So you think Marshall would actually do what Eisenhower said needed to be done to utilize Montgomery effectively? Eisenhower said that "General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander. I personally think that the only thing he needs is a strong immediate commander" then singularly failed to be a strong immediate commander.
Eisenhower dies in '44/'45: who becomes Supreme Allied Commander in Europe?
- Thread starter Onkel Willie
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So you think Marshall would actually do what Eisenhower said needed to be done to utilize Montgomery effectively? Eisenhower said that "General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander. I personally think that the only thing he needs is a strong immediate commander" then singularly failed to be a strong immediate commander.
usertron2020
Donor
I think FDR may have to cope with losing Marshall. The only person from Britain I could think about is Brooke, but (As Usertron has pointed out) he was scared to leave Churchill alone for the amount of time it took to run a bath, let alone the SACEUR!
"Ah, Brooke, there you are. Had a cracking idea while in the WC. How about we invade Norway? And Greece? Why not Turkey, while we're at it?"
If he isn't there to sit on some of Churchill's more ludicrous ideas, the midden will hit the fan. Actually, if Marshall did take SACEUR, there'd probably be a lot less bitterness between those below him. Put simply, I can't see Marsgall putting up with Monty's shenanigans, nor can I see Monty thinking he can get away with them. If he bahaves himself, and Marshall can convince Bradley he's actually Patton's superior, and is allowed to act like it, things should be somewhat more harmonious than in OTL.
Would there be any major negatives to Marshall not being in Washington from June '44 onwards? Were there any major Charlie Foxtrots that he had to clear up that may otherwise have gone unattended?
Yes. Probably the Pershing tank never makes it to Europe without Marshall whipping Armor Replacement Command's collective ass. I know the Pershing wasn't a factor in the war, but like the handful of P-80 Shooting Stars that flew over Europe before war's end, they were a good confidence builder, as every fighter pilot and tanker could hope that their's was the next outfit to get the "big upgrade".
Depending on how late Ike's death happens, the British will lose ever more influence on any "veto power" over an American appointment. If it happens after Paris is liberated, Bradley will be considered well blooded.
Nor did a lot of people in Britain and the British Army. His bullying personality IMO overwhelmed anyone's this side of MacArthur's and Patton's. And Patton had had his wings clipped twice already. That never really happened to Monty, who had few friends outside of his worshiping fans on Fleet Street.
Almost by default. Is it true that Devers' biggest critic and political enemy within the US Army was Ike himself? I'd read that somewhere long ago.
Wow. That's the heaviest criticism I've ever seen of Alexander. Was he really so poor a commander?
Even Monty in his memoirs bitterly complained about how Eisenhower, in attempting to please everyone, tended to change his mind and agree with whoever was the last person to talk to him. Ironic, that. Since it was Monty who exploited that to the hilt more than anyone else.
And yeah, Marshall was a man who Took. Shit. From. Nobody.
He called FDR "Mister President", and nothing else. And demanded Roosevelt call him "General Marshall", and nothing else. The running joke in the army was that his wife saluted him at the dinner table and called him "General Marshall" too. It would take him all of two minutes, if that, to let Monty know where he stood. OTOH, as Geordie said, Marshall's reputation was already so fierce, and Monty's staff so good, that Monty would be well forewarned before they ever met as commander and subordinate for the first time.On the other hand, if Eisenhower dies during the Battle of the Bulge then I find it unlikely that the SHEAF command would go to the general who split his command across the Ardennes and had both his armies involved in two long and bloody battles which achieve few, if any, positive outcomes, and thus contributed to the conditions which made the Ardennes offensive so dangerous for the Allies, then refused to take charge of events to remedy it and instead locked himself away in his HQ afraid that he being targetted by the Germans for assassination. Really, Bradley as a general was very bad during the Autumn and Winter months of 1944.
