Alternate Apartheid Story

Hi all!

So this is my first time posting in this forum. For a while now I have been extremely interested in the history of South Africa during Apartheid due to the perceived uniqueness of this situation. Additionally, I have noticed that due to the topic of Apartheid being taboo very few people bother to dig deep and uncover the underlying reasons for the system's failure. Most simply chalk it up to the impossibility of a rather small white minority ruling over an entire black country. My research into the topic, however, has revealed that Apartheid, just like many other controversial historical periods, wasn't black-and-white (pun semi-intended). Additionally, the collapse of Apartheid wasn't a foregone conclusion until the mid to late 1980's. There were, indeed, many efforts to preserve Apartheid, especially by reforming it. Therefore, over the past few weeks I've been writing an alternate history scenario in which the white government of South Africa resolves to try and maintain its system of racial segregation through various means. This scenario is largely based on real historical facts and events supplemented with fictional elements here and there to make the scenario work. The story starts in 1978 with the election of PW Botha as Prime-Minister and the POD is in 1980.

I've done a lot of research writing this piece and I hope that you not only enjoy it but also find it plausible enough. Of course, as I am extremely interested in the topic, I will welcome any criticisms, accusations of ASB's and informed opinions contributing to a general discussion of history and specifically the likelihood of this scenario.

Lastly, I feel obligated to say that I do not hold any White Supremacist views and, in general, do not support Apartheid, especially in the way that it was implemented OTL.

Having said all of this, I hope you guys enjoy the first two Chapters.



South Africa: Birth of a New Nation




The Black Question

On 9 October 1978 Pieter Willem Botha was narrowly elected as the new leader of the ruling National Party of South Africa and consequently Prime-Minister of the country. The 62 year old veteran politician inherited an Apartheid system that, having been in place since 1948, had slowly begun to show its cracks. The growing internal opposition to the system was becoming more and more violent with organizations such as SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC openly waging war against the authorities. To make matters worse, this internal discontent was starting to be reflected on the world stage with numerous governments considering far-reaching sanctions against the Apartheid government. Change was needed. Botha, although considered a relative moderate among his party’s ranks, believed in the system and had no intention of abolishing it. However, realizing that white minority rule could not continue indefinitely, Botha decided to pursue reform. There had always been many anti-Apartheid activists who claimed the system could not be reformed and called for its outright abolition. The majority of the international community, however, was not that extreme in its demands. Changes of any kind, as long as honest and effective, would be seen as a substantial improvement to the situation as a whole, a first step towards true change.

Botha, as Prime-Minister, first wanted to address what he saw as the most pressing problem – the Swart Gevaar or Black Threat. The rapid growth of the black Bantu population coupled with its increasing political aspirations had always presented a complex problem for the government. A central idea of Apartheid addressing this problem was the Bantustan system, a program that had led to the establishment of several self-governing black ‘homelands’. The end result of this project was to be the segregation and separation of blacks into their homelands on the basis of ethnicity. However, the territories set aside for the purpose were small and disconnected from one another, rendering most of these quasi-states nothing more than a patchwork of ungovernable exclaves. Botha had always been aware of the flaws in the system so he resolved that in order for it to work these administrative entities would have to become more state-like and less resembling black reservations. To that end, in early 1980 he introduced two bills that would change the history of the country forever. After a fiery debate Botha managed to impose his will on those opposing his reforms and so, on 20 March the South African Parliament passed the Homeland Territorial Act (HTA) and the Homeland Repatriation Act (HRA). The laws begun to restructure the homelands, especially the HTA which redrew their borders. All were allocated additional land so that their combined, newly contiguous territory now constituted more than a third of the total area of South Africa. The resulting six homelands were, namely, Lebowa, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, Venda, Bophuthatswana and the Kei. The last two had become independent already under Botha’s predecessor Vorster with the Kei being the new name of Transkei after its incorporation of Ciskei, another Xhosa homeland. Additionally, the Basotho Strip and Northern Swazi Territories were created along the borders of Lesotho and Swaziland respectively as special areas under direct South African administration. Later on, in 1985-89 South Africa would implement the HRA through a ruthless programme of population displacement, sometimes forced, to bring about the ‘repatriation’ of the entire black population to the homelands, a grandiose project that would lead to regional conflicts lasting for years.

