A True and Better Alamo Redux

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

With no Guadalcanal, would more amphibious resources be available for North Africa?

...and other operations.

Subject of the USS Ranger came up. It was rated for fewer aircraft than the other USN carriers of 1942, and was considered slower. but, it did do some ferry missions of US Amy aircraft to Africa in mid 1942, and raided German cargo ships in Norwegian ports in 1943 - Operation Leader.

 

[burmafrd]

The ranger was slow, lacked defensive armament and armor and was not thought to be very well protected as regards underwater.

They really wanted to use it as an aircraft ferry, training ship, etc. Never in combat. But things in late 42 when the Enterprise with a bad elevator was the only carrier operational they were actually moving it towards the pacific - it would have gone to pearl and stayed there unless the sky literally fell in. But that decision got reversed in the end as it was felt that the IJN naval air corps had lost so much and had deteriorated so far that it was no longer necessary.

 

[ViperKing]

So how will operation Torch go ITTL without the US Navy not having the four Sangamon class light carriers finished and worked up yet? Despite the changes to the timeline, I've seen nothing to suggest any major changes regarding these ships, unless shipyard workers where pulled off other projects. Then there's the issue of the aircraft available. OTL the TBF Avenger didn't start coming into service until around the time of Midway. Here, I would think that Nimitz would have first priority in getting first access to new carrier aircraft to refit the squadrons of his three remaining carriers, as well as rebuilding and upgrading the squadrons stationed on Wake island. So with an earlier Torch the number of available US carriers is much reduced, and Ranger might not have replaced her Devastators yet.

 

[Fearless Leader]

So how will operation Torch go ITTL without the US Navy not having the four Sangamon class light carriers finished and worked up yet? Despite the changes to the timeline, I've seen nothing to suggest any major changes regarding these ships, unless shipyard workers where pulled off other projects. Then there's the issue of the aircraft available. OTL the TBF Avenger didn't start coming into service until around the time of Midway. Here, I would think that Nimitz would have first priority in getting first access to new carrier aircraft to refit the squadrons of his three remaining carriers, as well as rebuilding and upgrading the squadrons stationed on Wake island. So with an earlier Torch the number of available US carriers is much reduced, and Ranger might not have replaced her Devastators yet.

Actually in Part XIX this is touched on (See Kennebec class carriers). The Battles around Wake revealed a desperate need for high speed oilers and thus the decision is made NOT to convert the Cimarron class oilers to the Sangamon class escort carriers. Instead four slower oilers (OTL's Kennebec class) are chosen.

 

[ViperKing]

Actually in Part XIX this is touched on (See Kennebec class carriers). The Battles around Wake revealed a desperate need for high speed oilers and thus the decision is made NOT to convert the Cimarron class oilers to the Sangamon class escort carriers. Instead four slower oilers (OTL's Kennebec class) are chosen.

That makes sense. If a big part of the availability of extra ships in the Pacific is a reduced German threat, perhaps other Cimarron class ships such as the USS Salamonie could be delpoyed to the Pacific a year or so sooner then OTL.

Biggest issue with the Kennebec class, if you plan to use them for Torch, especially an earlier then OTL Torch, aside from being smaller then the Sangamon class carriers and likely having somewhat lesser aircraft capacity, there's also still a bottleneck in construction and getting the ship safe for operations. All four OTL Sangamon class ships had been in service already as oilers since 1940/41, and while a lot of work on the ships had to be done to make them into carriers, stuff like general shakedowns, testing the hull, making sure the propulsion and power systems and other basic equipment was in safe and working order had already been taken care of well before the carrier conversions, and some members of the crew where already familiar with their jobs, shaving off a lot of time on training.

Here the 4th Kennebec class ship, USS Kankakee, wasn't even launched until end of January 1942, and didn't complete shakedown trials and enter the fleet til up in March. That's not factoring in the time it would take to actually do the conversions and make sure that worked out fine.

http://wonderduck.mu.nu/the_best_of_the_jeeps

Additionally, the design and use of the Sangamons played a not insignificant roll in the development of the Casablance class CVE. That's not to say that the Casablanca class would turn out bad ITTL, but some practices or lessons learned for the construction and use of that class could be impacted here with an inferior class such as your proposed Kennebec class.

Even with the four ships of the Cimarron class that where converted, they where still able to act as oliers on occasion, with one of the ships actually returning to duty post war as an oiler.

http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/us_esc3.htm

With the Kennebec class, you also have a major speed disadvantage. The Kennebec class could only get up to around 16.5 knots, not really fast.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kennebec-class_oiler
http://uboat.net/allies/warships/class/434.html
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/K/e/Kennebec_class.htm

Sangamons and Bogue class CVE could do 18 knots, and the purpose built Casablanca could do 20 knots. Not counting any carriers built pre war, there are no carriers, especially small CVE and CVL with a top speed of less then 18 knots.

http://forum.worldofwarships.com/index.php?/topic/8194-march-13th-focus-uss-sangamon-class-cves/

The T3 tankers carried 146,000 barrels of fuel and are overall larger than the C3 cargo ships being converted to the Bogue Class CVE’s. Both types of ships were faster at more than 16 knots than most other merchant ships. This increased speed is terribly important as more “over the deck wind speed” allows launching of heavier aircraft, or in the case of short decked escort carriers any aircraft at all. In low wind conditions with their low speed the smaller carriers could not launch heavily or even fully laden aircraft which greatly reduced their ability to fulfill their missions.

Given that the Sangamons and Bogues could have trouble launching aircraft even with a top speed of 18 knots, having the Kennebec class with a top speed of 16.5 knots will have an impact on their ability or lack thereof to put aircraft in the air.

There is the case of the USS Long Island and her sister ship the HMS Archer, both of which could only get up to around 16.5 knots. But considering USS Long Island primarily acted as a training carrier or as a transport at times, and the HMS Archer had quite a few accidents or difficulties and resulted in the ship being decommissioned in early 1944 after having never gone into combat, mainly acting as a transport or being assigned to backwater commands, I don't think that speaks well of that class of ship.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Archer_(D78)#HMS_Archer

 

[marathag]

Given that the Sangamons and Bogues could have trouble launching aircraft even with a top speed of 18 knots, having the Kennebec class with a top speed of 16.5 knots will have an impact on their ability or lack thereof to put aircraft in the air.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Archer_(D78)#HMS_Archer

You would see more use of RATO and the Hydraulic catapults.

Existing CVEs had the H-2 Hydraulic Cat, otherwise even 18 knot and a good headwind was still chancy for a fully loaded Avenger.

 

[ViperKing]

You would see more use of RATO and the Hydraulic catapults.

Existing CVEs had the H-2 Hydraulic Cat, otherwise even 18 knot and a good headwind was still chancy for a fully loaded Avenger.

I know ships such as CAM ships used JATO, and I'v seen videos of the Navy testing the designs, found this video circa 1944:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovRWPV0PDDk

I thought by the time it became impossible for carrier aircraft to take off under their own power due to size and weight issues, they'd just made catapult launching more practical and reliable.

The fact that these Kennebec class ships will essentially require either near 100% perfect wind conditions and/or 100% use of a catapult will still doom them to a short combat career and regulation to training and transport tasks regardless. They're smaller then the Sangaman and Casablanca class ships, and slower then even the smaller Bogue class design, and will end up entering service months later in TTL then the Sangamon class would have, which by that time other more capable CVE and CVL types will be entering service anyway.

