AHC: A better US space program WITH a shuttle

I had similar idea a loooong time ago. http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,5915.msg50347.html#msg50347

The manned flyback S-IC would have been an awesome flying machine - a cross of A380 (size) S-IC (the F-1s) and X-15 (flight profile)

Why is having a human pilot for the booster stage a good thing?

At the time of the "Shuttle Decision" it was of course a very big thing; one reason Chrysler's SERV proposal was ignored is that it did not require piloting for cargo delivery to orbit. Requiring flight crew to operate it was seen as a sign of progress at NASA. Sources attribute this attitude to the astronaut corps, but I doubt they'd have been allowed to impose this restriction all on their own, without someone else backing them up on the point.

Anyway the more I learn about the Shuttle Decision the more I despair of rationality in human decision making, even when the decision is about something technical.

But you, Archibald, seem to be talking about the booster being piloted--I mean here, having a requirement to be piloted, to be inoperable without being piloted, as thought that were a good thing. Can you elaborate on why the booster should be piloted then?

I think what happened is NASA went from a vehicle with two re-useable stages to only having enough money to make one re-useable stage - so they decided that the orbiter was the one they needed first... (I guess a re-useable first stage doesn't make much sense if it doesn't have anything it can carry up.)

And then of course, they never got the funds to make a proper re-useable first stage for the shuttle. But then, I wonder how much of getting stuck like that that was simple lack of money and how much was the psychological impediment of the SRBs being "re-useable"?

If NASA had developed the saturn-shuttle instead (with a throw-away version of the Saturn IC) would they have ever gotten around to upgrading the Saturn IC to a flyback version, or would they have gotten stuck in a similar way?

fasquardon

Very interesting questions in view of the depths of irrationality prevailing in the SD, and that then apparently followed by some version of the Somebody Else's Problem field protecting every aspect of STS as developed from any criticism or second thoughts.

Just one correction, though the way you phrased it may capture the mentality at the time and place pretty well..."(I guess a re-useable first stage doesn't make much sense if it doesn't have anything it can carry up.)"

But it does, I'd say! It can carry up any number of upper stage designs already developed in the US space program. A Centaur for instance, to capitalize on the superbly high ISP of the RL-10 rocket, still the most efficient US design in terms of ISP, ahead of SSME in that respect. Some godforsaken (IMHO) hypergolic stage like Agena, which at least I'd cheerfully see disposed of. Or of course what I assume and hope they'd focus on, a variation on the Saturn third stage, since a rational focus on devising a nice reusable booster stage and letting the upper stage be disposable for the nonce puts a premium on making the upper stack as light as possible. Nothing needs to be fitted with TPS except vehicles that are intended to return people or down-mass cargo. These can be regarded as being part of the payload package one wishes to launch; now (assuming that only one upper stack size can be compatible with the booster design) the decision is, what size orbited payload package should we aim for?

In my own kludging around lately I assume 25 tons, and that of that 15 will be revenue payloads, with the other 10 supporting that payload in orbit. This is about half of what fasquardon has suggested is the sweet spot of 30 tons; I assume that the early program would start with more modest expectations and then think about how to raise the orbited package.

I suspect the 'eye candy' single flyback booster would tend to prevail if one could smack the heads involved in the Decision and get them to reverse their priorities versus the two stages. Certainly it is a prize comparable to the Orbiters of OTL for whichever lucky contractor gets it, and if SST were cancelled at the same time, it would be a fair trade for Boeing to get the contract, as far as government pork goes, and would make good use of stuff Boeing developed and learned for the SST I'd think.

But I think the really rational choice would be to develop pairs of recoverable boosters for the minimal package, and then contemplate how adding more boosters, stretching the upper stacks, and developing a double-thrust heavy version of the booster could enable a broad spread of capabilities.

e of pi, do you have reports on the costs of recovering and reusing the SRBs that show where the high costs come in? Is in maintaining a mini-fleet of boats to go out and fish a 70 ton spent booster out of the drink, refurbishing costs, costs associated with saltwater damage, or what? If we were to cut the process of sending segments back to Utah and simply order new segments for a solid (to go inside a permanent pressure sleeve casing per my suggestion) would that cut in half a big component or small one of the costs? I strongly favor liquid fuel boosters, more than I did a couple weeks ago, for a number of reasons, including that they can be controlled to burn in phase in any numbers while keeping more than one solid in synch is tricky, hence disapproval of "simply" using lots of little solids for STS. OTOH it would be very nice indeed if designing them to splash into the ocean to be fished out--by helicopters instead of boats if we could get the dry masses light enough--were a reasonably economic mode of recovery for reuse. It requires infrastructure and operational costs the fancier fly-back systems might avoid or minimize, but the great simplification of the boosters themselves allows us treat them pretty much like expendable stages in their design, with only a few other considerations deviating us from a straightforward optimization of the core launch mission.

So, if the major costs of the SRB reuse program were in fact the process of fishing them out of the water I'd have to reconsider, but perhaps these can be reduced if the units are a lot lighter, so a helicopter can simply grapple on to some convenient built-in feature (say, a helium balloon that retains the pressuring gas displaced by flooding part of the stage with ballast sea water) and haul it right out and bring it back immediately as a sling load. Also of course as with other aspects of STS, a high-cost fixed investment (in suitably modified ships or aircraft in this case, and retaining and training and giving practice to a suitable crew for them) is much better justified with a high launch rate than a low one, so if the National Launch System, the Space Transportation System, based on these boosters, is capable of delivering on the promise of high launch rate at modest cost, and the low cost and reliability create a stable market, then the picture might be quite different.

At any rate eliminating the phase of disassembling a retrieved sold and shipping its separated parts across the continent to be refurbished must be a help; any refurbishment should be in the field, and the rest of the job just a matter of refueling--another reason I favor liquids so much.
 
Just one correction, though the way you phrased it may capture the mentality at the time and place pretty well..."(I guess a re-useable first stage doesn't make much sense if it doesn't have anything it can carry up.)"

But it does, I'd say! It can carry up any number of upper stage designs already developed in the US space program. A Centaur for instance, to capitalize on the superbly high ISP of the RL-10 rocket, still the most efficient US design in terms of ISP, ahead of SSME in that respect. Some godforsaken (IMHO) hypergolic stage like Agena, which at least I'd cheerfully see disposed of. Or of course what I assume and hope they'd focus on, a variation on the Saturn third stage, since a rational focus on devising a nice reusable booster stage and letting the upper stage be disposable for the nonce puts a premium on making the upper stack as light as possible.

Well, they could have made a re-useable first stage that launched something like an Atlas-based 2nd stage and a Centaur 3rd stage. Or one that launched a Titan-based 2nd stage and a Centaur 3rd stage. I question if the Atlas and Centaur stages would have been able to take a heavier load than 20 tonnes to LEO though.

(Edkyle over at NSF made up some mock-ups of a Saturn-Atlas-Centaur - it looks like a pretty neat rocket to me, so a Saturn-Atlas-Centaur with a re-useable Saturn IB first stage would probably give NASA good service.)

