Awesone WWII W Allied Wank Scenario

[danwild6]

Please critique.

Operation Torch: POD no landings in Morroco instead Allied landings at Algier, Oran and Tunis.

Result: North African theater sown up in Dec 1942. Landings in Sicily in Feb 1943.

Allied Landings in Italy: POD April 1943 Italians sabotage northern rail lines preventing German reinforcement and occupation of southern and central Italy.

Result: Allies enter Rome less than a week after landing and advance rapidly up the the Italian Peninsula reaching the Po river by June 1943.

 

[Da Pwnzlord]

Does the Italian army actively fight incoming Germans, or are their actions limited to sabotage?

 

[Cook]

The Germans surrendered 130,000 troops in Tunisia, the Italians 120,000. Most of these were reinforcements rushed to North Africa after Operation Torch took place; a case of Hitler reinforcing failure.

If Torch included Tunisia and the Germans chose not to reinforce North Africa they’d have an additional 200,000 German troops to defend Italy, Greece and Southern France. That is not an insignificant increase in forces. And that’s excluding Italian forces.

 

[Cook]

Some good reading:
An Army at Dawn by Rick Atkinson.
Alamein by Philip Warner.
The Bitter Sea by Simon Ball
Mussolini’s Island by John Follain

 

[BlairWitch749]

If the allies take Africa in one fell swoop before the Germans can reinforce... they then have 6 additional high quality divisions plus a ton of transport planes that can relieve stalingrad

 

[Darth Revan]

If the allies take Africa in one fell swoop before the Germans can reinforce... they then have 6 additional high quality divisions plus a ton of transport planes that can relieve stalingrad

By relieve do you mean get even more massively encircled? Because that is a very neat way of depriving Germany of manpower.

Edit: in explanation, look at Operation Little Saturn. If the Germans moved so far out of position because they actually have the divisions to attempt to relieve Stalingrad, then the probability that this Operation succeeds goes up drastically, capturing all of Army Group South

 

[BlairWitch749]

By relieve do you mean get even more massively encircled? Because that is a very neat way of depriving Germany of manpower.

Edit: in explanation, look at Operation Little Saturn. If the Germans moved so far out of position because they actually have the divisions to attempt to relieve Stalingrad, then the probability that this Operation succeeds goes up drastically, capturing all of Army Group South

Theres a shot that happens if Army Group Don gets it head so deep in the sack that little saturn cuts them off completely

or

Manstein deploys the reserve divisions properly, rescues 6th army and punches the Russians in the mouth

 

[Cook]

Dan,
The Morocco landings would still be necessary because of the very real fear that the Germans would occupy Spain and close off the Mediterranean that way. You require further forces for Tunisia. Also, Landings in Tunisia would be subject to air attacks from Sicily.
This is not to say that it isn’t possible, just that you need to consider it.
Blair and Darth, FOCUS!

 

[Devolved]

Dan,
The Morocco landings would still be necessary because of the very real fear that the Germans would occupy Spain and close off the Mediterranean that way. You require further forces for Tunisia. Also, Landings in Tunisia would be subject to air attacks from Sicily.
This is not to say that it isn’t possible, just that you need to consider it.
Blair and Darth, FOCUS!

I agree with almost everything that's been said about this.

There are other spanners in the works to worry about too.

Firstly, I am sure the Allies thought about it and rejected it. After all why even invade Algeria at all? Just go straight for Tunis.

They didn't because of the reasons others have given. Even if North Africa is cleared by Dec 1942 there is no reason to think the Allies would go through Sicily and on to Italy and sit on the Po.

Churchill would have wanted that but the Americans may have been emboldened by their easy victory (no Kasserine to give them pause for thought) to push for a cross channel invasion of France in Spring/summer of 1943.

One of the reasons for continuing the war in the Med was because the campaign in North Africa didn't end until May 1943. Too late to redepoly to the UK for use in an invasion. The troops and the ships were hanging around Tunis. Sicily and Italy were the only suitable places to use them.

Greece was too far from the heart of Europe for the Americans to agree to that and just 'too British'.

Also we cannot assume the Italians would collapse or switch sides earlier than they did. Most of Italy's best troops were lost by 1943 both at Tunis and on the Russian front. They would still be available if Tunis fell early and they could be used to defend Sicily and hurt the Allies much more than OTL.

 

[Cook]

By the way,
After the war Kesselring said simultaneous landings in Sicily and Calabria would have trapped the Army in Sicily and made the withdrawal from the island impossible.

 

[danwild6]

I was aware of the reason of why Morocco was chosen but if Hitler couldn't force Franco to terms in June 1940 I doubt he could do it in November 1942. But on the other points yes I'd have to concede. A simultaneous landing in Calabria would also lead to earlier German occupation wouldn't it?

 

[Devolved]

I was aware of the reason of why Morocco was chosen but if Hitler couldn't force Franco to terms in June 1940 I doubt he could do it in November 1942. But on the other points yes I'd have to concede. A simultaneous landing in Calabria would also lead to earlier German occupation wouldn't it?

Depends on when you have the invasion. In OTL then yes you do. I also think a Calabria landing force would have been destroyed after a few weeks.

If you have an earlier landing based on an early victory in North Africa then you have less Germans hanging around Italy. On the other hand you have more motivated Italians defending their soil against invasion.

