I have a new map project in mind where an event similar to the House Grey Memorandum leads to an end to WWI with a return to the status quo in the west (except for a chunk of Alsace-Lorraine being ceded to France) while Germany disarms the High Seas Fleet but keeps its gains from the treaty of brest-litovsk. But when it comes to France I can't think of what the ramifications would have on the country. Would it see itself as coerced into an undesirable peace by its allies? What political faction would benefit from this? And how would this affect French domestic and foreign policy?
France after a central powers victory
- Thread starter Hawkeye
- Start date
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- cp victory entante france wwi
One variable to consider is how much of Germany's Septemberprogramm they'd be able to enact in the peace treaty. Possible terms included...
France should cede some northern territory such as the iron-ore mines at Briey and possibly a strip of land reaching from Dunkirk to Boulogne-sur-Mer to Germany or Belgium.
Pay a war indemnity of 10 billion German Marks, with further payments to cover all Germany's national debt as well as a veterans fund.
Partially disarm by demolishing all northern fortifications.
Join the Mitteleuropa economic block which would be dominated by Germany as well as turning over African colonies to the development of German Mittelafrika.
Each of these will present France with unique challenges that open up a lot of possibilities.
France should cede some northern territory such as the iron-ore mines at Briey and possibly a strip of land reaching from Dunkirk to Boulogne-sur-Mer to Germany or Belgium.
Pay a war indemnity of 10 billion German Marks, with further payments to cover all Germany's national debt as well as a veterans fund.
Partially disarm by demolishing all northern fortifications.
Join the Mitteleuropa economic block which would be dominated by Germany as well as turning over African colonies to the development of German Mittelafrika.
Each of these will present France with unique challenges that open up a lot of possibilities.
What do you mean by keeps its gains from Brest-Litovsk? Germany didn't annex Russian territory, though they did install to German monarchs with real but not absolute power, and those countries were to be under heavy German economic influence. Are you talking about Mitteleuropa? Or are you referring to an ATL where they annexed the Polish border strip from the Septemberprogramm?
The OP mentions having Germany cede part of Alsace-Lorraine back to France, so I don't think they'd be in a position to force France to do anything.
The Radicals lead the government so they come away with an entire carton of eggs on them. The Socialists and the moderate right supported the government via the Union Sacree so they also come away with egg on them. The former Anti-Dreyfusards/future Vichyites are well positioned to say something to the effect of "this wouldn't have happened if we were less degenerate" (aka the same argument that carried the day when France was defeated in 1940).
I think they mean Germany is permitted a free hand to try to keep their client states in the east, and the west recognizes the new countries.
I admit it's sort of vague language but my understanding is that Germany essentially treated most of these new states as colonies and intended to extract resources from them to pay for the war as well as to use them as a buffer against Russia. Weather that would have worked out for them is another question as it seems the Germans themselves weren't entirely sure how they would control these new states, only that they would dominate them somehow.
... only that what the OP as well as the House Grey Memo outline are not 'compatible' with anything mentioned within the for the german goverment effectless but here around so 'liked' September-program'.
What's described is rather a substantial german net loss - in both 'proposals' by the OP as well as this memo - the german leadership would never accept aside - from the memo - the restoration of Belgium.
At the point of time of said memo - feb. 1916 - there was the battle of Jutland still to take place.
Why should the german leadership be inclined to disarm its fleet at all?
For all of 1915 the allies had started one offensive after the other ... only to be one time after the other been bloodily for the allies repelled and gaining nothing of any substance all the while the central powers were on every other front on the move forward.Why shoul - in this case esp. the german leadership - accept any territorial loss at all?
... and what "chunk of Alsac.Lorreine" do you speak of while France won't accept anything less than the whole of it?
The CP side may have been - as Beethmann-Hollweg actually was - inclined to open an open discussion for any kind of peace wihtout any preconditional demands from any side.
But what's proposed here is - as said - a loss for the CP and the germans. ... no way. Also said memo's rather a proof of the american ... unknowledge of the war as well as the european - at least - politics.