South Africa Apartheid (Durban).png


The Nationality Question

Addressing the black question was only the beginning for Botha. After four years at the helm of the country he felt that reform was not quick or palpable enough. It would take years before the black homelands became ready for full independence, Apartheid’s end goal. Meanwhile South Africa remained, in the eyes of the world, a racist and oppressive regime. Support was hard to come by both internationally and domestically. On top of that, at home there were still millions of Coloured and Asian South Africans whose fate in the nation was at that time unknown. As different from the blacks, they did not fall under the Bantustan system, but weren’t considered citizens by the Pretoria government either. What is more support for Apartheid was beginning to wane even amongst some of the white population. Botha realized that in order to make the system more popular he needed to make it more inclusive.

Beginning in the early 1980s the emphasis of the National Party’s ideology began to shift from race to culture. Increasingly, European roots and language replaced skin color as the defining feature of the nation. This trend culminated in 1982 with the passing of the National Citizenship Act, a law that granted full citizenship with equal rights to South African Coloureds and Asians, both in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia, at that time under Pretoria’s administration. The opposition to the law was intense. Botha however, managed to convince Parliament that the changes were necessary if the system was to survive at all. ‘Adapt or die’ were his famous words. He argued that on the basis of their language, religion and ancestry the Coloureds were far closer to the whites than to the blacks. After all, the vast majority had white European ancestry, mostly spoke Afrikaans and a minority English as their mother tongue, and practiced Christianity. Therefore, they would integrate more easily into the nation, despite not being white. It was decided that Asians, of whom most were Indian South Africans, would also be granted citizenship, as they did not belong to the black homelands either. Following the passage of the law the country’s citizenry basically doubled over-night. Most of the new citizens felt gratitude towards the Party for finally recognizing them as equal to the whites and were willing to vote accordingly. These dramatic changes did not leave Botha’s party itself unscathed, however, as many of its ultra-conservative members who found the reforms too hard to stomach split from the NP and formed the new Conservative Party led by Andries Treurnicht. This new party would become the main parliamentary opposition replacing the Progressive Federal Party. The progressives had long opposed Apartheid and had campaigned for its abolition. Many of its followers, however, were beginning to be appeased by Botha’s reforms leading to a gradual decline in the Party’s popularity.

The drastic and somewhat controversial changes brought about by the National Citizenship Act were further solidified in 1983 when Botha had a new Constitution for South Africa approved by Parliament. This came on the heels of a constitutional referendum approved by 56%, the last white-only vote to take place. The Constitution led to the abolition of the upper chamber of the legislature resulting in a unicameral Parliament. Furthermore, Botha’s own office, that of Prime-Minister, was abolished and its powers were transferred to that of State President, a formerly ceremonial post for which Botha would run in the following year’s General Elections.
 
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Interesting concept. I assume there is little interest because South Africa is "main character".

I think that South Africa wouldn't be treated much better because they enfranchised coloreds, or created bantustans that are actually viable as independent nations. International opponents to Apartheid were already dead-set-on democratic and united SA, and would angrily oppose division along ethnic lines.
OTOH, Reagan could plausibly claim that his policy of Constructive Engagement was successful in leading SA government on path to reform, so he could avoid placing sanctions on them to placate domestic opponents to Apartheid.
So Botha's reforms would at least prevent that one pitfall, and that means more time to implement them.
 
Interesting concept. I assume there is little interest because South Africa is "main character".