Edit:

Speaking from a physical production standpoint also, while the physical shipyard work on the 4 Sangamon class ships didn't start in OTL until early 1942, the planning and discussion of how to go about the conversions by the engineers and naval architects and shipyard staff that actually did the conversions likely started some weeks or possibly months beforehand, they didn't just go "hey, let's turn these oilers into baby carriers, have them in the drydock on Tuesday and we'll begin work immediately". Drawing up blueprints and schematics on how to build or convert ships would take a good deal of time, especially back in the 1940s when there was nothing around like CAD(Computer Aided Design) or other more modern construction methods to help in the design phase. Then there's the aspect of actually training the shipyard workers to actually do the work itself, what the plans for the conversion are, etc. Not to mention arranging for the supplies, materials, making arrangements to acquire parts and equipment that wasn't or couldn't be made onsite. If the Sangamon class CVE is cancelled, you can still convert the other class, but it means that there will be time lost as the engineers go back and redo or revise the blueprints and schematics for the conversion process, or possibly have to start over from scratch, and that's not factoring in the fact that the Kennebec class ships, unlike the Cimarron class ships which have been in active service for a year or two by now, are just entering service and still undergoing initial builders trials, making sure everything is in working order, etc. So more then likely unlike the Sangamons, these proposed Kennebec class CVE are not going to be ready to convert up until spring or possibly summer of 1942, and likely will not be ready to commission into the fleet, let alone be ready to deploy for combat, until the end of 1942 or more likely into 1943, by which time more capable designs that make them redundant would already be starting to enter the fleet in numbers anyway.

On top of that, by cancelling the Sangamon class, but having to delay construction of the Kennebec class, you've got a lot of shipyard workers that aren't going to be doing anything, and a lot of dry dock or pier space available that wasn't in OTL, and given the war footing the US would be on, having a lot of men and resources just sitting around doing nothing isn't going to be allowed, so they'll have to assign men and resources to other projects that where not done or done later in OTL, further delaying the conversions of the Kennebec class ships.

 

[GTStinger]

Without the Sangmon class, I could see the Long Island being sent to the Atlantic. It's biggest contribution OTL seems to be training and ferrying planes to Guadalcanal.
With the Indian Ocean more secure Indomitable and Formidable could potentially be sent to support Torch. Much longer trip than Madagascar though. If it could be pulled off, they with Long Island could provide similar numbers to aircraft to four Sangamons.

 

[GTStinger]

Now if you want to think crazy....

To cover the Torch landings, Britain could create false intelligence that Indomitable and Formidable plus the fast battleships are going to the eastern med.
Worry that the supply routes will get squeezed from East and West, some German officers might think that something has to be done about Malta......

 

[ViperKing]

Without the Sangmon class, I could see the Long Island being sent to the Atlantic. It's biggest contribution OTL seems to be training and ferrying planes to Guadalcanal.
With the Indian Ocean more secure Indomitable and Formidable could potentially be sent to support Torch. Much longer trip than Madagascar though. If it could be pulled off, they with Long Island could provide similar numbers to aircraft to four Sangamons.

Biggest issues with the Long Island are that she's already in the Pacific ITTL, she's got a generally small air wing, and again the speed issue. A slow carrier isn't that bad if you're launching unarmed aircraft during training operations thousands of miles from the front lines that aren't weighted down with ordnance, and possibly going light on fuel load as well.

Given no Indian Ocean Raid, it's quite possible that Madagascar either was judged to not be needed, or was invaded and occupied by the British some weeks or more sooner then OTL. Either way, a sideshow like that isn't going to have that much of an impact either way.

 

[GTStinger]

Reading up on Madagascar. I didn't realize forces from the Western med, including an aircraft carrier, were sent there.

No/earlier Madagscar makes HMS Illustrious and some other ships from Force H available earlier to support operations in North Africa.

 

[GTStinger]

Heavier losses ITTL would probably cause Japan to keep their subs in the pacific instead of sending four to Madagascar. That would make the battle somewhat easier.

 

[ViperKing]

Reading up on Madagascar. I didn't realize forces from the Western med, including an aircraft carrier, were sent there.

No/earlier Madagscar makes HMS Illustrious and some other ships from Force H available earlier to support operations in North Africa.

With the much reduced threat of Japanese naval attacks into the Indian Ocean region ITTL, HMS Illustrious may not be needed at all in the region. Formidable and Indomitable are more then capable of doing the jobs.

 

[Alternate History Geek]

Biggest issues with the Long Island are that she's already in the Pacific ITTL, she's got a generally small air wing, and again the speed issue. A slow carrier isn't that bad if you're launching unarmed aircraft during training operations thousands of miles from the front lines that aren't weighted down with ordnance, and possibly going light on fuel load as well.

Or if you use catapults, RATO, or both (aircraft goes on the catapult with RATO bottles attached but unlit, launched by catapult, ignites RATO bottles as it flies off the end of the catapult)...

 

[Gunner's_Quadrant]

Sangamon Class vice Kennebec Class

I think you are overstating the conversion and fitting out process. The US Navy was already converting C-3 class ships for the Royal Navy. So it wasn't like they had to start from scratch. Both services had been looking at the issue since the mid-1930's. The conversions for all classes was very straight forward. They took the existing ship, removed everything down the main deck and then put on a flight deck over the top, added a bridge, and the aviation capabilities. One of the reasons the Sangamon class was preferred over the C-3 conversions was there was less camber to the main deck. The aircraft rested on the main deck for maintenance and storage, and the planes stored towards the ends of the ship had to be pushed uphill and downhill to get to the elevator. Moving an Avenger around on them was a royal pain.

I also think you are overstating the time needed to prepare the ships for action. The decision to convert the Sangamon and the C-3 ships was made in early to mid February 1942. The Sangamons were all commissioned in August/September 1942. So at best, they had about 2 months to work up for combat.

All the escorts were fitted with catapults because of their low speeds; there isn't much difference between 18/19 knots and 16 knots for the Kennebecs. A Wildcat could lift off a CVE without needing a catapult, a Hellcat was iffy without a decent breeze, but there was no way a loaded Avenger was lifting off without it. It was already becoming apparent by this time, that fleet carriers needed catapults as well. Tactical considerations often forced them to launch aircraft when not flying into the wind; there are numerous incidents when planes didn't get enough airspeed under these conditions and stalled out, crashing into the ocean.

Nonetheless, I doubt that the USN would actually choose the Kennebecs for conversion. They are shorter and narrower than the Cimmaron-class, essentially the same size as the Bogue class conversions from C-3 ships. Why add another design of the same size and capability . The USN wanted to see if a larger size CVE would prove more capable, as it proved to be. In addition the Sangamon's could still carry fuel oil, so the conversion process did not erase that capability.

 

[ViperKing]

I think you are overstating the conversion and fitting out process. The US Navy was already converting C-3 class ships for the Royal Navy. So it wasn't like they had to start from scratch. Both services had been looking at the issue since the mid-1930's. The conversions for all classes was very straight forward. They took the existing ship, removed everything down the main deck and then put on a flight deck over the top, added a bridge, and the aviation capabilities. One of the reasons the Sangamon class was preferred over the C-3 conversions was there was less camber to the main deck. The aircraft rested on the main deck for maintenance and storage, and the planes stored towards the ends of the ship had to be pushed uphill and downhill to get to the elevator. Moving an Avenger around on them was a royal pain.

I also think you are overstating the time needed to prepare the ships for action. The decision to convert the Sangamon and the C-3 ships was made in early to mid February 1942. The Sangamons were all commissioned in August/September 1942. So at best, they had about 2 months to work up for combat.

All the escorts were fitted with catapults because of their low speeds; there isn't much difference between 18/19 knots and 16 knots for the Kennebecs. A Wildcat could lift off a CVE without needing a catapult, a Hellcat was iffy without a decent breeze, but there was no way a loaded Avenger was lifting off without it. It was already becoming apparent by this time, that fleet carriers needed catapults as well. Tactical considerations often forced them to launch aircraft when not flying into the wind; there are numerous incidents when planes didn't get enough airspeed under these conditions and stalled out, crashing into the ocean.