Does anyone know how far into the 70s Saturn IV stage production could have been re-started? Unlike the Saturn IC stage, references to the Saturn IV stage seem to fade from the papers of the era pretty quickly...

Playing around with a Saturn IB-like first stage, with 40 tonnes of unspecified recovery system added to the 1st stage, another 8 seconds of ISP and 50% more thrust on the H-1 engines, a flyback Saturn IB-Atlas-Centaur could carry 15 tonnes to LEO. Adding a pair of UA1207 boosters to such a vehicle would push the payload up to 22 tonnes to LEO.

If a bigger first stage (like a flyback Saturn IC) could have launched an Atlas-Centaur stack without damage then assuming that the Saturn IC has about 100 tonnes extra of dry mass in wings, landing gear etc (no idea if I am over or under estimating there), then I make the flyback Saturn IC-Atlas-Centaur stack as being able to get about 40 tonnes into orbit from Cape Canaveral.

The thing is, neither of these are able to lift the Orbiter, meaning that to push NASA down this path, almost certainly they need to have chosen either the HL-20 or HL-42 over the big space van of OTL. Otherwise both of them are LVs in search of a mission - particularly in the case of the flyback Saturn IC-Atlas-Centaur.

A flyback Saturn IB-Atlas-Centaur paired with something like the HL-20 would have made a fine system for LEO work and space probe launches for NASA in the 70s and 80s. It would have required a far less ambitious NASA, however.

(Of course, NASA being NASA, almost certainly the flyback Saturn IB-Atlas-Centaur I'm discussing would have very little relation to the Saturn IB stage - it might have engines related to the IB's H-1s, but otherwise I suspect the zeitgeist of the age would push NASA into making a clean sheet design.)

Consider--8 H-1 are approximately equal to an F-1; Eyes Turned Skyward demonstrated that one F-1A with suitable lower stage plus one stage pretty much the same as the Apollo Saturn upper stage with a J-2S can put something like 25 tons into LEO. So, with fairly easy improvements in thrust and ISP derived from applying some modern improvements in state of the art to a 1960 design, let's call this the H-2, 4 H-2 on each booster should get the job done with 2. It doesn't look much like Saturn, but it is basically yet another Saturn 1C. Or the H program can go the other way, starting with off the shelf H-1s with no improvement but using 5 of them per booster, with first priority being to examine and test to destruction recovered ones.

8 H-1s are roughly equal to one F-1A - they provide over 50% more thrust than a single F-1.

I suppose making a Saturn V class LV with 30-40 H-1/H-2 engines on the first stage isn't completely daft - NASA at least has a fair grasp on how reliable the engine is after using it on the Saturn IB. Even so... So many small engines would, IMO, make the LV over-complicated and prone to failures.

There's no shame in using the right engine for the job.

fasquardon
 
I think what happened is NASA went from a vehicle with two re-useable stages to only having enough money to make one re-useable stage - so they decided that the orbiter was the one they needed first... (I guess a re-useable first stage doesn't make much sense if it doesn't have anything it can carry up.)
Ya. but that bolded sentence makes no sense.
A 'half reusable' system with a reusable booster would have an expendable second stage. Possibly even an existing one, but probably something new(ish).
Since the payload penalties and thermal protection problems are much less for a booster than for an orbiter, it would be a much easier task to develop.
 
Any chance on developing the metallic TPS for the shuttle. From what I remember reading in the end it would have been cheaper to develop and maintain than the ceramics that ended up being used. Though ceramics were pursued because initially they were to be lower cost.
 
Does anyone know how far into the 70s Saturn IV stage production could have been re-started? Unlike the Saturn IC stage, references to the Saturn IV stage seem to fade from the papers of the era pretty quickly...
Until the mid-70s, I think. Per document I-46 here:

As you know, when the decision was made to retain Saturn V industrial assets, we took action to store, maintain and preserve tooling, equipment and facilities capable of producing up to two Saturn V Vehicles per year at the following primary locations: Manufacturing Sites: Michoud Assembly Facility, Louisiana Seal Beach Assembly Facility, California McDonnell Douglas, Huntington Beach, California International Business Machines, Huntsville, Alabama Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, California Test Sites: Mississippi Test Facility, Mississippi (S-IC only) McDonnell Douglas, Sacramento Test Site, California Rocketdyne, Santa Susana Test Site, California Rocketdyne, Edwards Air Force Base, California

The approximate acquisition value of the government-owned Saturn V tooling, equipment and facilities presently retained at these locations is $585M. The approximate annual cost of maintaining these assets after we have discontinued flight support for ongoing programs will be $6M. Lower maintenance costs in FY 1973 and 1974 are made possible by continuing current “in place” storage and by making the most efficient use of existing Saturn contractor man-power.

The possibility of future Saturn V missions, the potential utilization of Saturn V industrial assets by the Shuttle Program, and the relatively low cost of maintenance made it prudent to retain Saturn V industrial assets until their utility could be confirmed. I have re-examined this requirement in view of the exceedingly stringent expenditure limitation facing us in FY 1973 and the advent of the Shuttle Program, and I have determined that: 1. Existing Saturn IB flight hardware is adequate to conduct anticipated space missions prior to Shuttle [Initial Operational Capability]. 2. Beyond 1978 there is significant potential interference between planned Shuttle activities at [Kennedy Space Center] and Saturn launched missions. For example, [Launch Complex] 39A and B will have been modified for Shuttle use. 3. Approximately $100M of Saturn V assets will be directly applicable to the Shuttle Program. 4. By taking action now and with actual Saturn asset dispositioning being deferred until FY 1974 or later, it is anticipated that up to $2.9M in cost savings will accrue in FY 1973. After careful consideration of these factors, I believe that the retention of the two-per year Saturn V production capability is no longer prudent. Accordingly, I request your approval to cancel this requirement. Dale D. Myers

APPROVED: Original signed by George M. Low] For James C. Fletcher Administrator Approved subject to notification of OMB, and subject to “no objection” by OMB. GML

Looking at that, I think S-IVB and maybe S-II were available as long as S-IC was (namely through '74ish in at least some form), but any time after resuming production would be as much of a problem as resuming S-IC production.

If a bigger first stage (like a flyback Saturn IC) could have launched an Atlas-Centaur stack without damage then assuming that the Saturn IC has about 100 tonnes extra of dry mass in wings, landing gear etc (no idea if I am over or under estimating there), then I make the flyback Saturn IC-Atlas-Centaur stack as being able to get about 40 tonnes into orbit from Cape Canaveral.
It's better to use the S-IVB or ideally something even heavier in a hydrolox form for an S-IC upper stage. You want to stage as low and slow as possible to minimize heating or reduce need for exo-atmospheric retropropulsion after staging to get to a heat load manageable with a non-exotic-metal heatshield. A hydrolox stage like S-IVB can deliver more delta-v to the same payload and lets you stage lower, and a stretched S-IVB stage could deliver even more. S-IVB also has the benefit of already being structurally design to carry paylaods larger than 40 metric tons, where Atlas you might need to upgrade structurally to take the load. But this verges on a spoiler for a project too large to be contained in this reply, so I should stop.
(Of course, NASA being NASA, almost certainly the flyback Saturn IB-Atlas-Centaur I'm discussing would have very little relation to the Saturn IB stage - it might have engines related to the IB's H-1s, but otherwise I suspect the zeitgeist of the age would push NASA into making a clean sheet design.)
The zeitgeist of the era in NASA might argue for clean-sheet, but the OMB might have issues with it. Ironically, a reusable mod of the S-IC is probably cheaper, and delivers more payload, while holding the door open for a future reusable large orbiter/second stage.
 