For the german leadership to be able to call it at least nearing the 'label' victory but the least 'losses' for the allies:
- restoration of Belgium
- NO border changes between germany and any of its western neighbours
- maybe a guarantee - something alike Locarno ? - for eevery german wersten neighbourcountry (thereby excluding even a voluntary joining of Luxembourg to the confeceration the bismarckian empire actually was) just to serve the french obsession of 'securitée'
- indemnity to germany maybe 'payed' by - at least partially- temporary occupation or exploitation of the Briey basin (similar to IOTL Saarland post WW1 but probably less intervening with the politics of the region) and/or by ceeding some colonies - or payed in money/gold wholesome maybe as a 'combined loan' of the western entente to ge granted to germany or so
- colonies - aside the above named possibilities - would otherwise be returned to prewar status (maybe some 'special' arrangement with Japan ... some ceeding for money or similar)
- oh ... and a free hand in the east ofc, which by early/mid 1916 end rather in establishing some 'buffer state(s)' against Russia - with whatever goverment - only and most likely only as such: Poland (given the front lines in early 1916 and in whatever formand extend the alliance partners - Germany and Austria - wasn't anywhere near an agreement then.
These might be conditions able to be labeled 'victory' for the german leadership as well as public at least.
Suxch a 'peace deal' would leave France relativly unscathed with 'only' the indemnity (IMO likely a mixturte of all the above named possibilities) but such would very likely be perceived by the french public as ... a defeat and the governing parties most likely will have to pay for it afterwards in electorial defeats as well.
Who would the public turn too ... probably the socialists might whiste a song of 'being somehow forced' into the Union Sacre with gaining an upper hand (I still don't see a french 'right' to arise or even becoming faschistoid-like). But ... whover will be at the helm ... another revanchism IMHO weould be unavoidable.
... what might lead to ... sommee tensions with Germany as well as the UK and maybe even the US of A as having thrown them under the bus. Could become rather lonely for France ...
I regret putting "CP Victory" in the title and tags but I wasn't sure how to explain my scenario clearly and I thought it would grab some attention.
This summarizes the scenario I was going for this thread. Thank you.
I could see socialists on the rise after the war. But why do you think the French right couldn't make inroads with the mainstream?
With two wars lost to Germany and undependable Anglo allies, do you think a French-German rapprochement could be possible?
This is a third draft, I hope it benefits from editing!
The OP asks us to focus on France, so I will start with considering the French position first.
For overview, the more I look at the actual situation of the various fronts in early 1916, the less likely it seems any major fighting party would seriously consider any peace on any terms that early, let alone the specific one the OP indicates partially with a few points to guide us. I strongly dislike using the term "ASB" when there is nothing formally defining ASB per site rules in the cards, but perhaps I would grant it loosely to this scenario, as I don't see a realistic path from facts on the ground as of say January 31 of the year to this armistice. Nevertheless, let us suppose that somehow or other the Great Powers France, Germany, Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia all agree to stop fighting by February 1 (Gregorian; the Russians are still using the Julian calendar of course, not to mention the Ottomans using an Islamic one). And somehow or other the specific points the OP stipulates are honored in practice.
That is:
1) Germany cedes all her 1871 Franco-Prussian War conquests and thus France regains all of Alsace-Lorraine back as integral French territory--we might want to discuss a variant whereby A-L is in the Third Republic but with a special status and demilitarized, but the OP doesn't give us any warrant to suppose that. I read it as saying A-L is back in France in the same status it had under the French Second Empire, suitably reformed to fully integrate into the Third Republic. This certainly helps explain why France might accept the armistice though it raises serious issues with Germany doing so! Then again I can foresee divergent possibilities; I am going to lean in a direction that says the Alsatian people (meaning everyone resident in A-L) do over a fairly short time integrate into France, accept their French citizen status, are accepted as fellow French citizens, while retaining a fair degree of latitude for ongoing cultural distinctness including the use of Alsatian German in daily life and some official acceptance and accommodation of that. Another way it could go though is that A-L winds up being a poison pill for France for a variety of reasons and winds up more weakening than strengthening the ability of French chauvinists to project power in Europe--which in turn could either work out to be a good thing strengthening more conciliatory French policy and favoring peace, or the pretext and cause of the next big war--which frankly I'd like to see avoided!
