A True and Better Alamo Redux
- Thread starter Fearless Leader
- Start date
Fascinating timeline.
Am I mistaken in believing that the Kido Butai was at the end of its fuel tether during the raid on PH and had to return to Japan to refuel before continuing on to other operations? I was under the impression that the destroyers in particular were so low on fuel that some thought was given to abandoning them if the fleet remained near Pearl long enough for a third attack.
Am I mistaken in believing that the Kido Butai was at the end of its fuel tether during the raid on PH and had to return to Japan to refuel before continuing on to other operations? I was under the impression that the destroyers in particular were so low on fuel that some thought was given to abandoning them if the fleet remained near Pearl long enough for a third attack.
Fearless Leader
Donor
Yeah...Kimmel is already remembered pretty fondly by Wake Island vets in OTL for his efforts to relieve them. Given their greater role in TTL...
Gee, I would have thought it would have made some difference.
I think you meant 'infinitely', which would also be wrong (unloading in 0 time). How about 'very much'?
I wrote that footnote late at night...fixed.
Question: Would some of the supplies brought in by the Relief Convy included some 500 or 1000 lb bombs? Though IDK even if the Wildcats were configured for carrying them. Still. It wouldn't be a bad thing to have a limited Strike capability
Nope. F4F's can't carry that kind of ordinance, nor do the pilots have training in delivering it accurately. However there are all sorts of goodies on the island for the Marines to raise hell with.
Yes and no. Are they low on fuel? Yes. But their diversion to Wake is earlier than OTL and therefore they actually have slightly more fuel to work with. They're not quite that bad off. You're thinking of the Destroyers which were first on the list to be left behind if fuel became a limiting factor.
TFSmith121
Banned
Again, nicely done
Again, nicely done.
Two things:
1. "1st Marines" would universally be understood in this era as a reference to the 1st Marine Regiment; the 1st Marine Defense Battalion might be "1st DB" or "the defense battalion" or something similar on second reference;
2. APDs were actually a pre-war concept, and the first six conversions commissioned in 1939-40; Transport Division 12 was in the Atlantic in December, 1941, but obvious choices for the sort of "blockade runner" type mission you have suggested here would be the similar destroyer-mineweeper conversions designated as DMS. No less than 13 were assigned to the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Oahu raids as Mine Squadron 2, under Cdr. G.F. Hussey; here's his flagship, USS Hopkins, DMS-13. Even with only three funnels, they could still do ~30 knots flat out, and they had already lost the torpedo tubes, some of the battery, etc, and had extra boats and cranes for the sweeping gear - if you are looking for extemporized APDs, the DMS types are a good bet.
Best,
Again, nicely done.
Two things:
1. "1st Marines" would universally be understood in this era as a reference to the 1st Marine Regiment; the 1st Marine Defense Battalion might be "1st DB" or "the defense battalion" or something similar on second reference;
2. APDs were actually a pre-war concept, and the first six conversions commissioned in 1939-40; Transport Division 12 was in the Atlantic in December, 1941, but obvious choices for the sort of "blockade runner" type mission you have suggested here would be the similar destroyer-mineweeper conversions designated as DMS. No less than 13 were assigned to the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Oahu raids as Mine Squadron 2, under Cdr. G.F. Hussey; here's his flagship, USS Hopkins, DMS-13. Even with only three funnels, they could still do ~30 knots flat out, and they had already lost the torpedo tubes, some of the battery, etc, and had extra boats and cranes for the sweeping gear - if you are looking for extemporized APDs, the DMS types are a good bet.
Best,
1) where did you read this? I tried a quick google and couldn't find the like. I'm not doubting you, just would like to see the info for myself. And was this 'on the way home'?
2) a quick strike in passing on the way home is one thing. Going to Midway and then to Wake would surely mean they have to refuel, rearm, and possibly get new planes.
All I can find suggests that the carriers returned to base after Pearl, which I suspect means they likely had to. Again, a passing strike on the way home, I'd believe, but I'd like to see evidence for anything more than that.