Ya. but that bolded sentence makes no sense.

I should maybe have said "a re-useable first stage of that power doesn't make much sense if it doesn't have anything heavy it can carry up".

NASA making a re-useable first stage for something in the Saturn IB class before making an orbiter would make alot of sense, given that a rocket of that power would be useful for a large number of missions and satellites that NASA or other organizations had the money to launch.

However, for NASA to be leery about building a re-useable first stage that could only launch payloads of 80-150 tonnes before they had in place a 120 tonne re-useable orbiter to launch on that rocket, is, I think quite understandable.

Looking at that, I think S-IVB and maybe S-II were available as long as S-IC was (namely through '74ish in at least some form), but any time after resuming production would be as much of a problem as resuming S-IC production.

OK. So any Saturn IC flyback booster could come with S-IVB and S-II stages if necessary.

That makes it easier to get good use out of a flyback Saturn IC.

fasquardon
 
I went for Saturn Shuttle in first version of 2001: A Space Time Odyssey
15071265380_e85c5b33c6_o.jpg

The Design in detail (with little help by e of pi)
this is a modified Flyback-1 (F-1A engines) with large Orbiter using four J-2S
as heat shield it use a Metall one as heatsink, all parts are modular and can easy replace in the orbiter
there is a Cargo version using a modified S-IVB with J-2S engine

The payload
For Orbiter version in payload bay of 60 ft by 15 ft ø
54895 pounds into 100 nm orbit at 28°
27999 pounds into 100 nm orbit at 90°
29983 pounds into 100 nm orbit at 55°

For Unmanned cargo version with S-IVB 55 ft by 21.66 ft ø
85000 pounds into 100 nm orbit at 28°
43354 pounds into 100 nm orbit at 90°
46425 pounds into 100 nm orbit at 55°

Off course this Design could also use a Saturn S-II as upper stage to bring bigger payload into orbit.
 

marathag

Banned
Probably need larger wings on the booster to keep the Center of Pressure closer to Center of Gravity for stability, unless you really increase the gimbal range and rate speed on the engines
 
I've been playing around with the idea that the Shuttle Decision boiled down to developing a single model of liquid-fuel strap-on booster that could be recovered from ocean splashdown and reused many times, and that variable numbers of these standard boosters would be attached to hydrogen-oxygen tanks propelled by air-lit J-2S (later by J-2S+, that is later iterations of the J series designed to improve ISP while keeping throttle capability and either cheapening construction for continuing with disposable upper stage philosophy, or making reusable if investment in recovery of orbital engines and possibly tanks with them seem justified). Note that since all manned payloads would have escape systems as a matter of course there is no need to design the hydrogen engines to parallel burn on the ground. Physically the smallest version would look rather like a run-of-the mill Shuttle Derived system, with two boosters flanking a large central tank with a hydrogen engine set on the bottom and payload on top. Bigger versions however would have more than two boosters--any number up to the point where the tank is too cluttered with them to allow more, at which point if bigger systems are desired, one would design a new double thrust booster and halve their number. The tank making facility at Michoud would have to come up with a whole matrix of tank designs of various volumes, each stressed to take a certain number of boosters and high-energy engine set on the bottom.

I've rediscovered as I have before that finding optimum stage sizes and engine sets is tricky with Silverbird Calculator, since if one stumbles on a combination that works well, it is still often the case that by fiddling around with it often in counterintuitive ways, one gets still better results. The only independent check I know how to do is to do the math on the mass ratios and ISPs of a given stack, but the tricky thing there is that the rocket equation by itself says nothing about thrust and nothing about gravity loss. You get the same delta-V out of 100 tons of fuel on a 25 ton dry mass whether the thrust is 100 tons or 10, and in the latter case your engine is lighter so the mass savings goes straight to payload--but it takes 10 times as long to reach the final velocity with the small engine, and for a launching vehicle presumably you were below orbital speed at the start of the burn so your craft suffers 10 times the gravitational deflection. This is presumably why Silverbird can give the same payload mass after one slashes the fuel mass of an upper stage in half--your net mission delta-V is lower, but that is because you avoided accumulated a lot of gravity loss the bigger system suffered from. I've got no elegant way to smoothly integrate the accumulation of gravity loss that must be countered with more delta-V into a simple equation; all I can think of doing is tediously setting up spreadsheets and iteratively feeling my way by trial and error toward optimized trajectories with optimized stage weights.

Consider this though!
Total booster stage (2 boosters)

52 tons dry mass

600 tons fuel (ker-lox at 2.23 O/F ratio)

11310 kN thrust (10 advanced H type engines)

ISP 296 seconds

Thus a "standard booster" masses 26 tons dry (thus, can be recovered by helicopter), holds 300 tons of fuel and has 5 H-2c engines.


Upper stage—hydrogen/oxygen tank based on Saturn upper stage, stretched

16 tons dry mass

150 tons fuel (LH2-LOX at 5.5 O/F)

1148.5 kN—J-2S

ISP 436



Launch to 90 degrees inclination from Vandenberg, circular orbit 185 km altitude (100 NM, standard during Apollo program) :

Mission Performance:

Launch Site:

Cape Canaveral / KSC

Destination Orbit:

185 x 185 km, 29 deg

Estimated Payload:

30364 kg

95% Confidence Interval:

23823 - 38127 kg



For a polar launch from Vandenberg:

Launch Site:

Vandenberg AFB

Destination Orbit:

185 x 185 km, 90 deg

Estimated Payload:

25349 kg

95% Confidence Interval:

19567 - 32167 kg

The goal here was to produce a standardized booster that could place a J engine powered stage into 100 nautical mile orbit, carrying a load at least 25 tons; I figure that NASA needs to offer services with their launches that cost some of the mass, so that about 60 percent of the mass orbited (excluding any spent launch stages that might possibly be repurposed) is actual revenue payload. In this case, we seek to put at least 25 tons into ‘polar orbit thus being able to sell 15 tons of actual customer payload, in a 10 ton bus that can deliver the package to higher orbits, and otherwise support the payload until it is finally deployed. The idea is of course to reuse the ker-lox boosters, and to minimize the necessary weight and number of engines needed for the hydrogen upper stage, since these are expended

Our “standard” booster has 5 H-1c engines. H-1c is listed in Encyclopedia Astronautica along with H-1b; the latter has more specs and I think it was a paper study but well worked out, in 1966. -c has a higher thrust but seems otherwise similar. I assume this result, with a rocket massing in the close ballpark of 1 metric ton (H-1b is given at 988 kg) is attainable.