Nonetheless, I doubt that the USN would actually choose the Kennebecs for conversion. They are shorter and narrower than the Cimmaron-class, essentially the same size as the Bogue class conversions from C-3 ships. Why add another design of the same size and capability . The USN wanted to see if a larger size CVE would prove more capable, as it proved to be. In addition the Sangamon's could still carry fuel oil, so the conversion process did not erase that capability.

Even the C-3 class vessels that became Bogue/Attacker class carriers for the US and Royal Navies had already been in commission for some months prior to actually being taken in by the navy and converted. I don't think that a conversion process itself would take very long, but with the C-3 and Cimarron hulls, they'd already undergone all or a lot of the precommissioning workups prior to conversion, in the case of the Cimarrons already being in commission and active service for a year or more. The 4th Kennebec didn't commission in OTL until March 1942. I doubt a conversion would add more then a month or two beyond what it took in OTL to launch the Sangamons but it would make them enter service later then when the Sangamons would have.

From my understanding, despite the Navy wanting the oilers, part of the decision to convert the oilers was made from people higher up then the likes of Nimitz or King, so their arguements might not matter regardless.

 

[burmafrd]

The men that operated the carriers understood the need for a reliable catapult for a very long time. Unfortunately technology there was primitive and more to the point R & D was not emphasized in that area.

It was really not until the post war and the Midway class that the situation was truly addressed - and that was brutally because you could not launch the first generation of Jets without one. That was understood very quickly by all; and the realization that without being able to use jets the carriers would quickly become useless became a very POWERFUL motivator for the Navy. Nothing gets the brass attention like the possibility of budget cuts.

 

[Gunner's_Quadrant]

Even the C-3 class vessels that became Bogue/Attacker class carriers for the US and Royal Navies had already been in commission for some months prior to actually being taken in by the navy and converted.

That is incorrect. While some C-3 class ships were in service, the hulls chosen for conversion were still under construction or just launched, but not yet completely fitted out. For example, Bogue was laid down 10/1/41; launched 1/15/42, acquired by US Navy and began conversion on 5/1/42, and commissioned as ACV-9 in 9/26/42 per Friedman. A launched ship is not a completed ship; the electrical wiring, outfitting of crew spaces, installation of weapons, etc. still needs to occur. A commissioned ship is a fully outfitted ship that has passed sea trials and is accepted into the USN for service.
Attached is a picture of what she looked like on 1/15/42 at her launching.

The Sangamon class vessels had been in service for a few years before conversion but as merchant ships. They would have received completely new USN crews upon being acquired the service.

 

[marathag]

The men that operated the carriers understood the need for a reliable catapult for a very long time. Unfortunately technology there was primitive and more to the point R & D was not emphasized in that area.

It was really not until the post war and the Midway class that the situation was truly addressed - and that was brutally because you could not launch the first generation of Jets without one.

The wartime cats fitted to the Essex,the H4B was 18,000 pounds@90mph, with ones after Lexington were rated at 28,000 pounds@90mph

The postwar Essex SCB-27A rebuild program still used Hydraulic Cats, right up to 1953 when the 27C program had angled decks and steam Cats

The H8 was rated for 15,500 pounds@105 knots or 62,500@61 knots

The Steam Cat used for the post Korean War 27C was the C10 40,000 pounds@125 knots

1st Gen Jets and H4 Hydraulic Cats worked with the heavier Banshee and F9F, but was very marginal compared to the lighter Phantom and Fury that had similar weights to the heavier WWII prop planes

 

[Fearless Leader]

Part XXI: The Empire Strikes Back

Bataan has fallen. The Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and bloodstained peninsula have laid down their arms. With heads bloody but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior force and numbers of the enemy.

The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the jungle fastness and along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the constant and grueling fire of the enemy for more than three months. Besieged on land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and in America, the intrepid fighters have done all that human endurance could bear.

For what sustained them through all these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than merely physical. It was the force of an unconquerable faith—something in the heart and soul that physical hardship and adversity could not destroy! It was the thought of native land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity and pride in these most priceless of all our human prerogatives.

The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will credit our troops with nothing less than the courage and fortitude that his own troops have shown in battle. Our men have fought a brave and bitterly contested struggle. All the world will testify to the most superhuman endurance with which they stood up until the last in the face of overwhelming odds.

But the decision had to come. Men fighting under the banner of unshakable faith are made of something more than flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last, endurance melts away, and the end of the battle must come.

Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand—a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the world—cannot fall!

Radio Broadcast-The Voice of Freedom- Malinta Tunnel, Corregidor, August 9th 1942


(From “The Thin Red Line: Allied Forces in the Burma 1941-1944” by Howard McPhee)
...Though most portrayals of the Burma campaign in 1942 focus on the battles around the Sittang River they miss out on three other critical events that ultimately determined the course of the campaign and ensured that the Sittang line held. For though many point to the strategic overstretch experienced by Japan in the aftermath of the Second Battle of Wake Island, an examination of Japanese sources showcases just how important they ranked the seizure of Rangoon and the closure of the Burma Road. Indeed, even after the destruction of the remaining fleet carriers of the Japanese navy at Wake, Marshal Sugiyama Hajime, Army Chief of Staff, sought to throw all possible resources at Rangoon with the hope of taking it before the advent of monsoon season yet was constrained by factors outside of his control...

...Perhaps the most obvious was the fact that the Imperial Japanese Navy was in no way shape or form ready to conduct the operations required of it in the Indian Ocean by the Army. Heavy losses sustained in the Centrifugal Offensive as well as in operations against Rabaul and Wake had left the navy’s carrier and land based air wings in utter disarray. Though certainly the forces committed against Wake in April 1942 would have been more than enough to deal with the British Eastern Fleet at the time, to the battered IJN, even the small air groups of the Indomitable and Formidable seemed daunting. Furthermore, with the suicide of Nagumo and the resignation of Yamamoto, the new head of the IJN, Admiral Kondo was able to skillfully argue that all of his available forces were needed to meet the threat posed by the Americans in the Pacific and could not be spared for further offensives in Burma...

...Hajime’s planned attack may have gone ahead even without IJN assistance had Operation Chariot not laid bare the precarious logistical situation of the Japanese army in Burma in the aftermath of the Battle of Toungoo. Having recognized the vulnerability of the 15th Army’s supply line, Somerville and the Far Eastern fleet set out to buy Alexander and his army as much time as they could before the impending monsoon season and sortied in force in the hopes of intercepting as much Japanese shipping destined for the 15th Army as possible. Though only a handful of vessels were sunk, in reality that portion of Operation Chariot covered a much more important act, namely the scuttling of the HMS Scout in Moulmein harbour (1)...

...Deemed to be not worth the effort to repair by the Royal Navy, the battered Scout , a veteran of the Banka strait was made seaworthy, booby-trapped and then scuttled in Moulmein harbour by an intrepid group of sailors and SOE operatives on the night of April 1st. Having been suitably distracted by Somerville’s airstrikes the preceding day, the Japanese garrison only noticed that the Scout wasn’t responding to their signals when it was too late. Though deemed unfit for regular service, the elderly destroyer’s guns proved to be more than capable of sinking the river ferry that bridged the Salween as well as a number of smaller craft. By the time the Japanese were able to respond the crew had already disappeared into the jungle to join up with Wingate’s forces and the Scout had disappeared into the depths, effectively preventing the Japanese from using the harbour...

