Japan as a wild card in WW2

[BBadolato]

So I've been recently in a WW2 class that thankfully is focused solely on the Pacific, and it's been giving me some ideas about AH for Japan from 1930 at least up until the end of November of 41. I'm sorry if I'm contributing to a recent glut in Showa-era Japan Threads.

That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

I ask this because understandable given their isolation even if self-imposed what was the value of Japan supporting The Tripartite Pact. To me, they're one chance of avoiding a war with the U.S but still getting their oil was Simply to renounce The tripartite Pact considering Cordell Hull mentions his own and the American public anxiety that Japan is officially aligned with the Axis.

To that end, I was thinking of 2 paths one could there have been a relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union that well not entirely goodwill and buddy-buddy could still be functional? The Soviet never bothered to try to ask for the Chinese Eastern Railway back after the Japanese took Manchuria, I feel the Soviets could have a deal with Japan to do so, and possibly build stronger relations.

Another is could the Japanese possibly avert the embargos that forced them into Pearl Harbour, and maybe even become an ally provided the Cold War doesn't get butterflied away. So could be any way to either reduce the atrocities by it by reckless troops or the 3 Alls, which is the closest you got to Khorne worship in real life. Or could at the very least a settlement is reached between the U.S and Japan in 41, or maybe the Japanese only stay in Northern Indochina.

I'm sorry if this a lot to work with as well.

 

[mlp]

The Japanese definitely feared the Communists more than anything since the 1920s. Being close with the Soviets will be hard. Maybe they fear the US enough to just "shove it" with most/all of their invasion plans? That makes it a neutral - better than a belligerent, anyway.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

So I've been recently in a WW2 class that thankfully is focused solely on the Pacific, and it's been giving me some ideas about AH for Japan from 1930 at least up until the end of November of 41. I'm sorry if I'm contributing to a recent glut in Showa-era Japan Threads.

That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

I ask this because understandable given their isolation even if self-imposed what was the value of Japan supporting The Tripartite Pact. To me, they're one chance of avoiding a war with the U.S but still getting their oil was Simply to renounce The tripartite Pact considering Cordell Hull mentions his own and the American public anxiety that Japan is officially aligned with the Axis.

To that end, I was thinking of 2 paths one could there have been a relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union that well not entirely goodwill and buddy-buddy could still be functional? The Soviet never bothered to try to ask for the Chinese Eastern Railway back after the Japanese took Manchuria, I feel the Soviets could have a deal with Japan to do so, and possibly build stronger relations.

Another is could the Japanese possibly avert the embargos that forced them into Pearl Harbour, and maybe even become an ally provided the Cold War doesn't get butterflied away. So could be any way to either reduce the atrocities by it by reckless troops or the 3 Alls, which is the closest you got to Khorne worship in real life. Or could at the very least a settlement is reached between the U.S and Japan in 41, or maybe the Japanese only stay in Northern Indochina.

I'm sorry if this a lot to work with as well.

Japan joined the Axis, because it was a revisionist power. The Japanese wanted to build an Empire like the British, French and Americans did, but all three were sobstacles to their goal.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

So I've been recently in a WW2 class that thankfully is focused solely on the Pacific, and it's been giving me some ideas about AH for Japan from 1930 at least up until the end of November of 41. I'm sorry if I'm contributing to a recent glut in Showa-era Japan Threads.

That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

I ask this because understandable given their isolation even if self-imposed what was the value of Japan supporting The Tripartite Pact. To me, they're one chance of avoiding a war with the U.S but still getting their oil was Simply to renounce The tripartite Pact considering Cordell Hull mentions his own and the American public anxiety that Japan is officially aligned with the Axis.

To that end, I was thinking of 2 paths one could there have been a relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union that well not entirely goodwill and buddy-buddy could still be functional? The Soviet never bothered to try to ask for the Chinese Eastern Railway back after the Japanese took Manchuria, I feel the Soviets could have a deal with Japan to do so, and possibly build stronger relations.

Another is could the Japanese possibly avert the embargos that forced them into Pearl Harbour, and maybe even become an ally provided the Cold War doesn't get butterflied away. So could be any way to either reduce the atrocities by it by reckless troops or the 3 Alls, which is the closest you got to Khorne worship in real life. Or could at the very least a settlement is reached between the U.S and Japan in 41, or maybe the Japanese only stay in Northern Indochina.

I'm sorry if this a lot to work with as well.

Japan joined the Axis, because it was a revisionist power. The Japanese wanted to build an Empire like the British, French and Americans did, but all three were sobstacles to their goal.