I think that South Africa wouldn't be treated much better because they enfranchised coloreds, or created bantustans that are actually viable as independent nations. International opponents to Apartheid were already dead-set-on democratic and united SA, and would angrily oppose division along ethnic lines.
OTOH, Reagan could plausibly claim that his policy of Constructive Engagement was successful in leading SA government on path to reform, so he could avoid placing sanctions on them to placate domestic opponents to Apartheid.
So Botha's reforms would at least prevent that one pitfall, and that means more time to implement them.

Hey, thank's for the input. I realize that there's not too much interest atm but we'll see how things go. As for your observations, *SPOILER ALERT*, enfranchising the Coloureds and Asians is only the beginning and SA is at this point still pretty much in hot water like you said. But, there will be more Chapters taking this further. Also, just as an explanation of why I started with these two: OTL Botha did try to reform Apartheid by creating the Tricameral Parliament. This, however, was an affront to democracy in the eyes of the world as it was obviously aimed only at placating the international community and not at delivering true change. So at this point, increasing the size of Bantustans from 13% to about 35% of SA territory, making them contiguous, and fully enfranchising some non-white citizens is a good start since it addresses the most important specifics of why Apartheid was so vehemently opposed (aside from the general opposition to the idea of racial segregation in any form). Also, as you did mention Raegan, as far as my research has revealed, the point of no return for Apartheid happened when Raegan could no longer pitch constructive engagement and had Congress turn against him and impose sanctions on SA allowing the UN to do the same which really kicked off the whole Disinvestment Movement largely credited with bringing down Apartheid. However, again, all of this will be addressed in the subsequent Chapters which I'll post regardless of the level of interest.
 
Politics in the ‘new’ South Africa

Following the enactment of the 1983 constitution events were immediately set in motion in preparation for elections to the new Parliament. The first post-reform general elections in South Africa were to take place in August 1984. Meanwhile, a large group of the population new to full political rights had begun to affect the politics in the country. In preparation for the elections, the National Party became increasingly active in trying to lure these new voters into its camp. The expectation was that these voters, having been enfranchised by the NP in the first place, would be quick to express support for the reformed party. Many Afrikaans speaking Coloureds did become supporters of the government. Some Asian and English South Africans, however, remained distrustful of the Apartheid regime and opposed its actions.

Campaigning for the elections began and political loyalties started to form. The National Party had suffered a backlash from its more conservative supporters which had formed the Conservative Party led by Andries Treurnicht. The party attempted to appeal to the most disgruntled members of the white community opposed to reform. Their considerable gains, however, were somewhat offset by the emergence of a large support base for the ruling NP among the Coloureds. Not all of the new ‘mixed’ citizens, however, believed in blind support for the Nationalists. The English speaking followers of the relatively small Labour Party believed that the Coloured citizens and their political aspirations needed to be given a special voice. Thus, the United Democratic Party was founded in late 1983 mostly by Coloured South Africans and former LP followers. Soon enough, the UDP’s support would grow to rival that of the two main opposition parties, the Conservatives and the Progressives.

The Progressive Federal Party, a party long opposed to Apartheid, continued to receive support among the most liberal circles of society. However, this support was becoming harder and harder to come by. The reforms led by the government had been positively received by a large portion of the voters and interest in the PFP had begun to wane. Its opposition to the policies of the NP was coming to be seen as pointless as most of the country’s new voters opted to support the establishment or the other small parties. Up until the day of the election, however, the level of support for the parties in South Africa, especially the smaller ones, would remain unpredictable.

The elections were held on 22 August, 1984. The results were that a restructured 240 seat Parliament became more split than it had ever been before. The National Party, in spite of all its fluctuations in terms of support came out on top with 55% of the vote, securing it 132 seats in the National Assembly. Although maintaining parliamentary majority, this signified a historic drop in support for the ruling Nationalists. The other three parties shared the remaining 108 seats with the Conservative Party receiving 38 seats and the Progressive Federal Party – 28 seats. The surprise, however, was the level of support for the new United Democratic Party, securing 42 seats in Parliament.