...The loss of the harbour at Moulmein meant that any plans for a Japanese offensive in Burma became intractably linked to logistical difficulties surrounding their current situation. Though unable to stop the initial Japanese advance, the remaining units of the Burma Rifles were proving to be even more troublesome than the fortifications along the Sittang. Beginning with their destruction of granaries in January 1942, remnants of the Burma rifles had continued to hijack trains and destroy trucks throughout February 1942 and had brought harsh reprisals upon the Burmese populations under Japanese rule. Though these reprisals did succeed in limiting the actions of the Burma rifles for a time, the arrival of reinforcements and a new commander in Orde Wingate allowed them to resume operations in late March from their bases in the highlands (2)...

...Never one to be outshone by his rivals in the SOE, Wingate was quick to mobilize the assets available to him to launch another daring raid on Moulmein which, though costly, managed to destroy even more of the vital port and further complicate Japanese logistics...

...Thus without concrete support from the IJN, and facing severe logistical challenges which were only compounded by a pervasive guerilla campaign, Hajime was forced to abandon his efforts to take Rangoon before the coming of the 1942 monsoon season. Any offensive would have to wait until the supply lines of the 15th Army could be solidified and with naval support not immediately forthcoming, Hajime was forced to content himself with pressing the construction of the Burma Railroad. Only with a direct rail link between Burma and Siam would the 15th Army be able to finally eradicate the troublesome British guerillas and break through the Sittang line. In the meantime the IJA was forced to begrudgingly agree with Yamamoto’s successor Admiral Kondo that the Philippines, Marianas, and New Guinea needed to take precedence over any ambitions of cutting the Burma Road...

(From “Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire” by Frank Richards)
...Though news of the catastrophic defeat at the Second Battle of Wake Island was heavily suppressed by the general public, few held any illusions within the Imperial Japanese government. A mere five months after instigating the conflict against the Allied powers they had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams and paid a cost far beyond that which they had expected to pay. The loss of all of their fleet carriers around Wake Island to an American fleet they had supposedly crippled in December was a particularly bitter pill to swallow. So bitter that by April 21st, news from the fleet reached Tokyo that Admiral Nagumo had taken his own life, preferring to use a pistol rather than commit seppuku. Days later Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto tendered his resignation and faded into obscurity for the remainder of the conflict (3)...

...The loss of both Yamamoto and Nagumo within days, coupled with the losses suffered at the Second Battle of Wake Island effectively left the Army in charge of the Japanese Empire’s prosecution of the war. Having far more successes under their belt, General Sugiyama and the Army faction was able to argue convincingly that they held the best chance of bringing Japan out of the conflict with the majority of its hard won gains – most of which were taken by Army men – intact. With that, the Army’s long stated goal of cutting the Burma Road finally became first and foremost in Japanese military planning...

In fact, only the extreme weakness of various naval air assets in the aftermath of the Second Battle of Wake Island allowed Admiral Kondo to prevent the commitment of the IJN’s remaining assets and rightly so. Possessing effectively green aircrew and obsolete aircraft, the remaining light aircraft carriers Shoho and Zuiho were completely ineffective and desperately needed time to train up to the level required of them. Without adequate air cover, the Kondo feared that the much stronger Royal Navy would be able to inflict even more grievous casualties than Crace’s force in Operation Odysseus (4)...

...In the end a compromise solution which would see joint Naval and land operations on Bataan was accepted when it became apparent that the IJN lacked the ability to help solve the logistical difficulties faced by the Army in Burma. Having bypassed the peninsula early in the conflict after it became apparent that Wainwright’s forces would not surrender easily, with the failure to take Wake Island fears began to percolate in the High Command that the Americans would take the offensive and attempt to link up with their army trapped on Bataan. When coupled with the fact that, due to a malaria epidemic in February and March 1942, Homma’s besieging force was actually substantially weaker than the defenders of Bataan, these fears of a Central Pacific offensive however premature proved to be enough to spur the Japanese into not only reinforcing the Marianas but also providing more forces to allow Homma’s 14th Army to re-ignite one of the bloodiest battles the war had seen to date (5)...

(From “Fighting Jon Wainwright” by Leonard Collins)
...With the cessation of the Japanese offensive on January 20th, the Battle of Bataan entered into a period of static siege warfare as the Japanese sought to pin down the American troops while continuing their operations elsewhere in the Pacific. They hoped that through the application of minimal resources they would be able to successfully wear down the American defenders and lay the groundwork for a quick mop up campaign after the bulk of the centrifugal offensive concluded. Yet as their attacks decreased in intensity and frequency, the exact opposite occurred. In fact, due to the expert withdrawal to the peninsula, until May 1942 the combined American Filipino forces were actually better supplied than their Japanese opponents. Never one to take anything for granted, Wainwright did not let up in the slightest and immediately ordered defensive preparations along the peninsula to
continue unabated (6)...

...In addition to strengthening the current positions along the Mauban and Abucay lines, Wainwright ordered a pair of fall back positions constructed further south along the peninsula. Furthermore, potential invasion beaches were scouted and defensive preparations made there. Perhaps most infamously, the period between January 20th and April 27th saw the creation of incredibly detailed maps of the peninsula and its various jungle trails as well as the construction of tens of thousands of booby traps (7)...

...In order to compensate for their lack of anti-personnel mines, the combined American-Filipino forces took using bamboo stakes known as “punji sticks” either in concealed pits or in areas in which the Japanese were likely to take cover as a means to retard the inevitable Japanese advance. Often smeared with urine, feces, or rotting meat these sticks were intended to wound rather than kill and further strain tenuous Japanese logistics (8)...

...Ingenuity was not limited to the construction of fortifications and booby traps, as the combined American-Filipino forces continued to work logistical wonders with the meager means available to them. Having just executed a sterling withdrawal to the Bataan peninsula, the combined quartermaster staff moved heaven and earth to try and make the most of the supplies available to them on the island as everything was funnelled into the war effort on the peninsula. As it lay perilously close to the frontlines, over 100,000 tonnes of rice was harvested early on in the siege and then shipped south to the central granaries (9)...

...Fish also became a staple for Wainwright’s army as, from the beginning of the siege, Filipino fishermen on the eastern shore of Bataan were encouraged to continue their activities. Based on wartime estimates between 10 and 12 thousand tons of fish were collected weekly and used to supplement the existing rations. Only with the arrival of significant Japanese reinforcements in April were Homma’s forces able to interfere adequately and shut down these vital operations (10)...

...Wainwright also proved prudent enough to lay the foundations for the utilization of every last available resource on the peninsula. American chefs were encouraged to incorporate as much local food into the diet of the American troops as they would tolerate. Though initially unpopular, the fact that, by the end of the siege, the Americans were essentially eating the same rations as their Filipino comrades created a sense of camaraderie that far outweighed the logistical gains that were made (11)...

...Finally, the logistical successes of the Bataan campaign would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of the intrepid inter-island ferries that continued to run until April 1942. In addition to contributing to the supplies of fresh meat, fruit, and vegetables, their smuggling runs also contributed to ammunition supplies and also provided a conduit for individuals to join the growing resistance (12)...

...These activities meant that American morale only grew during the siege. In particular, the decision to emulate the experience of the defenders of Wake and create 2 regiments by merging the 4th Marines and several Filipino units proved to be especially impactful as it allowed for the pioneering of the “fire team” tactics which became so widespread after the war. Upon the creation of the two “Joint Provisional Regiments” the 4th Marines quickly organized themselves into four man “fire teams” with one rifleman, one Thompson SMG, one BAR, and one ammunition carrier. Though few expected much from the JPRs, over the next few months they would quickly become known as some of the most effective units under Wainwright’s command. In particular they became noted for their use of the Colt Monitor rifles they had acquired from the Filipino government (13)...