2) Germany accepts in addition to losing A-L, a rather draconian ban on German naval power. Logically in the larger context it would be necessary to extend that ban to all CP powers great and small--if there is no restriction on Austro-Hungarian naval power for instance, the Germans can formally comply in full on their Baltic and North Sea coasts, maintaining only a short range defensive screen heavy on coast artillery and aerial strike capability and short range U-boats by the thousand, but divert funds as military aid to Austria-Hungary and assist a truly massive buildup of forces at Trieste and Pola threatening to come swarming out of the Adriatic (and with God knows what consequences for the Italian east coast) to stir up all kinds of hooraw in the Mediterranean. Similarly if there are no restrictions on Bulgaria it can build a navy with massive German help, as of course could the Ottomans. Against the obvious weirdness of the CPs accepting such bans, the only one of them that really requires much more than a coastal defense is the Ottomans, and even they could live with such a restriction I suppose.
3) Vice versa, the Germans are explicitly permitted to do as they please with whatever territory they have taken as of the Armistice from Russia. The question of how far to "logically extend" this to other fronts than the Western Front is vexed and up to us I suppose, or OP clarification; the "principle" of "conquest fair and square" which has this glaring exception in the west would if given full play otherwise result in the Ottomans suffering losses on several fronts, notably the Caucasus to the benefit of Russia, southern Mesopotamia (though the British had been stopped short of taking Baghdad as of early 1916), and permanent loss of Egypt, though the Palestine and Syrian campaigns had not yet got under way nor had the British quite got around to promoting the Arab revolts. I don't have a good visualization of just where the frontier stood between AH and Italy, but I gather it was at this point largely a push with neither side having much from the other yet. On the Balkan front proper though, Serbia and Montenegro are conquered by joint German-AH-Bulgarian forces, and so I suppose Serbia is partitioned between AH and Bulgaria and the question is does this stand or does principle 4 below apply?
4)Explicitly on the Western front, and debatably elsewhere, opposing the "right of conquest" principle apparently meant to benefit mainly Germany in the east at Russian expense, we have it decreed the Western front returns to status quo ante--except for Alsace-Lorraine of course, a massive at least apparent victory for France, but otherwise, if we reread it as 'status quo ante 1871', a push.
Implicitly, there are no reparations or indemnities whatsoever paid by anyone to anyone. Belgium presumably is restored in full, the Germans pulling out with no residual demands or restrictions on Belgium and vice versa no help offered to amend the damage they did there either.
There is also no discussion of any sort of post-war international regulatory regime of any kind, not even any explicit mention of treaties such as the Geneva Conventions being updated. I would assume at the very least that prior vague declarations against chemical warfare get reinforced, perhaps resolutions seeking to somehow prevent the excesses of both the British and Germans in commerce raiding and restriction (such as the RN laying minefields in international waters, versus of course German unrestricted submarine warfare) but even if we get a consensus some such declarations are made, we can only hope independent state actors and alliances choose to observe them for the same moral and political reasons that prevailed--or failed!--to secure such norms before 1914. There is no League of Nations, no UN, no formally organized Concerts or Leagues or whatever beyond de facto alliances.
I would also guess that in these circumstances, if they can be realized, the pre-war alliances carry over for the most part. That is, France remains the kingpin of an Entente that continues to include Russia and Britain, while the Central Powers also remain in being under very strong if legally informal German patronage. Despite the Ottomans being the worst loser so far as of early 1916 already, they are pretty far from their total collapse a couple years later; there is also little to no warrant for the idea that AH or Russia will collapse at this early date. I might get more argument about AH being doomed, but I assume the Germans step in and work to support and "guide" the AH regime to remain integral and more or less successful; in effect AH is one gigantic colony of Germany I figure, while the Ottoman regime is less subject to being effectively strongarmed by as many diverse intimate channels as AH is, and is more distant and in theory could be wooed away by a rival alliance, in practice I think the Germans are in a position of offering the Sultanate the kind of support it needs to survive, and the right kind of German guidance combined with suitably shrewd Ottoman governance can perhaps stabilize the region and make it prosper, in cooperation with the European CPs. So the two alliances, with Italy's status being unclear to me, seem likely to remain as the major international organizing principle of the postwar years.
Obviously this poses the risk, indeed perhaps bakes in as near certainty, that the "Armistice" is just a brief cease-fire, to recover, reload, and resume the Great War after a handful of years if that. I suggest we try to find reasonable ways the resumption of the war, which we can suppose all parties assume initially is inevitable, gets postponed long enough for the situation to evolve to favor ongoing peace. If we can!
