At what exact moment did Germany lose the opportunity to win the war with the Soviet Union?
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The moment the British refused offers for peace, and instead told the Germans to pound sand.
One on one, Nazi Germany would have had a shot against the USSR, but they couldn't do it while also fending off the British Empire.
One on one, Nazi Germany would have had a shot against the USSR, but they couldn't do it while also fending off the British Empire.
Bavarian Raven
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I'd wager not taking Lenningrad (or at least properly/completely cutting it off) in the fall of '41 and not taking Moscow in the fall of '41. Or else, not stopping a lot sooner (and closer to home) and digging in a proper defensive positions long before winter. Remember, the Russian winters hurt the Russians more than the Germans. Both in gear/supplies and manpower. But the Russians had the advantage of having lend lease in truly astonishing amounts.
This is the real problem. Winning a war with the USSR might not be impossible. The issue is the Nazi government was incapable of viewing a war with Moscow as anything less then a mystical crusade against Asiatic Bolshevism, and mystical crusades make for lousy policy.
21 June 1941.
Halder's plan required the destruction of the entire Soviet Army (about 200 divisions) within the first 500km of the border. By early August the Germans had identified over 360 Divisions at which point Halder realised the plan had failed.
From Tooze's, Wages of Destruction:
Everything depended on deciding the battle, as in France, in the first weeks of the campaign. This was the assumption on which Barbarossa was premised. A massive central thrust towards Moscow, accompanied by flanking encirclements of the Soviet forces trapped in the north and south, would allow the Red Army to be broken on the Dnieper–Dvina river line within 500 kilometres of the Polish-German border. The Dnieper–Dvina river line was critical because beyond that point logistical constraints on the German army were binding. These limitations on Germany’s new style of ‘Blitzkrieg’ had not been obvious in 1940, because the depth of operations required by Manstein’s encircling blow (Sichelschnitt) had never exceeded a few hundred kilometres. The entire operation could therefore be supplied by trucks shuttling back and forth from the German border. On the basis of their experience in France, the Wehrmacht’s logistical staff calculated that the efficient total range for trucks was 600 kilometres, giving an operational depth of 300 km. Beyond that point the trucks themselves used up so much of the fuel they were carrying that they became inefficient as a means of transport.
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction (pp. 452-453). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
The attack on Russia required two things:
Halder's plan required the destruction of the entire Soviet Army (about 200 divisions) within the first 500km of the border. By early August the Germans had identified over 360 Divisions at which point Halder realised the plan had failed.
From Tooze's, Wages of Destruction:
Everything depended on deciding the battle, as in France, in the first weeks of the campaign. This was the assumption on which Barbarossa was premised. A massive central thrust towards Moscow, accompanied by flanking encirclements of the Soviet forces trapped in the north and south, would allow the Red Army to be broken on the Dnieper–Dvina river line within 500 kilometres of the Polish-German border. The Dnieper–Dvina river line was critical because beyond that point logistical constraints on the German army were binding. These limitations on Germany’s new style of ‘Blitzkrieg’ had not been obvious in 1940, because the depth of operations required by Manstein’s encircling blow (Sichelschnitt) had never exceeded a few hundred kilometres. The entire operation could therefore be supplied by trucks shuttling back and forth from the German border. On the basis of their experience in France, the Wehrmacht’s logistical staff calculated that the efficient total range for trucks was 600 kilometres, giving an operational depth of 300 km. Beyond that point the trucks themselves used up so much of the fuel they were carrying that they became inefficient as a means of transport.
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction (pp. 452-453). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
The attack on Russia required two things:
- The Russians must be destroyed within 500km of the Border
- The Russians cooperate with this plan.
Operation nordlicht and operation fischreiher in july 1942 cost not only germany the war but cost there european allies and the greater east asia co prosperity sphere the war,
As part of operation nordlicht had erich manstein and over one hundred fifty thousand troop's of the eleventh army moved from army group (a) to army group north,
Not counting the troop's of eleventh army over a quarter million reinforcement's were sent to reinforce army group north for operation nordlicht,
To support this operation required thousand's of train's loaded with hundred of thousand's of tonne's worth in material's,
This lead to army group north competing against both army group's (a) and (b) for train and rail load's,
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Operation fischreiher had army group (b) advance from the don river to the volga river,
An operation that diverted fourth panzer army and later the third romanian army from operation edelweiss to operation fischreiher,
Not counting the troop's of fourth panzer army and third romanian army as army group (b) required hundred's of thousand's in reinforcement's for there advance to the volga river,
A advance that cost hundred's of thousand's in casualtie's requiring hundred's of thousand's more in reinforcement's and replacement's,
To support this operation required thousand's of train's loaded with hundred of thousand's of tonne's worth in material's,
This lead to army group (b) competing against army group (a) for train and rail load's on most of the same rail line's.
As part of operation nordlicht had erich manstein and over one hundred fifty thousand troop's of the eleventh army moved from army group (a) to army group north,
Not counting the troop's of eleventh army over a quarter million reinforcement's were sent to reinforce army group north for operation nordlicht,
To support this operation required thousand's of train's loaded with hundred of thousand's of tonne's worth in material's,
This lead to army group north competing against both army group's (a) and (b) for train and rail load's,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation fischreiher had army group (b) advance from the don river to the volga river,
An operation that diverted fourth panzer army and later the third romanian army from operation edelweiss to operation fischreiher,
Not counting the troop's of fourth panzer army and third romanian army as army group (b) required hundred's of thousand's in reinforcement's for there advance to the volga river,
A advance that cost hundred's of thousand's in casualtie's requiring hundred's of thousand's more in reinforcement's and replacement's,
To support this operation required thousand's of train's loaded with hundred of thousand's of tonne's worth in material's,
This lead to army group (b) competing against army group (a) for train and rail load's on most of the same rail line's.
I've read one on JP's Panzer General forum years ago.
edit: tried to find the forum, but it has disappered.
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What happens if Germany annihilates most of the Soviet Army per OTL, and then stops at, or falls back toward, the Dniepr-Dvina river line?
Does the German economy still implode despite nabbing Brest-Litovsk 2.0 when the Soviets refuse to sue for peace?
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Problem is that the Germans will probably also lose at chess to the Russians too.
Bragration will come someday...
The moment it started. Frankly the amazing thing isn't that the Germans were defeated, it was how far they got before their logistics all but collapsed behind them.
That means that technically they already lost the war on 30 March 1941, as that was the day of the conference where the German military decided to go with Halder's plan.
This +1
The German planned goal was fine (destroy the red army and thus the USSR's ability to resist, then mop up over a vast area without having to fight a conventional army for and over every square mile)
But:
1). their facts were just wrong, they were not only wrong about the size of the red army and where it was but also how quickly more could be mobilized
2). They own limitations in resources and logistics means they have no flexibility to adjust when those errors become apparent. Instead having to fall back on hoping that concentrating their dwindling resources to achieve smaller individual victories* will somehow trigger a greater defeat for the Russians.
*compared to the prolonged three pronged simultaneous advance of the first couple of month of Barbarossa, after which they can't muster enough resources to do that again for any length of time
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