...Many have criticized Wainwright’s decision to reinforce Fort Wint, “The Corregidor of Subic Bay”, with elements of the Philippine Constabulary in late December 1941 and questioned its utility in the Battle of Bataan. Yet an examination of Japanese records show however that its continued resistance frustrated Japanese attacks on the western coast to no end. Though obsolete, the large coastal batteries on Grande Island proved surprisingly resistant to air attack, and were able to successfully interdict Japanese supply lines to forces operating on the western half of the peninsula thus playing a major role in Homma’s decision to focus on the eastern portion of the American position and later effectively denied Subic Bay and Olongapo denied to the Japanese until they began their renewed offensive in April 1942 (14)...

...Consumed by pinning frankly superior American forces in Bataan and combatting the nascent Philippine resistance, the 14th Army found little resources left with which to prosecute the offensive against the Americans. In spite of Homma’s continued requests for substantial additional reinforcements, none were forthcoming due to the losses incurred and unexpected needs of the Centrifugal offensive and other operations, meanwhile, day by day his reputation continued to plummet (15)...

...Though it did nothing for his reputation, the three month effective hiatus of offensive operations on the peninsula from February to April 1942 did allow Homma to gain a much better understanding of what the coming Battle of Bataan would be like. Clearing the peninsula of American troops would be no mop up action, he decided, even after months of being effectively cut off from substantive supply elsewhere. Unfortunately, Sugiyama remained unconvinced and ordered a resumption of hostilities in March after the conclusion of the malaria epidemic and the arrival of only a few thousand troops to reinforce the units already present within the 14th Army. Eager to have some success before demanding further reinforcement, Homma proceeded to launch an offensive hoping to attack the weaker western half of the American fortifications that had been all but ignored due to the presence of Fort Wint and earlier constraints on Nara’s initial offensive in January (16)...

...Yet Homma soon found that even his modest goals proved to be impossible in light of American preparations. Though better prepared than Nara’s original assault on the Abucay line, the March offensives against the Mauban line and Fort Wint were still unprepared for the defenses Wainwright’s army had managed to erect. Unfazed by Japanese artillery fire, King’s II Corps, having not yet faced a substantial attack like their compatriots in I Corps, responded eagerly to the Japanese advance and inflicted heavy casualties without ceding much if any ground...

...Even Homma’s attempt to take Fort Wint proved to be a disaster as the invasion flotilla quickly came under attack by the remnants of the FEAF which the Japanese had assumed to have been destroyed. Though the more modern aircraft had been deployed to counter aircraft supporting the main attack at Mauban, the ones that arrived over Fort Wint on March 21st proved to be equally effective as they were able to strafe and bomb the landing Japanese troops mercilessly as they sought to try and avoid not only fire from the Fort itself, but also from airborne attackers (17)...

...Once ashore the surviving Japanese troops found little respite as they came into contact with one of the best armed detachments of the Philippine Constabulary. Though initially sent to augment the island’s defenses as a throw-away unit in December 1941, these men had continued to train and by March had effectively became integrated into the Fort’s defenses. With additional training and automatic weapons, many of which were captured from the Japanese, the defenders of Fort Wint were able to repel the first Japanese attack in March 1942, annihilating the Japanese force, and thereby continue their work of denying Subic Bay to the Japanese...

...Realizing the inadequacy of even his earlier sober judgements, Homma called off his offensive after a mere 5 days of combat. Though certainly the defeats at Mauban and Fort Wint stung, they nonetheless underscored his earlier requests for reinforcements and ever so slowly the wheels were put into motion. Unfortunately for Homma, other events took precedence as the resource strapped IJA sought to cut the Burma Road and the Navy sought to eliminate Wake before dealing with the pesky, but ultimately unimportant American bastion at Bataan (18)...

...Any recalcitrance to defeat the Americans in Bataan effectively evaporated in April 1942 after the defeat at the Second Battle of Wake Island. Not knowing that the American Pacific Fleet had been just as heavily damaged and was incapable of launching such an offensive, the Japanese feared that in their current moment of weakness American marines would storm ashore in the Marianas and seek to relieve Wainwright on Bataan. Thus in addition to reinforcing the Marianas and stationing the bulk of their battle fleet in the region, both services prioritized the defeat of Bataan and began funnelling all available resources to the region...

...Many within the Japanese high command continued to doubt reports from Homma and his subordinates in the region that extolled the will of the Americans to resist, instead choosing to believe that once sufficient force was brought to bear, the Americans would surrender quite quickly due to low morale and the unlikelihood of their relief. Yet in the space between January and April 1942 the Bataan peninsula had developed a culture unto itself as the American and Filipino forces bonded and continued to resist. In particular motifs of Spanish guerillas and Greek hoplites at Thermopylae became quite popular as did motifs of sacrifice and last stands such as the Alamo. News of the American victory at Wake in particular bolstered morale as the defenders, much like their attackers, began to expect an expedition west to take the Marianas before landing on Luzon. When coupled with the martial culture already present on the peninsula, the American victory at Wake created a formidable cocktail that would only inspire further resistance (19)...

...Had the army not been planning an attack against the Sittang line, reinforcements for the 14th Army may have arrived even sooner, yet once the decision had been made to focus on Bataan, reinforcements began to arrive quite quickly. First among them were elements from the IJN, originally earmarked for an amphibious assault on Wake. Arriving shortly after the disastrous Second Battle of Wake Island, they were quickly put to use by Homma in a second assault on Fort Wint...

...Whereas his initial attack on Fort Wint had little in the way of air or naval support, Homma ensured that his subsequent attack lacked neither and though the FEAF was able to shoot down a number of aircraft, the handful of interceptors available were unable to dent the waves of aircraft which pounded the island, nor the elderly battleships Ise and Hyuga which pounded the defenders mercilessly from outside the range of the Fort’s guns. Though once again Colonel Bordereau’s men were able to inflict over 1000 casualties on the Japanese, the sheer weight of the Japanese offensive was able to seize the island within 48 hours of landing...

...Though Wainwright had little to smile about when hearing of the fall of Fort Wint, his knowledge that Japanese reinforcements could now use Subic bay and the port of Olongapao was mollified by the fate of the battleship Hyuga. While bombarding Fort Wint, the Hyūga's left gun breach in her No. 5 turret exploded, killing 51 crewmembers and threatening the explosion of the magazine and the loss of the ship. Faced with certain disaster, the captain was forced to curtail bombardment efforts and rapidly flood two aft magazines to save the ship. Though she remained offshore for the duration of the Battle of Fort Wint, with the Colonel Bordereau’s surrender she began the slow return journey to Kure for repairs. The opportunity to sink the Hyuga was not lost on the newly promoted Admiral Lockwood who ordered Captain Charles Wilkins of the Narwhal, the closest submarine in the region, to attempt to intercept. Having a slight head start on the Battleship, Wilkins rapidly offloaded his supplies and proceeded with all speed north hoping to ambush the battleship in the Luzon strait. There, on April 30th 1942 he sighted the battleship and proceeded to fire a full salvo of four Mark XIV torpedoes, each sporting the recently modified contact exploders. Though one of the torpedoes missed, the other three rain straight and true causing catastrophic damage to the already damaged battleship. Wilkins proceeded to dive deep to avoid the Japanese escorting force’s attacks before continuing his return to Pearl Harbour. The Hyuga’s sinking became not only the first major success of the American submarine arm, it also came as a welcome balm to defenders of Bataan for the fall of Fort Wint (20)...