 

[nbcman]

So I've been recently in a WW2 class that thankfully is focused solely on the Pacific, and it's been giving me some ideas about AH for Japan from 1930 at least up until the end of November of 41. I'm sorry if I'm contributing to a recent glut in Showa-era Japan Threads.

That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

I ask this because understandable given their isolation even if self-imposed what was the value of Japan supporting The Tripartite Pact. To me, they're one chance of avoiding a war with the U.S but still getting their oil was Simply to renounce The tripartite Pact considering Cordell Hull mentions his own and the American public anxiety that Japan is officially aligned with the Axis.

To that end, I was thinking of 2 paths one could there have been a relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union that well not entirely goodwill and buddy-buddy could still be functional? The Soviet never bothered to try to ask for the Chinese Eastern Railway back after the Japanese took Manchuria, I feel the Soviets could have a deal with Japan to do so, and possibly build stronger relations.

Another is could the Japanese possibly avert the embargos that forced them into Pearl Harbour, and maybe even become an ally provided the Cold War doesn't get butterflied away. So could be any way to either reduce the atrocities by it by reckless troops or the 3 Alls, which is the closest you got to Khorne worship in real life. Or could at the very least a settlement is reached between the U.S and Japan in 41, or maybe the Japanese only stay in Northern Indochina.

I'm sorry if this a lot to work with as well.

It would probably take a POD far earlier than the 1930s to get the Japanese on better terms with the Soviets-probably a smaller intervention and not attempting to colonize Siberia with 50k settlers during the Russian Civil War. But there would be big butterflies from that which would probably eliminate the further rise of radical forces in the Japanese military leading to a far different 1920s-1930s. Otherwise, the Japanese will still tension leading to border conflicts with the Soviets after their invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

Short answer is yes. At length it reqires considerable changes in both Japanese & US/British foreign policy.

I ask this because understandable given their isolation even if self-imposed what was the value of Japan supporting The Tripartite Pact. To me, they're one chance of avoiding a war with the U.S but still getting their oil was Simply to renounce The tripartite Pact considering Cordell Hull mentions his own and the American public anxiety that Japan is officially aligned with the Axis.

To grasp what was needed you have to understand what was really eating at the Japanese leadership. Not just the politicians in power but the buisness leaders-the Zaibatsu, the military, the leading academics ....

To that end, I was thinking of 2 paths one could there have been a relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union that well not entirely goodwill and buddy-buddy could still be functional? The Soviet never bothered to try to ask for the Chinese Eastern Railway back after the Japanese took Manchuria, I feel the Soviets could have a deal with Japan to do so, and possibly build stronger relations.

Another is could the Japanese possibly avert the embargos that forced them into Pearl Harbour, and maybe even become an ally provided the Cold War doesn't get butterflied away. So could be any way to either reduce the atrocities by it by reckless troops or the 3 Alls, which is the closest you got to Khorne worship in real life. Or could at the very least a settlement is reached between the U.S and Japan in 41, or maybe the Japanese only stay in Northern Indochina.

The occupation of Indochina was the seminal event that led directly to the embargos & was the culmation of increasing radical experssion of the Japanese PoV. Its tough to have any degree of occupation of Indo China & prevent the slide to war. In terms of aggresion the Japanese leaders of 1940 were never inclined to half measure, & the US leaders understood futher half measures & appeasement was not going to work. War was nearly inevitable from the moment the first Jpanese soldier set foot in Viet Nam

Through the 19th Century & into the 20th Japan had watched as the Europeans collectively colinized the planet. The western hemishpere had been overun by a mass of migrants, who had created a sort of extention of Europe, Nearly all of Africa and most of Asia had fallen under some sort of control. The Mughal empire in India had folded before the Europeans and the Manchu empire, the mightist on the planet in 1800 was powerless less than a century later. This was of course very disturbing to the Japanese. American warships had forced some embarassing treaties on them in the latter 19th Century & as they saw it it was just a matter of time before worse treaties were forced on them.

Thr solution as they saw it was to acquire a empire of their own, & the alternatice to become a client state & eventual colony of another nation. When you look at the Japanese actions of the 20th Century in this view they make better sense.

If in 1939-40 British diplomacy had aimed at returning Japan to a ally, as in 1914 -18 it would have had a chance of sucess. The Japanese wante recognition of the legitimacy of the empire as it existed in 1937 Had the Brits some assurance of support as in 1914-18 & seen some reduction in Japanese expansionismtensions would have been greatly reduced. The US had already shifted to the Europe first stratedy, embodied in the Plan Dog Memo of November 1940.

