Russia was clearly in a revolutionary transformation, I think we agree on that.

If we agree on the peace question, though, what exactly do you think is the mandate / resolution on which the Second Congress would have united with its Bolshevik/Left SR majority, and here I ask specifically what you think the Second Congress would have formulated as directives with regards to the behavior of military forces, the organization of CA elections, and the establishment of Milrevkoms, CheKa etc.

MilRevCom's would be created before the Congress, just like in OTL. After the seizure of power, the Central Executive Commitee would still go through with the CA elections, just like in OTL.

The main difference is, that the October Revolution in this TL would be the result of a decision made by a democratically elected body (the Second All Russian Congress Soviets), as opposed to a decision made by one party (in this case, it doesn't matter that the Bolsheviks and Left-SRs had a majority. The October Revolution in OTL was the result of a decision by the Bolshevik Central Commitee, which is the only reason why the whole "Coup of an armed minority" legend could have ever been created).
 
The most obvious alternative to insurrection in October was the peaceful transfer of power to the soviets and a coalition socialist government. This was a frightening prospect for Lenin, not least because many Bolsheviks favored it--even some who were nominally in favor of insurrection. I wrote about this in 2001; I wouldn't say I'd reaffirm everything I wrote in that post, but I still think it fundamentally valid:

***
I was recently reading Robert V. Daniels' *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917* (1967). Daniels argues that before October 24 (old style), Lenin was *not* making his leadership effective. The majority of the Bolsheviks, while they did not want to face up to his browbeating and were in theory committed to an insurrection, were in fact tacitly violating his instructions. They wanted to wait until the Second Congress of Soviets would meet (it was first scheduled for October 20, then October 25), and until then take only such armed action as could plausibly be described as defensive. After the fiasco of the July Days, it was doubtful that the Petrograd workers and soldiers would take offensive action on behalf of the Bolshevik party--though they would rally to the *soviets* if convinced Kerensky was attacking them. (In this respect it is noteworthy that Lenin, unlike Trotsky, had never worked in a soviet, and was inclined to underestimate the extent to which the workers and soldiers were attached to them, and would do things in the name of the soviets they would not do in the name of their supposed vanguard, the Bolshevik party. This may seem paradoxical, since of course it was Lenin who raised the slogan "all power to the soviets" in his April Theses. But after all, he had not always had that high an opinion of the soviets, and for a while, after the July Days, wanted to abandon the slogan.)

Daniels argues that even Trotsky wanted to wait for the Congress. (I do not mean "wait passively" of course--Trotsky and the Bolsheviks were doing what they could to subvert the Provisional Government and pave the way for its overthrow. But that is not the same thing as the final overthrow itself.) After the insurrection, Trotsky argued that anything he had said about waiting for the Congress of Soviets was merely a maneuver to deceive the Bolsheviks' enemies. Daniels argues that Trotsky "was prevaricating after the fact rather than before." (p. 104) In any event, if it is true that, as Trotsky later claimed, he wanted to provoke Kerensky into a pre-emptive attack that would give the Bolsheviks an excuse to seize power before October 25, Kerensky's raid on the Bolshevik press on October 24 certainly played into his hands.

Would it have made any difference if the Bolsheviks had waited for the Congress? It would, if for no other reason than this: the Bolsheviks did not have a majority in the Congress, though they were by far the largest single party in it. The Congress would have declared for a government by the soviets, but this would undoubtedly be a multi-party government of all the major socialist parties. Even the Bolsheviks' closest allies, the Left SRs were in favor of this--as were indeed many Bolsheviks. At least for the time being, Russia would be on the road to peaceful political compromise rather than civil war.