Admiral Halsey
Banned
Loving the TL so far. Hoping the Big E gets through unscathed and has at least close to her OTL reputation along with being saved as a museum ship.
Fearless Leader
Donor
Again, nicely done.
Two things:
1. "1st Marines" would universally be understood in this era as a reference to the 1st Marine Regiment; the 1st Marine Defense Battalion might be "1st DB" or "the defense battalion" or something similar on second reference;
2. APDs were actually a pre-war concept, and the first six conversions commissioned in 1939-40; Transport Division 12 was in the Atlantic in December, 1941, but obvious choices for the sort of "blockade runner" type mission you have suggested here would be the similar destroyer-mineweeper conversions designated as DMS. No less than 13 were assigned to the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Oahu raids as Mine Squadron 2, under Cdr. G.F. Hussey; here's his flagship, USS Hopkins, DMS-13. Even with only three funnels, they could still do ~30 knots flat out, and they had already lost the torpedo tubes, some of the battery, etc, and had extra boats and cranes for the sweeping gear - if you are looking for extemporized APDs, the DMS types are a good bet.
Good catch...this whole 1st Marines debacle is proving to be a pernicious error from the first draft
About the improvised APD's. I originally had Mine Squadron 2 be converted, however I ended up going with the few remaining Wickes class given the fact that they're older ships. I figured that they would be considered the most expendable in said situation.
I have to check my notes for the Midway strike, but I was under the impression that the participation of the Soryu and Hiryu at Wake Island while en route to Japan after Pearl Harbor was common knowledge. They had enough fuel for a few more sorties if they were willing to violate Yamamoto's request that they keep fuel in reserve to fight the US carriers.
TFSmith121
Banned
The thing is, the DMS types are basically ready to use
No problem on the "X Marines" means "regiment" - unless you were or are a Marine, or spend time with them, it's sort of a nuance.
The thing is, the DMS types are basically ready to use ... and, paradoxically, after Pearl, the Pacific Fleet needed all the surface action ships it could muster, and then some.
And it's not like there was shipyard availability being unused at Peak in December 1941...
Best,
Good catch...this whole 1st Marines debacle is proving to be a pernicious error from the first draft
About the improvised APD's. I originally had Mine Squadron 2 be converted, however I ended up going with the few remaining Wickes class given the fact that they're older ships. I figured that they would be considered the most expendable in said situation.
I have to check my notes for the Midway strike, but I was under the impression that the participation of the Soryu and Hiryu at Wake Island while en route to Japan after Pearl Harbor was common knowledge. They had enough fuel for a few more sorties if they were willing to violate Yamamoto's request that they keep fuel in reserve to fight the US carriers.
No problem on the "X Marines" means "regiment" - unless you were or are a Marine, or spend time with them, it's sort of a nuance.
The thing is, the DMS types are basically ready to use ... and, paradoxically, after Pearl, the Pacific Fleet needed all the surface action ships it could muster, and then some.
And it's not like there was shipyard availability being unused at Peak in December 1941...
