(Gas from Russia to Southern Europe - a source of money and Russian influence in Europe)
The deal proposed by Silvio Berlusconi was too good to pass up for Russia. On 15 December 1996, in Sochi, in the presence of the Prime Minister of Russia Anatoly Sobchak and the Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, the gas companies of Russia, Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece signed an agreement on construction of South Stream. On 6 January 1997, the Prime Minister of Russia Anatoly Sobchak and the Prime Minister of Turkey Necmettin Erbakan in attendance of the Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi signed a protocol routing the pipeline through the Turkish territorial waters. The South Stream pipeline would be completed in January 2003, with a capacity of at least 10 billion cubic metres (350 billion cubic feet) per year. The onshore pipeline would have eight compressor stations, and it was estimated to cost €6 billion.
In the meantime, citizens of Kaliningrad decided in a referendum that the name of their city should remain unchanged.
As it was earlier promised by Prime Minister Sobchak, combating the enviromental degradation in Russia was a top priority for the government. To tackle the issue, the government undertook folllowing initiatives:
- introduction of a regulatory body to deal with the issue;
- stricter enforcement of environmental regulations;
- increased funding for national parks;
- development of renewable energy sources;
- modernization of water treatment facilities;
- increased fines for illegal dumping of industrial waste;
- increased funding for cleanup efforts;
- introduction of "Operation Tree" in schools throughout Russia;
- state-sponsored awareness campaign;
- establishment of programs to eliminate undergrowth and dry wood from forests in order to minimize the risks of forest fires;
- Introduction of measures to control industrial pollution;
- creation of designated areas for industrial waste.
(Thanks to the government's investments, by the 2000s Russia become second largest steel producer in the world)
Thanks to the cheap American, European and Japanese credits, the Russian government could begin a series of new projects in order to modernize the country, which included:
- expansion of the mining of rare earth minerals;
- investments in the production of electric cars;
- expansion and modernization of the highway and train networks throughout Russia;
- modernization of communication links between Moscow and Minsk;
- establishment of the Russian semiconductor industry;
- establishment of Russian Technological Associations;
- increased funding for the development of ER - 200 train design;
- establishment of a high-speed railway network between the largest population centers in Russia;
- modernization of ports, airports and power plants across the country;
- subsidies for the industrial sector.
(Purchase of the S-300 missile system from Russia sparked an international crisis between Turkey and Cyprus/Greece)
The Cypriot S-300 crisis was a tense and rapidly escalating political standoff between the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey. The confrontation was sparked by Cypriot plans to install three Russian-made S-300 air-defence missile sites on their territory, provoking Turkey into threatening an attack or even all-out war if the missiles were not returned to Russia. The missile deal with Russia represented the Cyprus government's first serious attempt at building a credible air defence system after years of Turkish superiority in the air. The S-300 system was completed in 1978. It is designed to defend against short and medium-range air attacks. At its time it was considered one of the world's most powerful air defence systems. Russia sold the S-300 system to 20 countries. The Imia crisis in the Aegean Sea broke out in the final days of 1995 and reached its peak in January 1996. Failing to stop Turkish Air Force flights Greece concluded that the proportional U.S. arms sales made to both countries could not meet Greek needs. The first step took in this regard in 1996 was to sign a deal with Russia for the purchase of S-300 air defence system for deployment on Cyprus.
As of 1995, the Cypriot government had reportedly begun conceptualisation and planning of an integrated air-defence solution to defend the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, which, according to local press reports, sustained nearly-daily airspace violations by the Turkish Air Force, acting on behalf of the de facto Turkish state in the north. Further heightening concerns was the recent sale of Israeli ATACMS long-range artillery rockets to Turkey; these weapons could be fired directly from bases on Turkey's southern coast with the capability of reaching Southern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots determined that they had no ready means of defence against them. On 3 January 1997, an unnamed defence source leaked information to the Cypriot media regarding the purchase of Russian-made surface-to-air missiles, a story picked up by Reuters, the Cyprus News Agency, and others. The leak reported that the date for the conclusion of the sale between Russia and Cyprus for surface-to-air missile systems would be 4 January 1997.