But the Mensheviks and so-called Right SRs (many of whom could better be described as Center or even Left-Center SRs) were furious that the Bolsheviks were presenting them with a violently-imposed *fait accompli* and stormed out of the Congress. This gave the Bolsheviks a clear majority there and allowed them to establish a one-party dictatorship (whose nature was not really changed by the later addition of a few Left SRs) in the name of the soviets. The moderate socialists were bitter and intransigent and even when it seemed there was a real chance for a coalition government-- after the railroad workers' union (Vikzhel) threatened to bring all rail traffic to a halt unless such a government was formed--they raised unrealistic demands, e.g., that any coalition government exclude Lenin and Trotsky. For their part, the Bolsheviks--the majority of them, anyway; there were of course important exceptions, like Zinoviev and Kamenev--were emboldened by the smell of gunpowder, and ready to resort to violence to preserve the conquests of a uprising most of them had not really wanted.

So, how do we get the Bolsheviks to delay seizing power? I can think of two ways (apart from our old stand-by of killing Lenin...):

(1) What if Zinoviev and Kamenev did not inform the moderate socialists that the Bolsheviks were divided on the issue of insurrection? When the Menshevik/SR Central Executive Committee of the Soviet learned about this, it decided that it could play for time in the hope of more Mensheviks and SRs arriving for the Congress. So it delayed the opening of the Congress from the 20th to the 25th. A fateful decision, because the Bolsheviks would not have been ready for an insurrection at the earlier date. Thus, Zinoviev and Kamenev helped to make possible the risky resort to force they were trying to forestall.

(2) What if Kerensky had not moved against the Bolshevik press on the morning of the 24th? (Of course there are all sorts of things Kerensky could have done or refrained from doing earlier--but here I am trying to show how very late in the game he might still have prevented a Bolshevik dictatorship by the simple expedient of doing nothing!)

Supposedly the attack on the Bolshevik press was motivated by the Military Revolutionary Committee's order of October 22 that any directives for the garrison that were not countersigned by the MRC were invalid. But the curious thing is this: when toward midnight on October 23, the MRC faced an ultimatum from Headquarters to retract the countersigning order, it actually accepted the ultimatum (at least "in principle"). But when Kerensky learned of the acceptance, he dismissed it as playing for time (though some Bolsheviks later claimed it was for real, and forced upon them by the Left SRs). In any event, Kerensky at this late hour was in no mood to abandon his preparations for a preemptive attack. So the printing press where *Rabochii Put* and *Soldat* were rolling off the presses was seized. Actually, there was nothing in *Rabochii Put* (unless you count its publication of the MRC's October 22 order) that pointed to an imminent Bolshevik coup. On the contrary, an editorial by Stalin called for a peaceful transfer of power to the soviets: "organize meetings, elect your delegations and through them, lay your demands before the Congress of Soviets...the stronger and the more organized and powerful your action, the more peacefully will the old government make way for the new." (Quoted in Robert Slusser, *Stalin in October: The Man Who Missed the Revolution*, p. 241)

Even on the 24th, the MRC's actions could be portrayed--and were portrayed by Trotsky--as defensive. The government tries to close down the Bolshevik press, the MRC sends men to re-open it; the government tries to raise the bridges, the Red Guards take control of the bridges, etc. It does not seem that the Bolsheviks shifted to an unequivocally offensive mode until after Lenin's arrival at Smolny--though of course the take-over of so many strategic points to "protect" them from Kerensky's pre-emptive strike had already blurred the line between defense and offense and probably made it easier for the Bolsheviks to assure Lenin that they really had been following his instructions all along, and that all the party's hedging tactics were just a ruse to fool the opposition. The fact that it had all been done so easily, that the government forces had proven so amazingly weak, was something the Bolsheviks could by no means have been confident of in advance. They had been worried that if they did not wait for the Congress, the workers and soldiers might not fight for them--and indeed only a small percentage of the workers and soldiers in Petrograd *did* fight for them. But given that hardly anyone was willing to fight for the Provisional Government, that was enough.

