Most ideas on this thread so far seems to be centered on putting Central Asian countries into this movie of another. But I honestly think that alone would not be enough. After all, its not like that before Borat, Central Asia had zero representation in Western pop culture. The 1997 movie "
Air Force One" staring Harrison Ford, for example, had the main villains being from
Kazakhstan, with the country under the control of a rump Soviet state. Or the video game "
Command and Conquer: Generals" from 2003, which had a large chunk of the game's missions taking place in Central Asia. None of them, however, managed to really put the region 'on the map' in terms of popular culture recognition. After all, do people even remember that plot of Air Force One beyond Harrison Ford being an action hero POTUS, or care where the missions in C&C Generals took place at beyond 'generic Islamic looking third world country number 5'?
The reason why Borat managed to put this while the previous examples that I have cited was that... Well... It was just so gosh darn 'meme-able', making people remembering and quoting all the Kazakhstan related punchlines long after they have finished watching the movie. As such, any alternate work of popular culture that could displace Borat's influence of how Kazakhstan is viewed in the rest of the world will need to be equally 'meme-able'.
It's interesting to see by reading his bio that he supported the soviet hardliner coup attempt. I dont know how possible this but prehapse If he chooses to never formally withdraw from the soviet union and default on the soviet dept (becuse their economy could not pay it back but would scar there ability to get international loans) Turkmenistan might begone a bastion for fleeing communist hardliners and retain the USSRs UN succurity council seat which would DEFINITELY make central asia known with Turkmenistan being a player in Global politics. In theory at least this would also guarantee them any nukes located in Turkmenistan (becuse they cant strong arm russia out of there's) so at least this should help ward of invasion should issues arise. Like north Korea China might be one of the few countries willing support them financially as a proxy, with the added benifit unlike North Korea that they have a UN succurity council seat (which China might hope to mold with their support and good relations to possibly suit there international agenda.) The Fondation of this is grounded is similer to something which vary briefly happened with Kazakhstan becoming the USSR for 4 days all by its self after all the other republics except for it left so a Kazakhstan USSR might also be another possibility for central asia.
I think we're circling the strongest option, a scenario I've thought on some: A rump USSR dominating Central Asia, the Soviet answer to Yugoslavia-which-is-actually-Serbia-and-Montenegro.
Of the Central Asian SSRs, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan apparently sought independence during the break up in any active sense. The other three, though, were handed a
fait accompli and had to make do. Had Kazakhstan been on board, there might have been a way.
There are different frames to view the break up through, but the aspect of it that was essentially personal politics is among the more promising. Yeltsin, for example, was decisive in the break up. Had the political head of Russia-and-only-Russia not sought to become an independent head of state, it's very likely that most smaller states would have remained extremely cautious or assumed outright independence (as opposed to autonomy) was out of the question. The home rule all round option probably depends quite a bit on him alone. I should be cautious trying to rely on decade-old reading, but I think it's fair to say specifics of individuals and cliques in SSR capitals determined a lot of the details of the Fall.
Sheer nationalism had a role primarily on the western fringe. Clearly that was what was going on in the Baltics, for Georgia and Armenia, and I think Ukraine, but Belarus for example declared independence because the local Communist leadership wanted to remain in power. "National feeling" didn't enter into it.
Perhaps then, it might be as simple as having popular hardliners in Alma-Ata at the decisive moment. Maybe some of those who OTL went for local resource control, economic reform, and privatization in late 1991 fall down stairs, or have a falling out, or a couple key people are murdered by hardliners. If Kazakhstan's leadership's goal is to maintain the Union under their (personal/ideological, not ethnic) leadership, they could probably make it work in the short term, with most or all of Soviet Central Asian governing figures cooperating. Even Azerbaijan might be amenable, as an edge case. There'd likely be a bit of immediate voting-by-foot as Union or Communist loyalists crossed to take direction from the real nation, with reform-minded defectors headed the other way. Not large scale, but if officials, senior KGB, or generals are doing it, it matters a lot. (Long-term this
might avert a fair amount of the ethnic Russian exodus from Central Asia we saw in OTL, but that's only if the situation lasts.)
Short term... what?
None of the preliminary machinations makes me think Ukraine would avert its overwhelming vote for independence. Nor would the December 8 declaration by Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine be put much off. The leadership of the first wanted to remain in power, Yeltsin was seeking the top spot even if it had to be in a smaller country, and Ukraine wanted out, period. So assuming that goes ahead roughly as IOTL, early December is the moment where the divergences are suddenly 'revealed" because the rest of the Union refuses to play ball. Yeltsin and others in Russia would be deeply uncomfortable, but this is happening
after they declared independence, so for the moment there's nothing they
can do.
If the relationships and ambition is there for people in Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad, etc. to hang together rather than hang separately, this awkward construction probably has several years in it, minimum. It's not going to suddenly disappear, if it can hang on at all. Unified, they have the name, the Security Council seat, Baikonur, and won't be denuclearized. Most importantly, what the top officials are doing is guaranteeing each other's job security.
Meanwhile, they're an intractable problem for Yeltsin. In our TL independence was followed almost immediately with the formation of the CIS, which was nominally going to be a meaningful new union. But if the Central Asians are refusing to dissolve the Soviet Union, it doesn't quite work like that. Their claim would be for a new union not particularly under the leadership of the national leader of Russia, while Yeltsin's goal was a framework where that specific person would essentially have the top job.
I doubt there's a negotiated solution with the leadership groups described, so I imagine a small CIS-entity with the Slavic republics and Moldova facing off with a Soviet rump state in Central Asia, with the Caucasus republics put in an awkward and probably violent situation. Might make for a more integrated CIS-thing.
Relative to the outside world, it's hard to picture how to square the circle on the Security Council seat. It would be an immediate problem and would not go away while Russia faced off with the Soviets.
I think a Chinese relationship for "the USSR" is very likely, assuming Moscow and Alma-Ata don't reconcile in the early years. If they do have Chinese patronage, that means either a more isolated Russia, or one that will have a less confrontational relationship with NATO.
But whatever else,
people would be paying attention to Central Asia.