But he had the support of Alanbrooke - who respected his ability as a soldier even if he thought he should keep his mouth shut more often - and the trust of the soldiers and officers under his command. Monty didn't have "his wings clipped" because, largely, he achieved positive result at a tolerable cost and was one of the few proven winners in high command that the British had.
That said, his personality did very nearly get him in trouble several times. Gort almost got rid of him from the BEF for addressing the sex lives of his soldiers in frank terms in a leaflet - he was saved by Brooke - and he was briefly demoted upon return to Britain after he criticized Gort and command of the BEF in a letter to the War Office, and, of course, there was his almost dismissal for his press conferance at the Battle of the Bulge.
Devers was an old rival with Eisenhower for Marshall's attention and favor. As a result Devers did not move in the same social circles as Eisenhower, and was not on friendly terms with Eisenhower. Eisenhower often criticized him and belittled him in private, and so did Bradley who was a Eisenhower man.
He had the good judgement to rely on his more able subordinates, and he was personally brave, charming and affable, but he was incapable of reigning in those subordinates when they went out on a limb and did their own thing. I have never been impressed by him.
Alanbrooke was also someone who suffered fools not at all and took crap from nobody, and Monty highly respected him and did what he was told when Brookie put his foot down. So I can see a man like Marshall having more control over Monty than Eisenhower's affable approach as a mediator achieved. Where Monty came to think of Eisenhower as a nice guy who was good at the political stuff but not good at the military side of his job he might come to actually respect Marshall in the same way he respected Alanbrooke, though whether Marshall would ever come to respect Monty's abilities as a soldier and general I couldn't say.Even Monty in his memoirs bitterly complained about how Eisenhower, in attempting to please everyone, tended to change his mind and agree with whoever was the last person to talk to him. Ironic, that. Since it was Monty who exploited that to the hilt more than anyone else.
And yeah, Marshall was a man who Took. Shit. From. Nobody.
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BlairWitch749
Banned
If it's before mcnairs death it would be McNair
Marshal liked McNair and assuming fdr won't let him have a combat command then McNair gets the gig in all likelihood due to seniority. Thankfully with his patron Ike gone it's not likely to be mark Clark
McNair even if has pig headed and stubborn might do pretty well. He did know how to handle Patton and would put the fear of god in him
Marshal liked McNair and assuming fdr won't let him have a combat command then McNair gets the gig in all likelihood due to seniority. Thankfully with his patron Ike gone it's not likely to be mark Clark
McNair even if has pig headed and stubborn might do pretty well. He did know how to handle Patton and would put the fear of god in him
Well, going on the idea that it needs to be an American, and can't be a low level commander, the choices are rather slim.
Marshall - Poor general and too valuable in Washington
MacArthur - Poor general, politically unworkable, and stuck in the Pacific
Patton - Politically unworkable, poor general
Clark - Dear god no
Bradley - Not the worst on the list, competent enough to do the job and politically not as bad as some
Devers - Probably the best choice, competent enough, been in Europe for a while, and not a political nightmare like some of the others
Marshall - Poor general and too valuable in Washington
MacArthur - Poor general, politically unworkable, and stuck in the Pacific
Patton - Politically unworkable, poor general
Clark - Dear god no
Bradley - Not the worst on the list, competent enough to do the job and politically not as bad as some
Devers - Probably the best choice, competent enough, been in Europe for a while, and not a political nightmare like some of the others
The guy was a good administrator, but IIRC he never held a field command, and the plans he proposed during WWII weren't particularly sound (at least in my opinion). It seems like the airbourne troops in particular would have been slaughtered under his command.
Admittedly, at the level of SHAEF skill as a general isn't as important as it is at lower levels, and Marshall isn't the worst general on that list by far.
It just seems like a waste to trade a good administrator for an unproven sub-par field commander.
Look up Marshall's suggested plan to land airbourne troops at Evreux in 1944. Madness.
