Mays 'Strange Victory' is a recent analysis. Horne 'To Lose a Battle'. and Champman 'Why France Fell touch briefly at several points on the German planning. Their focus is more in the failures of the senior French commanders. ie: That Georges may have had a mental breakdown on the 14th May, completely paralyzing him. Or, on some of the decisions by the German division and corps commanders.
How "should" WWII in 1940 have gone?
- Thread starter Flavius Iulius Maiorianus
- Start date
Basically the guys on the ground in the attacks were seeing one thing the guys further back thought they saw something different, and both felt teh other was missing the full reality of the situation.
Ultimately the Brits an France were not able to mount a decent counter attack and the ones they did mount were not joined and had little overall effect
You and RedSword12 are both right, it just you are right about different things are that aren't 100% mutually exclusive
Which to be fair was the plan for Barbarossa, but Germany's biggest mistakes were in military intelligence to whit;
1). How big the Red army was
2). Where the red army was
3). how quickly the USSR could mobilise reserves
(1 & 2 being inherently linked as they looked at what they could see in the immediate areas at and behind the new border and thought that was the vast majority of the red army)
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True, but that's also why their plan was only to fight in the first 200-250km or so
If only those pesky Soviets had stuck to the German plan, it would have all worked out.
Giant Man Eating Rabbits
Banned
Order of battle, 10 May
| Aircraft type | Role | Squadrons |
|---|---|---|
| Air Component | ||
| Westland Lysander | tactical reconnaissance photographic survey | 5 |
| Bristol Blenheim | Strategic reconnaissance | 4 |
| Hawker Hurricane | fighter | 4 |
| AASF | ||
| Fairey Battle | light bomber | 8: 12, 15, 40 88, 142, 150, 218, 226 |
| Bristol Blenheim | medium bomber | 2 : 138 and 144 |
| Hawker Hurricane | fighter | 2: 1, 73, *501 |
10–21 May
BAFF was reinforced by four Hurricane squadrons as planned. The operational instructions issued by BAFF had stated that.
Armee de l'Air & RAF numbers in France May 1940
The Armée de l'Air had 1,562 aircraft, RAF Fighter Command 680 and RAF Bomber Command could contribute about 392 aircraft.[
You're saying that they didn't appreciate the the Sqn's above?
It would've helped if the French Govt didn't screw over the entire French aircraft industry thus stopping modern designs getting into production quicker. That's fuck all to do with the British or RAF!
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I am saying that the French didnt appreciate seeing all those German aircraft over them, knowing most of the RAF was in the UK, and not in France where the actual fighting was.
How can you not understand the completely justifiable French frustration?
yeah, a couple of the General saw things differently on the ground, with the offensive already happening... but most German generals, and that was my point, saw the entire plan as a huge risk at its conception, even by the ones that ended supporting the plan because Germany had no alternative, they had to either win big or just wait to lose like the last time.
This was not a plan conceived by confident people... but by desperate ones.
This is the complete opposite of Barbarossa.
I'm sure they would have appreciated seeing the French Air Force flying over them instead but as many squadrons only managed one sorte per aircraft per week it sadly wasn't to be.
Oh, I am pretty sure they were pissed both at their absent AdA and their absent allied RAF... plenty of anger to go around.
They could understand the UK having a small army... but they did have an air force, jsut unwilling to commit it to the fight when it mattered the most.
Giant Man Eating Rabbits
Banned
Because there wasn't any justifiable French frustration.
1)The RAF's Fighter Commands remit is for the defense of the UK . . . not France, Belgium or anyone else.
2)The Curtiss Hawk 75's & Dewoitine's of the French were more than a match for the Bf 109's at medium to low level.
3)With the German advance, the quickest way to really fuck up an oppositions air force is to over run that air forces airfields. The said sqn(s) at those airfields then have to withdraw and land at a predetermined point
. . . then wait until the ground support and staff to turn up which either takes the best part of a day or never as it's either stuck in traffic from all the refugees and Army units retreating and what not or thus gets attacked or straffed on said roads.
I suppose you have references regarding said 'justifiable French frustration'?