The resulting structure of the Assembly meant that the National Party was able to form a government on its own, in spite of the drop in support. Thus, the NP leader, PW Botha, was elected to his first five year term as State-President, the first leader of the newly enhanced executive presidency. The results of the election were favorable, showing a large amount of support still present for the NP and its policies of reforming Apartheid. Of specific significance was the level of support among the newly enfranchised Coloureds. This led Botha to include the Coloured UDP, the largest opposition party, in the government. With mutual agreement, a coalition was formed and a new Cabinet was appointed including UDP members. The most influential ministry positions remained reserved for the NP, however.

The results of the first elections under the new South African Constitution would change the country for decades to come. The reconfirmation of the National Party as the majority party in Parliament signified a general level of support for Botha and his policies. These results coupled with the inclusion of the Coloured UDP would embolden Botha’s government to push its policies even harder. In the coming years the Homeland Repatriation Act, Apartheid’s most controversial policy, would enforce a social engineering project meant to reshape the demographics of the country forever. Achieving what supporters called ‘true decolonization’ meant that the black homelands would need to become true homes to the black population eventually leading to full independence and universal suffrage for all citizens. Pursuing this goal, however, would lead down a difficult road for the people subjected to forced relocations and the countries involved in integrating these new African ‘refugees’.
 
I wouldn't be surprised if the Progressive Federal Party ends up dissolving and its members folding into the either the National or United Democratic Party, depending on personal leanings.
 
A thought occurs, if the thrust of the National Party's ideology is towards cultural rather than racial identity, wouldn't it make sense for them to open the franchise to Coloured South Africans but not the Asians?

Keeping the franchise restricted to the primarily Christian and European-descended ethnicities but not the Hindu and Muslim Asians could be seen as a compromise towards conservatives whilst also allowing the government to play the Coloured against the Asians.
 
What is the UDP's ideology/stances other than Coloured interests?

Well, the UDP basically aims at truly integrating the Coloureds into the nation. Their main goal is to ensure that the government treats them as equals in practice and not just in law. To be honest, beyond Coloured interests they don't really have any specific stances of their own. Mostly, they adhere to a form of Christian Democracy, in which their ideology aligns quite neatly with that of the NP. Most importantly, the UDP fully supports the segregation of the black population, which shouldn't be too surprising given that OTL the Coloureds did see themselves as different (sometimes even superior) to the blacks.

A thought occurs, if the thrust of the National Party's ideology is towards cultural rather than racial identity, wouldn't it make sense for them to open the franchise to Coloured South Africans but not the Asians?

Keeping the franchise restricted to the primarily Christian and European-descended ethnicities but not the Hindu and Muslim Asians could be seen as a compromise towards conservatives whilst also allowing the government to play the Coloured against the Asians.

Actually, even among the Coloureds, not all (although most) have European ancestry (some have Asian ancestry). However, that's actually a very good thought and one which I pondered on a lot while writing. There are three main reasons why I decided to include the Asians as well. First, as I mentioned in Chapter 2 the Asians fell outside the Homelands system so the government couldn't really have them as non-citizens living within SA in perpetuity. Second, as I stated in the prelude, the scenario is based on true events and facts. OTL Botha did treat Coloureds and Asians equally, making no distinction in regards to the fact that the Coloureds were still closer to the whites than the Asians and thus allowed both groups to benefit from his "reforms". Third, the city of Durban was (and still is today) the most Indian city outside of India itself. Therefore, if SA wants to keep Durban functioning economically and remain within the country's territory the government has no choice but to enfranchise the Asians. And just as a last note, OTL South Africa did extend a so-called 'honorary white' status to various Asian immigrants (Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese) which granted them almost equal status to actual whites. So, again, including the Asians is not so outlandish in this timeline. Plus, the backlash from the conservatives is really not too detrimental to the NP since they got a ton of new voters.
 