Best,
Fearless Leader
Donor
Part V: War Comes to Wake…Again
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The span between the end of the 3rd air raid on December 11th and the arrival of Carrier Division 2 on December 20th could be described as a resumption of the “Watchful Peace” that pervaded the island’s atmosphere since August. Japanese bombers were no longer seen, save for the few reconnaissance planes brave enough to try and test the island defenses, and the only action came from the daily patrols of VMF-211 in which they endeavoured to shoot down said reconnaissance planes…
…Yet something about this watchful peace was different. A certainty that the full might of the Japanese Empire was about to fall on the island was common throughout both Marine and civilian camps. Yet everyone seemed to believe that they had a good chance of weathering the storm. The initial Japanese attacks, besides causing a rather large conflagration when a 25,000 gallon fuel storage tank was hit, did relatively little damage. Though many feared for the maintenance of VMF-211 with the seeming destruction of the squadron’s tools and spares in the initial attack, the mechanics and civilian volunteers were able to work wonders. A great deal was salvageable, and parts soon became available once it had been decided to cannibalize 2 of the squadron’s Wildcats. Using parts from these fighters the mechanics were able to maintain a constant strength of 6 fighters and were able to repair 4 more fighters damaged in the initial air and naval attacks by the 20th (1)…
…The arrival of the relief convoy on the 18/19th and the decision of the majority of civilians to remain behind further strengthened the resolve of the Island’s defenders. As evening fell on the night of the 19th, the men of Wake were determined to make the Japanese pay dearly for every inch of Wake’s soil…
…A particular fatalism sprung up among the fighters of VMF-211 who knew that their paltry 10 Wildcats stood no chance of defeating the same aerial armada that devastated Pearl Harbor. They were determined to sell their machines and their lives dearly, before the rest of the squadron formed an infantry company and joined the defensive lines…
…The squadron’s last mission was a subject of fierce and lively debate for the duration of the lull. Knowing that defensive actions were essentially futile, several pilots, including Henry Elrod advocated for a strike mission to be carried out instead. Each Wildcat was capable of carrying a pair of 100 lb bombs, one on each wing, and though the bombs provided to Wake were of the wrong type to fit the hardpoints on the Marine Wildcats, some ingenuity had solved that problem (2). Elrod advocated sending the squadron out on a reverse heading in the hopes of catching the Japanese carriers unaware, or sending it out along the route of a likely Japanese invasion fleet…
…Though Elrod and others continued to push for a strike mission for the duration of the lull, when the first radar reports came in of a large formation inbound from the north, the conservative faction won out, and the bombs were left in the airfield’s magazine. Instead Major Putnam and the 10 remaining fighters of VMF-211 scrambled in the predawn gloom to meet the Japanese strike in the same way that they had met the first 3 air raids on Wake…
…Yet this air raid would be fundamentally different than the previous ones. A far cry from unescorted obsolete bombers, the pilots from the Soryu and Hiryu flew the best planes Japan had to offer and were escorted by the feared A6M Zero fighters. Fortunately, the events over Wake coupled with the fortuitous find of the “Niihau Zero” on the 14th quickly demonstrated the Zero’s weaknesses and gave the Americans a vital advantage in the early days of the war…
…14 The Niihau Zero refers to the fighter that landed on the Hawaiian island of Niihau after the attack on Pearl Harbour. The pilot, suffered a severe head trauma upon landing and died a few days later. Yet due to the island’s isolation, American officials did not find the fighter until the 14th of December. Upon finding the fighter it was immediately shipped to the United States where it was tested strenuously and influenced the design of several fighters as well as aerial tactics (3)...
…Knowing that they would be facing the fearsome marine flyers of Wake, the initial strike against the island was escorted by the majority of the Zeroes carried by both carriers. Had Elrod’s suggestion been taken and a strike mission been sent instead, it is likely that the fighters of VMF-211 would have caught Carrier Division 2 completely by surprise if they would have been able to locate them…
…Using the advantage given by radar, Wake’s remaining fighters climbed into the predawn sky and began to reach altitude. Knowing it was their last mission, each pilot carried an extra sidearm with extra ammunition and orders to link up with the rest of the Marines should they survive being shot down. In a somber moment, upon the last Wildcat’s takeoff, the remaining groundcrew of VMF-211 set down their tools and took up their helmets and rifles in preparation for what was to be one of the most ferocious battles of the war…
