There are three battalions in China on 5 April 1862 (31st, 67th, 99th Regiments) so I wouldn't say "actively committed"- there were six battalions in Malta at the same time (2/3rd, 2/15th, 1/22nd, 2/22nd, 2/23rd, 4/RB). Five battalions returned from China in mid-1861 after the war was over, and most expeditions came out of the Indian establishment in the first place.
EDIT: In 1861, British imports from China were £8,932,581, and exports to China were £3,161,918. For context, imports from Egypt were £8,398,493 and exports £2,398,479.
Trent Affair?
No, but the state of Texas was. So you have to ship your weapons overland all the way through Mexico (which, if it doesn't simply close its ports under French influence as EnglishCanuck suggest, is in the midst of a civil war and might be tempted to appropriate the weapons) beyond El Paso, then up through New Mexico, Colorado and Kansas to somewhere like Kansas City before you can then transfer them on to the east coast. Which is sort of what I meant by "in the way".
Others have ably pointed out the logistical difficulties of this route, but I'd just like to throw another angle onto it.
1) If the goods are registered as being destined for the US, they're liable to seizure. At any point on their journey to California, these ships can be boarded and searched by Royal Navy ships of the North America and West Indies Squadron, the squadron off Mexico, the squadron off the south-east coast of America, or the Pacific squadron.
2) If the goods are sent to Matamoros, they fall under the doctrine of continuous voyage as applied during the Crimean War:
The Dutch ship, Frau Howina, was captured off Cape Rocca while on a voyage from Lisbon to the neutral port of Hamburg... A hostile destination overland into Russia was inferred... there was no such local commercial demand there [Hamburg] for a further supply of that necessary ingredient of gunpowder... it appeared to the satisfaction of the court that it was destined by the owner from the first for, and was being carried to, a belligerent... It will be noted that the ship was captured before it arrived at the neutral port and the second stage of the carriage was to be either by water or land transportation. (Charles Burke Elliott, 'The Doctrine of Continuous Voyages', American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan. - Apr., 1907), p.75)
That means the ships would also be liable to seizure on any stage of the journey between the US and Mexico.
3) You're also assuming that the only problem is how to get the guns from Britain to the US. What if the British gunmakers decide they don't really want to sell weapons to a country they're at war with in the first place? Who buys these large orders of guns if the Union is blockaded and the Confederacy is unblockaded? What does a smaller, more poorly-equipped Union army mean for the Union's ability to carry the war into Confederate territory, and to defend their own? What does that mean for popular support for the war?
Incidentally, just to have the full picture, here are the statistics for the proportion of foreign weapons issued in 1862 as well as for Enfields alone. That gives a better impression of the sort of effect a successful blockade might have on the Union's ability to arm its troops, and mitigates the risk that someone will conflate British guns and all foreign guns further down the line.
New York: 57% Enfield/86% foreign
Maine: 37%/63%
New Jersey: 37.5%/75%
Massachusetts: 38.7%/53%
Wisconsin: 30%/87%
Iowa: 50%/96.9%
Ohio: 27%/86.6%
And I'll give the split between smoothbores and rifles for the domestically-produced weapons as well, including smoothbores converted to rifles in the latter category.
New York: 1% smoothbore/13% rifles
Maine: 27%/9%
New Jersey: 19%/6%
Massachusetts: 7%/39%
Wisconsin: 9%/4%
Iowa: 3.1%/0%
Ohio: 1%/12%
Because I researched these statistics, dammit, and I'm going to post them whether anybody cares or not.
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