I doubt that even Lenin could have gotten the Bolsheviks to stage an insurrection prior to the Congress if not for Kerensky's clumsy "counter-coup" of the 24th. Such an insurrection seemed too risky, and the political prospects of a "peaceful" take-over seemed so promising: by the 24th even moderate socialists like Dan and Gotz had condemned Kerensky and had joined left-Mensheviks like Martov in calling for a government that would move faster toward peace and land for the peasants. One can of course say that Kerensky was merely furnishing the Bolsheviks with an "excuse"--but the Bolsheviks may very well have *needed* some such excuse in view of the fact that nobody knew how weak the government was until it tried to exert itself on the 24th. Even if you accept Trotsky's later claim that he was trying to goad the government into a pre-Congress attack all along (and in that case, such things as the MRC's acceptance of the government's ultimatum seem curious), his strategy involved the *risk* that (should the government refuse to let itself be provoked) power might not be seized until after the Congress met. This was a risk which seemed to bother very few Bolsheviks--other than Lenin.

Of course, asking Kerensky to passively await the Congress may be unrealistic. It requires him to realize that his government was doomed, and that the only question was who would replace it. The truth is that Kerensky actually seems to have welcomed an attempted Bolshevik coup, thinking he could easily defeat it.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/shwi/WI Bolsheviks Had Waited for the Second Congress of Soviets.txt
 
Would it have made any difference if the Bolsheviks had waited for the Congress? It would, if for no other reason than this: the Bolsheviks did not have a majority in the Congress, though they were by far the largest single party in it. The Congress would have declared for a government by the soviets, but this would undoubtedly be a multi-party government of all the major socialist parties. Even the Bolsheviks' closest allies, the Left SRs were in favor of this--as were indeed many Bolsheviks. At least for the time being, Russia would be on the road to peaceful political compromise rather than civil war.

Not meant to be rude, but that's obviously false. The Bolsheviks alone had the absolute majority (60%) at the Second Congress. Together with their allies, the Left-SRs, they had 75.4%, aka a 3/4th majority.


See "Second Congress".

On the Civil War, the Bolsheviks didn't start the civil war. The various anti-socialist insurrections did.


With or without a revolution before the Second All Russian Congress, the civil war is unavoidable.
 
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To add numbers to back up the assertion that the Congress would overwhelmingly approve the transfer of power to the Soviets, 505 delegates at the Congress (Out of 649) were pledged beforehand to do exactly that. Only the Bolshevik faint accompli the night before threw things into chaos. A wide variety of socialist factions had come around to the idea of the swift assumption of Soviet power by late September.

The best way to get Kerensky to wait is to avoid the RVS' October 21 ultimatum of total Soviet control over the garrison. Keep it to informal deployment of RVS commissars to the various units. When Trotsky was forced to back down and rescind the ultimatum by the Left-SRs and Mensheviks on October 23, Kerensky believed that the Bolsheviks were weak. Without that opening, he may have delayed a bit longer and as a result faced a unified socialist opposition on the 25th.
 
Not meant to be rude, but that's obviously false. The Bolsheviks alone had the absolute majority (60%) in the Second Congress. Together with their allies, the Left-SRs, they had 75.4%, aka a 3/4th majority.

I don't mean to be rude but you are calling something "obvious" which is far from obvious. There is considerable disagreement on whether the Bolsheviks had a majority before the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and non-Left SR's.

(1) The Wikipedia article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_Revolution states that "The Second Congress of Soviets consisted of 670 elected delegates; 300 were Bolshevik and nearly a hundred were Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who also supported the overthrow of the Alexander Kerensky Government." In a footnote, it gives as its source Robert Service's *A History of Twentieth Century Russia*

(2) Alexander Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks in Power: The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd*, p. 29: "Bearing in mind that at the start of the Second Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks did not have a majority without support from other 'internationalists'..." https://books.google.com/books?id=BEoBCGJ4VqYC&pg=PA29

From the same book, p. 409:

"According to a preliminary report by the Credentials Committee, 300 of the 670 delegates to the congress were Bolsheviks, 193 were SRs (of whom more than half were Left SRs), 68 were Mensheviks, 16 were United Social-Democratic Internationalists, 14 were Menshevik Internationalists, and the remainder either were affiliated with one of a number of smaller political groups or did not belong to any formal organization. An overwhelming number of delegates, some 505 of them, were firmly committed to the transfer of “All Power to the Soviets,” that is, to the creation of a Soviet government that reflected the party composition of the congress (M. N. Pokrovskii and Ia. A. Iakovleva, eds., Vtoroi vserossiiskii s”ezd sovetov R. i S. D. [Moscow-Leningrad, 1928], pp. 144–153)." https://books.google.com/books?id=ZmzWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA409