On 5 January 1997, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Alekos Michaelides, announced to the world media that the government had acquired an air-defence capability in the form of Russian-made S-300 air-defence missiles and associated radars. At the stage, details were kept vague, and the media seized upon rumours ranging from claimed numbers of missiles and capability, to wildly-differing claims of the price for the purchase. On the same day, a government spokesman, Yiannakis Cassoulides, made a statement in which he remarked that the Cyprus government had the legitimate right to enhance its "defence capabilities" and also said that the weapons purchase was "proportional" to the Turkish military buildup in the north of the island. Concurrently, Turkish Defence Minister Turhan Tayan was reported in Turkey as saying that the action would "undermine peace in the region". Russia's main defence export agency, Rosvooruzheniye, also added its comment to the media frenzy when its spokesman Valery Pogrebenkov stated that the sale of S-300 missiles to Cyprus would not adversely affect the balance of power in the region, as the weapons were "purely defensive".
(Compicated situation in Cyprus)
On 11 January 1997, Cypriot and US media sources reported that Turkey had overtly threatened either a pre-emptive strike to prevent the arrival of the missiles or an actual war in Cyprus as a response to the arrival of the missiles. Also, it threatened a blockade of Cyprus from Turkey. Turkey also said that it might occupy an abandoned tourist resort in Cyprus if the Cypriot government did not back down. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, threatened to take over Varosha, a disputed area that has been sealed off since Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Most property in Varosha is owned by Greek Cypriots.
The Turkish Armed Forces, when the purchase of S-300 was announced, obtained surface-to-surface missiles from Israel, which could be used in a military operation to destroy the S-300 if they were installed on the island. Also, according to Turkish media and other countries' intelligence agencies,Turkish pilots with their F-16s were sent to Israel's Negev region to be trained on how to destroy the S-300s. According to Israeli radio reports, Turkish pilots were trained only on how to evade the S-300s, not on how to destroy them. The Israel embassy at Athens denied all reports. In March 1997, Turkish armed forces carried out a military exercise in Northern Cyprus, where they destroyed S-300 dummy missiles to prepare for operations against the real missiles on Cyprus. The Cypriot government protested against the Turkish threats at the United Nations and asserted its right for self-defence and the need for effective deterrence. In addition, Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides said that the missiles would be deployed on the island but used only defensively. Also, the Cypriot National Guard were placed on their highest state of alert and mobilisation since the 1974 invasion of the island by Turkey. Between January and June 1997, Greece reportedly increased the readiness of the Hellenic Air Force and the Hellenic Navy assets positioned closest to Cyprus and moved to support the Cypriot position, tacitly that the missiles were designed only for defence. The situation was then escalated, this time by the Greek decision to send a small contingent of F-16 fighter jets to Cyprus as well as additional troops to reinforce the Greek ELDYK contingent on the island.
Turkish threats led to a campaign by Western countries to prevent the system's deployment on Cyprus for fear of triggering a war in Cyprus that could draw in the Greeks. In addition, the European Union warned that a military buildup could harm Cyprus's application for membership. The United States strongly opposed Cyprus's plans to install the anti-aircraft weapons; however, it also warned Turkey not to attack. The U.S. State Department spokesman stated: "This is no time for the Turkish government to be making wild and dramatic statements, it would be completely out of bounds for Turkey to take this action. In the months leading up to June 1997, the two sides traded political rhetoric and aggressive propaganda as both attempted to justify their positions before the international community.
On 14 May 1997, NATO Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov announced agreement on the text of the
"Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation," creating a new relationship between the Alliance and Russia. The Act has been referred to NATO countries and President Fyodorov for approval. The Clinton Administration had made building a more stable, secure, and undivided Europe one of its key foreign policy priorities. At the Helsinki summit in March, Presidents Clinton and Fyodorov agreed on the importance of crafting a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. The Act provided the basis for an enduring and robust partnership between NATO and Russia, one that could make an important contribution to Europe's security architecture in the 21st century. Under the terms of the Act, NATO and Russia would consult and coordinate regularly and, where possible and appropriate, act jointly - as they were doing in Bosnia. The Act had five principal sections:
The preamble noted that NATO and Russia did not consider one another adversaries and cited the sweeping transformations in NATO and Russia that made possible this new relationship.
Section I lays out the principles governing the relationship, e.g., restatement of the norms of international conduct in the UN Charter and OSCE Helsinki Final Act and explicit commitments, such as respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and settling disputes peacefully.
Section II creates a new forum called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for NATO-Russia meetings and describes how this Council will function.
Section III describes a range of issues that NATO and Russia will discuss, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and exchange of information on security policies and defense forces.