From July 1943 onwards the Italians were demoralized by losing ALMOST EVERYTHING in North Africa and the Italian 8th army in the East.

To get things moving in the Med you need more carriers to give air cover to a landing closer to Rome in September 1943. This would allow the allies to secure the Italian government and army who could then organize a better defence against the German reaction. The Italians would lose but it would buy time for the allies to set up a defence north of Rome and you trap some of the German units in the south.

You have more of Italy secured early with a bigger blow to the Germans. You have more airfields secure and a more organized Italian state to fight alongside you.

But you would need more carriers. I'm not sure how many more could have been made available as even the Americans didn't have a large carrier force until early 1944.

 

[Cook]

I was aware of the reason of why Morocco was chosen but if Hitler couldn't force Franco to terms in June 1940 I doubt he could do it in November 1942. But on the other points yes I'd have to concede. A simultaneous landing in Calabria would also lead to earlier German occupation wouldn't it?

If you are the Allied Commanders planning an invasion of North Africa, you cannot assume that Hitler will be unwilling to invade Spain and close the Mediterranean. Do not go using 20/20 hindsight.

German Troops were present in Italy is significant numbers from the time of Operation Torch onwards. If Tunisia had been taken in the first landings you can reasonably expect that the forces that were sent there IOTL would be used to reinforce the Italians. This would not be occupation; this would be support of a still fighting fascist Italian Ally.

Locations for landings on the Italian Mainland were restricted by the range of tactical air support, Italy is not all that small. Consider invading Sardinia for air bases further north, the Allies certainly considered it.

 

[Gridley]

Please critique.

Operation Torch: POD no landings in Morroco instead Allied landings at Algier, Oran and Tunis.

Result: North African theater sown up in Dec 1942. Landings in Sicily in Feb 1943.

Allied Landings in Italy: POD April 1943 Italians sabotage northern rail lines preventing German reinforcement and occupation of southern and central Italy.

Result: Allies enter Rome less than a week after landing and advance rapidly up the the Italian Peninsula reaching the Po river by June 1943.

One medium-sized but easily butterflied problem: the Axis' most powerful weapon in the Tunisia Campaign would still be in play:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lloyd_Fredendall

 

[Cook]

Two other books that would be very good concerning this are Together we stand and Italy’s Sorrow, both by James Holland.

 

[merlin]

If you are the Allied Commanders planning an invasion of North Africa, you cannot assume that Hitler will be unwilling to invade Spain and close the Mediterranean. Do not go using 20/20 hindsight.

Marshall wanted to invade France in '42 - though it would have been with mostly British & Empire troops. But when that wasn't on the US needed to be doing something against the Germans, or else public opinion in the States would want more action in the Pacific - hence 'action' in North-West Africa it was initially intended to be before Elections there.
But it then seems bizarre, to be worried about the possiblity of German action through Spain, or Spanish action by themselves, as compared with the probability of German action against an Allied landing around Cherbourg in '42.

 

[merlin]

By the way,
After the war Kesselring said simultaneous landings in Sicily and Calabria would have trapped the Army in Sicily and made the withdrawal from the island impossible.

I think simultaneous landings, would be a mistake, and I wouldn't choose Calabria!

In the context of the OP then I think there would be greater US pressure for a '43 D-Day. Yet, to take Siclly still has the advantage of safeguarding shipping through the Med., which with the reduction of journey times has the effect of increasing the availability of shipping.
The US didn't seem to appreciate the advantages of the Med. strategy - that of dispersing German forces - Italy, Greece & the Balkans - away from France.

But back to Sicilly - invade asap - with just Monty! He is there to act as bait, and to secure airfields. When weeks later airfields are secure, fighter bombers move in - phase two. Patton lands around Tarranto, with paratroop support in the hills outside. The landing, is unexpected meets with little oppossition - the Germans are busy at Calabria ferrying troops across Messina. Patton, drives north-west secures the heights, and reaches the west coast - cutting off the Germans in the 'toe' and in Sicilly.

 

[Cook]

I think simultaneous landings, would be a mistake, and I wouldn't choose Calabria!

Are you suggesting that Field Marshal Kesselring didn’t know his business?

And Eisenhower said in hindsight that it had been a mistake not to have simultaneous landings both sides of the straights of Messina.

 

[Cook]

Marshall wanted to invade France in '42 - though it would have been with mostly British & Empire troops. But when that wasn't on the US needed to be doing something against the Germans, or else public opinion in the States would want more action in the Pacific - hence 'action' in North-West Africa it was initially intended to be before Elections there.
But it then seems bizarre, to be worried about the possiblity of German action through Spain, or Spanish action by themselves, as compared with the probability of German action against an Allied landing around Cherbourg in '42.

An Allied invasion of mainland Europe in 1942 was ruled out because the Allies were simply not ready. They lacked the forces and the skills required.

 

[merlin]

Are you suggesting that Field Marshal Kesselring didn’t know his business?

And Eisenhower said in hindsight that it had been a mistake not to have simultaneous landings both sides of the straights of Messina.

No, Kesselring was a very able 'General' according to Richard Brett-Smith in Hitler's Generals only second to Manstein. However, in this case I think it a 'put-down' of what could have been.
And, Eisenhower could say anything in 'hindsight' but at the time he was reluctant about Husky, if they found another two German divisions in the area - Churchill was not amused - see Alanbrooke by David Fraser.