Was a submarine raid on Scapa Flow possible in the early stages of the war in 1914 with careless British Admirals not guarding things?
WI Britain, seeing Germany develop U-boats (as in this TL your writing), decides to deploy torpedo nets as countermeasures, and then, believing RN ships safe, becomes careless.
Assume the Germans actually conduct tests (Long range voyages) with these boats, and manages to improve the designs to become reliable.
Then, in the opening stages of WW1, 10 U-boats manage to sneak in and sink 50 vessels, including 20 battleships (OTL during the Dardanelles campaign, 3 british battleships were sunk, all with torpedo nets deployed), and then all escape, with no losses
OR is that ASB?
Interesting. A PoD in 1904 with the Karp class built for Russia is possible. I am curious, how you want to deal with the capital ships. It might be needed to keep up building them as well. And only to fool the British as well as to pacify the admirals not wanting the Uboats. Also they are still needed in the long run.
Adler
To avoid butterflies, the funding for the U-boats will be additional funding. My rough projections have about a 1-2% increase in Imperial Germany's Naval budget. The Germans will have exactly the same number of surface ships as OTL. The other powers will have the same capital ships, but i may make some adjustment to support ships. The POD is not to fool the British because the true uses of a U-boat are not appreciated at higher Naval levels. I have yet to come across a pre-war reference to unrestricted submarine warfare. Mahan analysis of Europe pre-war indicates that the existing sea laws will be followed, that Holland will be able import unlimited amounts of material for re-export overland, and that the British will have great difficulty maintaining a close blockade. For example, Mahan thinks that the British will be unable to close the Baltic ports, so the Germans will simply send all neutral shipping to the Baltic ports, not the North Seas ports, and the British will let the ships passed unhindered.
The Germans will still have all the difficulties adjusting to the surprise British actions, and Vice Versa. More ships and more experience will give the Germans a more powerful tool, and some of the easier lessons will have been learned. i.e. There will be few training accidents in 1914, mechanical bugs will have been worked out a bit better, the logistics of supporting the subs will be a lot better, the war plan to blockade the channel will be better, etc.
I thought that too at first, but by 1906 the British had over 24 boats built, and by 1910 they had over 62 boats built, and by the war, the had 86 boats of 16 classes. Now to be fair, quite a few sank, but the fleet was still a lot bigger than about the 40 boats the Germans had. The French were actually the leaders in submarines before the war. So, my POD is the Kaiser and the Naval admirals decide they want a submarine fleet in parity to the British or French, and this will get them near 100 boats. The boats are also pretty cheap at 50K to 110K pounds for the British models, so it is not a huge number, no more than 20 built in any given year. Now the 10 year old boats will be very long in the teeth, and of limited value.
The difference from WW2, is that this is not a rush planned, but a 10 year buildup with no naval limitation treaties. The budget cost is not trivial but the entire program is around 7.5 million British pounds over 10 years, and will consume 4000 sailors and say another 4000 support personnel. I am still working on the types of boats but don't have it nailed down. Or the way I am looking at it, two dreadnaughts worth of budget.
The big selling point is that Naval authorities believed submarines made a naval base almost unattackable, and that Port Arthur would not have happened if the Russians have subs. Whether or not this is true does not matter, it only matters that they believed it pre-war. Once it is in the naval budgets at an average of 10 or so boats per year, it will just keep getting funding each year. This is why i am avoiding reading post war analysis. I want to have the same beliefs as pre-war people did. I am trying not to implement any idea, if i can't find it in a 1913 or earlier work.
And to get around admiral slots, I will bring one up through the ranks. Otto Schultze. In my time line, he will be ready for the job, when an admiral job shows up. He his POD is being assigned to U-2 in 1905/06. He will make squadron commander when the total U-boat crews would not gun a main battery on a BB. After all, if there is 8 U-boats, someone is in charge. And the way these boats are, it will be lucky if 6 still float. They were death traps early on.
http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRMACHT/KRIEGSMARINE/Generaladmirals/SCHULTZE_OTTO.html
The British spent far more per capita and in real amounts on their fleet than the Germans. The Brits then could afford to have so many Uboats, because they already had a massive fleet. Physically yes it is possible for Germany to build up all of those boats, but I cannot figure a single reason why they would do so, given their primary land focus. Especially since the naval race ended in 1912 and the Germans were then focused on expanding their army.
Plus the Kaiser and his admirals (whose opinions actually mattered) were focused on the big battleships and the decisive fleet engagement, the so-called vernichtungsschlacht on the seas. Subs were not viewed as a weapon that could take down anything above a light cruiser, so would be worthless to this pursuit. Unless some how the Jeune Ecole took over in German naval thought I'm still having a hard time imagining how and why the Germans decide for this. It wasn't in the Kaiser's nature to buck the majority of his advisors when they were set on something.
Does the increased submarine war bring the US into the war earlier?
Incidentally, what gets cut for that 1-2% of additional funds?
You raise several points. First on costs. We seem to see the numbers differently. I view the program as being a minor cost item in the overall budget, and the naval bills are slightly larger. I am going to keep this in British pounds. The German annual Naval budget was around 50 million per year. In the first couple of years of the expansion the cost of the U-boats will be around 0.1 million pounds or 0.2% of the budget. By the 1913 time period, the budget will have grown to around 2 million pounds or 4% of the budget. In 1914, the departure from OTL will be about half of that or 2% of the budget. I believe this overstates the marginal cost substantially because a consistent, long-range building plans should lower per unit costs substantially. There also will be built only one model of sub per year, instead of differing designs at different ship yards. These number may seem large, but in terms of the overall naval budget (0.2-2.0%), military budget (0.1-0.7%) or the overall German budget (0.0-0.2%), the numbers seem plausible.