Section IV describes the military dimensions of the relationship. Among the key provisions:
Reiteration by NATO of aspects of its current defense policy and strategy, including the December 1996 statement that it has "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members including nuclear weapons storage sites.
Reference to NATO's March 14, 1997 statement that in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO will carry out its collective defense and other missions through interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members.
Recognition that NATO will require adequate infrastructure on new members' territories commensurate with NATO's collective defense and other missions.
Commitment by NATO and Russia to work for prompt adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to reflect the changed security environment since CFE was completed in 1990.
Section IV also provides mechanisms to foster closer military-to-military cooperation between NATO and Russian militaries, including by creating military liaison missions in respective NATO and Russian military headquarters.
NATO retains its full prerogatives. While Russia will work closely with NATO, it will not work within NATO. The Act makes clear that Russia has no veto over alliance decisions and NATO retains the right to act independently when it so chooses.
The Act has no impact on NATO enlargement. That process is proceeding on schedule; NATO leaders at the Madrid summit in July will extend invitations to the first countries to begin accession talks. Those countries admitted will have the full rights and responsibilities of Alliance membership, and the door to membership will remain open to all emerging European democracies.
(Mohammad Khamati - new reformist president of Iran)
Presidential elections were held in Iran on 23 May 1997, which resulted in an unpredicted win for the reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami. The election was notable not only for the lopsided majority of the winner - 70% - but for the high turnout. 80% of those eligible to vote did so, compared to 50% in the previous presidential election. During the election, voting age was 15 and more than half of Iran's population was younger than 25. Running on a reform agenda, Khatami was elected president, in what many have described as a remarkable election. Despite limited television airtime, most of which went to the conservative Speaker of Parliament and favored candidate Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, Khatami received 70 percent of the vote. "Even in Qom, the center of theological training in Iran and a conservative stronghold, 70% of voters cast their ballots for Khatami." He was re-elected on 8 June 2001 for a second term and stepped down on 3 August 2005 after serving his maximum two consecutive terms under the Islamic Republic's constitution.
Khatami supporters have been described as a "coalition of strange bedfellows, including traditional leftists business leaders who wanted the state to open up the economy and allow more foreign investment" and "younger voters". Khatami’s ascendancy was a prelude to a dynamic reform thrust that injected hope into Iranian society, whipped up a dormant nation after eight years of war with Iraq in the 1980s and the costly post-conflict reconstruction, and incorporated terms in the political lexicon of young Iranians that were not previously embedded in the national discourse, nor did they count as priorities for the majority of the people. The day of his election, 2 Khordad, 1376, in the Iranian calendar, is regarded as the starting date of "reforms" in Iran. His followers are therefore usually known as the "2nd of Khordad Movement". Khatami was regarded as Iran's first reformist president, since the focus of his campaign was on the rule of law, democracy and the inclusion of all Iranians in the political decision-making process. However, his policies of reform led to repeated clashes with the hardline and conservative Islamists in the Iranian government, who controlled powerful governmental organizations like the Guardian Council, whose members were appointed by the Supreme Leader. Khatami lost most of those clashes, and by the end of his presidency many of his followers had grown disillusioned with him.
As President, according to the Iranian political system, Khatami was outranked by the Supreme Leader. Thus, Khatami had no legal authority over key state institutions such as the armed forces, the police, the army, the revolutionary guards, the state radio and television, and the prisons. Khatami presented the so-called "twin bills" to the parliament during his term in office, these two pieces of proposed legislation would have introduced small but key changes to the national election laws of Iran and also presented a clear definition of the president's power to prevent constitutional violations by state institutions. Khatami himself described the "twin bills" as the key to the progress of reforms in Iran. The bills were approved by the parliament but were eventually vetoed by the Guardian Council.
(During the 19th century, Russian and Britain divided Iran into spheres of influence)
During the 19th century, Russians dealt with Iran as an inferior "Orient", and held its people in contempt whilst ridiculing all aspects of Iranian culture. The Russian version of contemporaneous Western attitudes of superiority differed however. As Russian national identity was divided between East and West and Russian culture held many Asian elements, Russians consequently felt equivocal and even inferior to Western Europeans. In order to stem the tide of this particular inferiority complex, they tried to overcompensate to Western European powers by overemphasizing their own Europeanness and Christian faith, and by expressing scornfully their low opinion of Iranians. The historian Elena Andreeva adds that this trend was not only very apparent in over 200 Russian travelogues written about Iran and published in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but also in diplomatic and other official documents. In 1907, Russia and Britain divided Iran into three segments that served their mutual interests, in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The Russians gained control over the northern areas of Iran, which included the cities of Tabriz, Tehran, Mashad, and Isfahan. The British were given the southeastern region and control of the Persian Gulf, and the territory between the two regions was classified as neutral territory.