This is supposed to be bottom of the line of the definitive series, but I got curious what would happen if we put a hydrogen upper stage atop a single one of these boosters, and with an upper stage massing 8 tons dry and holding 35 tons of fuel, again driven by one J-2S we can apparently put 10166 kg into that standard 29 degree inclination orbit from Canaveral!

I tried seeing what substituting 5 RL-10 engines for the J engine would do; the thrust at 330 kn is only a third of that of the big engine, while the engine set I figure would mass about one ton, about half of what I am assuming a J-2S with suitable gimbaling and mounting would need. Despite the savings of a ton of dry mass and a higher ISP (444 sec) we come up shorter, under 9 tons.

Then I wanted to see what would happen if before the perfection of the standard boosters, an interim model using off the shelf H-1 engines were to be studied, as working prototypes toward the definitive version. For the single stage version, this downgrades the thrust of the single unit to 4740 with a lower ISP of 289 sec. (Reminder—one always uses vacuum thrust and ISP in Silverbird). This delivers 9066 kg from Canaveral.

Returning to the nominal system with more advanced H engines, look at what happens if we use 6 boosters on a 38 ton dry mass tank holding 500 tons of fuel, fitted with 3 J-2S engines; we get 102.4 tons to standard orbit out of Canaveral. In other words, with somewhat less thrust on the pad and half as many J type engines used up as a Saturn V, we get a payload in much the same ballpark.

This is intermediate in mass efficiency to orbit between Saturn and OTL’s STS—the latter puts about 120 tons into LEO with all up pad mass of 2050, the former nearly topped 3000 tons to put up a bit more and this system requires 2500 tons on the pad to accomplish a bit less. We could investigate what effect adding more J engines to the upper stage and tinkering with its tank mass. Putting on a seventh booster on the other hand is pushing the thrust up to the limits the pad designed for a Saturn V launch.

How often is a program that begins with developing a standard booster and upper stage combination for economical launches going to require tonnages to orbit exceeding 100 tons? Well, every time they go to the Moon, I suppose. And every time they want to put a new large space station up.

I would think that a conservative and simple approach to reusable launch capacity like this, with its great flexibility, would leave plenty of room in even a tight budget to fund both new manned vehicles to ride on these combination stages, and space stations for the craft to ride to.

It is very correct to observe it would be strange to go straight for the 100 ton to orbit variant, and try to make that alone be the basis of every US launch. Indeed only the Saturn program ever offered a single stage in the mass range such a large launcher would need to lift.

On the other hand, with the modular approach, booster thrust just 1/3 of that is appropriate for a 200 ton “upper” stack that puts 30 useful tons into orbit, of which 15 or more are revenue payload.

At no level of the system looked at yet is any sort of third stage necessary, though for various purposes it might be desirable—say for a Saturn-V like moon shot, the 100 ton payload may include a lot of fuel for a Lunar payload.

To properly analyze the potentials, I’d have to systematically list a matrix with number of booster stages in one dimension and number of J engine upper stages in the other, and seek the optimum tank size to yield maximum payload mass in each case. The more boosters, the more range we have in numbers of upper stage engines we might want to use. But note that even with 6 boosters, it is not clear at this point that we get any benefit from trying to use more than 3 J type engines, whereas it is also dubious we’d want to use fewer than 2—a tank so large as to require 6 boosters to lift will accelerate sluggishly indeed with just one upper engine, so slowly I think gravity loss would eat up the payload whereas a smaller tank launched with fewer boosters would match what is left with much better economy. By choosing the right combinations, a very efficient national launch system spanning payloads from 10 tons each, to 30, to a near continuum from 30 to 100 is available using standard, reusable boosters, a standard upper stage engine (the J-2S) and more or less custom made tanks from Michoud-indeed the smaller variants would have tanks that could be made a number of places and flown on aircraft to the launch site. Aside from size, what is customized is the stress pattern they are designed to take—how many side boosters, how many J engines on the bottom, for what compression load the intended payload imposes.
 
The goal here was to produce a standardized booster

The standardized booster you've come up with sounds like a very interesting piece of kit.

It would be interesting to see how economical it was in practice. In OTL, the Soviets rejected large polyblock rockets like this because of their complexity - too many servicing ports, fueling ports, and check inspection points for their taste. I suspect that launching 6 of these boosters at once would prove economical, despite the complexity of this HLV.

fasquardon
 
The standardized booster you've come up with sounds like a very interesting piece of kit.

It would be interesting to see how economical it was in practice. In OTL, the Soviets rejected large polyblock rockets like this because of their complexity - too many servicing ports, fueling ports, and check inspection points for their taste. I suspect that launching 6 of these boosters at once would prove economical, despite the complexity of this HLV.

fasquardon
But Energia was just such a thing! 4 Zenit ker-lox boosters for the standard version, downgradable to 2 for a smaller tank, upgradable to 6 for a big Vulkan version which might also have had a third (2 1/2?) upper stage.

I believe Energia also did parallel burning of the hydrogen engined (disposable) core. I reject it in part because the J series engines behaved poorly at sea level--I don't know how much -2S improved on that, but -2 suffered badly because its gas generator was not up to the task at sea level, being designed to reject exhaust into vacuum. That this can be addressed is obvious. But also the J series had a core chamber pressure of about 30 atmospheres, versus the H-1 at 40, the two (paper?) upgrades -1b, -1c at 48, and the F series at 70. All of these pale before SSME's 200+ pressure of course! But such high pressures are needed only on the ground.

I think I've proven to my satisfaction, by comparing Silverbird models of STS with parallel burning versus waiting for air lighting of the SSMEs until the solids burn out, that parallel burning is inherently less efficient than series, despite the greater thrust for modest extra mass cost sea level lighting of the SSMEs gives. Overall performance is better if we wait, and per payload mass would be better still if we optimized the tank size for air lighting of the high energy engines. Parallel burning then is chosen, apparently, not for efficiency but for reliability reasons--only one STS mission ever had an SSME failure in mid-boost, but I think something like a dozen planned launches were scrubbed or delayed due to misbehavior of an engine diagnosed on the ground.

If that is true, and we suppose equivalent failure rates for air-launched engines in an alternate program, we'd have had something like 13 launches over STS's career in which the Orbiter or alternate crewed vehicle would need to escape. But with proper redesign, involving much lighter crewed vehicles, hopefully nose-mounted, this would not be too difficult, and the ATL equivalent of Columbia's loss would never happen at all. This assumes the same overall launch rates and that every launch is crewed, neither of which would be true if the Shuttle Decision had led to such a system as I describe.

The hard part is, how to convince early 70s decision makers that a solid booster in the 300-400 ton range is not better suited? It would be narrower, eliminate many of the servicing ports, eliminate fueling ports completely, and simplicity might make inspection on the pad superfluous. I'm sure everyone would clamor to argue cheapness as well.