I think that South Africa wouldn't be treated much better because they enfranchised coloreds, or created bantustans that are actually viable as independent nations. International opponents to Apartheid were already dead-set-on democratic and united SA, and would angrily oppose division along ethnic lines.
I'd not count on that, because to be blunt: Who really cares? I was too young to really remember that much about the time, but IMHO opposition to Apartheit was for 99% of Westerners like "Free Tibet". Something everyone agreed upon when it came up in conversation, but didn't really care that much about. This kind of reform wouldn't placate their international opponents indeed, but also make it much harder for them to get anything but platitudes expressing support out of their governments.
Also granting full citizenship rights to Asians gives them other options for trade, friends, investment, immigrants etc: India & China. Plus the other tiger states. When the end of the century approaches, they don't need anyone in the West to like them. If they aren't too racist to realize it, that is.
 
This kind of reform wouldn't placate their international opponents indeed, but also make it much harder for them to get anything but platitudes expressing support out of their governments.
"We will give them all possible support, except of help."

99% of electorate or even officials would indeed feel that way, but politics are shaped by small, organised, and motivated groups of interest. And those groups wouldn't be discouraged at all. In fact, they'd consider reform a sign that SA regime is crumbling, and would double down on attacking it.

@Martoto, what are your thoughts on Zulus? IIRC, of all ethnic groups, they were most interested in their own state, rather than being part of rainbow country. Other than desire for enlargement of their bantustan, they'd be staunchest supporters for "peaceful divorce" with South Africa.
 
"We will give them all possible support, except of help."

99% of electorate or even officials would indeed feel that way, but politics are shaped by small, organised, and motivated groups of interest. And those groups wouldn't be discouraged at all. In fact, they'd consider reform a sign that SA regime is crumbling, and would double down on attacking it.

@Martoto, what are your thoughts on Zulus? IIRC, of all ethnic groups, they were most interested in their own state, rather than being part of rainbow country. Other than desire for enlargement of their bantustan, they'd be staunchest supporters for "peaceful divorce" with South Africa.

First, let me say that your point about anti-Apartheidists seeing reform as a sign of weakness is very true. OTL this is largely why Apartheid collapsed, i.e. because Botha began reforms which then eventually snowballed due to the expectation of more reforms. However, let me just say that OTL Botha was naive enough to think that his puny reforms would placate the big western governments largely negating the influence of the anti-Apartheid lobby. That, as we know, failed. However, in this alternate timeline the reforms are actually more far-reaching and thus much more likely to appease world powers (arguably the biggest change is actually yet to come in the next Chapters).

As for your question about the Zulus, it's complicated (surprise surprise). The Zulus actually never received nominal independence as a Bantustan and remained instead a self-governing entity within SA. The leader of KwaZulu at the time, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was actually opposed to full independence and consistently refused calls to that end. However, he was also a staunch anti-communist. Additionally, today he still leads the Inkatha Freedom Party which represents the Zulu minority interests. But you are right about the Zulus. Out of all the black ethnic groups in SA they have the strongest national consciousness. After all, the exploits of their historical leader Shaka Zulu and his Zulu Empire are legendary and a source of great pride for the people to this day. And even today, many Zulus continue to see themselves as Zulus first, and South Africans second. Just ask SA's Zulu president Jacob Zuma. But now that you've brought the Zulus up, they do feature prominently in some of the following Chapters and will have an even bigger role in the Chapters that I've yet to write. Cheers!
 
Just some additional info for those who are interested:

This is what the population of South Africa looks like following the enactment of the National Citizenship Act.