Anyway I interpret "status quo ante" on the "western" front to include the Italian-AH front, mainly there because I have the impression the outcomes as of January 1916 were largely a push there anyway, and to mean that the 1914 constitutions are resumed--mainly this applies to Belgium, which I also assume is going to wind up a voluntary sidekick of France. Here I assume that OTL attempts to restore Belgium's treaty neutrality, part of the basis on which the kingdom was founded by treaty in the first place back in the early 19th century, go by the board. Here it is understood the founding treaty is out the window, with a major signatory power Germany (at the time, it was Prussia of course) having grossly violated it, and Belgium is free to seek whatever alliances she can--and this means France obviously. Belgian military and foreign policy, and to a degree domestic, are joined at the hip to French, and Entente military strategy can assume a continuous front along the French and Belgian borders with Germany; the per capita military capability of Belgium will equalize with France's and any fighting would be under joint and de facto French command.
I felt all that was necessary to outline the broad parameters of the overall situation immediately after the Armistice. I should add that I think we should somewhat violate the OP by moving the date of the ATL version of the House-Grey memo back some months. OTL it is dated February 22, 1916, and by then the Germans had launched their offensive against Verdun, and I think it would be practically impossible to get either Germany or France to agree to anything while that massive battle, which continued at high intensity well on toward the end of the year OTL, is underway. At first the French were getting mauled badly, which would mean the Germans would feel cheated of total victory if asked to interrupt when it is going so apparently well for them, whereas later the French managed relative success and pushed it back--so they would hardly be prepared to throw in the towel even in the early phases where their hind ends were being handed to them at the moment.
That's the general problem making any such early "white peace" problematic of course--neither the victors of the moment nor the losers think they've reached the end of their rope by any means, the victors think yet more glory and success is right at hand, the losers, even say the Ottomans or Russians, think that if they can just hold on a while longer, regrettably losing more men, treasure and territory right now, they can rally and turn it around, recoup their losses and even if they despair of winning all on their own, if they can just hold on their allies might pull their chestnuts from the fire for them and they win at the peace negotiations. OTL the war ended only when the Germans, having squeezed all the juice they could from their suffering domestic economies, saw the math was just plain against them and gave up--by then the Ottomans were torn to rags, AH was disintegrating, and Russia was a battlefield between various "White" expeditions and the Bolsheviks. It is very clear to us in hindsight all the established powers on both sides ought to have quit much earlier, but at the time no one thinks so unfortunately.
So we are out on a somewhat ASB limb here, but let's see if we can make the most of it, without a lot more absurdity. Stipulate the powers, the sufficiently large ones anyway, take the deal, and perforce the lesser ones must cease fire too; the old regime governments, even the Ottomans and the Romanovs, are strong enough to enforce it and probably (more likely if they can get moderate amounts of help from their respective alliance patrons, which I assume the Ottomans will get and the Russian Tsarists probably don't need really yet) damp down mass revolution.
Now what?
Having written so much here I think I had best move on to another post to take the OP challenge to look at from the French point of view first of all.
The OP asks us to focus on France, so I will start with considering the French position first.
For overview, the more I look at the actual situation of the various fronts in early 1916, the less likely it seems any major fighting party would seriously consider any peace on any terms that early, let alone the specific one the OP indicates partially with a few points to guide us. I strongly dislike using the term "ASB" when there is nothing formally defining ASB per site rules in the cards, but perhaps I would grant it loosely to this scenario, as I don't see a realistic path from facts on the ground as of say January 31 of the year to this armistice. Nevertheless, let us suppose that somehow or other the Great Powers France, Germany, Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia all agree to stop fighting by February 1 (Gregorian; the Russians are still using the Julian calendar of course, not to mention the Ottomans using an Islamic one). And somehow or other the specific points the OP stipulates are honored in practice.