Even if we addressed the leaky seam problem (and as a solid, we'd need to make equivalent booster modules at least two segments, maybe three) I still don't like the shipments of 100+ ton units from Thiokol in Utah, and more fundamental are the control issues. Apparently grain segments for STS came from identical batches to guarantee uniformity of burning time. Thus SRB booster segments were not interchangeable parts.

Still more fundamental--like liquid boosters, solids "pogo". That is the rate of burning is related to pressure which surges with any vibration, leading to resonances where the pressure and thus thrust pulsates. I've often seen comments on the relatively rough ride veteran pre-Shuttle astronauts were unpleasantly surprised by during SRB boost phase. Worse--pogo in liquid engines can be addressed with more sophisticated plumbing, but there is nothing to be done to damp it in solids save designing the grain to avoid it as much as possible, and then using shock absorbers of some kind to try to damp it out. STS did that, with flexible upper attachments. Even so the ride was rough and I think Ares 1 and other single-stick in line designs would suck even worse.

A hybrid liquid-oxidizer/solid fuel system would address many of my objections to solids but alas they are still an unproven technology and I see no good POD to make their competitive development earlier probable. Since HTHP is a strong oxidizer candidate, perhaps a more successful British "Black X" program might do it though everyone seems intent on ignoring anything British, and Britain's anemic economy and leadership in the Cold War era makes it all unlikely.

Also it seems hard to sell the idea of recoverability as focusing on strap-on boosters for that economy, though in cold rationality it seems pretty obvious. It is not however very "sexy." A Saturn based flyback booster, probably given the mentality of the early 70s (and to be fair state of the art of microelectronics, though I think early generation drone planes used for training would provide a sound basis for successful remote piloting to a somewhat rough landing) crewed to boot, would almost certainly prevail.

So I am hard up for a plausible political POD that could convince NASA and perhaps DoD to buy into developing unit liquid fueled boosters. And the economy depends a lot on just how costly it must be to fish them out of the water and bring them back to base, otherwise we have to look at fancier and heavier fly-back concepts. OTL SRBs are too big for off-the-shelf helicopters. And to be sure even a mere 25-30 ton helicopter sling load would be a bitch to haul several hundred miles; it might be necessary to have a ship a short distance from the splash zone for the choppers to load the things onto.

Or--seriously!--develop airships to do the job, then the size limits can be much larger--versus the fact that airships cannot as easily "keep station."

There is the Cyclocrane concept. Please do not laugh! (well go ahead and giggle if you like, but this is serious). Not only would it be somewhat better than a traditional airship, even one with vectored thrust, at station keeping while securing the load, it is practically designed for this sort of task, a long skinny sling load, and the mass it could pull out of the water would be far greater than any available helicopter. I'm not sure if fuel economy would allow it to go a few hundred kilometers in the face of adverse winds.

I do think traditional airships are good enough though. If a landed stage is sticking tail-first up out of the water as a buoy, stabilized by partially filling the upper tank (presumably the kerosene tank) with sea water ballast in a bag, and as I imagine it venting excess ullage pressuring helium into a balloon, it is only necessary to grapple an eye on top of the balloon; a strong cable to lift the stage dry mass weight plus some ballast weight can be incorporated into the balloon. A short tether arrangement, possibly with a propeller thrust unit, hanging below the low-flying airship, could do this. Once grappled, the airship is in effect tethered. It should then be possible to slip a kind of bracelet type apparatus down the stage exterior, trailing another strong line, and slide down to an attachment point on the stage, possibly a repurposing of the upper side mount. To bring the sleeve down we lift the main bulk of the stage out of the water by vectored thrust and/or dropping ballast from the airship, and once the nose end attachment is secured, and drain the ballast bag in the nose by simply rising out of the water, again with a mix of vectored thrust and more ballast dropping. Once the nose tip is clear of the water the airship can just drift with the wind (assuming it is now in static equilibrium with its load) while the tail end support is shifted back and the nose end is winched in, for a close-hauled and fairly streamlined sling load, then power up the main props and head back to base. Range is not a problem for a big airship. A 25 ton load should be little problem for a modern semirigid design (similar to Zeppelin NT) about half the volume of Hindenburg, so clearly buildable and manageable. (Hindenburg could manage some 50 tons or so, much of that was of course built-in passenger accommodations; we'd have none of that here).

Investing in a fleet of 10 or so of these types of airships would be a project in itself, but might prove cheaper than helicopter operations considering that 25 tons is near the upper limit of Western made choppers and Soviet designs that were more robust were not an order of magnitude more so; such big choppers must be pretty expensive to operate too, and I still don't know if they'd have the range with a sling load. A big airship on the other hand might not even have to carry a sling load; for a bit more mass it could leave a big "hangar" volume in its belly and haul the spent rocket right into its streamlined outer hull; for more weight it would even be possible to have equipment and crews on hand to begin checking it out for post-flight inspection and preparation for reuse. A spent liquid rocket still has residual propellant of course; it would probably be possible to flush all the oxygen out during descent to splashdown, and if the kerosene is not similarly expelled, perhaps to pump most of what is left into sump tanks on the airship; the residue after that ought to be a manageable hazard, considering the ullage of the fuel tank is full of helium!

Actually, an elaboration--I've proposed having a folded plastic bag in the fuel tank to be flooded with sea water when the tip plunges into the sea, to stabilize the thing as a buoy with the engine set end up. (This is where the parachutes have to be packed too, perhaps including a helium ballute inflated with super-atmospheric pressure ullage gas. But this ullage gas would mostly be from the oxygen tank, where the helium is surely mixed with residual oxygen; we would hardly want to vent surplus helium from the fuel tank if it is mixed too, although to be sure concentrations of oxygen and fuel vapor will be low in the mostly helium mix). The helium from the fuel tank might simply be vented of course, along with both fuel vapor and some condensed fuel in an aerosol--but embedded in helium so it poses little hazard. In fact if we vent it we probably want it to go into the water it will bubble through, trapping some hydrocarbon in the water.

However I'm a fiend for saving helium if we can. I suggest then we have two plastic bags in the fuel tank system--the kerosene is also contained in one, and the helium that pressurizes it is separated by it, so it is pure stuff. As the bag of water floods to fill it, the helium is vented up a pipe to the ballute on top; once the airship secures it this gas, mixed with oxygen as it is, can then be vented into a segregating ballonet in the airship main helium volume, to be repurified by compression/refrigeration later. Or the oxygen can be removed catalytically; combining with a carefully metered stream of hydrogen in the presence of a catalyst, we get heat and water molecules which can be removed more easily.

A helicopter hauling it would probably best leave the ballute alone, though it makes the load more draggy to be sure. Perhaps it can be shaped as a fairing on the otherwise blunt nozzle end of the stage?

A cyclocrane could either leave the ballute alone or vent its contents into storage within its own gas bag, but this is more problematic than with a simpler airship.
----
OK, big digression! I do think airships are appropriate technology here, and designing and employing new state of the art airships is well within the range of what the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ought to be doing. But it might get laughed out of consideration--unfairly, but this project has enough political improbabilities already.