1982:
Total: 30,610,000
Citizens: (27%) 4,675,000 Whites; 2,816,000 Coloureds; 851,000 Asians = 8,342,000 Total
Non-citizens: (73%) 22,268,000

1984:
Total: 32,200,000
Citizens: (27%) 4,812,000 Whites; 2,929,000 Coloureds; 886,000 Asians = 8,627,000 Total
Non-citizens: (73%) 23,573,000

Source: Mid-year estimates by Statistics South Africa (2000's)
 
First steps on the Road to Independence

Beginning in 1985 the Bantustans had slowly begun to take shape as true homelands for their respective ethnic groups. Opposition was still strong among the populace, especially the blacks. The improving conditions in the territories, however, had started to increase their appeal. Under the Homeland Assistance and Development Act (HADA) of 1982 passed shortly after the HTA and HRA, South Africa had effectively pledged economic assistance and investment in developing the nations and increasing the general quality of life. Politically, the Bantu peoples living in the homelands were considered citizens of the homelands only. At that point Pretoria had begun to distance itself from governing the black territories directly and allowed the population itself gradual self-rule. Achieving the final goal, independence for all homelands seemed not so far down the road.

The story, however, had a bleaker side. Beginning in 1985 the South African authorities started to enforce the Homeland Repatriation Act, a law that mandated the relocation of all blacks to their respective homelands. In 1985-1989 the country would see relocations, often forced, of black people from South Africa proper to their ‘true’ home. But even before the ‘repatriations’ had begun there was already opposition to the land ‘returned’ to blacks. The Zulu people, in particular, having been allocated the now enlarged KwaZulu under the HTA were still not content. Opinions were voiced that the territory allocated to the Zulus was too small. Special opposition was expressed against the continued existence of Natal, with Durban as its largest city, as part of South Africa. This land was seen by the Zulus as originally theirs and large scale protests erupted against the displacement of blacks from Natal to KwaZulu. Durban in particular would see a lot of protests and sometimes even riots in 1985-87.

The government in Pretoria, however, saw Natal as rightfully South African land. What remained of Natal after the redrawing of the KwaZulu borders was an area populated mostly by English whites and Indians, the country’s newest citizens. The idea of ceding the entirety of Natal, Durban included, to the Zulu homeland received some support among the more liberal sections of Parliament. However, the vast majority of MPs mostly from the NP-UDP ruling coalition supported keeping the area in South Africa. The land redistribution in the province was largely seen as fair. Not only was it considered big enough for the Zulus but there were also historical reasons justifying the new borders. The territory of KwaZulu largely corresponded to that of the historical Zulu Kingdom of the late 19th century. The rest of Natal, on the other hand, was largely reminiscent of the Boer Natalia Republic. This latter fact was especially emphasized by the ruling Nationalists to try and truly integrate the area in this form with its mostly English-speaking citizens, many of whom had only recently been accepted into the nation. Natal, and Durban especially, had always been home to a large community of Indians and white English speaking South Africans many of whom were historically opposed to Apartheid. Enfranchising the Indians and keeping Natal in South Africa was meant to garner support for the government even in these circles.

As a compromise, in 1986 South Africa would cede the so-called West Zululand to KwaZulu. The territory located in eastern Transvaal was sparsely populated and the Pretoria government hoped to appease political opinions by apportioning it to KwaZulu. After the incorporation of the territory into the homeland more and more Zulus would begin to move to the new territory. Local nationalism would start to develop and the nascent nation would come to be referred by its people as the ‘Zulu State’, in anticipation of independence and true freedom.

Over the years, Zululand, just like the other homelands, would gradually adapt to self-rule and transition to independence more or less peacefully. In some areas, however, transition to black rule under new government would be more difficult. The displacement of blacks would cause unrest in the most sensitive areas and attempts in Swaziland and Lesotho to unify their people with the help of South Africa would lead to violent conflicts lasting for years.
 
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The Beginning of the End

On 6 November 1984 Ronald Reagan decisively won the US presidential election and embarked upon his second term. Under Reagan the US had adopted a policy of so-called ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. While the majority of the international community demanded sanctions and disinvestment from the Apartheid state, the US consistently blocked proposed measures to that end in the UN. The Reagan administration preferred to encourage gradual reform and conditioned the easing of embargoes on certain exports, including arms, on the addressing of a decade long regional and international conflict.