Russia's influence in northern Iran was paramount from the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. During this time period, it stationed troops in Iran's Gilan, Azerbaijan and Khorasan provinces, and its diplomatic offices (consulates) in these parts wieleded considerable power. These consulates dominated the local Iranian administration and in some circumstances even collected local taxes. Starting in the same year as the Anglo-Russian Convention, unpremeditated Russian colonization commenced in Mazandaran and Astarabad provinces. Then, in 1912, Russian foreign policy officially adopted the plan to colonize northern Iran. At the outbreak of World War I, there were most likely some 4,000 Russian settlers in Astarabad and Mazandaran, whereas in northeastern Iran the Russians had founded a minimum of 15 Russian villages. During the reign of Nicholas II of Russia, Russian occupational troops played a major role in the attempted Tsarist suppression of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. In the dawn of the outbreak of World War I, Russian occupational forces occupied Qajar Iran's Azerbaijan province as well as the entire north and north-east of the country, and amounted to circa twenty thousand. Following the start of the Persian Campaign of World War I, the number of Russian troops in Iran moderately grew to some eighty or ninety thousand.
As a result of the major Anglo-Russian influence in Iran, at a high point, the central government in Tehran was left with no power to even select its own ministers without the approval of the Anglo-Russian consulates. Morgan Shuster, for example, had to resign under British and Russian diplomatic pressure on the Persian government. Shuster's book The Strangling of Persia: Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue That Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans is an account of this period, criticizing the policies of Russian and Britain in Iran. These, and a series of climaxing events such as the Russian shelling of Mashad's Goharshad Mosque in 1911, and the shelling of the Persian National Assembly by the Russian Colonel V. Liakhov, led to a surge in widespread anti-Russian sentiments across the nation.
One result of the public outcry against the ubiquitous presence of Imperial Russia in Persia was the Constitutionalist movement of Gilan, which followed up the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Many participants of the revolution were Iranians educated in the Caucasus, direct émigrés (also called Caucasian muhajirs) from the Caucasus, as well as Armenians that at the same period were busy with establishing the Dashnaktsutyun party as well as operations directed against the neighboring Ottoman Empire. The rebellion in Gilan, headed by Mirza Kuchak Khan led to an eventual confrontation between the Iranian rebels and the Russian army, but was disrupted with the October Revolution in 1917.
As a result of the October Revolution, thousands of Russians fled the country, many to Persia. Many of these refugees settled in northern Persia creating their own communities of which many of their descendants still populate the country. Some notable descendants of these Russian refugees in Persia include the political activist and writer Marina Nemat and the former general and deputy chief of the Imperial Iranian Air Force Nader Jahanbani, whose mother was a White émigré. Russian involvement however continued on with the establishment of the short-lived Persian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920, supported by Azeri and Caucasian Bolshevik leaders. After the fall of this republic, in late 1921, political and economic relations were renewed. In the 1920s, trade between the Soviet Union and Persia reached again important levels. Baku played a particularly significant role as the venue for a trade fair between the USSR and the Middle East, notably Persia. In 1921, Britain and the new Bolshevik government entered into an agreement that reversed the division of Iran made in 1907. The Bolsheviks returned all the territory back to Iran, and Iran once more had secured navigation rights on the Caspian Sea. This agreement to evacuate from Iran was made in the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship (1921), but the regaining of Iranian territory did not protect the Qajar dynasty from a sudden coup d'état led by Colonel Reza Shah.
In the 1920s-1930s, the Soviet secret service (Cheka-OGPU-NKVD) carried out clandestine operations on Iranian soil as it tried to eliminate White émigrées that had moved to Iran. In 1941, as the Second World War raged, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom launched an undeclared joint invasion of Iran, ignoring its plea of neutrality. In a revealing cable sent on July 6, 1945, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the local Soviet commander in northern Azerbaijan was instructed as such:
"Begin preparatory work to form a national autonomous Azerbaijan district with broad powers within the Iranian state and simultaneously develop separatist movements in the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and Khorasan".