I am increasingly convinced it is the way to go though, with recovery airships perhaps significantly cutting the cycle cost of stage recovery despite their exotic nature.
 
But Energia was just such a thing! 4 Zenit ker-lox boosters for the standard version, downgradable to 2 for a smaller tank, upgradable to 6 for a big Vulkan version which might also have had a third (2 1/2?) upper stage.

A big part of the Zenit's promise as a booster was because it could be used as a first stage and as 2, 4 or 6 boosters for Energia family vehicles (2 on the Energia-M, 4 on Energia, 6 on Vulkan), just like your proposed boosters.

So like I say, the system should be very practical and in practice be relatively cheap - I was just mentioning the main potential downside I saw.

I think Ares 1 and other single-stick in line designs would suck even worse.

I've read opinions that expected that the Ares 1 would vibrate so badly they'd be completely unsuitable for launching manned payloads.

And of course, that was the LV's main job...

There is the Cyclocrane concept.

A contract from NASA to develop a bigger cyclocrane might keep the company going long enough to iron all the bugs out of the concept too...

fasquardon
 
A contract from NASA to develop a bigger cyclocrane might keep the company going long enough to iron all the bugs out of the concept too...

fasquardon
I would hope not! That video showed me that I would never have invested in a thing like that. And the Blimp was just as bad. They need a large lifting body (Rigid), and the ability mount a lifting motor, and a framework that doesn't fold in a stiff wind. Sounds like there is a good challange for e of pi.

To bad they don't make gaming packages with real science built in, so folks could play and learn at the same time, and have a blast designing a system that would work.
 
Some things to emphasize about the standard strap on liquid booster concept:

1) since they are meant to be developed to be reusable, on the assumption this leads to major cost saving despite retrieval and refurbishment costs, I want to be aggressive in their use. The balance between ker-lox lower stage and high-energy hydrogen-oxygen upper stage that would be optimal with a fully disposable or fully reusable system is upset in favor of the reusable lower stage. The name of the game at this point in development is to cheapen the overall launch cost in part by being stingy with upper stage propellant; smaller tankage there and less fuel mass makes fewer J series engines (I did look into RL-10 but they are so small they don't seem appropriate in this role, even for the smallest possible version of the system) more effective on the upper stack, lowering gravity losses in the early burn. To this point I've actually tried to maximize payload for a given engine set but I suspect that would evolve, with that volume option for the 2nd stage being a "max cargo" option, and I now intend to look for the mass combination where we get the most payload per kg of loaded tank--call that "economy" option. Then given that I expect a sort of parabolic-sinusoid sort of curve of payload plotted against full tank mass, going between these benchmarks would seem to be where the standard would lie--going 2/3 of the way down gives more payload without much lowering the payload/tank ratio, while going 1/3 back improves that ratio from the mediocre one of maximum load significantly while not lowering the total payload by much. This would require a lot of work with Silverbird and I am not sure I can trust it either, but could tune the economy of the system significantly. Also for small variations I think I can check Silverbird by estimating gravity loss due to larger fuel loads versus higher theoretical ideal delta-V.

2) On the other hand, tank mass (dry) estimates assume we get better volume/tank wall mass ratios with increasing volume. The tanks seem likely to scale as the 2/3 power of the mass/volume, that is with area rather than volume. To be sure at a given pressure, tanks that are sized solely as pressure vessels scale with mass, since increased diameter raises the force a cylindrical section's wall must restrain, so the volume of tank structural material hence mass scales with contained volume. But the pressure of an STS type tank is pretty low, 1.5 atmospheres absolute, so I believe the structure is not mainly a balloon but mainly a stress bearing structure moderately stabilized against buckling by modest pressure. However tanks were shipped across half a continent (well a third anyway) from Michoud to Cape Canaveral, very big tanks. And at 27 tons the ultra-lightweight latest model, containing 725 or so tons of propellant, massed just a bit under 4 percent of the propellant. Whereas in this ATL I assume, given the conservative nature of the program, that the starting design point for the 2nd stage is the Apollo program upper stage, which was 108 tons of propellant in 15 tons of stage all up. Figuring 2 tons for the engine and its primary thrust structure and articulation etc, and perhaps 1 for miscellaneous stuff, that is a fixed 3 tons for all single-engine sizes plus 12 of tankage. Note though that at 5.5/1 O/F ratio for J engines versus 6 for STS we can't directly compare STS tanks to Apollo ones, since the average propellant density is lower for the latter. LOX has density 1.14 times water or 8/7 and therefore takes 7/8 cubic meter per ton--though we practically have to allow for insulation--but then we also have that need for hydrogen so assume for the moment we can compare different mixes directly. LH2 requires 14 cubic meters per ton, 1/14 water density hence 1/16 LOX density. Thus for the 6:1 ratio used in STS we need 2.75 cubic meters/ton but for a 5.5:1 ratio we need 2.894, a 5 percent difference. Thus a tank the same size as the STS, with suitably rearranged internal volume ratios, would hold only 690 tons instead of 725, a difference equal to the mass of the dry tank!

A tank that holds 690 tons of the lighter mix and thus is the same size as the Shuttle tank, but extrapolated from the Apollo upper stage set, would mass 41.3 tons by the 2/3 law. At over 14 tons more than the same volume STS tank, 53 percent heavier, I figure it ought to be plenty strong to take the stress of compression by a payload on top while taking 22 percent more thrust than the three systems (asymmetrically!) of STS put on it from the sides. Except that come to think of it such a tank would be used for a much larger booster set than 6, since the system I propose has the 2nd stage lit aloft and thus burns a lot less propellant. So perhaps this procedure is a bit dubious but anyway it is less optimistic than extrapolating from OTL ultralight tank design. Perhaps it will be necessary to beef them up a bit more, but I think I am in the right ballpark here.

So anyway if it is legitimate to estimate tank masses by the 2/3 power method, and assume 2 tons for every J-2S engine installed and one miscellaneous overhead ton, we are going to tend to get better propellant/dry mass ratios with larger tanks, which tips the balance a bit toward larger tanks and thus payloads offsetting my desire to make the thrust of the recoverable units count for more.


3) If at a later date we go over to trying to recover elements of the 2nd stage, this will tip the balance of mass ratio of 2nd to first stage toward the former since now presumably, once we shake it down, net cost of each upper stage set is lower. But surely there will be significant, perhaps huge, mass penalties involved in deorbiting components and retrieving them in reusable form, so the payloads delivered for a given engine set will be reduced, perhaps dramatically. Thus despite larger upper stage sizes and perhaps significantly increased engine performance (SSME at ISP 453 versus J-2S at 436 sec; denser fuel mix allowing a tank that masses 41 tons to hold 30 more tons of propellant) we will need to realize really large cost reductions in both booster and upper stage burns to realize net economy in dollars/ton of payload.

Upper stage reusability may never happen therefore!