(3) Even the Wikipedia article you rely on acknowledges a dispute about whether the Bolsheviks had a majority: "According to the bureau of all factions, by the opening of the congress 649 delegates were present of which: 390 were Bolsheviks, 160 Social Revolutionaries, 72 Mensheviks, 14 United Internationalists, 6 Mensheviks-Internationalists, and 7 Ukrainian socialists. By the end of the congress, after the departure of the right-wing socialists and with the arrival of the new delegates, there were 625 delegates, of which 390 were Bolsheviks, 179 left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, 35 United Internationalists and 21 Ukrainian socialists. Thus, the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary coalition won about two thirds of the votes there. According to other sources, 739 deputies arrived at the congress, including 338 Bolsheviks, 211 right and left Socialist Revolutionaries and 69 Mensheviks." [emphasis added--DT] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_All-Russian_Congress_of_Soviets_of_Workers'_and_Soldiers'_Deputies

(4) Vladimir Brovkin writes in *The Mensheviks After October*:

"As Oskar Anweiler has pointed out, the Bolsheviks, even at the height of their success, had a very narrow margin of numerical strength over their opponents. According to the Credentials Commission's figures, the combined strength of the 200 SR delegates and the 92 Menshevik delegates almost equaled the 300 Bolsheviks.

"The official breakdown of the political forces at the congress, however, did not correspond to the real alliances and antagonisms. The data from personal questionnaires give a somewhat more precise picture of the numbers in various factions. Of the 98 Mensheviks, according to this source, 62 were Martov's supporters, 14 backed the Menshevik Central Committee, and 22 belonged to the Defensists' faction. These groups had fundamentally different political objectives. The SRs, the second largest faction at the congress, were also split. The Right SRs sided with the Defensist Mensheviks; the Left SRs were Martov's partnetrs in the Left Bloc. The Bolsheviks, as is now well known, were divided as well, into radicals, led by Lenin and Lev Trotsky, and conciliatory Bolsheviks, led by Lev Kamenev and Grigorii Zinoviev. The political struggle at the congress developed on two planes: the leftist soviet parties — Bolsheviks, Menshevik Internationalists, and Left SRs — versus the rightist soviet parties — Right SRs and Defensist Mensheviks; and within the left wing itself, conciliatory Bolsheviks, Left SRs, and Menshevik Internationalists versus extremist Bolsheviks.' https://books.google.com/books?id=cP0xLtu1aZgC&pg=PA17

(5) Stephen Kotkin in *Stalin: Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928*, p. 217, writes: "Smolny's colonnaded hall...had filled up with between 650 and 700 delegates...Somewhat more than 300 were Bolsheviks (the largest bloc), along with nearly 100 Left SRs..."

So it is far from "obvious" that the Bolsheviks initially had a majority--especially if Rabinowitch is correctly quoting a book on the Congress published in the USSR in 1928 and co-edited by Pokrovskii, who would not seem to have any motive to understate the strength of the Bolsheviks.

That the Bolsheviks and Left SR's combined had a majority at the Congress is another matter, something I do not deny. My point. however, is that the Left SR's too favored a coalition government of all the parties represented in the soviet--as indeed did many Bolsheviks. As I put it in a post a couple of years ago:

"So there may or may not have been a slight Bolshevik majority. But there clearly was not a majority for Lenin and Trotsky's goal of an all-Bolshevik government. In fact, when Martov called for a coalition government, the Bolsheviks did not dare to oppose his resolution--it passed *unanimously.* But then the more right-wing of the Mensheviks and SRs insisted on walking out because the Bolsheviks had resorted to an insurrection without waiting for the Congress to act--and then Martov joined them.