That is:
1) Germany cedes all her 1871 Franco-Prussian War conquests and thus France regains all of Alsace-Lorraine back as integral French territory--we might want to discuss a variant whereby A-L is in the Third Republic but with a special status and demilitarized, but the OP doesn't give us any warrant to suppose that. I read it as saying A-L is back in France in the same status it had under the French Second Empire, suitably reformed to fully integrate into the Third Republic. This certainly helps explain why France might accept the armistice though it raises serious issues with Germany doing so! Then again I can foresee divergent possibilities; I am going to lean in a direction that says the Alsatian people (meaning everyone resident in A-L) do over a fairly short time integrate into France, accept their French citizen status, are accepted as fellow French citizens, while retaining a fair degree of latitude for ongoing cultural distinctness including the use of Alsatian German in daily life and some official acceptance and accommodation of that. Another way it could go though is that A-L winds up being a poison pill for France for a variety of reasons and winds up more weakening than strengthening the ability of French chauvinists to project power in Europe--which in turn could either work out to be a good thing strengthening more conciliatory French policy and favoring peace, or the pretext and cause of the next big war--which frankly I'd like to see avoided!
2) Germany accepts in addition to losing A-L, a rather draconian ban on German naval power. Logically in the larger context it would be necessary to extend that ban to all CP powers great and small--if there is no restriction on Austro-Hungarian naval power for instance, the Germans can formally comply in full on their Baltic and North Sea coasts, maintaining only a short range defensive screen heavy on coast artillery and aerial strike capability and short range U-boats by the thousand, but divert funds as military aid to Austria-Hungary and assist a truly massive buildup of forces at Trieste and Pola threatening to come swarming out of the Adriatic (and with God knows what consequences for the Italian east coast) to stir up all kinds of hooraw in the Mediterranean. Similarly if there are no restrictions on Bulgaria it can build a navy with massive German help, as of course could the Ottomans. Against the obvious weirdness of the CPs accepting such bans, the only one of them that really requires much more than a coastal defense is the Ottomans, and even they could live with such a restriction I suppose.
3) Vice versa, the Germans are explicitly permitted to do as they please with whatever territory they have taken as of the Armistice from Russia. The question of how far to "logically extend" this to other fronts than the Western Front is vexed and up to us I suppose, or OP clarification; the "principle" of "conquest fair and square" which has this glaring exception in the west would if given full play otherwise result in the Ottomans suffering losses on several fronts, notably the Caucasus to the benefit of Russia, southern Mesopotamia (though the British had been stopped short of taking Baghdad as of early 1916), and permanent loss of Egypt, though the Palestine and Syrian campaigns had not yet got under way nor had the British quite got around to promoting the Arab revolts. I don't have a good visualization of just where the frontier stood between AH and Italy, but I gather it was at this point largely a push with neither side having much from the other yet. On the Balkan front proper though, Serbia and Montenegro are conquered by joint German-AH-Bulgarian forces, and so I suppose Serbia is partitioned between AH and Bulgaria and the question is does this stand or does principle 4 below apply?
4)Explicitly on the Western front, and debatably elsewhere, opposing the "right of conquest" principle apparently meant to benefit mainly Germany in the east at Russian expense, we have it decreed the Western front returns to status quo ante--except for Alsace-Lorraine of course, a massive at least apparent victory for France, but otherwise, if we reread it as 'status quo ante 1871', a push.
Implicitly, there are no reparations or indemnities whatsoever paid by anyone to anyone. Belgium presumably is restored in full, the Germans pulling out with no residual demands or restrictions on Belgium and vice versa no help offered to amend the damage they did there either.
There is also no discussion of any sort of post-war international regulatory regime of any kind, not even any explicit mention of treaties such as the Geneva Conventions being updated. I would assume at the very least that prior vague declarations against chemical warfare get reinforced, perhaps resolutions seeking to somehow prevent the excesses of both the British and Germans in commerce raiding and restriction (such as the RN laying minefields in international waters, versus of course German unrestricted submarine warfare) but even if we get a consensus some such declarations are made, we can only hope independent state actors and alliances choose to observe them for the same moral and political reasons that prevailed--or failed!--to secure such norms before 1914. There is no League of Nations, no UN, no formally organized Concerts or Leagues or whatever beyond de facto alliances.