Montgomery was not likely, though in rank the most senior aside from Eisenhower. Patton was politically not likely to be choosen, due to his openly hostile attitude to the Allied USSR. Roosevelt would have him removed from Europe, if necessary, just to keep at relative good terms with Stalin. Bradly was a somewhat more logical choice though, even when still inferior in rank to some other officers. Marshall was a desk General needed in Washington DC, so not likely to go to Europe.
Other Field Marshalls and 5 star Generals were optional as well:
British:
Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander,
Henry Maitland Wilson, 1st Baron Wilson,
USA:
Henry Harley "Hap" Arnold,
Other Field Marshalls and 5 star Generals were optional as well:
British:
Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander,
Henry Maitland Wilson, 1st Baron Wilson,
USA:
Henry Harley "Hap" Arnold,
TFSmith121
Banned
MacArthur? Not in a million years; the only
MacArthur? Not in a million years; the only place better for MacArthur in 1943-45 than the Southwest Pacific theater would have been the CBI.
Alexander is not going to get the supreme command slot, any more than anyone other than an AUS officer was going to; whoever sends the most troops, commands.
Best,
MacArthur? Not in a million years; the only place better for MacArthur in 1943-45 than the Southwest Pacific theater would have been the CBI.
Alexander is not going to get the supreme command slot, any more than anyone other than an AUS officer was going to; whoever sends the most troops, commands.
Best,
TFSmith121
Banned
McNair, Handy, or DeWitt, most likely.
The other option would be bring Malin Craig back, with Handy remaining as DCSA.
That's probably the best idea, actually, in the first place - have GCM go to the ETO in 1942, bring Craig back, keep McNarney in place as DCSA and Handy at OPD. Assign DDE as GCM's chief of staff.
Best,
The other option would be bring Malin Craig back, with Handy remaining as DCSA.
That's probably the best idea, actually, in the first place - have GCM go to the ETO in 1942, bring Craig back, keep McNarney in place as DCSA and Handy at OPD. Assign DDE as GCM's chief of staff.
Best,
Bringing Krueger back from the Pacific in early 1944 is a long shot, and after mid 1944 even longer. I think he would have done well as a military leader, but as a coalition leader is a open question. He had the ability to suffer MacArthurs command so his diplomatic skills were well developed.
Still, as I run over the list again Devers keeps looking more realistic. I dont think his posting as commander of US Forces in the UK during 1943 was a spurious or accidental assignment. Had Eisenhower failed in the Mediterranean Devers would have been well positioned and well accquainted with the British. Plus he had supervised the construction of the US Army infrastructure in the UK and much of Operation Bolero, making the completion of the US forces for Op. Overlord possible.
Still, as I run over the list again Devers keeps looking more realistic. I dont think his posting as commander of US Forces in the UK during 1943 was a spurious or accidental assignment. Had Eisenhower failed in the Mediterranean Devers would have been well positioned and well accquainted with the British. Plus he had supervised the construction of the US Army infrastructure in the UK and much of Operation Bolero, making the completion of the US forces for Op. Overlord possible.
TFSmith121
Banned
Point worth considering - in terms of combat arms,
Eisenhower, Devers, and Patton were all tankers/cavalry; Bradley, Clark, Hodges, Simpson, Patch, and Gerow were all infantry.
MacArthur, Krueger, Eichelberger, and Stilwell were all infantry as well. Buckner was infantry, but actually commanded the 66th Armored in a period when it was (officially) the 66th Infantry (Tanks).
Best,
Eisenhower, Devers, and Patton were all tankers/cavalry; Bradley, Clark, Hodges, Simpson, Patch, and Gerow were all infantry.
MacArthur, Krueger, Eichelberger, and Stilwell were all infantry as well. Buckner was infantry, but actually commanded the 66th Armored in a period when it was (officially) the 66th Infantry (Tanks).
