How to successfully evacuate Singapore, Jan 1942?

[Admiral Beez]

From early January 1942 the British and CW forces in Malaya began to fall back to Singapore. When Singapore fell in mid-February over 85,000 British/CW troops were captured or killed.

Tokyo radio at the time announced that there would be "no Dunkirk in Singapore". Notwithstanding this claim, there was a limited evacuation effort started in January right up to the last moment.

http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/japadvance/singapore.html
Official evacuations from Singapore had begun in late January and continued until almost the last moment. RAAF squadrons had been evacuated before the Japanese invaded the island and the remaining RAN warships were ordered to leave. Some merchant ships also got away carrying evacuees from the path of the Japanese. The warships' main operational tasks were escort duties, and the fleet based in Singapore included the destroyer HMAS Vampire and the sloop HMAS Yarra, which arrived late in January, along with several corvettes. The corvettes in the 21st Minesweeping Flotilla swept the sea lanes and conducted anti-submarine patrols. HMA Ships Toowoomba, Wollongong and Ballarat reinforced the original four corvettes, HMA Ships Bendigo, Burnie, Goulburn and Maryborough. The last 65 Australian Army nurses stationed in Singapore were ordered to board the Vyner Brooke, which sailed on 12 February. Their colleagues, who had sailed in the Empire Star the previous day, reached Australia, but only 24 of the nurses who sailed in the Vyner Brooke survived to return to Australia in 1945 after the war had ended.

Let's assume after Force Z is lost Dec 10th that a larger plan is conceived to evacuate all British/CW forces from Singapore to Burma/India and Australia. Both routes, especially that to India/Burma pass dangerously close to Japanese held positions. This of course means deeper thinking folks in control understand that things "may" go badly in Malaya.

By early January it is clear that Percival is going to lose, but regardless in OTL, Australian troop ships were arriving as late as 21 January to disembark reinforcements, obviously demonstrating the lack of IJN superiority in the area.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2/4th_Machine_Gun_Battalion_(Australia)
After departing Fremantle, the convoy steamed towards Java and reached Ratai Bay early on 20 January. Proceeding on to the Sunda Strait, which was reached mid-morning on 21 January and the men were then transferred to a number of smaller, faster Dutch ships to run the gauntlet of Japanese bombers that were attacking Allied shipping in the area. In concert with several Australian, British and Indian escorts and two Dutch Catalina flying boats, the convoy entered Keppel Harbour on 25 January 1942.

Instead, let's have these ships, both large and small evacuate Singapore's 100,000 British and CW troops plus, if possible, Malay civilians who worked for Britain.

Now, I know this is contrarian bait, we can find a list of reasons why this can't be done, or shouldn't be done, such as somehow betraying the Malays or showing the Empire's weakness (not that didn't stop the Dunkirk evacuation). I say it could be done. When the causeway was destroyed the Japanese were delayed a week before entering Singapore, and even then they had to fight for nearly two weeks. A British rear guard may have been lost, but with sufficient boats it can be done.

 

[Zheng He]

This would make a cool TL. First, at some date, STOP BRINGING IN REINFORCEMENTS. You can prevent a large number of personnel from needing to be evacuated by not bringing them there in the first place (like the 18th Division for example, some of whom arrived in early February).

This will require some hard decisions like who is going to be the rear guard? For purely brutal political optics I recommend using as many white troops as possible as the rear guard so it does not become an issue of a bunch of Indian troops holding off the Japanese so the white soldiers can escape.

I agree this can be done - it largely requires leaders to realize at some date that Singapore is going to be lost and instead of continuing to throw good after bad, it is time to start pulling money out.

 

[Admiral Beez]

This will require some hard decisions like who is going to be the rear guard?

Percival should be leading it Maybe he can blow up the graving dock to avoid its use by the IJN.

Perhaps with some British-Maskirovka the rear guard can be reduce to a few hundred troops and then these lucky fellows grab boats to DEI and onward.

 

[deathscompanion1]

If the Brits abandon the heart of their Pacific strategy without a fight the Australians will scream bloody murder.

Singapore had to be defended it was too prestigious and comforting to anyone scared of Japan.