It is always easier to accuse someone other, than to look themselves in the mirror.
For each French fighters' sortie, Germans were mustering 3-4 of their own during the critical phases of the battle. Not a good thing on it's own, and doubly so when the difference in technical and tactical matters are accounted for.
A look in the mirror would've also pointed out to the fact that French-based part of the RAF was not allowed to attack anything in Germany. French even blocked, with trucks, the airport where the RAF was staging the bombing raid against Italy when these came out to play.
Granted, not everything was the fault of the French.
British believed that France will hold as good, if not better than it was the case in 1914, despite the German-friendly Soviet Union at the east, instead of Germany forced to deploy a good chunk of their assets in the East like it was the case in 1914 against Russia.
Your opinion, or something proven beyond the doubt?
1) A defended France is a defended UK?
2) MS.405 and 406 were the mainstay of the French fighter force. Even the Hurricanes were handily out-performing these, to say nothing about what the 109Es were good for. The Bloch fighters were marginally better the the Moranes.
Hawk 75 was about as good as Hurricane, ie. a lower performing fighter than the 109E; even the 110C was faster. The D.520 was the best what they had, but not in good numbers.
Expecting that German pilots will be suckered into low-altitude low-speed fight is expecting that enemy follows you plan, not his own doctrine.
3) Yet another reason that British deploy a much bigger ground army, and to have their fighters being designed with greater fuel tankage, or with drop tanks.
The British had financial issues restricting their armed forces, as did every other country. Where will the money come from for a larger ground army (without using hindsight and demanding an inhuman level of perfection in decisions) and if it comes from debt, what will the British NOT buy later in the war when their reserves of foreign currency run out earlier than ITL?
We know why the Spit, in any case, didn't have greater fuel tankage. It was a case of either having four fewer guns or having bigger tanks. What decisions could have created more design staff, given that the RAF had already been spreading its purchases between firms in order to preserve as much design and build capacity as possible?
Do the maths and show us how, in the real world, the available RN forces could have caught the German forces. You would have to move the UK to make it happen, and criticising a force because they cannot change geography is not actually very reasonable.
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Giant Man Eating Rabbits
Banned
Agreed but . . .
Before the outbreak of war, the RAF entire remit was that they were expected to defend the UK from German aircraft flying from Germany, not flying from occupied France, that's why Downing and the rest of the Cmdr's believed that 50 Sqn's (600 aircraft) was reasonable enough.
The collapse of France completely shattered that doctrine so when the French started screaming about sending more aircraft all it would have done is gut our entire air defense for no gain whatsoever.
. . . . and there goes not only the UK but the 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' for the retaking of Europe.
I never stated that the Germans did or were expected to follow someone else's doctrine let alone follow their plan. What I'm getting at is a lot of the problems of the Ada stems from the French Gov't gutting the French aircraft industry in merger after merger.
If the Hawk 75's and the Dewoitine, MS and rest are the fighters they had,, that's what they had to use. That's a French problem not the UK's or even Germany's. To say otherwise is like saying the French were the reason for the Fairy Battles already being obsolete and thus getting hacked out of the sky.
Also don't forget you can't buy 'initiative', just ask John S Thach when flying Brewster Buffalo's against A6M's. Pity the RAF in the East didn't have his advice isn't it?
Trouble is how do the UK or anybody else know that the French Army would collapse? Every one in France, UK etc were expecting WWI Part 2!
Even Churchill said "Thank God for the French Army!"
Ref: The World at War (1973)
Did I say that? Quote me.
Same applies for the BA and the RN then... doesnt it? Why would anyone want you for an ally if you dont commit to the fight?
True, but that was not my point.
Oh yeah, the French mismanaged their own air force, prior and during the war... they still inflicted 30% losses on the Lw.
Yes, but I think it was reasonable to expect the ally to fully commit to the battle at hand, since they did not, many French bought into the "defend England to the last Frenchman".
Everything is subjective and that is my impression of things, Carl made a great summary of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the plan.
Yes.
They should have committed most of the RAF to defending France, that is where the decisive battle was to be fought, as it was, the LW suffered 30% losses, imagine if they were opposed by a larger force.
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