Best,
TFSmith121
Banned
You know, despite the "Anglophobic Americans" trope,
You know, despite the "Anglophobic Americans" trope, or the "Sun never sets Britons" trope, everyone involved were professionals and many had served together in 1917-19.
Senior US officers of both services universally respected Dill, and liked Alexander and Nye; Stilwell and Slim respected each other; all the naval and air commanders generally got along with their opposite numbers; and the Americans had good relationships with the British, Commonwealth, and Allied component commanders operating within US armies, fleets, and air forces.
The case that gets all the attention, however, is BLM; KA Anderson and Coningham in Tunisia less so, but to a degree. Might be worth considering what it was about BLM that made him such a special case throughout the war, and what it was about Tunisia in 1943 that made Anderson and Coningham as problematic as they were there.
The other situation worth mentioning was Brooke's astoundingly bad relationship with Marshall, who invariably impressed everyone else in the British command structure, from WSC to Dill and on down.
What is also interesting is that while everyone on the US side - notably DDE, but also Marshall, Leahy, King, and Arnold - demonstrated an understanding of global coalition warfare, it is pretty clear that both Brooke and BLM had very poor grasps of the realities of the alliance after 1941.
Cripes, Thomas C. Hart had a better grasp of the demands of coalition warfare in 1941-42 than Brooke and Montgomery demonstrated in 1944-45.
Best,
Alexander is odd. The Americans like him, but his British countrymen dont. And since when have the Americans thought very highly of their counterparts in the British general ranks (or those of any other nation)?
You know, despite the "Anglophobic Americans" trope, or the "Sun never sets Britons" trope, everyone involved were professionals and many had served together in 1917-19.
Senior US officers of both services universally respected Dill, and liked Alexander and Nye; Stilwell and Slim respected each other; all the naval and air commanders generally got along with their opposite numbers; and the Americans had good relationships with the British, Commonwealth, and Allied component commanders operating within US armies, fleets, and air forces.
The case that gets all the attention, however, is BLM; KA Anderson and Coningham in Tunisia less so, but to a degree. Might be worth considering what it was about BLM that made him such a special case throughout the war, and what it was about Tunisia in 1943 that made Anderson and Coningham as problematic as they were there.
The other situation worth mentioning was Brooke's astoundingly bad relationship with Marshall, who invariably impressed everyone else in the British command structure, from WSC to Dill and on down.
What is also interesting is that while everyone on the US side - notably DDE, but also Marshall, Leahy, King, and Arnold - demonstrated an understanding of global coalition warfare, it is pretty clear that both Brooke and BLM had very poor grasps of the realities of the alliance after 1941.
Cripes, Thomas C. Hart had a better grasp of the demands of coalition warfare in 1941-42 than Brooke and Montgomery demonstrated in 1944-45.
Best,
usertron2020
Donor
Any general is going to look bad when the Third Reich decides to throw everything they have left in offensive potential against your command while the key strategic asset you've been relying on for years has betrayed you. Hitler got the idea that perhaps we WERE breaking his codes, so prior to the Bulge he ordered all top secret communications in Germany to be done by landline, not radio. With their being kicked out of France, they no longer had to worry about phone taps.
Leaving the Ardennes thinly protected was a calculated risk, since it was seen that launching an offensive there would be strategic madness. They were right. And blame belongs on Ike's shoulders, really. Once the offensive's size became obvious, Eisenhower found that his entire strategic reserve consisted of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Not exactly the kind of forces appropriate to be employed for the stopping of two panzer armies. Ike's insistence on maintaining pressure left his reserves dry. Though they did insure that the German 15th Army would not be able to participate in the initial assault as Hitler had originally wanted.
Agreed. Monty was a true winner.
After Brooke had specifically told him to be diplomatic regarding any public statements Monty made at the time, Brooke was forced after the press conference to record in his diary "It looks as though Monty, with his usual lack of tact, is wasting no time in rubbing salt in the Americans' wounds."
