Atomic bomb ready for use before German capitulation: Matters of target selection

The idea of them dropping the bomb on an enemy formation just before sending in the infantry seems terrible today but at the time, ignorance is bliss until you start having the VA make a lot of payments to cancer doctors a few years or decades down the line
Doesn't seem bad to me now, having once been a (part time) soldier and now being a classified radiation worker. Lots of machine gun and small-arms fire followed up by unfriendly locals with sharp pointy things on the end of their weapons are far more likely to kill me now than cancer is in 20 or 30 years time.
Remember also that they were considering the massive use of mustard gas as well in conjunction with nuclear weapons. The protective equipment you need against both is actually remarkably similar.
 
If we still get a Battle of the Bulge then there's no point in using it in Europe, because the Germans can offer little resistance.

Probablly the case. Rhoades 'The Making of the Atomic Bomb' wrote that the Allied leaders dropped Germany from target consideration in the autum of 1944. they thought German defeat too close for the atomic devices to be of value when finally available.

I've heard rumors that one of the original plans for the use of the atomic bomb was to clear the beach just before amphibious forces went ashore in Japan so as to prevent something like Omaha, due to lack of knowledge that it wasn't "just a little radiation" (like say, an X-rays worth) in the area afterward.

A air burst such as over Japan leaves little residual radiation on the ground. The effects on the Japanese came from exposure during the detonation. The exposure to the US Sailors at Bikini Atoll came from the detonation being a surface burst with contaminated solids being spread across the adjacent area. Part of my nuclear weapons training was calculating the radiation levels on the ground based on distance from the burst or its height.
 
Maybe Allies get stalled on the Rhine and OKH was allowed to pursue a more flexible defense in the East so encircled units are allowed to break out and manpower isn't wasted trying to hold useless "cauldrons" like Courland peninsula and East Prussian "fortress cities". So for the purpose of the thought experiment, the Allies have only gotten as far east as the Rhine and as far west as the Oder/Neisse.
In that case the Ruhr and Saar in the west seem like promising targets since it would both decrease both the German's industrial production dramatically and IIRC they had a couple of armies sitting on top of them so it helps write down their military forces as well, could also make a forced crossing of the Rhine easier. In the east Dresden for the same reasons as in our timeline that it was firebombed make it a good candidate.

Nuremberg has already been mentioned for the propaganda value, and I believe from previous threads that one of the major port cities like Bremen or Hamburg had also been under consideration.
 
OTL there were six Plutonium bombs and one Uranium bomb available in 1945. Core for a second Plutonium bomb was enroute to Tinian in August & about one per month would have been available to December. The case & triggers for most of those were complete or being built in August.

So, following the production schedule of OTL Germany could have been hit by three devices in less than four weeks & another a few weeks after that. It was possible to strike four major targets inside 6-7 weeks, perhaps more.
 
By 1945 German industry was pretty decentralized, so a "big" industrial target was not very obvious for an A-bomb. I personally would go with Nürnberg or Munich for symbolic reasons (Nürnberg in particular), but Munich has the advantage of being an industrial area as well. Berlin is out for reasons already stated (and also heavy defenses), and they would not want to hit places like Hamburg which were needed by the Allies at some point (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not in that category). I don't think, in this scenario, Dresden would be hot for two reasons. First off, with a stalled Soviet offensive eliminating Dresden as a transport/staging area is less important. Secondly, the US (and UK) will not be happy with the idea that the first folks on the scene after the explosion would be Soviet troops, and it would be unclear how cooperative they would be in allowing US/UK observers on scene let alone sharing any data they had gathered early on.

Building the arming pits in the UK would not be a big deal, the USA did it on Tinian where everything had to be shipped across the Pacific and all labor had to be brought in (SeaBees/Army engineers).
 
OTL there were six Plutonium bombs and one Uranium bomb available in 1945. Core for a second Plutonium bomb was enroute to Tinian in August & about one per month would have been available to December. The case & triggers for most of those were complete or being built in August.

So, following the production schedule of OTL Germany could have been hit by three devices in less than four weeks & another a few weeks after that. It was possible to strike four major targets inside 6-7 weeks, perhaps more.

Maximum production rates would have resulted in:
3 through the end of August (LB, FM, FMII by August24th)
3 in September
6 in October (w/60 empty casings on hand)
6 in November
7 in December
Up to 10/month in 1946.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq8.html#nfaq8.1.5
 
If the bomb was ready in early April 1945, it is on my personal opinion that it will still not be used in Germany. With good reason: every major urban target in Germnay had been so heavily bombed anyway that using the atomic bomb would be way overkill.

With the B-29 already flying bombing raids on Japan by that time, the Allies would still have considered using it on target in Japan. And they would still have considered Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki and Niigata as primary targets.
 
Assume the Manhattan Project's pace of work is accelerated and they have the bomb ready for overseas deployment by early/mid April of 1945... Which cities would the US prioritize if they had two bombs ready for use?

what u think?

Central Berlin - the Fuhrerbunker. Ends the war immediately. Which saves several hundred thousand lives because no battle of Seelowe Heights.
 
Net saving of lives is probably about 0, fewer 'allied' (soviet) lives, but far more German ones in the long-run. Also, it will irritate the soviets, since at least part of thier occupied territory will now be a no-go zone due to radiation.
 
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If the bomb was ready in early April 1945, it is on my personal opinion that it will still not be used in Germany. With good reason: every major urban target in Germnay had been so heavily bombed anyway that using the atomic bomb would be way overkill.

With the B-29 already flying bombing raids on Japan by that time, the Allies would still have considered using it on target in Japan. And they would still have considered Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki and Niigata as primary targets.

