Should you choose to accept it, your challenge is to give a plausible scenario where the United States launches a first strike on the Soviet Union with strategic nuclear weapons, between 1962 and the end of the Cold War.
AHC: US Strategic nuclear first strike (1962-1991)
- Thread starter Erin Go Bragh
- Start date
Ok, technically not a 'First Strike', but I'd argue the difference isn't much.
During the Cuban missile crisis, the submarine B-59 launches its nuclear torpedo, which would have been in keeping with its orders. Said torpedo vaporizes a significant segment of the US carrier group on the scene.
The US assumes that this is part of a Soviet first strike and goes whole hog. That's a reasonable assumption on their part---the idea that local commanders could have unilateral authority to launch nukes was unthinkable to them, and thus unthought. The missiles in Cuba also had use if you will lose orders that didn't require confirmation with Moscow. I think if you run this simulation 100 times you'd get major nukes flying most of those runs.
During the Cuban missile crisis, the submarine B-59 launches its nuclear torpedo, which would have been in keeping with its orders. Said torpedo vaporizes a significant segment of the US carrier group on the scene.
The US assumes that this is part of a Soviet first strike and goes whole hog. That's a reasonable assumption on their part---the idea that local commanders could have unilateral authority to launch nukes was unthinkable to them, and thus unthought. The missiles in Cuba also had use if you will lose orders that didn't require confirmation with Moscow. I think if you run this simulation 100 times you'd get major nukes flying most of those runs.
On the evening of October 25, 1973, after being informed the Soviets have moved nuclear weapons into Egypt, Nixon kills an entire fifth of scotch, and decides the [expletive] [obscenity] USSR can go [unprintable] itself.
marathag
Banned
False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks Put U.S. Forces on Alert in 1979-1980 | National Security Archive
Washington D.C., March 16, 2020 - During the Cold War, false alarms of missile attacks were closely held matters although news of them inevitably leaked. Today the National Security Archive revisits the false alerts of the Jimmy Carter administration when on four occasions warning screens showed...
nsarchive.gwu.edu
Yes
1962 and Cuba (or the Berlin Wall?) was pretty much the last chance for the US to cripple the USSR (& the PRC) at low cost to itself. (For some values of "low", 10m deaths??)
Pity about Europe but destroying that continent is a price some US leaders might have paid for global preeminence and safety from any conceivable enemies.
Lucky for Europeans (including the UK and Ireland geographically) JFK wasn't one of those.
Later Presidents of the US probably never felt a crisis was bad enough to chance a first strike when the Soviets could hit back much harder than in 1962.
Outside the OPs question but, without Suez, could the US have bern tempted to launch a first strike during the Hungarian uprising?
It's hard to see Ike ordering any such strike. But maybe he goes down from a serious heart attack and Nixon gives the order?
You're right that Cuba was the last chance for the US to " win" a nuclear war with the Soviets ( Win in the sense of losing say NYC or Washington or both, having South Florida get hit a few times and have US forces abroad and most of Europe and East Asia sent back to the stone age but also completely destroying the USSR and having the US continue to exist as a nation with a relatively paltry several million dead Americans and a standard of living knocked back a couple decades. At the time of the crisis the Soviets had what 6 ICBMs that were pad launched, liquid fueled ( fueling them took hours and they could only stay fueled for like less then a day. They were also pretty unreliable and inaccurate so expect a large chunk of however many get launched either ouright fail or hit rural areas or the ocean instead of cities. The Soviet intercontinental capable bomber force was tiny. And no SSBNs yet. Theirs a reason Kruschev planned for like two dozen IRBMs in Cuba. It would have like tripled the number of warheads the Soviets could actually hit the US with. Of course they had plenty of shorter ranged missiles, bombers, and nuclear artillery shells. So Western Europe and US allies and bases in East Asia get plastered but CONUS only gets hit a relative handful of times.