On the other hand, I estimated I needed only 3 J-2S to match the Shuttle's delivery capability to orbit, with 3 SSMEs of twice the thrust, and well over twice the mass! So to recover the engines alone might require much more modest systems. For instance if it would really require 45 tons to return the SSMEs from a standard Shuttle launch (with Orbiter eliminated in favor of separate return of the engines) here for the same payload I ought to only need half that, or under 23 tons. This only makes sense to do if the J series is evolved to become reusable, which would presumably raise their dry mass somewhat, so the scenario is not all that rosy after all. But with a core pressure of 30 atmospheres I can be optimistic that for half the thrust, they ought not weigh a lot more than half the mass of the SSME sets we'd need.

4) The idea is to be conservative with technology and thus get something useful on the shelf pretty quickly, then improve it gradually. Thus we can start with old-fashioned early 60s state of the art H-1 engines, then look up the studies done to sketch out the H-1b & -1c, aiming for the thrust of the latter which apparently called for a 20 percent chamber pressure increase that also raised the vacuum ISP from 289 to 296 (with sea level ISP of 262, and I assume thrust in proportion although impediment of the gas generator turbine might lower thrust further. I hope not as all my work up to now is based on vacuum thrust of 1131 kN per engine and thus sea level thrust of 1001--thus one set of 5 could lift 510 metric tons, which gives us the upper mass limit on the pad of each combination of boosters. (Lower for H-1 of course). At the same time we want the upgraded H engines, call them H-2 in the Mark 1 form (with H-1 being Mark 0, prototypes useful for real launches but with no intention of reusing the engines, rather to test out integration and the recovery mode) to be reusable as well as delivering the higher thrust and ISP.

5) Hitherto I have not been paying enough attention to keeping the G load low. My aversion to using more J engines than strictly necessary, since they are disposal items, tends to keep maximum G loads on the 2nd stage from being excessive, but I think we'll need some throttling on the boosters--though one way to get that is to simply shut down some of the 5. I have been figuring that the H engines can have simple gimbaling in one dimension, with each one veering tangential to stage circumference, so we have 3 axis control overall. We don't need roll control on the boosters affixed as side boosters, but I thought it would not save much weight to have one axle for 2 engines to gimbal on--physically it would be hard to do that anyway because the fifth engine is in the center. But this means we want to avoid shutting down more than the center engine since it would throw vectoring thrust off to shut down one of two for each dimension (yaw and pitch). This should be doable though, so shut down options are good for 20, 40 or 60 percent.

5) I am largely at a loss to explain how this "flies" politically, when there are so many interests to pull it another way--to go with F-1A instead, to reject liquid fueled engines completely and go for solids, to have pressure fed boosters with simple though large engines, to make a big integrated sexy fly-back stage (requiring more than a single F-1A worth of thrust due to having extra mass for flyback) that would have limited growth options and thus make making a single type extra large.

But perhaps the politics of having something useful before election day 1976 would appeal very much to Nixon; not knowing Watergate is looming on the horizon (though by the time of the Shuttle Decision it was already a thing) he thinks he'd be around then and the first iteration of the new system would be his baby politically. It is really Saturn based, but looks so different he can claim it for himself. This points in the direction of simple as damn possible; having avoided the Charybdis whirlpool of an ambitious high tech Great Leap Forward, we now have to elude the Scylla monster trying to pick off features such as liquid fuel (just make some simple solids, dude! Be done by this coming Christmas!) using H engines (hey lookit a single F-1A is better than 8 H-1!) water recovery (dude, we can make this fly back real simple...) and so on.

On another front, what if OMB is even more hardline than OTL? OTL at one point the proposal was made to scrap all work on anything like a Shuttle except for a small budged for researching very small spaceplanes to be launched from evolved expendable boosters. I've wondered if that path had been taken, with NASA really being cut back hard, something would evolve from it superior to OTL. But let us suppose NASA management (and we could steal a page from the ETS book and put in a different administrator) is so panicked and desperate that they beg for a two track project--namely develop an ultra-cheap and simple but somewhat reusable launcher system meant to serve all national needs by being modular and evolving, with a very short time frame for initial use of the first iterations, and that this saves so much money that they can justify insisting on a space station program to use it--which must involve a manned vehicle of some kind to be launched on the first iteration system. Can they negotiate a commitment that if they keep the first wave manned vehicle very simple in terms of research and development, by making a derivative of Apollo, they get to follow up with "upgrades" meant to make a space bus (for 5-8 space travelers at a time) with superior entry characteristic later?

Then you see, if all three elements are funded, NASA has a clear mission path for the next decade or so. Get Mark 0 of the national launcher system up and running, past initial testing, before 1976 is out; design space station modules (in the 20 ton range, later to stretch to 25-30) to be put up by the new launch system (and initially dock by remote control, so a pair is ready before any astronauts have to get up there to shepherd them together) followed by a manned mission to occupy the growing station; intersperse module upgrade launches and Apollo-derived missions to the station while at the same time touting the new rocket family as the cure-all for all launches, DoD, commercial, even seeking foreign customers and with proof of success, retire everything else meant to launch anything above 15 tons or so. By the beginning of the 1981 Presidential administration, have a more advanced reusable space "plane" of some kind--not necessarily a winged thing, but something with good hypersonic L/D for gentle and better controlled reentry and good landing characteristics and reusable with minor refurbishment--to carry people. Meanwhile, between '76 and '81, bigger versions of the modular system, with 3 or 4 boosters, would be first tested, then prototyped and then used, while the Mark 1 Standard booster module would come on line with the superior thrust and ISP of H-2, and its engines being reused many times while the basic tank frame is used many more times. After that, with the industry becoming accustomed to standardizing around that system's capabilities, further evolution would be incremental with the aim of achieving the same net impulse at the same accelerations but more cheaply and reliably--a 20 percent thrust upgrade can lower engine numbers from 5 to 4; ISP improvements can cut down on the propellant load, hence tankage, and free up more mass for more grandiose upper tank stages, or be used to further reduce the engine count to 3 perhaps; reliability improvements and durability allow the unit to be reused very promptly with minimal refurbishment cost thus cheapening launch prices. There is very little to improve in the upper stage unless one wants to explore reusable items from it. So the development budged goes from being mostly about the booster, but with a very minor increment on off the shelf stuff that just lasts a couple years, while the rest goes to an Apollo derivative--ETS suggests this might take half a decade or so, so available in first version by '78-9, 1980 at the latest. As the Mark 0 Booster goes into service, back burner development prepares H-2 engines that will be reusable and more powerful so that the Apollo derivative can count on a mass budget of 14 tons--6 tons for the capsule, 2 tons for propellant--twice as much as enough to get up to a 500 km altitude orbit, circularize there and deorbit, leaving 6 for structure and other supplies. That's a huge truncation of the Apollo SM of course, which all up for an Apollo Lunar mission was 24 tons.

I'm talking here about a launch on top of a single standard booster, with a bog standard Saturn V upper stage--108 tons of propellant, 15 tons dry mass. This can be done with 5 H-2 engines, so it has to wait for Mark 1 of the booster, and unusually we put the upper stage on top. What we have then is a basic replica of the Saturn 1B in capability, but with a smaller lower stage. We can't do it with old H-1 engines because these lack the sea level thrust needed to lift the whole stack.