 

[zert]

It might allow the Empire to hold Burma. Maybe with more destruction of the harbor drydocks they might hamper Japanese operations.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If the Brits abandon the heart of their Pacific strategy without a fight the Australians will scream bloody murder.

Singapore had to be defended it was too prestigious and comforting to anyone scared of Japan.

No where do I suggest the Brits are not fighting or that they're abandoning anything, but when the IJA gets to the borders of Singapore that means Malaya is lost. In my scenario the RN/RAN just rescued thousands of Australians so they can fight again, and you foresee them complaining?

When tens of thousands of British soldiers escaped at Dunkirk, the Brits weren't giving up without a fight nor abandoning France. They were withdrawing to redeploy, reequip and fight again. Many of the lads who escaped at Dunkirk would return to France 48 months later at Normandy.

So, let me be clear. Britain is not abandoning its Pacific strategy (BTW, Singapore is in the Indian Ocean), but by January has been militarily defeated in Malaya and forced to make a final stand at Singapore. It's that final stand I am suggesting we can avoid, for the most part.

 

[ExScientiaTridens]

It all gets down to how many and how far. Which depends on what type of shipping is available.

The amount of time you have to evacuate is also a significant issue (taking into account the amount of time to load the ship and make a round trip). I seriously doubt there is time to do much if the evacuation does not begin well before the Japanese reach Singapore. Too late otherwise to do anything other than remove a token amount.

The Dunkirk equivalent would be using anything that floats to take people across the straits to Sumatra.

Evacuation to Burma requires running up the Straits past Japanese artillery, etc. but it does have the advantage of a shorter turn-around time.

Taking them to Australia or India is another kettle of fish. Figure 1,500 - 2,000 in a typical troop transport (there are very few larger in 1941). That is a considerable number of shiploads, and long turn-around time. Also note that aside from transporting poorly treated POWs, cramming a thousand people into a freighter causes problems for anything but short distances. Although "heads" (of the age of sail variety) can be rigged topside, none of those ships have sufficient water distillation capabilities so drinking water is a real issue. If you put on water casks and food for a longer voyage you will necessarily to limit the number carried.

Wild guess for transport of 100K is 50 troopship loads or 100-200 freighter loads (depending on distance), or various combinations. That is quite a bit of shipping.

 

[Riain]

The biggest problem was that Sumatra was invaded the day before Singapore surrendered and Sumatra is the closest place for an evacuation, everything else is simply too far away.

 

[mattep74]

How about withdrawing from Singapore when the Japanese had taken the first airfields in Malaya, and evacuating everything to Sumatra?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

From early January 1942 the British and CW forces in Malaya began to fall back to Singapore. When Singapore fell in mid-February over 85,000 British/CW troops were captured or killed.

Tokyo radio at the time announced that there would be "no Dunkirk in Singapore". Notwithstanding this claim, there was a limited evacuation effort started in January right up to the last moment.

http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/japadvance/singapore.html
Official evacuations from Singapore had begun in late January and continued until almost the last moment. RAAF squadrons had been evacuated before the Japanese invaded the island and the remaining RAN warships were ordered to leave. Some merchant ships also got away carrying evacuees from the path of the Japanese. The warships' main operational tasks were escort duties, and the fleet based in Singapore included the destroyer HMAS Vampire and the sloop HMAS Yarra, which arrived late in January, along with several corvettes. The corvettes in the 21st Minesweeping Flotilla swept the sea lanes and conducted anti-submarine patrols. HMA Ships Toowoomba, Wollongong and Ballarat reinforced the original four corvettes, HMA Ships Bendigo, Burnie, Goulburn and Maryborough. The last 65 Australian Army nurses stationed in Singapore were ordered to board the Vyner Brooke, which sailed on 12 February. Their colleagues, who had sailed in the Empire Star the previous day, reached Australia, but only 24 of the nurses who sailed in the Vyner Brooke survived to return to Australia in 1945 after the war had ended.

Let's assume after Force Z is lost Dec 10th that a larger plan is conceived to evacuate all British/CW forces from Singapore to Burma/India and Australia. Both routes, especially that to India/Burma pass dangerously close to Japanese held positions. This of course means deeper thinking folks in control understand that things "may" go badly in Malaya.