Ever since World War I South Africa had been in control of the territory of South West Africa. A former colony lost by the Germans in 1914, it had been placed under a League of Nations mandate entrusted to Pretoria. With the start of the Cold War, however and the emergence of the UN the world began to call for the independence of the territory, referred to as Namibia. The US itself had endorsed a 1978 UN Resolution calling for the independence of Namibia. The realization of the Resolution’s aims was central to the US policy in regards to Apartheid South Africa. While the US was wary of Pretoria’s policies of racial segregation on the whole, their application in Namibia was particularly unacceptable as the territory came to be seen as occupied land.

What is more, South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia had encouraged local resistance since the early 1960’s when the two main independence movements SWAPO and SWANU were formed and later took up arms against the government. Throughout the years SADF and Police forces would have to fight a growing domestic insurgency in Namibia. Matters were made worse in 1975 when the Portuguese colony of Angola was finally granted independence. Liberation movements had long fought a war against the colonial authorities and following a revolution in Lisbon overthrowing the Estado Novo the mostly communist militants led by the MPLA were able to take control of the capital Luanda. A civil war ensued between the MPLA government and the nationalist UNITA. This situation created a problem for the South African authorities as militants from SWAPO’s armed wing known as the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) could easily use southern Angola as a base for raids into South West Africa with the acquiescence of Angolan authorities. Thus, Pretoria soon became actively involved in the civil war in support of the anti-communist UNITA. This, however, prompted a Cuban intervention in Angola, in support of the communist authorities. The direct confrontation between Cuba and South Africa would become a historic conflict of the Cold War at times dragging in even the United States and Soviet Union.

By 1985 Botha had established himself as State President. The office granted him far-reaching powers under a new Constitution that represented the first real reform in Apartheid South Africa. Many in the country and abroad came to believe that this was only the first step. More changes were expected and Botha and his new coalition government were to deliver. One of the most controversial issues other than Namibia was the continued imprisonment of Nelson Mandela. Mandela, a leading figure of the ANC, had been imprisoned since 1964 on charges of terrorism. Over time, he had come to symbolize and inspire resistance against Apartheid, especially by the ANC and its supporters. What is more, he had come to be considered the most important political prisoner in South Africa by the international community, which repeatedly demanded his release.

On 15 August 1985 the National Party held a meeting in Durban to discuss current issues with members of the other major parties. The Conservatives and the PFP had both been invited to provide their opinions. A speech was drafted for Botha, in which the State President would address the most pressing issues facing the nation. After reading and approving the speech in consultation with his coalition partners, Botha stepped up to the podium and announced the new sweeping changes to an enormous worldwide media audience. First, the South African Defense Force would begin its immediate withdrawal from southern Angola in accordance with the Lusaka Accords. The ceasefire signed in 1984 in the Zambian capital called for the withdrawal of all foreign powers from Angola. The agreement, at first very unstable would prove to be the key to peace as the South African government would manage to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops in parallel to their own.

In addition to its withdrawal from Angola, South Africa would go even further in assuring Angloa, Cuba and the world at large that support for UNITA would cease and the SADF would entirely withdraw from the conflict zone. In the speech Botha declared that in accordance with the UN measures addressing the matter, Namibia would be placed under UN administration pending democratic elections and eventual independence, while Pretoria's forces completely withdrew from the territory. The historic announcement was to be coupled with various conditions that Botha put forth. The UN would have to take up administration of Namibia as soon as possible, and establish a peace keeping mission to ensure that militant activity would not hamper the peaceful transition to independence. The significant amount of Coloureds and Whites in southern Namibia, considered citizens by Pretoria, would be granted a ‘right of return’ allowing them to settle in South Africa proper with government assistance. A similar right would eventually be granted to South African citizens who had found themselves living within the black National States.

As for the fate of Nelson Mandela, Botha announced that his case would be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, he would be released from Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town and placed under house arrest. These measures stopped just short of granting Mandela full pardon and left some observers disappointed. On the whole, however, it was seen as a dramatic step in the right direction.