I would also guess that in these circumstances, if they can be realized, the pre-war alliances carry over for the most part. That is, France remains the kingpin of an Entente that continues to include Russia and Britain, while the Central Powers also remain in being under very strong if legally informal German patronage. Despite the Ottomans being the worst loser so far as of early 1916 already, they are pretty far from their total collapse a couple years later; there is also little to no warrant for the idea that AH or Russia will collapse at this early date. I might get more argument about AH being doomed, but I assume the Germans step in and work to support and "guide" the AH regime to remain integral and more or less successful; in effect AH is one gigantic colony of Germany I figure, while the Ottoman regime is less subject to being effectively strongarmed by as many diverse intimate channels as AH is, and is more distant and in theory could be wooed away by a rival alliance, in practice I think the Germans are in a position of offering the Sultanate the kind of support it needs to survive, and the right kind of German guidance combined with suitably shrewd Ottoman governance can perhaps stabilize the region and make it prosper, in cooperation with the European CPs. So the two alliances, with Italy's status being unclear to me, seem likely to remain as the major international organizing principle of the postwar years.
Obviously this poses the risk, indeed perhaps bakes in as near certainty, that the "Armistice" is just a brief cease-fire, to recover, reload, and resume the Great War after a handful of years if that. I suggest we try to find reasonable ways the resumption of the war, which we can suppose all parties assume initially is inevitable, gets postponed long enough for the situation to evolve to favor ongoing peace. If we can!
Anyway I interpret "status quo ante" on the "western" front to include the Italian-AH front, mainly there because I have the impression the outcomes as of January 1916 were largely a push there anyway, and to mean that the 1914 constitutions are resumed--mainly this applies to Belgium, which I also assume is going to wind up a voluntary sidekick of France. Here I assume that OTL attempts to restore Belgium's treaty neutrality, part of the basis on which the kingdom was founded by treaty in the first place back in the early 19th century, go by the board. Here it is understood the founding treaty is out the window, with a major signatory power Germany (at the time, it was Prussia of course) having grossly violated it, and Belgium is free to seek whatever alliances she can--and this means France obviously. Belgian military and foreign policy, and to a degree domestic, are joined at the hip to French, and Entente military strategy can assume a continuous front along the French and Belgian borders with Germany; the per capita military capability of Belgium will equalize with France's and any fighting would be under joint and de facto French command.
I felt all that was necessary to outline the broad parameters of the overall situation immediately after the Armistice. I should add that I think we should somewhat violate the OP by moving the date of the ATL version of the House-Grey memo back some months. OTL it is dated February 22, 1916, and by then the Germans had launched their offensive against Verdun, and I think it would be practically impossible to get either Germany or France to agree to anything while that massive battle, which continued at high intensity well on toward the end of the year OTL, is underway. At first the French were getting mauled badly, which would mean the Germans would feel cheated of total victory if asked to interrupt when it is going so apparently well for them, whereas later the French managed relative success and pushed it back--so they would hardly be prepared to throw in the towel even in the early phases where their hind ends were being handed to them at the moment.
That's the general problem making any such early "white peace" problematic of course--neither the victors of the moment nor the losers think they've reached the end of their rope by any means, the victors think yet more glory and success is right at hand, the losers, even say the Ottomans or Russians, think that if they can just hold on a while longer, regrettably losing more men, treasure and territory right now, they can rally and turn it around, recoup their losses and even if they despair of winning all on their own, if they can just hold on their allies might pull their chestnuts from the fire for them and they win at the peace negotiations. OTL the war ended only when the Germans, having squeezed all the juice they could from their suffering domestic economies, saw the math was just plain against them and gave up--by then the Ottomans were torn to rags, AH was disintegrating, and Russia was a battlefield between various "White" expeditions and the Bolsheviks. It is very clear to us in hindsight all the established powers on both sides ought to have quit much earlier, but at the time no one thinks so unfortunately.
So we are out on a somewhat ASB limb here, but let's see if we can make the most of it, without a lot more absurdity. Stipulate the powers, the sufficiently large ones anyway, take the deal, and perforce the lesser ones must cease fire too; the old regime governments, even the Ottomans and the Romanovs, are strong enough to enforce it and probably (more likely if they can get moderate amounts of help from their respective alliance patrons, which I assume the Ottomans will get and the Russian Tsarists probably don't need really yet) damp down mass revolution.
Now what?
Having written so much here I think I had best move on to another post to take the OP challenge to look at from the French point of view first of all.