After the end of the war, the Soviets supported two newly formed in Iran, the Azerbaijan People's Government and the Republic of Mahabad, but both collapsed in the Iran crisis of 1946. This postwar confrontation brought the United States fully into Iran's political arena and, with Cold War starting, the US quickly moved to convert Iran into an anti-communist ally. The Soviet Union was the first state to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran, in February 1979. During the Iran–Iraq War, however, it supplied Saddam Hussein with large amounts of conventional arms. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini deemed Islam principally incompatible with the communist ideals (such as atheism) of the Soviet Union, leaving the secular Saddam as an ally of Moscow. However, during the war, the USA imposed an arms embargo on Iran, and the Soviet Union supplied arms to Iran via North Korea. After the war, in 1989, Iran made an arms deal with Soviet Union. With the fall of the USSR, Tehran–Moscow relations experienced a sudden increase in diplomatic and commercial relations, and Russia soon inherited the Soviet-Iranian arms deals. By the mid-1990s, Russia had already agreed to continue work on developing Iran's nuclear program, with plans to finish constructing the nuclear reactor plant at Bushehr.
Iran was Russia’s most important ally in the Middle East. Moscow supplied Tehran with arms and nuclear reactors. They were allies against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, as well as in countering Azerbaijan and Turkey. Russia had also helped Iran's efforts to evade and eliminate the U.S.-led efforts to isolate that country. Yet the election of Iranian president Muhammad Khatami in May 1997 and his subsequent efforts at rapprochement with the United States have begun to threaten Russian-Iranian relations.One of the most striking changes in Russia’s foreign policy, as compared to that of the former Soviet Union, had been a revision of its regional priorities. With the Soviet breakup, the newly independent states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia had become a central focus of Russian policymakers trying to regain control of that area. Given these states’ importance and their ties to Turkey and Iran, Russia tended to view the Middle East through the lens of its policy toward Central Asia and Transcaucasia.
Of all the states in the Middle East, perhaps none was more important to Russia than Iran. Iran’s strategic location on the Persian Gulf, its importance as a trading partner, and its ties and interests in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia have all drawn Moscow’s close attention. There were some differences between the two states, for example Russian misgivings over some Iranian circles' call for spreading Islamic radicalism, and Iran’s offer to transport energy resources from the Central Asia and the trans-Caucasus as an alternative to Russia. Nevertheless, the rgovernment of Russian President Svyatoslav Fyodorov valued Iran as an important market for Russian arms and nuclear reactors, and as a way to demonstrate independence from the United States. The two countries also shared an interest in checking Turkey’s influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in opposing Taliban forces in Afghanistan, and in containing Azerbaijani irredentism and independence. In addition, Iran needed Russia’s diplomatic aid in the face of U.S. Isolation.
Russian relations with Turkey and Iran were of prime importance for Moscow, particularly in view of these countries’ influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia and the potential threat they pose to Russia’s influence in those regions. The oil-rich and strategically important Persian Gulf was also high on Russia’s list of priority regions. Moscow has sought, though not always successfully, to balance its policy among Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, whose inter-relations have usually been marked by deep hostility. The third priority, now of far less importance, was the central Arab-Israeli zone composed of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian entity. During most of the Soviet period, Moscow focused on this region in seeking to construct an alliance based on Arab hostility to what the USSR called the “linchpin” of Western imperialism—Israel. Although relations have been strained over Russian supply of nuclear reactors and missile technology to Iran, Moscow sees Israel as its closest friend in this sub-region. Israel is Russia’s major trading partner among these states, there has been military production cooperation, and the more than 900,000 Israeli citizens who emigrated from the Soviet Union create a major cultural bond between Russia and Israel. In addition, close Russian-Israeli ties enable Russia to play at least a symbolic, if not substantive, role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Finally, Turkey playeed a special role for Russian policy in the Middle East. Not only Turkey was Russia’s main economic partner in the area and an increasingly important actor in regional politics, it was also a rival to Russia’s position in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.