" If the Bolsheviks had waited until the Congress had met, there would have been no need for an insurrection, and the moderate socialists would not have walked out. The demand of virtually all non-Bolsheviks (including Left SRs) and many Bolsheviks for a coalition government would have been extremely difficult to resist. As it was, the Bolsheviks could say the walkouts were "traitors" who deserved no role in the new government, which was basically a one-party Bolshevik government with some Left SR window dressing." https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-lenin-dies-circa-august-1917.342336/#post-10250410

Again, I am not denying that there was a left-wing majority in the congress. I am not denying that there was a majority for transferring power to the soviets. But that is not the same thing as a majority for a government completely dominated by the Bolsheviks. And yes, I am well aware of the problems a genuine coalition socialist government would face (perhaps I should have been more explicit about them in the post from 2001 that I reposted but even there I wrote " At least for the time being, Russia would be on the road to peaceful political compromise rather than civil war." [emphasis added]) Yes, there would still be resistance from counterrevolutionaries but it would be even more feeble than it was in early 1918 in OTL. (Amusingly, Lenin in the spring of 1918 stated that the civil war was basically over! "In the main, however, the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters was fulfilled in the period from October 25, 1917, to (approximately) February 1918, or to the surrender of [Ataman] Bogayevsky." http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/x03.htm)
 
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I don't mean to be rude but you are calling something "obvious" which is far from obvious. There is considerable disagreement on whether the Bolsheviks had a majority before the withdrawal of the Mensheviks and non-Left SR's.

(1) The Wikipedia article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_Revolution states that "The Second Congress of Soviets consisted of 670 elected delegates; 300 were Bolshevik and nearly a hundred were Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who also supported the overthrow of the Alexander Kerensky Government." In a footnote, it gives as its source Robert Service's *A History of Twentieth Century Russia*

(2) Alexander Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks in Power: The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd*, p. 29: "Bearing in mind that at the start of the Second Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks did not have a majority without support from other 'internationalists'..." https://books.google.com/books?id=BEoBCGJ4VqYC&pg=PA29

From the same book, p. 409:

" According to a preliminary report by the Credentials Committee, 300 of the 670 delegates to the congress were Bolsheviks, 193 were SRs (of whom more than half were Left SRs), 68 were Mensheviks, 16 were United Social-Democratic Internationalists, 14 were Menshevik Internationalists, and the remainder either were affiliated with one of a number of smaller political groups or did not belong to any formal organization. An overwhelming number of delegates, some 505 of them, were firmly committed to the transfer of “All Power to the Soviets,” that is, to the creation of a Soviet government that reflected the party composition of the congress (M. N. Pokrovskii and Ia. A. Iakovleva, eds., Vtoroi vserossiiskii s”ezd sovetov R. i S. D. [Moscow-Leningrad, 1928], pp. 144–153)." https://books.google.com/books?id=ZmzWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA409

(3) Even the Wikipedia article you rely on acknowledges a dispute about whether the Bolsheviks had a majority: "According to the bureau of all factions, by the opening of the congress 649 delegates were present of which: 390 were Bolsheviks, 160 Social Revolutionaries, 72 Mensheviks, 14 United Internationalists, 6 Mensheviks-Internationalists, and 7 Ukrainian socialists. By the end of the congress, after the departure of the right-wing socialists and with the arrival of the new delegates, there were 625 delegates, of which 390 were Bolsheviks, 179 left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, 35 United Internationalists and 21 Ukrainian socialists. Thus, the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary coalition won about two thirds of the votes there. According to other sources, 739 deputies arrived at the congress, including 338 Bolsheviks, 211 right and left Socialist Revolutionaries and 69 Mensheviks." [emphasis added--DT] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_All-Russian_Congress_of_Soviets_of_Workers'_and_Soldiers'_Deputies

(4) Vladimir Brovkin writes in *The Mensheviks After October*:

"As Oskar Anweiler has pointed out, the Bolsheviks, even at the height of their success, had a very narrow margin of numerical strength over their opponents. According to the Credentials Commission's figures, the combined strength of the 200 SR delegates and the 92 Menshevik delegates almost equaled the 300 Bolsheviks.