…Though every pilot knew his odds of surviving were low, the Marines were eagerly anticipating the opportunity to fight the same aviators which had attacked their comrades earlier in December. With that thought probably in their minds, the Wildcats of VMF-211 began their diving attack on the 4th Air raid on Wake…
…While the Wildcats of VMF-211 approached from above, the 3-inch AA batteries and machineguns opened fire from below with devastating effect. The Japanese planes, distracted by VMF-211 often failed to effectively evade the island’s AA fire which was far more effective due to the arrival of modern ammunition for the 3-inch guns…
…One of the highest priority requests for the relief convoy had been the arrival of modern AA shells for the 3-inch guns. These shells, which used a 30 second mechanical fuse instead of a 21 second power train fuse, were far more reliable than the original ammunition sent to Wake which dated from the First World War. Most Marines believed that the performance of their AA during the first battles would be substantially improved. Statistics would later show this to be the case, however, the limited number of modern shells meant that it wasn’t long before the Marines were forced to revert to their older ammunition (4)…
…A third infamous nickname was added to the ranks of VMF-211 when Tharin found himself engaged by a trio of Zeros. Engaged in a whirling dogfight, Tharin took advantage of the Wildcat’s heavier construction to shoot down two of the Zeros before trying to close with the third. Unfortunately for the Japanese pilot, a miscalculation on both of pilots parts’ led to a rare mid-air collision in which Tharin’s wing sliced clean through the Zero’s wing earning him the nickname “Battle-axe”. Unfortunately, the dogfight left Tharin vulnerable to a fourth Zero which damaged his plane to such an extent that he was forced to bail out…
…The rest of the Marine pilots, like Tharin, Elrod, and Putnam all found themselves in the same situation. Despite fighting valiantly, they were horribly outnumbered, and though they sold their lives and their planes dearly, averaging 1.5 aerial victories per plane that day, within 30 minutes, all of them had been shot down thus satisfying the main objective of the Japanese raid (5)…
…The remainder of the raid was a bit of a letdown for the defenders of Wake. The Japanese bombers continued their runs on the now isolated airfield and destroyed what was left standing before turning and attacking the remnants of the Pan Am facility on Peale. No attempt was made on either the coastal or the AA batteries, even as the latter hammered away at the Japanese planes, often with surprisingly effective results…
…As the Japanese bombers retreated, the defenders of Wake took stock. They had lost their first line of defense, yet the island’s network of defenses remained intact. All of the island’s AA guns remained active and the total manpower losses were negligible. That being said, the pilots of VMF-211 did not fare nearly so well. Half perished in that final furious dogfight over Wake, including Major “Pounding Paul” Putnam who was unable to bail out of his critically damaged Wildcat. Those pilots that did survive such as “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and the newly christened “Battle-axe Tharin” joined the rest of VMF-211 in taking up arms and waiting for the inevitable Japanese amphibious assault…
…The effectiveness of VMF-211 would foreshadow the immense importance airpower would come to have in the Pacific War. Though small in numbers, the 12 fighters and the small number of support staff effectively stymied an exponentially larger Japanese invasion force. The forces used for the subsequent invasion of Wake had all been earmarked for other operations which were delayed out of necessity. Their aerial victory record was also quite impressive. Over the course of 12 days, they shot down 38 Japanese aircraft and damaged another 15, effectively destroying the 24th Air Flotilla…
…Yet without the distraction of VMF-211, Wake subsequently began to feel the full weight of the Imperial Japanese forces that had been brought against them. A second wave from the Soryu and the Hiryu arrived later that day to build upon the damage done by the first. The AA batteries received particular attention in this attack, as did the remaining structures on the island. Camp 2, housing the Marines, was almost completely annihilated as was the much nicer Camp 1. The Hospital was also hit resulting in the deaths of a dozen wounded men. Fortunately, the presence of civilian volunteers allowed almost all the valuable medical supplies to be saved from the conflagration that followed…