The Russian-Iranian rapprochement began in the latter part of the Gorbachev era. After alternatively supporting first Iran and then Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, Gorbachev had clearly tilted toward Iran by July 1987. The two states solidified their ties in June 1989 when Iran’s president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, visited Moscow and concluded a number of major agreements, including one on military cooperation. The military agreement permitted Iran to purchase highly sophisticated military aircraft from Moscow, including MIG-29s and SU-24s. At the time, Iran desperately needed Soviet military equipment as its air fleet had been badly eroded by the eight-year war with Iraq and it could not request spare parts, let alone new planes, from the United States. Iran’s military dependence on Moscow grew as a result of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The United States, Iran’s main enemy, become the primary military power in the Gulf, obtaining defensive agreements with several GCC states that included pre-positioning arrangements for U.S. military equipment. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s most important Islamic challenger, also acquired massive amounts of U.S. weaponry. In addition, while the war left Iraq badly damaged, its oil wealth could provide a quick military recovery if sanctions were lifted.
The war in Afghanistan, to Iran’s northeast, continued despite the Soviet withdrawal, with Shi’a forces backed by Iran taking heavy losses. To the north, the USSR's collapse presented both opportunity and danger for Iran. On one hand, for example, Iran had the chance to export its influence to six new Muslim states (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). But Iran was also challenged by some factors. In Azerbaijan, the Popular Front, which ruled in 1992-1993, urged the unification of that country with Iran's Azerbaijan area. Iran faces a similar, if far less serious problem, with Turkmenistan, whose natural gas resources might make it an irredentist attraction for Turkmens living in northeastern Iran.) Given Iran’s need for sophisticated arms, Rafsanjani was careful not to alienate either the Soviet Union or Russia during his term as president. Thus, when Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union in November 1991, Iran - unlike Turkey-did not recognize its independence until after the USSR collapsed. Similarly, despite occasional rhetoric from Iranian officials, Rafsanjani ensured that Iran kept a relatively low Islamic profile in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, emphasizing cultural and economic ties rather than Islam as the centerpiece of relations. This was due in part to the fact that after more than 70 years of Soviet rule, Islam was weak in those places; leaders of the mew states were all secular, and chances for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution were very low. Indeed, some skeptics argued that Iran was simply waiting for mosques to be built and Islam to mature before trying to bring about Islamic revolutions.
Nonetheless, the Russian leadership believed that Iran was basically acting very responsibly in Central Asia and Transcaucasia and was thus ready to continue supplying Tehran with modern weaponry—including submarines—despite strong protests from the United States. Iran’s low-key reaction toward the Muslim insurgency in Chechnya and toward Russia’s pro-Serb and anti-Muslim policy in Bosnia in 1993-1995 helped cement relations further. During 1992, Fyodorov’s honeymoon year with the United States-when he and Washington agreed on virtually all Middle East issues aside from Iran-the two countries clashed over Russian arms shipments to Iran. Iraq and Libya were under UN sanctions, while Syria lacked the hard currency to pay for weapons and already owed Russia some $10 billion. In contrast, Iran could supply Russia with badly needed hard currency.
(The Taliban victory in Afghanistan forced closer cooperation between Russia and Iran)
In addition, despite Fyodorov’s cultivation of the United States, there were a number of influential Moscow figures such as Igor Ivanov advocating a more independent Russian policy in the Middle East. Given that the United States did not have relations with Iran or Iraq, Russia could fill the diplomatic vacuum in both states. Furthermore, unlike Iraq or Libya, America’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained extensive economic ties with Iran, though the Salmon Rushdie affair and the murder of Iranian exiles in Western Europe somewhat damaged political relations. Thus, Russia had a certain amount of diplomatic cover for its dealings with Iran. Consequently, as Fydorov came under fire from increasingly vocal members of parliament in 1993 and 1994 for being too subservient to the United States, he could point to American criticism of his policy toward Iran—which by 1993 included a promise to sell nuclear reactors—to demonstrate his independence. Indeed, one of the central issues of contention in the May 1995 Moscow summit between Clinton and Fyodorov was Russia's January 1995 decision to sell nuclear reactors that Washington claimed would speed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Fyodorov refused to back down in the face of U.S. pressure. But he did agree to cancel a proposed gas centrifuge sale to Iran--initially approved by Russia’s atomic energy ministry--which might have aided Iran’s nuclear proliferation, something very few Russians, including Fydorov, wanted. Nonetheless, the Russians regularly asserted that U.S. opposition to the sale of nuclear reactors was due to commercial jealousy, not to any genuine fear of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
The surprisingly swift military victories of Taliban forces in Afghanistan in September 1996 spurred even closer Russian-Iranian cooperation. Given that the Sunni Taliban were enemies of the Iranian-backed Shi’a forces in Afghanistan, and that the obscurantist nature of Taliban Islam embarrassed even the Iranian leadership, Iran sought to build a coalition to stop the Taliban offensive. It organized a regional conference in Tehran, which Russia attended, to address the situation. Russia’s leadership, which feared that the Taliban's influence could penetrate Central Asia or even Russia itself (20 percent of whose population was Muslim), had an equally strong interest in blocking the Taliban. Consequently, the situation in Afghanistan was high on the agenda when Ivanov visited Tehran in December 1996. In addition, the fact that Afghanistan, under the Taliban, soon became a haven for purveyors of opium concerned both Iran and Russia, which faced growing drug problems, and the two countries signed an agreement to fight the narcotics trade in 1997.