On the last part of cost, the Germans had 144 torpedo boats by 1906. When compared to the number of torpedo boats, a 10 year plan to get to 100 boats does not appear large. This also relates to the role of the U-boat. They were called "daytime torpedo boats". The concept is that torpedo boats can't survive in the clear daytime against a sizable fleet of warships due to the secondary guns on the ships (4'', 5'', etc.) Without submarines, a base was vulnerable to daytime bombardment by BB or CA. Submarines cover this daytime gap by attacking the fleet partially or fully submerged. This is how the British are using the ships at this time period. The submarines are also the invisible pickets watching for approaching fleets. They are serving much the role that patrol planes would play in WW2.
There is also the issue of defense of Colonial ports. The German colonies were lightly protected, and the U-boat will expand into this role over the years, copying the pattern of the French in Tunisia and Algeria. U-boats are the most cost effective method of provide credible protection of ports. Once the decision is made that it is desirable to provide some protection at the colonial ports, U-boats are a very cost effective choice.
The concept will broadly be the "swords and shield" strategy. The surface fleet and the army are the swords that will deliver the decisive naval and land victories. The torpedo boats and the submarines will be the shield that protects the naval base, prevents amphibious assaults, and prevents the colonies while the other battles develop.
Second, on sub usefulness, i see a subtle difference. Yes, subs were viewed as largely useless in fleet battles on the open sea, but subs were viewed as a decisive weapon even against dreadnoughts by some naval strategists. Over time, this view will become a view held by enough individuals to maintain the program.
The Kaiser liked to give out Mahan to his officers to read. In this POD, there is not a decisive event that changes the strategy, but an evolution of views that will eventually differ from OTL enough to enlarge the fleet. It will always be starved for funds, but more ships an trained men will be there. The POD is that Prince Henry, a much more flexible thinker, will begin to see potential in submarines. Through his influence, the Kaiser will also read some of the pro-submarine literature and become more influence by it. In a critical series of meetings, it will decide to add 2 submarines to the 1905 budget and 2 to the 1906 budget. These submarines will be attached to Prince Henry, since he is the champions of the ships. These subs will have limited value, and function more as experimental submarines. In 1907/1908, more functional but yet limited 10 submarines will built, and they will largely be moved to West Africa and East Africa. In 1909, the submarine authorization will be bump as a part of the general ramp up of the navy. (Note, I may have to adjust the years some, and the number built up or down, as i write the time line.) This bump up in production will be a multi-year appropriation, and it will not drop due to lobbying by the ship building companies and Prince Henry. The numbers of subs available will happen to be slightly higher than the British by when the war starts, due mostly to inertia in the building program.
The POD is not the main focus of where I take the TL, but it will be there. The time line should probably be renamed as Prince Henry falls in love with the U-boat.
You seem to see the issue as either subs or fewer BB. In no year, will the U-boat program pay to construct even a single BB. And largely through Prince Henry support, mentoring, and lobbying, the naval budget will be 1 to 2% larger than OTL. Do you still see this as implausible?
A Kaiser class BB costed 45,6 million Mark. In 1914 19 million Mark were planned to build 6 boats (Germany usually ordered boats of 6 or 12, as 12 boats were a flotilla). Thus 12 boats per year would cost 38 million Mark, roughly 85% of a BB.
Adler
...I had Hitler export kit U-boats to friendly ports and assemble U-boat squadrons near 'choke points' of British and potential Allied commerce. Not unlike your proposals.
Subs make good secret minelayers - that's how Haig was killed. Go for torpedo improvements and arm U- and UB-boats with guns for surface actions. UC were only big enough as minelayers but had twin torpedo tubes.
What source are you using for this?
I was basing the early cost estimates off of British submarine costs due to the very small numbers of German subs built before 1914.
Let me make sure i have your number right. You are saying each boat is 3.2 million marks or about 0.5 million British pounds. In 1905, the first boat cost 0.25 million marks ( 0.05 million pounds), which was about the same as the early British boats costs (0.05-0.1 million pounds). If this is true, I will have to deal with the escalating cost issue in later years.
I am glad you found the suggestion of Prince Henry useful. A few other points. As for RN reaction I think a persuasive argument can be made that they will increase their submarine production but by something small like 15-20% Their Admiralty will at some point before the war scratch their heads and ask, "Why is the KM building so many damn subs?" I think one point that will occur to them at some point is that Forkbeard plans to have U-Boats work in close cooperation with the HSF. This was in fact something the RN esp. Jellicoe worried about a great deal and it was something they wanted very much to be able to do themselves leading to the unfortunate K class submarines (which may arrive earlier in your TL). I do not see any panic over the sort of USW which happened OTL before Sherlock Holmes points it out.
My quibble with the Tsingtao flotilla is not its existence but its size. I would see 12-15 as more likely. Now nowhere do I see a Pola Flotilla mentioned. The existence of a sizeable Pola Flotilla at the beginning of the war could make a big difference.
...I had Hitler export kit U-boats to friendly ports and assemble U-boat squadrons near 'choke points' of British and potential Allied commerce. Not unlike your proposals.
Subs make good secret minelayers - that's how Haig was killed. Go for torpedo improvements and arm U- and UB-boats with guns for surface actions. UC were only big enough as minelayers but had twin torpedo tubes.