...Though Homma had hoped to follow up the seizure of Fort Wint with another quick assault on the Mauban and Abucay lines, the high casualties suffered by the landing forces and the IJN’s desire to reinforce garrisons in the Central Pacific prevented him from doing so. Instead, he was forced to wait as reinforcements continued to arrive from all over the Empire. In the meantime, the arrival of considerable air assets meant that at long last the Japanese were able to annihilate the FEAF and establish air supremacy over Bataan. From this point on the island’s defenders came under almost constant air attack, and though they were well prepared defensively, it undoubtedly began to wear on the defenders, despite Spartan-esque claims of “Fighting in the Shade” which emulated the defenders of Wake Island (21)...

...By mid-May the arrival of significant artillery and armor from Burma in addition to a pair of infantry divisions and further reinforcements from China provided Homma with enough manpower to launch his first major sustained offensive against the American defensive line since January. Consisting of a pair of feints along the coast at Mauban and Abucay which were to hopefully lay the foundation for a successful pair of thrusts around the base of Mount Natib where the American line was perceived to be weakest, Homma hoped to crack the American defensive line and present a tangible success to his superiors...

...Unfortunately, this was not to be the case, as the weakness of American positions around Mount Natib had been apparent to Wainwright from the beginning and he had taken considerable efforts to shore them up and had allocated his forces accordingly. Had the Japanese attacked the same region earlier in the year they may well have succeeded, yet by May, Wainwright’s ambitious mapping and booby-trapping campaign had all but been completed. For the first, and perhaps only, time in the war, the Americans knew the jungle better than their opponents and were able to use it to their advantage whittling away Japanese strength while using the dense foliage of the region as cover from persistent aerial attacks (22)...

...As the Battle for Mount Natib stretched into June 1942, Homma became increasingly desperate. Having received some additional reinforcements to make up for substantial losses thus far, he planned a renewed offensive along the entirety of the front in conjunction with a daring amphibious landing at Bagac. With any luck the American lines around Abucay and Mauban would collapse and allow his forces to make substantial gains, perhaps even driving the Americans off the peninsula itself. Unfortunately, for Homma yet again he would be disappointed as excellent signals intelligence provided Wainwright with more than enough advance notice and as a result he was able to respond with his usual brilliance by deploying substantial forces, including the two Joint Provisional Regiments and his squadron of PT-boats to Bagac (23)...

...Homma’s Grand Offensive, which later became known as The Battle of Bagac, in fact consisted of far more than the landings at Bagac. In reality, the battles along the entirety of the Abucay-Mauban line were far more decisive and cost the Japanese far more, including almost the entire effective combat strength of the 3rd Tank Brigade. Though the Japanese were able to make several striking gains in and around Mount Natib, both of their salients were eventually pinched off and reduced by the American defenders while those troops stationed along the coast withstood withering bombardments before slaughtering their share of futile Banzai charges...

...The landings at Bagac, though intended to be the straw that broke the back of the American defenses, in essence, only proved their depth as the deployment of both PT boats and the Joint Provisional Regiments proved to be more than enough to handle the Japanese landings. Firing the last of their torpedoes, Kelly’s men recorded their largest successes to date with the sinking of a Japanese destroyer and merchant ship. Though forced to retreat their successes prevented a sizeable number of troops from storming ashore and as a result allowed the smaller American-Filipino force to defeat the landings in detail using superior tactics...

...Following the utter disaster at Bagac, Homma was rapidly sacked and reassigned to a minor post in Manchuria. It was hoped that his replacement, General Tonoyuki Yamashita, the “Tiger of Malaya” would be able to do what he had not been able to do. Yet few held out any ambitious hopes, both Tojo and Yamashita knew that only an ocean of Japanese blood would be able to take Bataan and many within the high command began to question the expenditure of so many resources...

...Ironically, the defenders of Bataan may have been spared Yamashita’s final onslaught or at the very least had it delayed had not Roosevelt ordered the infamous “Doolittle Raid” to go ahead. Hoping to assuage American public opinion, enraged over the “abandonment” of Wainwright, Roosevelt’s decision to dust off plans for the “Doolittle Raid” and execute them only worsened the situation on the peninsula as it made the threat of an immediate American Pacific counter attack an even more pressing danger...

(From “A Fruitless Endeavour? A Re-Appraisal of the Doolittle Raid” By James Cox)
...The need for something, anything to show the defenders of Bataan that they were not being abandoned was recognized by the Roosevelt government mere days after the crushing victory at the Second Battle of Wake Island. Yet from the beginning they were faced with the unwelcome reality that they lacked the ability to do anything substantive. Indeed, early projections dating back to March 1942 had revealed that the US Navy lacked the requisite landing craft and supply chain for operations in the Pacific (24)...

...Determined to pursue a “Europe First” strategy, now more than ever in light of the decreased threat posed by a Japan denuded of the strike force that devastated Pearl Harbour, Roosevelt harkened back to a plan formed in the early days of the war. In late December 1941, Admiral Francis Low, King’s chief of staff, suggested using army bombers on navy carriers to strike at the Home Islands. Some initial experimentation had been undertaken in January 1942 but this had been curtailed when losses forced the carrier being tested, the Hornet to be sent to Hawaii as reinforcements in the lead up to the Second Battle of Wake Island. Though the strategic situation in late April was vastly different than that of Late December 1941, Roosevelt nonetheless found a receptive ear within the navy as they were eager to do something, anything, to absolve themselves of the accusation that they stood idly by while the Army bled the Japanese white on Bataan (25)...

...Though the Hornet currently adorned the floor of the Central Pacific along with no fewer than six Japanese carriers, her sister ship, the battered Enterprise was undergoing repairs at Pearl Harbour and was one of the Pacific Fleet’s two remaining carriers in operation while the Lexington was undergoing a lengthy refit. Nevertheless, Nimitz gave his full support to the raid as did Admiral Halsey. However the latter had begun to suffer from a severe skin condition that forced him to step down temporarily. Though Halsey would have liked Raymond Spruance to take over from him, seniority meant that his command was assumed by Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher. Fletcher likewise relished the opportunity to strike at the Home Islands and eagerly cooperated with Nimitz to make paper bound projections a reality (26)...

...A far more difficult task was accorded to Colonel James Doolittle who was pulled out of his position with the FEAF and ordered to resume planning of the attack. Doolittle agreed, on the condition that the 8th Bombardment Squadron be chosen to participate in the attack as they were well acquainted with the B-25 Bombers that had been determined to be the best aircraft available for the mission. It didn’t take long for both Arnold and King to agree and before long, Doolittle and his men were making the long journey from Rabaul to Pearl (27)...

...All told, by the time Doolittle and his men were finished modifying their new bombers, the result resembled something almost completely different. Defensive armament had been reduced to an absolute minimum, with the B-25’s tail guns most famously replaced with painted broomsticks. A crude bomb sight had replaced the complex Norden bombsight, and almost every spare ounce of weight had been trimmed or allocated to additional fuel. With these modifications in place, 16 B-25’s were loaded onboard the Enterprise on June 9th 1942. The original plan had only called for a raid of 15 bombers, but Doolittle convinced the powers that be to add a final aircraft to the total, ostensibly for observation purposes (28)...

...As the taskforce sailed through the Central Pacific, the bombers remained clustered on the deck of the Enterprise while that carrier’s aircraft remained stowed below deck. Aircraft from the USS Wasp maintained a close watch over the vessels and the seas surrounding them yet tensions were high. Fitch had orders that if need be, the bombers were to be pushed overboard in order to allow the Enterprise’s CAG to launch...

