Might be able to scrape up enough resources to attempt the counter the allied offensive in 43 not that it would make much of a difference
Is a sucessfull Japanese invasion of Australia during WW2 more feasible than Sealion?
- Thread starter Malone
- Start date
Agreed on all the points you make, provided that the same mistake the Germans made in Libya in 1943 was not repeated - which was to reinforce for a large failure rather than cutting losses and getting out once Torch hit the beach.
No. That would never work. The Wehrmacht always forgets their winter gear.
Hideki Tojo himself said that the IJA while they had the plans never had the manpower or more importantly, the ships. Assuming they can find both though, sure, it's feasible.
The Sandman
Banned
So, to refocus a bit on the actual thread topic, what exactly did the Australians have defending the northern part of the continent during 1942, and what could the Japanese potentially have used to attack it? Figure that the area of interest is the coastline from Port Hedland to Thursday Island and inland to the line Daly Waters-Alexandria Station-Camooweal-Cloncurry. Also, assume the POD involves both an actual Japanese plan for invading northern Australia and the successful conquest of Papua in April-May 1942, probably meaning no Coral Sea or a more inconclusive one that doesn't result in the Port Moresby invasion transports turning around.
Since the most important factor in the Allies being able to turn back Operation MO was Rochefort's code cracking, you probably need to butterfly that away, just to get started.
The Sandman
Banned
That's actually pretty easy, or so I'd think; just change the schedule of the Japanese rotating their codes. They'll still inevitably be cracked, but as long as the new set haven't been cracked yet, MO would presumably happen roughly as planned.
Geon
Donor
Just to add my two cents here. Australia is BIG. The sheer size of the land mass would have daunted the Japanese. Looking at any map they would have noticed that Australia is a huge ring of fertility surrounding a large hostile outback. The sheer logistics would have been daunting to say the least for any invasion. In fact, the logistical problems to invade Australia would have been greater in many ways then those surrounding the Sealion operation. The supply lines to keep the invasion going would have been under constant air/sea attack by the Allies. And any invasion would face an Australian army able to use the outback and able to wage a guerilla war if Japan was fortunate enough to seize the northern ports.
Further, there was the manpower problem. As mentioned many times in various threads on this page, Japan was already overstretched with her manpower scattered throughout China, Burma, and the South Pacific. She had absolutely nothing to spare for an invasion of Australia period. The best she could hope for was to blockade Australia by taking New Guinea.
Further, there was the manpower problem. As mentioned many times in various threads on this page, Japan was already overstretched with her manpower scattered throughout China, Burma, and the South Pacific. She had absolutely nothing to spare for an invasion of Australia period. The best she could hope for was to blockade Australia by taking New Guinea.
The IJA poured something like half a million troops into the Lae-Solomons region in 1942-1943. The idea is that, given that the priority should be fortifying the inner defensive line, was it really the best use of these resources to send them into the South Pacific, or should they have sent less than half that total, with the rest going to Marianas and the Philippines instead, and forming an expedition to Australia as a diversion that takes MacArthur maybe 6-10 months to finish off? So, spitballing, rather than boosting Lae and the 'Slot' with 500,000 troops, send 100,000 there, 300,000 to the inner defenses, (esp. Marianas) and 100,000 to Australia to run around the outback. When they start to get cornered, evacuate them.
The Japanese were just ridiculously overextended. Armywise - half their Army was chasing Chiang; a second half was guarding Manchuria and a third half was fighting in the SW Pacific. Navy wise - well they launched three fleet carriers during the war but they never had functioning air groups. US launched three from Philadelphia alone. (US launched 20 plus total). US submarines cut off most of their supplies. They based most of their fleet in Singapore - to be close to refineries and far from US subs. They couldn't supply their troops in SW pacific - many were starving after 1943.
They could never have won - except by exhausting US; Australia wouldn't have made any difference, even if you conjure up 10 divisions plus support.
I only count one Japanese fleet carrier commissioned during the war - the Taiho (1944).
There was the giant Shinano - but it was technically a support carrier intended to carry reserve aircraft, fuel and ordnance in support of other carriers - rather than a fleet carrier.
But the basic point remains: As against 24 Essex class carriers, 9 light carriers and over 100 escort carriers built during the war, Japan was hopelessly outclassed by the U.S. in its shipbuilding capability.
I can't endorse the Australia scheme - logistically unsupportable - but I agree very much with your larger point.
Melanesia isn't a road to anywhere important. But the Marianas and Philippines are. The Japanese could and should have done more to fortify and garrison them.
I think you're right. They also built a few light carriers/ converted some boats to escort carriers. Unryu class were genuine carriers but only 40 a/c.
Right.
They did a number of conversions of marus and ocean liners.
But the only true fleet carrier designed from keel up as such during the war was the Taiho (which despite damage control issues, seems to have been the best carrier design the IJN ever came up with).
Shinano could perhaps have been pressed into service as a serviceable fleet carrier, if the IJN had been so minded - and actually had pilots, planes, and fuel to use it as such by that point in the war.
Agreed absolutely on inner island priority. But, the question is whether in the outer rim, whether it was more useful in these scattered outlying regions to passively remain in garrison awaiting attack or bypass, or to go on the offensive and occupy sparsely defended Allied locations to cause an overreaction by the Allies when retaking them. An actual example was the occupation of points in Alaska in 1942. Even without Midway these were unsupportable garrisons in the longer run, so theoretically having them there was a waste of Japanese resources. But - and this is the key point - in making the small commitment in Alaska in 1942, the Japanese in 1943 diverted large US amphibious resources to smash some empty shells with an oversized hammer. That's the idea with a diversion in Australia - let MacArthur use this to suck up vast amounts of Allied resources for a goose chase.
It's not at all impossible that the Japanese could have - had they really wanted to - staged an assault into Darwin, and even secured the port and immediate environs, had they struck early enough in 1942.
The problem is, you are going to have to write off any garrison you send there. The IJA and IJN have to make a hard decision that the distraction and diversion of resources on the part of MacArthur and the Australians will justify the complete loss of the troops, planes and equipment dispatched there. And to be sure, there will be some level of freakout in Canberra.
Otherwise, they're basically a giant POW camp that the Allies don't have to support. They have no ability to get anywhere else in Australia, and the Kimberley area will struggle to support them indigenously in terms of food. Which matters, given that the IJN simply will not be able to support it logistically.