…As casualties began to mount, some of the men, especially the civilians, began to question their choice to come to and eventually stay on Wake. As night fell, burial details went out and were forced to bury the largest number of dead yet. However in spite of the loss of VMF-211, the defenders remained optimistic. The AA batteries had managed to be quite effective, shooting down another 5 Japanese aircraft of the 2nd wave. They figured that if they could outlast the Japanese bombardment they might be able to hold out until the Pacific fleet could finally send more substantial reinforcements…
…The next day, December 21st saw more of the same for the defenders of Wake. This time the planes from Carrier Division 2 were joined by those of the Chitose Air Flotilla having absorbed what was left of the 24th Air Flotilla. Finally free to fly unescorted over the island due to the destruction of VMF-211’s Wildcats, the twin engine bombers still suffered from the determined AA fire of the Marines. The raids of the 21st were mainly concerned with reducing the batteries of the island and to their credit they did score several direct hits on the batteries and the island’s radar station, effectively reducing the island’s AA capacity by about half…
…Having gained air superiority, destroyed most of the buildings on the island, and damaged what they thought to be the island’s defensive network, it was decided to begin landing troops at dawn on the 22nd. They erroneously believed that the Americans had allocated all of their efforts into anti-aircraft defenses and airfield construction. Having bombarded the island with impunity, they assumed, wrongly, that the coastal defenses of Wake had yet to be completed and were unable of responding to a landing attempt. Out of prudence they had targeted them on the 2nd day, but they saw no reason to waste another day of sorties bombing effectively useless installations, yet they would soon find out just how wrong they were…
Footnotes
1)A few things to keep in mind. First, that the Wildcats at Wake were nowhere near as durable as the F4F-4 used later in the war, they had no armor, or self-sealing fuel tanks. Thus some combat damage when going up against swarms of unescorted bombers is unavoidable. Secondly, the naval bombardment of the 10th in TTL, though inaccurate, did damage several of the Wildcats. Finally, consider that the Americans did far more with far less in OTL. Given their performance in OTL with far less personnel and tools, I see no reason why they couldn’t maintain VMF-211 in TTL given a far better combat environment.
2)OTL
3)In TTL the Niihau incident went slightly differently. Nishikaichi suffered a far more severe head trauma upon landing on the isolated Hawaiian island. Thus he was unable to burn his fighter, allowing it to fall into the hands of the Americans on the 14th.
4)Ammunition situation for the 3 inch guns is OTL up until the relief convoy. Given that the majority of the combat had been aerial, 3-inch ammunition is at the top of Devereux’ supply list after reinforcements to help alleviate the trained manpower shortage.
5)Some of these victories must be partially attributed to AA fire as well.
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The span between the end of the 3rd air raid on December 11th and the arrival of Carrier Division 2 on December 20th could be described as a resumption of the “Watchful Peace” that pervaded the island’s atmosphere since August. Japanese bombers were no longer seen, save for the few reconnaissance planes brave enough to try and test the island defenses, and the only action came from the daily patrols of VMF-211 in which they endeavoured to shoot down said reconnaissance planes…
…Yet something about this watchful peace was different. A certainty that the full might of the Japanese Empire was about to fall on the island was common throughout both Marine and civilian camps. Yet everyone seemed to believe that they had a good chance of weathering the storm. The initial Japanese attacks, besides causing a rather large conflagration when a 25,000 gallon fuel storage tank was hit, did relatively little damage. Though many feared for the maintenance of VMF-211 with the seeming destruction of the squadron’s tools and spares in the initial attack, the mechanics and civilian volunteers were able to work wonders. A great deal was salvageable, and parts soon became available once it had been decided to cannibalize 2 of the squadron’s Wildcats. Using parts from these fighters the mechanics were able to maintain a constant strength of 6 fighters and were able to repair 4 more fighters damaged in the initial air and naval attacks by the 20th (1)…
…The arrival of the relief convoy on the 18/19th and the decision of the majority of civilians to remain behind further strengthened the resolve of the Island’s defenders. As evening fell on the night of the 19th, the men of Wake were determined to make the Japanese pay dearly for every inch of Wake’s soil…
…A particular fatalism sprung up among the fighters of VMF-211 who knew that their paltry 10 Wildcats stood no chance of defeating the same aerial armada that devastated Pearl Harbor. They were determined to sell their machines and their lives dearly, before the rest of the squadron formed an infantry company and joined the defensive lines…