...At 0735 hours on June 15th the taskforce was sighted by a Japanese patrol boat. Though the vessel was sunk within moments by accurate gunfire from the USS Nashville tensions ran high on the vessels whether or not to launch Doolittle’s raiders or abandon the attack. In the end, Doolittle’s pleas and Fletcher’s daring won out over cooler heads and the carriers pressed on, sailing for another 10 hours before they launched the raiders including the observation plane which had also been loaded with ordinance. Though none of the pilots had ever taken off from a carrier before, after some adjustments every one of them successfully got underway and began the long journey to Japan. Once the last of them took off, Fletcher sent the signal to the Chinese to begin preparations for the arrival of the raiders at the clandestine airfields intended to receive them (29)...

...Had the Japanese not been hobbled by the slow speed of their newly completed Hiyo class carriers, they may well have succeeded in forcing yet another Central Pacific engagement. Yet the underlying caution of both sides prevented yet another battle from taking place as both sides groped for each other in the dark and in the morning of June 16th before returning to their respective bases. Yet perhaps the Japanese were lucky that the battle they so desired did not take place. Given the poor state of their carriers’ air wings, they likely would have been at a severe disadvantage qualitatively in any carrier engagement. The IJN’s only theoretical hope would have been to close to a range in which their superiority in Battleships would have been made effective...

...As Fletcher and Kondo played a game of cat and mouse over the Pacific, Doolittle and his raiders arrived in force over the Home Islands and delivered their deadly payload. Each aircraft carried a specially constructed bomb load of 4 500 lb bombs. One was a high explosive weapon while the others were incendiary devices aimed at dispersing a considerable amount of explosive power over a wide area. Tokyo received the brunt of the attack while six other cities also were struck...

...All told, the damage inflicted by the raid was minimal though one of the bombers did manage to hit the carrier Ryuho currently under construction in Yokohama thus delaying its completion until January 1943. Still, the shock of the Doolittle raid coming on the heels of Japanese reverses in Burma and at the Second Battle of Wake Island proved to deeply impact the Japanese people and the attitudes of the high command. Discontent with the current order skyrocketed even as hundreds of fighter aircraft and AA resources were pulled back to the Home Islands for defensive purposes (30)...

...Running on fumes, thirteen of the sixteen bombers were able to land safely at their designated airfields in China. Having landed in Zhejiang, the bombers were quickly refueled and sent to join the China Air Task Force of the 10th Air Force taking shape in and around Chonqing. Little did they know what havoc their landing was to wreak upon the Chinese countryside (31)...

...Upon joining the 10th Air Force, Doolittle found that his work had only just begun as within weeks he was given the Medal of Honour, promoted to Major General and given command of the remainder of the 10th Air Force while Lewis Brereton was transferred along with some of the 10th’s best bomber units to the Middle East where they were to participate in actions leading up to the American entry into the European Theater of Operations (32)...

...Thus, despite the claims that the Doolittle raid caused more harm than good and needlessly endangered vital Pacific fleet assets, I have attempted to demonstrate the following. 1). Had Kondo’s forces engaged Fletcher in the aftermath of the raid, the result would have likely been another American victory due to a disparity in carrier air wing quality. 2). Given the supply situation in Bataan, there was no way to hold out until a hypothetical relief operation could be launched even in the absence of Yamashita’s July Offensive. 3) Though destructive, the Japanese offensives in Bataan and China sapped the IJA of experienced manpower that could have been critical at a later point in the war. 4). The transfer of aerial units and other resources to Japan deprived Japanese frontline units of critical assets during the turbulent days of summer and fall 1942. Taking these four factors into account, I submit that the Doolittle raid was far from a fruitless endeavour and in fact made a crucial contribution to the war effort against Japan...

(From: “America’s Thermopylae: Bataan 1941-1942” by Louis Puller)
...Having taken control of the 14th Army mere weeks before the Doolittle Raid, news of the shocking attack on Japan spurred Yamashita into action as he sought to make use of the forces under his command to crush the American salient before troops and aircraft were siphoned off to offensives elsewhere or to augment the clearly inadequate defenses of the Home Islands. Possessing complete aerial supremacy, Yamashita also possessed nearly twice as many troops as Wainwright and had considerable naval support...

...Moving quickly, Yamashita launched his offensive on June 28th once again focusing on the weaker portion of the American lines around Mount Natib. Yet rather than try to advance along the eastern and western slopes of the mountain like Homma, Yamashita’s advance focussed solely on the Western side of the peninsula. As the battleships of the Imperial Japanese Navy pounded American positions along the coast, Yamashita’s men advanced, taking ground slowly, and at a grievous cost...

...Ultimately, only the exhaustion of the combined American/Filipino troops caused Wainwright to give the order to fall back to the Bagac line on July 10th. This fighting retreat proved to be almost as destructive to the advancing Japanese as the battle for the line itself, as yet again, consistent American booby traps and ambushes along with their scorched earth tactics only served to further drain the morale of the advancing armies. In fact the American retreat to the Bagac line was so effective, that even though it was a shadow of the Abucay-Mauban line, it proved to be a formidable enough obstacle to cause Yamashita to call off the offensive after a few abortive attempts to overrun the defenders...

...Much has been made of the “rapid” collapse of the Bagac line and the end of the Siege of Bataan, much of it falling under the “Great Man Theory” of history which stresses the importance of Yamashita and the impact of General Wainwright’s evacuation following injuries sustained during an air raid on July 17th 1942. Though certainly the commands of both armies played a key role, underlying it all is the fundamental reality of logistics. Though well provisioned in a number of ways such as food, by July, the American-Filipino armies on Bataan were running on fumes in a number of important areas. In addition to vastly outstripping the paltry amounts of medicine smuggled in to the peninsula, most importantly, the Allied forces had all but exhausted their supplies of ammunition. This had a particular effect on their morale as they were no longer able to respond to Japanese aerial attacks. Furthermore, news of the recent Allied offensive in North Africa only heightened their growing sense of abandonment (33)...

...Knowing that his forces on Bataan were nearing their breaking point and were severely outgunned, General King began to evacuate as much as he could from the peninsula to Corregidor and the other islands in Manila Bay and began to funnel whatever else he could to the growing ranks of the resistance. Slowly Filipino soldiers were demobilized and funnelled into the ranks of the resistance knowing that they were capable of blending into the local population in a way that the American soldiers were not. Finally, General King gave perhaps his most famous order when he finally bowed to the experience of the soldiers in the field regarding the reliability of their mortar ammunition. From July 18th onwards, all available mortar ammunition was to be used for the construction of improvised explosive devices, a fact that would come to bedevil Yamashita in the coming weeks as the usual 50% unreliability of the American mortars was replaced with a far more effective means of utilizing their explosive potential (34)...

...Though certainly effective, Yamashita’s final offensive against Bataan was anything but painless. Though spanning only 16 days, his troops took staggering casualties from the retreating forces and more importantly, failed to notice the escape of thousands of Filipino soldiers along with considerable amounts of weaponry...

...With the collapse of the third and final defensive line around Mariveles, King gave the orders for local commanders on Bataan to surrender on August 9th, all the while remaining determined to fight on in Corregidor. Here, Yamashita was able to get his wish and rather than launch yet another costly attack on prepared American positions he was allowed to wait out his opponent and end the conflict in a far less bloody manner...

...Indeed Yamashita’s desires proved to be correct as following the surrender of Bataan on August 9th, the remaining American positions in Manila Bay capitulated one by one due to a lack of supplies. Water in particular proved to be the most pressing as several of the islands lacked fresh water springs. Fort Hughes and Fort Frank were the first to succumb on August 17th and 23rd respectively. Fort Drum lasted until September 7th due to the fact that its garrison had maintained a sizeable quantity of food and water in keeping with pre-war regulations to maintain a “Typhoon Reserve”. Further stockpiling efforts had meant that they had only begun to tap into it on August 7th. Yet under constant air and land bombardment, the “Concrete Battleship” was at last forced to give in with the exhaustion of its last supplies...