Concerns about Afghanistan also influenced discussions on Tajikistan. Tajikistan exemplified for Russia the threat of Islamic radicalism, particularly immediately after the Soviet collapse. Ironically, the civil war in Tajikistan did not begin with a radical Islamic attempt to seize power, but rather with a loose alignment of Western-style democrats and moderate Islamists, primarily from the eastern provinces of Garm and Pamir, ousting an old-line Communist leader. When the Communists came back into power with the help of Uzbek and Soviet military forces, many Islamists fled across the border into Afghanistan, where they became radicalized, and then mounted attacks back across the border into Tajikistan. In the process they killed some Russian soldiers guarding the Tajik border and drew Moscow into the fighting, posing a serious problem for Russian leaders who had no desire to get too deeply involved in another Afghanistan-type war in Central Asia. Under these circumstances, a diplomatic settlement of the war in Tajikistan became an important objective for Fydorov, though some elements in the Russian Defense Ministry appeared to prefer fighting there to revenge Russia’s defeat by Islamists in Afghanistan.
Since many Islamic opposition leaders, including Akbar Turajanzode, had taken refuge in Iran, it became necessary to bring Iran into the diplomatic process. By spring 1994, with Iran's aid, Russia managed to get talks started between the opposing sides, though Russian troops continued to suffer casualties in the fighting along the Tajik-Afghan border. With Iran’s help, Russia brokered an agreement in February 1997 between the government and rebel Islamic forces. Thus, for the time being at least, the Russian-Iranian relationship had been reinforced, though distrust remained high between the Tajik government and opposition forces and the agreement suffered a number of breakdowns. Russia and Iran continued to maintain close contact on Tajikistan.
(Russian troops in Taijikistan during the civil war)
The Tajikistani Civil War began in May 1992 and ended in June 1997. Regional groups from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions of Tajikistan rose up against the newly-formed government of President Rahmon Nabiyev, which was dominated by people from the Khujand and Kulob regions. The rebel groups were led by a combination of liberal democratic reformers and Islamists, who would later organize under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition. The government was supported by Russian military and border guards. The main zone of conflict was in the country's south, although disturbances occurred nationwide. The civil war was at its peak during its first year and continued for five years, devastating the country. An estimated 20,000 to 150,000people were killed in the conflict, and about 10 to 20 percent of the population of Tajikistan were internally displaced. On 27 June 1997, Tajikistan president Emomali Rahmon, United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leader Sayid Abdulloh Nuri and Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General Gerd Merrem signed the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan and the Moscow Protocol in Moscow, Russia, ending the war.
There were numerous causes of civil war in Tajikistan, such as economic hardship, communal way of life of Tajiki people and their high religiosity. Under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's 'Perestroika' policies, a Muslim-Democratic movement began to emerge in Tajiki SSR. The backbone of opposition were Party of Tajikistan Muslim Resurrection, Democratic party of Tajikistan and some other movements. The fight between the former communist elite and opposition shifted from the political sphere to an ethnic and clan based one. Tensions began in the spring of 1992 after opposition members took to the streets in demonstrations against the results of the 1991 presidential election. President Rahmon Nabiyev and Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Safarali Kenjayev orchestrated the dispersal of weapons to pro-government militias, while the opposition turned to mujahideen in Afghanistan for military aid. Fighting broke out on 5 May 1992 between old-guard supporters of the government and a loosely organized opposition composed of ethnic and regional groups from the Gharm and Gorno-Badakhshan areas (the latter were also known as Pamiris). Ideologically, the opposition included democratic liberal reformists and Islamists. The government, on the other hand, was dominated by people from the Leninabadi region, which had also made up most of the ruling elite during the entire Soviet period. It was also supported by people from the Kulob region, who had held high posts in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Soviet times. After many clashes, the Leninabadis were forced to accept a compromise and a new coalition government was formed, incorporating members of the opposition and eventually dominated by them. On 7 September 1992, Nabiyev was captured by opposition protesters and forced at gunpoint to resign his presidency. Chaos and fighting between the opposing factions reigned outside of the capital Dushanbe.