By early January it is clear that Percival is going to lose, but regardless in OTL, Australian troop ships were arriving as late as 21 January to disembark reinforcements, obviously demonstrating the lack of IJN superiority in the area.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2/4th_Machine_Gun_Battalion_(Australia)
After departing Fremantle, the convoy steamed towards Java and reached Ratai Bay early on 20 January. Proceeding on to the Sunda Strait, which was reached mid-morning on 21 January and the men were then transferred to a number of smaller, faster Dutch ships to run the gauntlet of Japanese bombers that were attacking Allied shipping in the area. In concert with several Australian, British and Indian escorts and two Dutch Catalina flying boats, the convoy entered Keppel Harbour on 25 January 1942.

Instead, let's have these ships, both large and small evacuate Singapore's 100,000 British and CW troops plus, if possible, Malay civilians who worked for Britain.

Now, I know this is contrarian bait, we can find a list of reasons why this can't be done, or shouldn't be done, such as somehow betraying the Malays or showing the Empire's weakness (not that didn't stop the Dunkirk evacuation). I say it could be done. When the causeway was destroyed the Japanese were delayed a week before entering Singapore, and even then they had to fight for nearly two weeks. A British rear guard may have been lost, but with sufficient boats it can be done.

This is good discussion topic - I've alway wondered why so many troops were left to be captured (some having just arrived) - a lot could have been done with that Corp and it's not like the powers that be really thought that Malay/Singapore could be held verses a determined Japanese Attack (as was laid out in the documents captured by one of the German raiders in 1940) - not without massive improvements to both the Quantity and Quality of the troops there which was not going to happen within the time frame.

So a realistic no BS appraisal would tell the British and Commonwealth leaders that unless some of the first team was sent to Malaya it cannot be held and if Malaya could not be held...Singapore could not be held

So.....what's the earliest that any non essential mouths can be evacuated? The Japanese invasion of FIC? Initial invasion Sept 1940/subsequent full invasion July 1941?

So evacuate none essential Civilians and staff (including those in HK) to Oz and India starting from this period.

In HK create a reinforced Regt of locals and Volunteers - whose job it is to ensure that any invasion of the Colony can only be achieved by force and also to ensure destruction of anything useful before the Colony surrenders - basically only keep the absolute minimum force in the colony that Politics can allow - the Majority of the Regular forces to be evacuated to Malaya - where they will form another Brigade (or 2 if C force is still sent) - These troops will drastically increase the number of Regulars in Malaya.

Once it becomes apparent that the Japanese have sent quality troops with proper support - turn the battle into a fighting retreat - Matador? Do it or don't do it - but whatever they do - don't bloody prevaricate and do nothing which is how nearly an Entire Brigade got overrun pretty much in the opening days.

Lastly have an evacuation plan agreed with before hand and have this understood by Wavell and Percival - that if holding the Colony is not achievable then they are to save as much of the their command as possible while at the same time denying facilities at Singapore to the Japanese - so move or sink in deep water the floating drydock, Dock cranes, any rail facilities and Fuel storage etc.

As for saving a rear guard - have them know their job and ensure that they are familiar with the evacuation plan - the rear guard should reach the harbour and board any DDs which should be the last ships to leave.

IMO the only reason this cannot be done is because of Politics

 

[Locke01]

This would make a cool TL. First, at some date, STOP BRINGING IN REINFORCEMENTS. You can prevent a large number of personnel from needing to be evacuated by not bringing them there in the first place (like the 18th Division for example, some of whom arrived in early February).

This will require some hard decisions like who is going to be the rear guard? For purely brutal political optics I recommend using as many white troops as possible as the rear guard so it does not become an issue of a bunch of Indian troops holding off the Japanese so the white soldiers can escape.

I agree this can be done - it largely requires leaders to realize at some date that Singapore is going to be lost and instead of continuing to throw good after bad, it is time to start pulling money out.

Hard to see this happening. Churchill, aided and abetted by newly minted Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke (*), insisted on funneling reinforcements into Singapore until the bloody, bitter end.. They would have sent even more troops into that hell-hole if they could have. The course of action you outline, sensible though it is, would practically require an ASB event to come to pass.