"The official breakdown of the political forces at the congress, however, did not correspond to the real alliances and antagonisms. The data from personal questionnaires give a somewhat more precise picture of the numbers in various factions. Of the 98 Mensheviks, according to this source, 62 were Martov's supporters, 14 backed the Menshevik Central Committee, and 22 belonged to the Defensists' faction. These groups had fundamentally different political objectives. The SRs, the second largest faction at the congress, were also split. The Right SRs sided with the Defensist Mensheviks; the Left SRs were Martov's partnetrs in the Left Bloc. The Bolsheviks, as is now well known, were divided as well, into radicals, led by Lenin and Lev Trotsky, and conciliatory Bolsheviks, led by Lev Kamenev and Grigorii Zinoviev. The political struggle at the congress developed on two planes: the leftist soviet parties — Bolsheviks, Menshevik Internationalists, and Left SRs — versus the rightist soviet parties — Right SRs and Defensist Mensheviks; and within the left wing itself, conciliatory Bolsheviks, Left SRs, and Menshevik Internationalists versus etremist Bolsheviks.' https://books.google.com/books?id=cP0xLtu1aZgC&pg=PA17

(5) Stephen Kotkin in *Stalin: Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928*, p. 217, writes: "Smolny's colonnaded hall...had filled up with between 650 and 700 delegates...Somewhat more than 300 were Bolsheviks (the largest bloc), along with nearly 100 Left SRs..."

So it is far from "obvious" that the Bolsheviks initially had a majority--especially if Rabinowitsch is correctly quoting a book on the Congress published in the USSR in 1928 and co-edited by Pokrovskii, who would not seem to have any motive to understate the strength of the Bolsheviks.

That the Bolsheviks and Left SR's combined had a majority at the Congress is another matter, something I do not deny. My point. however, is that the Left SR's too favored a coalition government of all the parties represented in the soviet--as indeed did many Bolsheviks. As I put it in a post a couple of years ago:

"So there may or may not have been a slight Bolshevik majority. But there clearly was not a majority for Lenin and Trotsky's goal of an all-Bolshevik government. In fact, when Martov called for a coalition government, the Bolsheviks did not dare to oppose his resolution--it passed *unanimously.* But then the more right-wing of the Mensheviks and SRs insisted on walking out because the Bolsheviks had resorted to an insurrection without waiting for the Congress to act--and then Martov joined them.

" If the Bolsheviks had waited until the Congress had met, there would have been no need for an insurrection, and the moderate socialists would not have walked out. The demand of virtually all non-Bolsheviks (including Left SRs) and many Bolsheviks for a coalition government would have been extremely difficult to resist. As it was, the Bolsheviks could say the walkouts were "traitors" who deserved no role in the new government, which was basically a one-party Bolshevik government with some Left SR window dressing." https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-lenin-dies-circa-august-1917.342336/#post-10250410

Again, I am not denying that there was a left-wing majority in the congress. I am not denying that there was a majority for transferring power to the soviets. But that is not the same thing as a majority for a government completely dominated by the Bolsheviks. And yes, I am well aware of the problems a genuine coalition socialist government would face (perhaps I should have been more explicit about them in the post from 2001 that I reposted but even there I wrote " At least for the time being, Russia would be on the road to peaceful political compromise rather than civil war." [emphasis added]) Yes, there would still be resistance from counterrevolutionaries but it would be even more feeble than it was in early 1918 in OTL. (Amusingly, Lenin in the spring of 1918 stated that the civil war was basically over! "In the main, however, the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters was fulfilled in the period from October 25, 1917, to (approximately) February 1918, or to the surrender of [Ataman] Bogayevsky." http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/x03.htm)

My sincerest apologies, I didn't know that.

