AH Challenge: Could Diadochi follow Napoleon's death?

[Admiral Matt]

Could Napoleon's empire and vassals fragment after his death into warring warlord states more divided than OTL 1815? Even to the extent of dividing France itself?

General thought: Suppose after the 4th coalition Spain doesn't become a running sore for France, presumably avoiding a Bonaparte in Madrid in 1808 and involving different French figures in the Peninsula. Perhaps the emperor's brother is simply not available when a Spanish King is needed?

Napoleon still walks into a 5th coalition, but well after OTL, with Austria waiting (despite French absorption of Rome) for Russia to be sufficiently offended at France. Napoleon obliges in causing this earlier than OTL, but he has security to the south, a more rested and satisfied French populace, and many more available soldiers. The peace is similarly harsh towards Vienna, but instead of passing Tarnopol to Russia as historically, Warsaw swells into a huge restored Kingdom of Poland encompassing parts of the Russian partitions.

An increasingly peaceful Europe is in stalemate, only Britain and Russia still in strong positions for another round, while their hostility only helps secure Spain and Poland in France's column. A march on Moscow would still potentially squander this position, but before Napoleon can get around to that, he abruptly dies.

My thought is that rather than the ancien regimes breaking Napoleonic and pseudo-republican power, here most power in Europe is within the network he threw together. We could get an alliance to install/confirm a child of his (with Marie Louise?) to all or most of the French annexations. We could get a scramble by France's "friends" that pares borders down "reasonably" in a way comparable to OTL 1815.

But what if the marshals and relatives can't agree, and associated powers - Spain, Austria, Italy, Naples, Sweden, Bavaria - back different claimants to the center of power? Might Napoleon's enormous "France" itself become the prize and battleground? Might drawn out conflict and ceasefires imposed from without actually lastingly divide the core of France?

I suspect there's potential for such outcomes, even if they aren't the most likely.

Thoughts and speculation welcome.

 

[UCB79]

But perhaps, even in these circumstances, a Congress of the Allies(or leading European powers), quite
resembling the Congress of Vienna IOTL(& the assembly that almost 200 years earlier produced The
Treaty of Westphalia that ended The Thirty Years War)would have been called to patch up Europe. Would such a Congress have partitioned France? More likely I think they would have done what the victors did
IOTL: saddle France with large reparations but keep it in one piece as the best way to preserve the Eur-
opean balance of power.

 

[Admiral Matt]

But perhaps, even in these circumstances, a Congress of the Allies(or leading European powers), quite
resembling the Congress of Vienna IOTL(& the assembly that almost 200 years earlier produced The
Treaty of Westphalia that ended The Thirty Years War)would have been called to patch up Europe. Would such a Congress have partitioned France? More likely I think they would have done what the victors did
IOTL: saddle France with large reparations but keep it in one piece as the best way to preserve the Eur-
opean balance of power.

I opened by saying that was one plausible outcome for a reason, yeah. Much of Europe would prefer not to end up there.

But with the French armies rested and intact, Poland strong and hostile in Central Europe, Spain primarily hostile to Britain, the path to alt-Vienna isn't obvious. Or at least it's not obviously inevitable!

What's to be done with these grand French armies astride Europe?

Maybe it's best to consider it as a challenge.

 

[Admiral Matt]

I'd really appreciate the insight and perspective of those who know the period better, but I brainstormed enough to offer ideas to critique, at least.

There are two ways something like this could happen, one purely based on geographic and ethnographic frontiers, the other based on French generals securing informal spheres of influence extending across France's borders. The former is less interesting, because it suggests German nationalism organizing around the Confederation of the Rhine or some of its members, Dutch secession, and Italy coalescing into a state. In other words, a Europe of familiar shape and proportions.

The latter is what I find such an intriguing prospect, if a less likely one. The reason isn't complicated: If France breaks up in the early 19th century, European history would be rendered not even remotely recognizable. It's not just the balance of power at stake either; France would also be the center of struggles for nationalism like OTL Germany or Poland.

The basic concept is that the major French generals could default effectively to warlords, if certain conditions were met:

• were there no adult heir,
• if France's armies were relatively intact,
• if France's armies were not overstretched,
• if surviving power centers in West and Central Europe had more incentive to compete for influence in the Napoleonic system than to dismantle it.

For a vague scenario, Napoleon dies and someone has to control Paris and the heir. The major generals, relatives, and Austria mobilize, but don't immediately fight it all out. A power-sharing compromise in a single city is impractical, nor can a French general maintain a French army exclusively in Poland, Italy, or Germany. So territorial compromises are in order. Certainly this wouldn't be designed to divide France, but if a marshal aligned with Westphalia doesn't trust the general with a good relationship to the Empress in Paris, how can he count on recruits and cash but by being based in the north from which he can skim from (say) Flanders, Alsace, and Champagne?

If French military leaders have a sort of detente keeping an eye on one another by having preeminence regionally and align with Napoleonic liberal states outside France, when push comes to shove resolving conflicts could risk nominal borders being formalized by violence. Alexander's subordinates didn't turn on each other right away, after all.

 

[Wendell]

I don't think you need so elaborate a setup. Just have Napoleon's injuries at Regensburg be worse resulting in his death. Legally, Joseph is next in succession, but he's in Spain, and the archchancellor running France in the absence of the emperor has Republican sympathies. Likewise, it's not too hard to wind down the Fifth Coalition in a white peace at that point. France will be able to keep at minimum the Amiens borders, but who ends up running France is an open question, and I suspect Westphalia, Berg, and, to a lesser extent, Holland, are doomed in the long term. Weirdly, Warsaw might endure, and the Napoleonic order or something like it could win out in Italy. Spain I think could be resolved with relative ease at that point in the peninsular war. I do agree that there'll be a Vienna-like conference, but it will go very differently in some respects.