(*) Everybody blames Churchill for the Singapore debacle, but no one ever takes Brooke to task for his role. Brooke thought Singapore could be held, if only enough men could be sent there, and did his best to make it so. Then he endorsed a highly classified report in which the Australians were held responsible for the catastrophe.

 

[Zheng He]

Hard to see this happening. Churchill, aided and abetted by newly minted Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke (*), insisted on funneling reinforcements into Singapore until the bloody, bitter end.. They would have sent even more troops into that hell-hole if they could have. The course of action you outline, sensible though it is, would practically require an ASB event to come to pass.

(*) Everybody blames Churchill for the Singapore debacle, but no one ever takes Brooke to task for his role. Brooke thought Singapore could be held, if only enough men could be sent there, and did his best to make it so. Then he endorsed a highly classified report in which the Australians were held responsible for the catastrophe.

Interesting, I did not know that last part.

 

[Zheng He]

Okay, the causeway is blown up on 17 January 1942. Sending reinforcements after that is not just stupid it is criminal, that means no more 18th Division other than the 53rd Brigade which is already there. Once he causeway is blown up, any adult with more than two brain cells should recognize that it is just a matter of time so now the focus needs to be on saving what can be saved.

So, after 17 January 1942 start pulling troops and people out on whatever will carry them. Indian and Australian troops have priority for evacuation for the political optic, the rear guard needs to be British troops and some will not make it out. British troops need to be the last to go. I don't know how many can be pulled out be as AB pointed out, plenty of convoys were still getting in and out in those last few desperate weeks. I would suggest trying to get them to Batavia because Allies had not lost complete control of the SLOCs around there just yet and then decide who gets to stay on Java for the defense of Java and who goes to Australia or Burma from there.

AB - suggest you start a TL on this. Your first primary POD is that after 17 January Allied leaders determine that they need to save what they can in Singapore instead of continuing to throw good money after bad.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Any idea what could prompt such a decision?

 

[Errolwi]

The Australians get good evidence that things are hopeless, and they are being fed over-optimistic rubbish, say "AGAIN!!!" (see Greece), and make even more noise?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Any idea what could prompt such a decision?

Perhaps someone that Churchill and the other leaders trusts (who was the South African fella?) and he feeds back to the Imperial Staff about the true state of the troops and situation (ideally before the Dec 7)

Another option might be General Ironsides - I believe that he may have been unemployed at this time and to get him 'out of the way' he might be asked to review the condition of the troops etc and being a renowned trainer of new troops he would easily see how poor many of the units where in both Malaya and HK and possibly how shaky the commanders where.

 

[Zheng He]

I don't know if this is that hard. The causeway gets blown up on 17 January. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that there is not going some glorious siege of Minas Tirith with the Riders of Rohan coming to the rescue (yes I realize LOTR had not been written yet). At that point two decisions are made:

1. All reinforcements to Singapore are to be diverted to Ceylon, Burma, Java, or Australia as appropriate. As a result the 18th Division less the 53rd Brigade goes to Burma where they find gainfull employment.

2. Troops in Singapore are to be withdrawn while the window of opportunity still exists.

 

[HJ Tulp]

I don't know if this is that hard. The causeway gets blown up on 17 January. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that there is not going some glorious siege of Minas Tirith with the Riders of Rohan coming to the rescue (yes I realize LOTR had not been written yet).

I agree. And yet IOTL there was no evacuation, instead Singapore was reinforced. So we need a better and more specific POD.

 

[Zheng He]

Just have Mr. Churchill decide that preserving forces to fight another day from somewhere else is more important than the Honour of the British Empire.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Just have Mr. Churchill decide that preserving forces to fight another day from somewhere else is more important than the Honour of the British Empire.

Which is exactly what he did and what he said to justify authorizing Operation Dynamo in May 1940 and it's evacuation of over 338,000 troops from France. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkirk_evacuation

...and repeated in April 1941 when Churchill authorized the evacuation of 50,000 British/CW forces from Greece to North Africa. Many of these same troops would fight under Montgomery to defeat first the Italians, and then the Germans under Rommel.

Churchill has recent historical examples of being able to see the advantage of strategic withdrawal and redeployment. It's not ASB to see that he might have had the same notion for Malaya.