But anyway, even if (if!) they didn't hold the absolute majority, there's no doubt that 1.) They were the most powerfull faction in the Second Congress, and 2.) That there was an absolute majority for the establishment of soviet power (i.e. the overthrow of the Provisional Government, and the transfer of all power to the soviets).

But as allready said, the main reason why the revolution was carried out before the Congress met, was not that the Bolsheviks supposedly feared that they wouldn't gain a majority for the establishment of soviet power. The main reason was, that they feared a crackdown and/or that Kerensky would turn Petrograd over to the German Army after an official Congress decision to establish soviet power.
 
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Also, calling the October Revolution a coup detat is wrong. A coup detat is the overthrow of a government by a minority without mass support. The Bolsheviks wer neither a small minority, nor did they lack mass support (again, the Bolsheviks and Left-SR's, i.e. the factions that carried out/supported the overthrow of the Provisional Government, had the majority of the russian people and allmost all of the workers on their side). The term revolution fits way better than coup detat.

Well, a coup d'etat is a planned armed takeover of state institutions which is pretty much on the nose with what October was. I don't disagree with calling it a revolution, but at the same time that sort of implies spontaneity and mass participation in the city like February was - October was distinctly different as a military showdown that was planned ahead of time and launched at a decided date and time. I think that is enough to qualify it was a putsch or coup. It might have had support from the population, there wasn't exactly popular participation either - it was an action conducted by organized Red Guard militiamen loyal to the Bolsheviks. The academic consensus as well is that coup d'etat is a a relatively appropriate way to describe the October Revolution in Petrograd at least.
 
Well, a coup d'etat is a planned armed takeover of state institutions which is pretty much on the nose with what October was. I don't disagree with calling it a revolution, but at the same time that sort of implies spontaneity and mass participation in the city like February was - October was distinctly different as a military showdown that was planned ahead of time and launched at a decided date and time. I think that is enough to qualify it was a putsch or coup. It might have had support from the population, there wasn't exactly popular participation either - it was an action conducted by organized Red Guard militiamen loyal to the Bolsheviks. The academic consensus as well is that coup d'etat is a a relatively appropriate way to describe the October Revolution in Petrograd at least.

Hm... well, the Provisional Government was virtually helpless to offer significant resistance against the red guards, as Railways and railway stations had been controlled by Soviet workers and soldiers for days, making rail travel to and from Petrograd impossible for Provisional Government officials.

Appart from that, it's just a question of definitions.
 
Without a violent seizure and Lenin dead or permanently incapacitated the immediate motivating factors among the Bolsheviks to steamroll the other socialist factions has vanished. The success of violence October 25 convinced the CC that Lenin's insistence that the working class was ready for revolution and would be 100% behind a forcible seizure of power - and therefore the other parties were denying the will of the working class - had serious merit to it. Before then, as others have noted, everyone was very nervous and not nearly as aggressive as Lenin wanted to be. So that makes long term socialist coalition building a much easier task.

Even in the short term, S-R and Menshevik support for Soviet Power makes Soviet state building a much simpler task in the waning months of 1917. Being able to (Mostly) peacefully transition into new institutions without a change in personnel (Especially in Siberia and on the Volga) would make establishing a normal routine of governance easier. If the Second Congress can bully Kerensky into stepping down and dissolving his government willingly over the next few days, it'll be an even more straightforward task to absorb the provisional government's institutions in the provinces - most of which shared personnel with the Soviets already!

The next big crisis will be the question of peace and relations with the Entente. While an armistice will be inevitable, with Lenin gone and a stronger coalition government in place it's hard to see anything close to Brest-Litovsk being accepted. In February-March 1918, when the Germans went back on the offensive in the East, Trotsky seriously considered inviting the Entente to help defend Petrograd - he'd already done so in Murmansk. Germany's control over its occupied territories in Russia during this time was extremely tenuous, so it's unlikely to do more to take advantage of the nascent Red Army. Soviet Russia might, strangely, end up as one of the war's official "victors" after all. This would do much to prevent the defection of large portions of the officer corps to the Whites (Anti-German patriotism was a big motivating factor).
 
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