Generally, the ‘Rubicon Speech’ as it would come to be known would shake the international community to the core. Many had been optimistic about the speech but few truly expected real change. The measures announced, however, were of historic significance. Finally, authorities seemed willing to compromise on Mandela and grant him a second chance at achieving justice. Soon enough, many hoped, he would perhaps be allowed to walk as a free man. As for Namibia, after decades of occupation and counter-insurgency operations by ruthless units such as the Koevoet and 32 Battalion, the ailing country would finally be free. In October 1985, seven years after the adoption of the UN Resolution, Botha’s government signed its commitments into law, officially handing over control of the territory to the UN administration in its entirety. For Apartheid South West Africa, this was truly the beginning of the end.
 
I am surprised that the more hardliner Boers aren't protesting all these changes.
Yes. Some assassination attempts against Botha wouldn't be unexpected.

Finally, authorities seemed willing to compromise on Mandela and grant him a second chance at achieving justice.
Didn't Mandela commit acts of terrorism? Amnesty International refused to declare him prisoner of conscience on the grounds that he did use violence. Botha offered to release him in 1985 on condition he renounced violence, and Mandela refused, arguing: "Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. Only free men can negotiate."

Botha isn't exactly in position to simply release him. If Mandela doesn't even pretend he doesn't want to violently overthrow the government, Botha will humiliate himself domestically by simply releasing him. But commuting sentence from life imprisonment to fixed release date (for example 1988 or 1993) would be doable.
 
Yes. Some assassination attempts against Botha wouldn't be unexpected.


Didn't Mandela commit acts of terrorism? Amnesty International refused to declare him prisoner of conscience on the grounds that he did use violence. Botha offered to release him in 1985 on condition he renounced violence, and Mandela refused, arguing: "Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. Only free men can negotiate."

Botha isn't exactly in position to simply release him. If Mandela doesn't even pretend he doesn't want to violently overthrow the government, Botha will humiliate himself domestically by simply releasing him. But commuting sentence from life imprisonment to fixed release date (for example 1988 or 1993) would be doable.

Yeah true. But that's why I didn't have Botha simply release Mandela. Instead he "released" him from prison and keeps him under house arrest basically indefinitely. Saying "the Court will review his case" is basically saying he'll stay under house arrest for as long as the government needs him so that he doesn't cause trouble. Remember, the Homelands still need to get independent (well most of them anyways) and that's something that Mandela would definitely try to stop. But keeping him under house arrest attempts to alleviate some of the international criticisms without really doing anything. Also, OTL De Klerk released him just like that. So, the power is available to Botha. He just needs to balance between appeasing the opponents of apartheid while at the same time not going to far so as to turn his more concervative supporters against him. That's basically what he's trying to do in this timeline.
 
Remember, the Homelands still need to get independent.
I wonder if UN will initially even recognise independent homelands, or will they try to force SA to take them back.

Also, OTL De Klerk released him just like that.
Didn't De Klerk explicitly campaign on working with opposition? Whereas Botha was opposed to it, and made only limited and purely tactical concessions. When Both placated opposition, he was surrendering, when De Klerk placated opposition, he was fulfilling his mandate.
 
I wonder if UN will initially even recognise independent homelands, or will they try to force SA to take them back.


Didn't De Klerk explicitly campaign on working with opposition? Whereas Botha was opposed to it, and made only limited and purely tactical concessions. When Both placated opposition, he was surrendering, when De Klerk placated opposition, he was fulfilling his mandate.

Very true. Although technically speaking FW never "campaigned" for anything. His election to the leadership of the NP was largely a surprise. But when he became State-President a year later he did so on the promise to bring about a "non-racist" SA. But few actually expected him to release Mandela at the time. The ANC wasn't considered as part of the opposition because they were outlawed as a terrorist organization. In fact, I don't know if FW himself knew all along that he would release Mandela or whether this decision was simply forced on him by the collapse of the Berlin war and consequently communism - the boogeyman that the apartheid government had always used to legitimize all of its actions both at home and in neighboring countries.
 
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