SAC in contrast had a large number of intercontinental bombers, more ICBMs and plenty of shorter ranged missiles, aircraft delivered bombs, and nuclear artillery for the Army. And a lot more bases closer to the USSR then the Soviets had for the US.
I agree with this. 1962 was the best window for a first strike. The U.S. would be hurt after losing the DC-Boston corridor and Florida but overall it would come out alive.
Mid to late 50s would be better. The US had gotten its shit together and had a sizable fleet of bombs and missiles. The Soviets had no ICBMs and a handful of bombers capable of striking CONUS. You might get a scenario where the Soviets are slaughtered but not a single Soviet nuke hits CONUS.
I think that in the present discussion about that a first strike would be 'worth' hypothetically, on this scenario, of course... Thanks to the likely possibility 'hypothetically lesser effects' on America than to the rest of the world of a (even if a 'limited one') nuclear interchange.... Seems that could be overlooking the certain climatic and economical effect derived from the unavoidable nuclear winter in the northern hemisphere...
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marathag
Banned
Nuclear Winter was far overstated. The would have been less soot and smoke than Tambora did in 1815
Radioactive Fallout, that's understated by most
The Soviets had the Tu-4, known as the Bull, since 1947. That surprised the United States on how the Soviets managed to reverse-engineer those B-29s that quick. The Bull was perfectly capable of hitting the continental U.S. on one-way flights. It had a range of 5,400 km.
This is a 1950s flyer showing how vulnerable the U.S. mainland was since the Pinetree Line and the Mid-Canada Line were inferior to the later DEW Line.
The Tu-4 was used multiple times on targets in Europe and the U.S. in Harry Turtledove's Bombs Away and Preview of the War We Do Not Want by Collier's Weekly published on October 27, 1951 (free PDF here).
On the other hand, the U.S. could simply send their B-47s and some B-52s over the USSR if the first strike was done in the mid-to-late 1950s. Now I have to look at what Soviet air defense systems were at this period or if they had jets capable of intercepting this USAF bombers.
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The TU-4 could theoretically have used them on one way flights but surprisingly ( considering they lacked pretty much anything else that could make the hit at all. ) they never made any plans to use them in such a fashion at all.The Soviets had the Tu-4, known as the Bull, since 1947. That surprised the United States on how the Soviets managed to reverse-engineer those B-29s that quick. The Bull was perfectly capable of hitting the continental U.S. on one-way flights. It had a range of 5,400 km.
This is a 1950s flyer showing how vulnerable the U.S. mainland was since the Pinetree Line and the Mid-Canada Line were inferior to the later DEW Line.
The Tu-4 was used multiple times on targets in Europe and the U.S. in Harry Turtledove's Bombs Away and Preview of the War We Do Not Want by Collier's Weekly published on October 27, 1951 (free PDF here).
On the other hand, the U.S. could simply send their B-47s and some B-52s over the USSR if the first strike was done in the mid-to-late 1950s. Now I have to look at what Soviet air defense systems were at this period or if they had jets capable of intercepting this USAF bombers.
Just like nuclear weapons, the Tu-4 was a deterrent showing that two oceans could no longer protect the U.S. mainland from attack.
I could see the Soviet message to the U.S. be like:
"We know your B-29s and B-36s can hit us but we could also hurt your country by flying over the Arctic since your air defense radars are crap. Sure we would be destroyed more but your country would still lose 20 or so cities which would still hurt. The choice is yours."
The Soviets were just as terrified of a first strike as the United States. Both sides did not want to test how their bombers would function over enemy airspace.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
That last part isn't true, the US was constantly sending recon versions of its bombers over USSR airspace in the period, partly for exactly that reason, only really stopping once the U-2 entered service
True and the US didn't know the Soviets never planned at all for one way TU-4 flights.
Yes by the late to mid 1950s Soviet AA and fighters/ interceptors would have taken a bad toll on SAC. But SAC had the aircraft numbers to still take terrible losses but still finish the mission.