If the Japanese had avoided occupation of Indo China, supported Britain as a ally, and entered into at least token negotiations with China. The Pacific war could have been avoided.

 

[rush4you]

This one is not that hard. Get Chiang Kai Shek to keep and expand his alliance with Germany, and have the war against Japan being initiated by a Chinese provoked incident, even if accidental. This will bring Japan into the Allied camp. Even if Japan pisses off the US, the rest of the Allies won't apply any embargo against them.

IJN carriers fighting Italian battleships in the Mediterranean and destroyers against U-boats in the Atlantic, you say?

The downside is that this could extend the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact for a while, as the USSR is unconfortable with a possible 3 front war, and Japanese naval assets make Italian impact less fruitful for Germany.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

This one is not that hard. Get Chiang Kai Shek to keep and expand his alliance with Germany, and have the war against Japan being initiated by a Chinese provoked incident, even if accidental. This will bring Japan into the Allied camp. Even if Japan pisses off the US, the rest of the Allies won't apply any embargo against them.

Japan as a active ally wont suffer any embargos. No one will think of them. In 1915 the Brits and US shouted in private but publicly did nothing about the 21 Demands.

IJN carriers fighting Italian battleships in the Mediterranean and destroyers against U-boats in the Atlantic, you say?

The downside is that this could extend the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact for a while, as the USSR is unconfortable with a possible 3 front war, and Japanese naval assets make Italian impact less fruitful for Germany.

I dont see how, the end of that pact was Hitlers call & in this case he has no reason to think anymore rationally about attacking the USSR than OTL.

 

[thaddeus]

That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

Japan declined to join the earlier Pact of Steel, what if Germany and Italy pursue better relations with USSR instead?

Japan is left wild card by default.

(not sure what, if anything, Soviets would want? other than better or at least tolerable relations. OR maybe all of Manchuria and an expanded Mongolia, to create three states as buffer to south, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria)

 

[Onkel Willie]

So I've been recently in a WW2 class that thankfully is focused solely on the Pacific, and it's been giving me some ideas about AH for Japan from 1930 at least up until the end of November of 41. I'm sorry if I'm contributing to a recent glut in Showa-era Japan Threads.

That being could Japan, have been a wild card in the diplomatic arena? That being is it more than possible for the Japanese to consider other relations with the Allies or even the Soviets as potential paths, then say siding with the Axis.

I ask this because understandable given their isolation even if self-imposed what was the value of Japan supporting The Tripartite Pact. To me, they're one chance of avoiding a war with the U.S but still getting their oil was Simply to renounce The tripartite Pact considering Cordell Hull mentions his own and the American public anxiety that Japan is officially aligned with the Axis.

To that end, I was thinking of 2 paths one could there have been a relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union that well not entirely goodwill and buddy-buddy could still be functional? The Soviet never bothered to try to ask for the Chinese Eastern Railway back after the Japanese took Manchuria, I feel the Soviets could have a deal with Japan to do so, and possibly build stronger relations.

Another is could the Japanese possibly avert the embargos that forced them into Pearl Harbour, and maybe even become an ally provided the Cold War doesn't get butterflied away. So could be any way to either reduce the atrocities by it by reckless troops or the 3 Alls, which is the closest you got to Khorne worship in real life. Or could at the very least a settlement is reached between the U.S and Japan in 41, or maybe the Japanese only stay in Northern Indochina.

I'm sorry if this a lot to work with as well.

I see Soviet-Japanese cooperation as unlikely. I do see possibilities for improved relations between Japan and the West after a Soviet-Japanese war. The Battles of Khalkhyn Gol could easily have escalated into a war if Stalin had wanted it, most likely ending with Japan being booted out of China. The decision to go to war in December 1941 was a result of the embargos imposed for Japanese actions in China and French Indochina. Those embargos are not imposed and/or lifted ITTL, meaning there will be no Pacific War, or at least not as we know it in December 1941.

In the meantime, Japan will be pissed that Germany - instead of consulting on what measures to take "to safeguard their common interests" as the Anti-Comintern Pact dictates in the event of Soviet aggression - didn't lift a finger and even signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This souring of German-Japanese relations leaves room for improved relations with the West and a Japanese Empire that sides with the USA in the Cold War. As for joining WW II, I see that as unlikely since Japan gains nothing from it except for some brownie points in Anglo-American public opinion.