With over 14 tons to the 100 NM standard low orbit, I think we can go ahead and modify the Apollo from Lunar Mark II to an orbital Mark III in this fashion:

Cut a hatch in the heat shield. Demonstrated to be safe with OTL STS since they have 3 landing gear hatches and a number of large fuel and other intakes all on the highly heated belly. It opens into a front section of the SM, lightly built, that is pressurized and with minimal clutter except for structural members carrying the pie-with-center disk cutout internal panel structure through, not as solid panels but as struts. This creates a "mission module" like extra habitable volume, and allows us to seat up to 5 crew members in the CM for launch and landing. Behind this is a toroidal service module zone proper, as with the larger CM of OTL containing much infrastructure for the CM and also mission propellant. But instead of a central single main engine the rim at the rear is flanked with 6 4-headed heavy maneuvering clusters, the forward pointing nozzles having been covered with light fairings during launch. These give roll control and translational thrust, supplemented by the maneuvering thrusters on the CM itself. In the center is a docking system and hatch; another hatch on the "bottom" of the habitable extension turns the narrow tunnel running to the rear hatch into an airlock. A light control set gives a pilot stationed at the rear port, which has a window, control of the ship for docking.

This is the standard vehicle for NASA human excursions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With a 14 ton mass budget, something like HL-20 (a bit bigger than the OTL proposal) can replace it in the mid-80s if deemed desirable.

Launched on a heavier array, with a 30 ton budget to the standard orbit, a station mission can include a 16 ton actual mission module, which can also be a unit to be docked to the station permanently as a module, or could be a mere supply trailer to be deorbited along with the returning main vehicle to burn up trash in the atmosphere. A 30 ton robot cargo vehicle can arrive at a 500 km high station with 27 tons mass all up, over 15 of which would be actual cargo, perhaps all but 3 tons of it in fact. Or again a 30 ton launch can turn into a pure station module launch with a permanent 24 tons of structure added to the station. If we ever want bigger modules, we'd develop bigger combinations of standard boosters and upper stage tanks. But it would seem the orbital program can begin very handsomely with nothing but 2-booster and 1-booster versions authorized as man-rated.

Would we ever actually need the bigger versions then? Well, there might be military demands for something massive. An ambitious station might need large single piece structural units--and by the way, the upper stage tanks are all available for repurposing and gradual furbishment. Moving them up to a 500 km orbit might require 1.5-2 tons of hypergolic propellant.

And NASA, after some years of success with a LEO station, might be authorized to go farther again. To replicate Apollo, we'd want a 100+ ton launch capability although if we are clever we could also do it in a few smaller launches. To do more than replicate Apollo, we might want seven or eight booster vehicles that put up substantially more than 100 tons while massing more than Saturn V did and hitting the launch pad with a lot more thrust. This might allow the one-shot pre-placement of a Lunar surface lab. Or the assembly in a few steps of very large interplanetary vehicles, with heavy components such as nuclear engine cores and bells or massive solar arrays.

Probably the larger arrays will have to wait until some high priority project demands them, which would require the funding not only of the article itself but a couple predecessors for testing. I'd suggest a procedure whereby a hitherto untried combination first launches a "dummy" payload-given that we have an orbital infrastructure a launch of water ballast in a tank into orbit is not wasted if it has an OMS, or a tug is available, to take it up the station where it will serve many excellent purposes--perhaps even allow the development of an aquarium module, a pet idea of mine for appropriate space science (biology--and the fish can't escape to infest the rest of the station, the way any sorts of land animals could). The second test launch assuming the first goes well will be a cut-rate getaway special payload, advertised to all and sundry with high insurance coverage provided "free" by NASA (i.e. the US taxpayer). At bargain prices, people can put their payloads into orbit in one massive cluster. After that launch goes well, the urgent priority mission is cleared to use the new combination.

Or of course NASA could get authorization to take these steps years ahead of any particular demand, supplying water in truckload amounts to a going concern space station with one test and a bargain extravaganza launch opportunity, success not guaranteed but cargo insured, for the second. And thus put that combination on the shelf as ready to go when needed.

I'm not sure we'd get around to using the Saturn V scale options until the 1990s and then only if a Lunar mission were authorized, or perhaps a very large space station project. We might never need to exceed that scale ever.
 
the standard strap on liquid booster concept

OK. I thought I'd try thinking up some ideas for how this system could come into being.

Idea 1

Disaster strikes. The shuttle is seriously delayed (maybe by Carter even) and the Soviets do better than OTL, meaning they pull ahead in the development race as they develop their Zenit-derived boosters and implement the planned recovery systems on them. This results in the Congress of the late 80s commanding NASA to "make something at least as good as what the Ruskies are throwing around". This results in a system that is heavily inspired by the Energia of this TL, but with more impressive recovery systems on the boosters. Due to the need to get the system flying fast, the engines recieve relatively little attention at first, with the earliest flights being powered by the "RS-27B" - an RS-27 devolved into something like a minimally improved H-1 - and a cluster of RL-10 engines on the second stage.

Idea 2

In the 70s, Nixon greenlights a much smaller OMB-style shuttle with a 10*30 foot cargo bay and a 14 tonne payload. Though this small shuttle could be developed to use Titan SRBs, NASA reacts to the defeat by digging in its heels an pushing for a completely re-usable liquid booster, basing the design around the H-1 engine to prove that the development won't be too pie-in-the-sky or expensive.

As the costs of shuttle development spiral out of control, NASA seizes on the idea of using the new booster as a first stage for an interim rocket in order to keep enthusiasm and political support up, mating the booster to a Delta first stage as its second stage and using the new LRB-Delta to launch TTL's grand tour probes.

The success of this bodge job gets NASA thinking about ways to get more use out of this successful booster design, allowing the booster to be one of the contenders for TTL's NLS design competition - a competition which it wins, forming the basis for the bulk of US launches into the new century.

fasquardon
 

Archibald

Banned
Idea 2

In the 70s, Nixon greenlights a much smaller OMB-style shuttle with a 10*30 foot cargo bay and a 14 tonne payload. Though this small shuttle could be developed to use Titan SRBs, NASA reacts to the defeat by digging in its heels an pushing for a completely re-usable liquid booster, basing the design around the H-1 engine to prove that the development won't be too pie-in-the-sky or expensive.

As the costs of shuttle development spiral out of control, NASA seizes on the idea of using the new booster as a first stage for an interim rocket in order to keep enthusiasm and political support up, mating the booster to a Delta first stage as its second stage and using the new LRB-Delta to launch TTL's grand tour probes.

The success of this bodge job gets NASA thinking about ways to get more use out of this successful booster design, allowing the booster to be one of the contenders for TTL's NLS design competition - a competition which it wins, forming the basis for the bulk of US launches into the new century.

fasquardon

Look at this thread https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-nasa-gets-the-flax-shuttle.325209/

You need a POD before January 5, 1972, the day Nixon approved the full size orbiter. There are all kind of shuttle concepts discussed there http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/ch8.htm
 
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