...Still in spite of the prolonged aerial attacks and siege, Fort Mills and Corregidor continued to hold out until Yamashita launched his final offensive on September 9th, supported by substantial air and naval assets. Even then, King and his men, in particular the reconstituted 4th Marines, continued to resist to the bitter end fighting for four long days before surrendering to Yamashita and his army...

(From “Nemesis: A History of the Pacific War” by Monty Hastings)
...With the Fall of Corregidor and the rest of the defenses of Manila Bay, the Japanese conquest of the Philippines was effectively over. As it was, it was an incredibly expensive affair for the aggressors, with the Japanese suffering roughly sixty thousand casualties over the course of the campaign. Certainly, the Americans and Filipinos endured suffering of an equal if not greater measure, especially for those with the misfortune of being captured or surrendering to the victorious Japanese(35)...

...Though some would say that the Battle of Bataan ultimately had little impact on the course of the war, which was won on the seas of the Central Pacific and the jungles of Burma, these observers fail to take into account the importance of the attrition of Japanese forces during the battle. Some of the best combat formations available to the Japanese, emerged from the Philippine campaign battered beyond recognition. Had these forces, or at the very least, a portion of these forces, been preserved for later offensives, the course of the war in the Pacific may well have been invariably altered. Yet as it was, the Japanese were left with the hollow victory of picking up the pieces in the Philippines...

...A final impact, which will be covered more in depth later, of the staunch resistance at Bataan, can be seen in the time it provided for American and Filipino forces elsewhere to prepare for the coming guerilla campaign on the islands. Harmless as it may have seemed at the time, in reality the Japanese occupation of Mindanao, the Visayas, and other islands would prove to be somewhat of a poison pill as in the days, weeks, and months following the supposed capitulation of the Philippines, American and Filipino guerillas quietly but consistently whittled away at Japanese strength in the region requiring the allocation of more and more forces as the war progressed (36)...

Footnotes
1. In OTL the Japanese were spared similar logistical problems in Burma due to the rapid nature of their advance and their seizure of Rangoon in February 1942. In TTL however, they are stopped cold and as a result have to rely on supplies being shipped through the tiny ports of Ye and Moulmein in Southeastern Burma. This leaves them vulnerable to an antsy Somerville eager to do something in the wake of the Japanese advance. Given his plans to attack the Japanese fleet in OTL, I see no reason why he wouldn’t do so in TTL given the weaker state of his opponent.

2. Wingate arrived in the theater in March 1942 in OTL. In TTL he finds a situation much more conducive to the type of warfare he wants to wage and he does so quite effectively.

3. Nagumo committed suicide in OTL using a pistol as well. As for Yamamoto, keep in mind that in TTL he has very few successes to hang his hat on. American victories at Wake Island, and Darwin have tarnished his reputation substantially.

4. Admiral Kondo is Yamamoto’s successor due to his presence within the Battleship clique. In doing so the IJN hopes to make better use of its remaining assets while it attempts to rebuild its carrier arm.

5. Malaria epidemic is from OTL.

6. Keep in mind that the Japanese pressed their attack on Bataan much harder than OTL due to a need to avenge Wake Island and run up against a much stiffer American/Filipino defensive line (see Part X) so they’re unable to keep up the pressure on the Americans like OTL allowing them to prepare even more.

7. In OTL the defenders didn’t have time for this...In TTL they do. If you’re wondering whether they would do this or not, keep in mind that in OTL during the leadup and during the Battle of the Points and the Battle of the Pockets the defenders of Bataan were doing just that.

8. The Viet Cong did not invent Punji sticks...it was a medieval tactic and one easily available to the defenders of Bataan.

9. In OTL much of this rice was lost due to the rapid nature of the American retreat. Only around 30,000 tonnes was recovered.

10. Fishing was key in OTL as well. However in TTL due to a weaker Japanese position, Filipino fishermen are able to be far more active far longer.

11. Wainwright is thinking long term here. Unlike MacArthur.

12. In OTL these ferries were forced to carry essentials due to poor American withdrawal practices. In TTL they can focus on largely carrying relative luxuries that improve morale.

13. The creation of 2 regiments out of the 4th Marines and some Filipino units is OTL and was vetoed by General Sutherland. In TTL he doesn’t call the shots, and Wainwright has the example of Wake to draw from so it goes through. The rest is all “rule of cool” stuff that I’m more than willing to part with.

14. In OTL Fort Wint was abandoned on December 24th mere days after MacArthur gave his order to evacuate to Bataan. In TTL, Wainwright’s withdrawal is better thought out. So instead, the garrison on Fort Wint is reinforced with Filipino troops and additional AA.

15. Keep in mind the low priority accorded to Bataan in OTL and the setbacks Japan has suffered elsewhere.

16. Homma’s thoughts followed a similar pattern in OTL.

17. Remember that in TTL the FEAF withdrew more effectively as well. Meaning far more fuel and ammunition for these planes. Also in keeping with the low level of hostilities they are shepherded until crucial moments such as this.

18. Bataan held a similar importance in OTL. I see no reason why it would be different at this point in the TL.

19. This happened to a much smaller extent in OTL. In TTL the defenders of Bataan have higher morale and are given much more time to develop this culture.

20. The Hyuga’s accident happened during a training exercise in OTL. The Narwhal is used as a cargo sub in TTL due to her size and unsuitability to other combat operations.

21. Aerial attack took its toll on the defenders of Bataan in OTL as well, a situation exacerbated by a much poorer logistical climate than TTL.

22. Keep in mind the experience of the Allies in TTL as well as the time Wainwright and his army have had to prepare for this battle. I don’t see it as overly unrealistic given what happened in OTL especially around the Battle of the Pockets.

23. Again this is basically a supersized version of Homma’s OTL offensives that he never got to launch in TTL.

24. One of the many small ramifications of TTL. Due to a more optimistic situation in the Pacific, the Allies begin thinking about amphibious operations earlier.

25. In TTL the Doolittle Raid goes through the initial planning phases in December 1941 and January 1942 but is aborted due to the American victory at Wake and the need for the Hornet to join the Pacific Fleet. However in the aftermath of the Second Battle of Wake Island and the subsequent shift of American emphasis to the ETO, the survival of Bataan causes plans for the Doolittle Raid to be dusted off.

26. Halsey’s skin condition is from OTL as is his desire for Spruance to replace him and Nimitz’ decision to go with Fletcher.

27. Doolittle participated in the planning of TTL’s raid but was assigned to the FEAF. The resumption of planning for the raid means that he’s pulled out. As a result, Doolittle gets his choice of men and he chooses the veterans of the 8th Bombardment Squadron which, like in OTL, was one of the first with combat experience in the B-25.

28. All like OTL.

29. Keep in mind that unlike Halsey, Fletcher has no undamaged Japanese fleet carriers to worry about. As a result he sails on for longer and sends the signal to the Chinese, two things that Halsey didn’t do.

30. Still no luck for the Ryuho in TTL. Given the problems with her conversion, I see no reason why she wouldn’t still be in dry dock.

31. Given that the raiders almost made it in OTL, albeit with the aid of a considerable amount of wind, I see these results as reasonable.

32. Doolittle experienced a similar promotion in OTL after the raid.

33. Given the choice between a force that can be reinforced and resupplied and a force that cannot, the side that cannot will always lose, no matter who is in command.

34. King is thinking long term here with the resistance. As for the mortar shells, they were notoriously unreliable in OTL. Given their lack of effectiveness and the poor supply situation, I can see this as a logical development for the Americans.

35. Japanese casualties are roughly 300% higher than OTL.

36. The actions of King and Wainwright in creating and strengthening the Philippine resistance means that it is exponentially stronger in TTL ... for better or for worse.