AHC: Eisenhower goes all out to prevent Castro from coming to power in Cuba?

What could alert Ike to the geopolitical importance of doing this? What would be the minimum effective means of stopping Castro’s rise? How would Ike justify any measures that would have required publicity or congressional support?

If he had multiple options for stopping Castro, covert vs overt, client support vs use of troops, what would he most likely choose?
 
What could alert Ike to the geopolitical importance of doing this? What would be the minimum effective means of stopping Castro’s rise? How would Ike justify any measures that would have required publicity or congressional support?

If he had multiple options for stopping Castro, covert vs overt, client support vs use of troops, what would he most likely choose?

The problem is that it was only after Fidel took power that he openly began embracing communism - there were suspicions before, but he constantly downplayed his associations to get support from other opponents to Fulgencio Batista, and he played it so well he even had certain CIA agents falling for it.

Your best option is for another group, and there were many, to overthrow Batista first and make Fidel's guerilla moot. For example, you could have the DR-13M succeeding on killing Batista in 1957, like this TL does.
 
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What could alert Ike to the geopolitical importance of doing this? What would be the minimum effective means of stopping Castro’s rise? How would Ike justify any measures that would have required publicity or congressional support?

If he had multiple options for stopping Castro, covert vs overt, client support vs use of troops, what would he most likely choose?
It's difficult for Eisenhower to support Batista as he was too repressive, a better way for Castro not to come to power is just dying/failing before or as said above another coup to succeed against Batista
 
What if Castro's ascent to power begins earlier, perhaps when the Eisenhower administration is in a more tense, "take-no-chances" mood. Perhaps Castro's risky, but not impossible, July 1953 assault on Moncada Barracks succeeds in embarrassing the Batista government, making Fidel famous, rallying popular support, starting in eastern Cuba, and puts his insurgency on a role, while the Batista government fumbles in trying to put his rebellion down over the next year?

The Batista is already an embarrassing and repressive dictator, who recently took power by a coup, and cancelled the 1952 elections, so the embarrassment is there. Castro isn't declaring himself a Communist. But the USA of 1953 and 1954 may be more tightly wound than the USA of '57, '58, and '59. McCarthyism is in full flower and he's going after everybody in summer '53. He wouldn't be confronted with Joe Welch's deflating "Have you no decency Sir" retorts on TV until summer 1954. The US is just coming off the Korean War armistice. The US was about to go ahead with the overthrow of Mossadegh of Iran, who it acknowledged the whole time was not a Communist, simply because he was seen as vaguely creating an environment conducive to Communist takeover, compared to the alternative of the Shah. And in 1954 the US would overthrow the not Communist but land-reforming and Communist tolerant Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Fidel Castro once opined that it was a good thing to have failed at Moncada and had the "break" of imprisonment and a later, longer insurgency, because an earlier revolutionary success would "certainly have been crushed" by a more eager USA against a then weaker Socialist bloc and Soviet Union.
 
What could alert Ike to the geopolitical importance of doing this? What would be the minimum effective means of stopping Castro’s rise? How would Ike justify any measures that would have required publicity or congressional support?

If he had multiple options for stopping Castro, covert vs overt, client support vs use of troops, what would he most likely choose?
they tried OTL, even batista failed
 
Interesting that you bring this up since I’m reading a book about the Cuban Revolution right now. My biggest takeaways are A) that Batista’s support had all but evaporated even amongst conservative Cubans by 1957/58; the church was part of the coalition that overthrew him! And B) that Castro was an extremely important figurehead over a very diverse group, but the Revolution in 1959 at least was not Communist, but rather more similar to the 1933 and 1940 mass movements.

Essentially, if Castro has an… accident sometime in early 1959, he’s a Marti-level martyr but there’s also plenty of figures of more moderate factions who could reasonably step in to steer a more progressive path
 
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