I don't think Monty really should have all the blame for that press conference, though. Fleet Street's performance during the war in the west seemed to be more interested in the war between the UK and the USA than anything else.
You might have seen Ameri-centrism in American media, but you didn't see them seeking to stir up trouble in an as yet unnamed Special Relationship. OTOH, there really seemed to be a sentiment on Fleet Street that if they just hit the war drums loud and long enough, they could somehow get Monty in charge of all Allied land forces in the west, or even be given SACEUR.
Even worse, Monty seemed to be publicly eating this up while at the same time both Ike's staff and his field subordinates were disgusted with Ike's inexplicable obsession with how HE stood with Fleet Street! [SIZE=-4]even his british mistress Kay Summersby couldn't figure out what he was thinking.[/SIZE] No, it doesn't make any sense to me, either. Its not like Ike was planning to run for President of the United Kingdom!Yeah, there was a sense that Eisenhower "inherited" Devers from the Med and resented having no real say in the details of the formation of 6th Army Group.
Sounds like a British Eisenhower? I've heard very nice things said about his very sharp intellect.
Yeah, once his first proposals for his "narrow-front strategy" and getting the job of ground forces commander were rejected by Marshall, I imagine that would be the end of the matter.
As long as he didn't get the bright idea of replacing all American tanks with Ford Model T's armed with 22 cal rifles.
May you choke on alphabet soup.
And the 1940 French Army taught them the mistake of using retreads for major commands. Look at happened with using MacArthur. When a former upperclassman finds himself brought out of retirement by one of his successors, he's always going to see the man who is now his commanding officer as being merely a "plebe", even if they are both four-stars. "Well, if he's a four-star, then I'M a six-star!"Alexander is odd. The Americans like him, but his British countrymen dont. And since when have the Americans thought very highly of their counterparts in the British general ranks (or those of any other nation)?
American commanders got along fine with their Australian and New Zealander counterparts, but all anybody can remember is MacArthur's nationalism. The only Australian he respected seems to have been the prime minister himself, John Curtin.
Best left with no comment. Save to say that I am sigging part of this.
Devers background was artillery, from battery to regiment and some time at Ft Sill schools in the 1920s. I need to review the literature and see if his name comes up in any important aspect 1925-29 while at Ft Sill. His appointment to the Armored Corps chief on Chaffes departure is worth a deeper look & you have to consider what Marshal was thinking in that recomendation, as well as what the old cavalry and new armor hands thought.
Beyond his assignment as 6th AG commander he was double hatted as Alexanders Deputy during the run up to Op Dragoon. This on the face of it was clever as it helped avoid problems of a theatre command ignoring or shorting the needs of a AG forming up. Devers stepped into the role as Alexanders deputy after the Anzio fiasco was well underway. That makes me a bit curious what he thought of that affair?
Minor point of detail. Eisenhower did not serve in the cavalry. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry. Ike returned to the infantry after his brief stint with tanks. And while its correct that MacArthur was infantry for a time, he actually started out in the engineers, the traditional choice of arms for the top graduate of the Military Academy. Mac switched to infantry to broaden his professional opportunities, and to gain access to faster promotion as a field grade officer.
Glad to be of service!This made my Morning.
I'm afraid that I don't know the US Generals well enough to answer that one.
I think enough other people have put down that Marshall would have sat on Monty quikcer than you could say the words "narrow front". If Ike could see it, so could Marshall. Brooke even offered to do it for Ike. An offer I suspect that he wouldn't have needed to make had Marshall been in the hot seat.
If Marshall isn't a competent enough general (comments upthread), then it would appear Devers is the best man for the job. How did he cope with uppity subordinates?
I think you've forgotten to remove your rose-tinted spectacles.
For example the British Pacific fleet would probably disagree about King's understanding of coalition warfare.
Tunisia might be a special case, but you also need to factor in that Fredendall and Patton were not exactly shrinking violets.