In March and April of 1945 they were just waiting for what they expected could be at any time for Hitler to off himself or someone in his inner circle to do it to save themselves and they believed the end could be at any time.

They aren't going to risk Germany doing something like unleashing the gas or mass executing WAllied POWs when the end of the war is so much in the very near future.
 
Central Berlin - the Fuhrerbunker. Ends the war immediately. Which saves several hundred thousand lives because no battle of Seelowe Heights.

Again, and, as has been stated earlier, Berlin would likely be kept off a hypothetical Atomic Target List for cultural/historical/political reasons akin to why Tokyo and Kyoto were OTL.
 
The war in Europe was essentially over in April 1945, I don't see the Allies thinking of using the bomb at this point. They will position its use for Japan much earlier than OTL and proceed there instead. World War II could end in spring 1945 instead of late summer. This would also keep Soviet influence out of Manchuria and further south.
 
Maximum production rates would have resulted in:
3 through the end of August (LB, FM, FMII by August24th)
3 in September
6 in October (w/60 empty casings on hand)
6 in November
7 in December
Up to 10/month in 1946.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq8.html#nfaq8.1.5

That may be drawing in part from goals proposed in planning the construction of the production site; The Haniford reactors. From 8.1.5 in the linked site:

The three reactors (B and D which went started up for production in December 1944, and F which started up February 1945) at Hanford had a combined design thermal output of 750 megawatts and were theoretically capable of producing 19.4 kg of plutonium a month (6.5 kg/reactor), enough for over 3 Fat Man bombs. Monthly or annual production figures are unavailable for 1945 and 1946, but by the end of FY 1947 (30 June 1947) 493 kg of plutonium had been produced. Neglecting the startup month of each reactor, this indicates an average plutonium production 5.6 kg/reactor even though they were operated at reduced power or even shut down intermittently beginning in 1946.

The 1947 production figure includes material produced after modifications of the two production reactors. As I see it Rhoades was drawing his numbers from 1945 adjusted estimates based on the output as the two production reactors were started up. Both were shut down after Japans surrender & extensively modified through 1945-46. I've seen others estimate production for 1946 as high as 36, or three per month average from the reactors as built in 1945. Rhoades low balled that to 1.5. He seems to have taken a pessimistic view of the actual capability of the two production reactors as they were in 1945. Tho not as bad as those who claim they would have had catastrophic accidents had planned production continued.
 
Would the Mighty 8th have the B-29, or would Tibbet's composite group be operating independently. For any number of anti-American trolls (including the far left and behind the Iron Curtain), it was Holy Writ that the USA would never nuke White People, only Asiatics. Conveniently ignoring that Tibbet's outfit was a COMPOSITE group, designed for operating separating in different theaters at the same time.

Tibbet's outfit, the 509th Composite Group didn't operate in multiple theaters at the same time (I am aware theoretical consideration as given to the idea). It was only a group, after all. You are liking thinking of the Twentieth Air Force which was the numbered air force to which the 509th was assigned (ignoring the intervening XX Bomber Command), and which supervised all B-29 operations worldwide before being replaced in that role by the United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (at that point all B-29s were in the Pacific or headed for it).
 
The war in Europe was essentially over in April 1945, I don't see the Allies thinking of using the bomb at this point. They will position its use for Japan much earlier than OTL and proceed there instead. World War II could end in spring 1945 instead of late summer. This would also keep Soviet influence out of Manchuria and further south.

I think February is the latest month you would see a nuclear strike if ready without significant changes to how the war went in 43 and 44.

Germany deciding to not attack Kursk and not reinforce Tunisia would be an easy TL to start off with to change the time frame of the war in Europe.
 
The war in Europe was essentially over in April 1945, I don't see the Allies thinking of using the bomb at this point. They will position its use for Japan much earlier than OTL and proceed there instead. World War II could end in spring 1945 instead of late summer. This would also keep Soviet influence out of Manchuria and further south.
Even if the bombs were ready by mid-April 1945 and the Allies were only at the Rhine in the west and Oder-Neisse line in the east at that point, you don't think they'd be used on Germany?
 
Doesn't seem bad to me now, having once been a (part time) soldier and now being a classified radiation worker. Lots of machine gun and small-arms fire followed up by unfriendly locals with sharp pointy things on the end of their weapons are far more likely to kill me now than cancer is in 20 or 30 years time.
Remember also that they were considering the massive use of mustard gas as well in conjunction with nuclear weapons. The protective equipment you need against both is actually remarkably similar.

Probablly the case. Rhoades 'The Making of the Atomic Bomb' wrote that the Allied leaders dropped Germany from target consideration in the autum of 1944. they thought German defeat too close for the atomic devices to be of value when finally available.



A air burst such as over Japan leaves little residual radiation on the ground. The effects on the Japanese came from exposure during the detonation. The exposure to the US Sailors at Bikini Atoll came from the detonation being a surface burst with contaminated solids being spread across the adjacent area. Part of my nuclear weapons training was calculating the radiation levels on the ground based on distance from the burst or its height.

Well thats good to know... I guess... in a horrifying sort of way, that tactical nuclear war is survivable even if your are close to the blast provided its an airburst and you aren't close enough to just be a charred shadow on the ground...

Having never been in the military due to being deaf in one ear since childhood my knowledge of how to surviving nuclear blasts boils down to "don't be anywhere nearby when it goes off", and considering I work at a USAF base... well, I wouldn't feel anything if it was hit anyway.

One of the recruiters who showed up at my high school back in my senior year was apparantly an alternate history fan though, I asked as a joke if he thought I'd be accepted if 'space lizards from Tau Ceti' invaded and he told me that if the Race invaded they'd be taking all who were willing :p

This was in late 2002 and soon after I first found alternatehistory.com (it still took a few more years before I joined though)
 
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