With the aid of the Russian military and Uzbekistan, the Leninabadi-Kulobi Popular Front forces routed the opposition in early and late 1992. The coalition government in the capital was forced to resign. On 12 December 1992 the Supreme Soviet (parliament), where the Leninabadi-Kulobi faction had held the majority of seats all along, convened and elected a new government under the leadership of Emomali Rahmon, representing a shift in power from the old power based in Leninabad to the militias from Kulob, from which Rahmon came. The height of hostilities occurred from 1992 to 1993 and pitted Kulobi militias against an array of groups, including militants from the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP) and ethnic minority Pamiris from Gorno-Badakhshan. In large part due to the foreign support they received, the Kulobi militias were able to soundly defeat opposition forces and went on what has been described by Human Rights Watch as an ethnic cleansing campaign against Pamiris and Garmis. The campaign was concentrated in areas south of the capital and included the murder of prominent individuals, mass killings, the burning of villages and the expulsion of the Pamiri and Garmi population into Afghanistan. The violence was particularly concentrated in Qurghonteppa, the power base of the IRP and home to many Garmis. Tens of thousands were killed or fled to Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the opposition reorganized and rearmed with the aid of the Jamiat-i-Islami. The group's leader Ahmad Shah Masoud became a benefactor of the Tajik opposition. Later in the war the opposition organized under an umbrella group called the United Tajik Opposition, or UTO. Elements of the UTO, especially in the Tavildara region, became the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, while the leadership of the UTO was opposed to the formation of the organization. Other combatants and armed bands that flourished in this civil chaos simply reflected the breakdown of central authority rather than loyalty to a political faction. In response to the violence the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan was deployed. Most fighting in the early part of the war occurred in the southern part of the country, but by 1996 the rebels were battling Russian troops in the capital city of Dushanbe.
A United Nations-sponsored armistice finally ended the war in 1997. This was in part fostered by the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, a Track II diplomacy initiative in which the main players were brought together by international actors, namely the United States and Russia. The peace agreement eliminated the Leninabad region (Khujand) from power. Presidential elections were held on 6 November 1999. The UTO warned in letters to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon on 23 June 1997 that it would not sign the proposed peace agreement on 27 June if prisoner exchanges and the allocation of jobs in the coalition government were not outlined in the agreement. Akbar Turajonzoda, second-in-command of the UTO, repeated this warning on 26 June, but said both sides were negotiating. President Rahmon, UTO leader Sayid Abdulloh Nuri and Russian President Fyodorov met in the Kremlin in Moscow on 26 June to finish negotiating the peace agreement. The Tajik government had previously pushed for settling these issues after the two sides signed the agreement, with the posts in the coalition government decided by a joint commission for national reconciliation and prisoner exchanges by a future set of negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov met with the Foreign Ministers of Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to discuss the proposed peace accord.
By the end of the war, Tajikistan was in a state of complete devastation. Around 1.2 million people were refugees inside and outside the country. Tajikistan's physical infrastructure, government services and economy were in disarray, and much of the population was surviving on subsistence handouts from international aid organizations. The United Nations established a Mission of Observers in December 1994, maintaining peace negotiations until the warring sides signed a comprehensive peace agreement in 1997.
On 1 June 1997, Russia joined the Paris Club, which was a group of officials from major creditor countries whose role was to find co-ordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertook reforms to stabilize and restore their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club creditors provided an appropriate debt treatment. Paris Club creditors provided debt treatments to debtor countries in the form of rescheduling, which was debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional rescheduling, reduction in debt service obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set date (stock treatment). The Paris Club was created gradually from 1956, when the first negotiation between Argentina and its public creditors took place in Paris. The Paris Club treated public claims (that is to say, those due by governments of debtor countries and by the private sector), guaranteed by the public sector to Paris Club members. A similar process occurred for public debt held by private creditors in the London Club, which was organized in 1970 on the model of the Paris Club as an informal group of commercial banks met to renegotiate the debt they hold on sovereign debtors.
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