…The squadron’s last mission was a subject of fierce and lively debate for the duration of the lull. Knowing that defensive actions were essentially futile, several pilots, including Henry Elrod advocated for a strike mission to be carried out instead. Each Wildcat was capable of carrying a pair of 100 lb bombs, one on each wing, and though the bombs provided to Wake were of the wrong type to fit the hardpoints on the Marine Wildcats, some ingenuity had solved that problem (2). Elrod advocated sending the squadron out on a reverse heading in the hopes of catching the Japanese carriers unaware, or sending it out along the route of a likely Japanese invasion fleet…
…Though Elrod and others continued to push for a strike mission for the duration of the lull, when the first radar reports came in of a large formation inbound from the north, the conservative faction won out, and the bombs were left in the airfield’s magazine. Instead Major Putnam and the 10 remaining fighters of VMF-211 scrambled in the predawn gloom to meet the Japanese strike in the same way that they had met the first 3 air raids on Wake…
…Yet this air raid would be fundamentally different than the previous ones. A far cry from unescorted obsolete bombers, the pilots from the Soryu and Hiryu flew the best planes Japan had to offer and were escorted by the feared A6M Zero fighters. Fortunately, the events over Wake coupled with the fortuitous find of the “Niihau Zero” on the 14th quickly demonstrated the Zero’s weaknesses and gave the Americans a vital advantage in the early days of the war…
…14 The Niihau Zero refers to the fighter that landed on the Hawaiian island of Niihau after the attack on Pearl Harbour. The pilot, suffered a severe head trauma upon landing and died a few days later. Yet due to the island’s isolation, American officials did not find the fighter until the 14th of December. Upon finding the fighter it was immediately shipped to the United States where it was tested strenuously and influenced the design of several fighters as well as aerial tactics (3)...
…Knowing that they would be facing the fearsome marine flyers of Wake, the initial strike against the island was escorted by the majority of the Zeroes carried by both carriers. Had Elrod’s suggestion been taken and a strike mission been sent instead, it is likely that the fighters of VMF-211 would have caught Carrier Division 2 completely by surprise if they would have been able to locate them…
…Using the advantage given by radar, Wake’s remaining fighters climbed into the predawn sky and began to reach altitude. Knowing it was their last mission, each pilot carried an extra sidearm with extra ammunition and orders to link up with the rest of the Marines should they survive being shot down. In a somber moment, upon the last Wildcat’s takeoff, the remaining groundcrew of VMF-211 set down their tools and took up their helmets and rifles in preparation for what was to be one of the most ferocious battles of the war…
…Though every pilot knew his odds of surviving were low, the Marines were eagerly anticipating the opportunity to fight the same aviators which had attacked their comrades earlier in December. With that thought probably in their minds, the Wildcats of VMF-211 began their diving attack on the 4th Air raid on Wake…
…While the Wildcats of VMF-211 approached from above, the 3-inch AA batteries and machineguns opened fire from below with devastating effect. The Japanese planes, distracted by VMF-211 often failed to effectively evade the island’s AA fire which was far more effective due to the arrival of modern ammunition for the 3-inch guns…
…One of the highest priority requests for the relief convoy had been the arrival of modern AA shells for the 3-inch guns. These shells, which used a 30 second mechanical fuse instead of a 21 second power train fuse, were far more reliable than the original ammunition sent to Wake which dated from the First World War. Most Marines believed that the performance of their AA during the first battles would be substantially improved. Statistics would later show this to be the case, however, the limited number of modern shells meant that it wasn’t long before the Marines were forced to revert to their older ammunition (4)…
…A third infamous nickname was added to the ranks of VMF-211 when Tharin found himself engaged by a trio of Zeros. Engaged in a whirling dogfight, Tharin took advantage of the Wildcat’s heavier construction to shoot down two of the Zeros before trying to close with the third. Unfortunately for the Japanese pilot, a miscalculation on both of pilots parts’ led to a rare mid-air collision in which Tharin’s wing sliced clean through the Zero’s wing earning him the nickname “Battle-axe”. Unfortunately, the dogfight left Tharin vulnerable to a fourth Zero which damaged his plane to such an extent that he was forced to bail out…
…The rest of the Marine pilots, like Tharin, Elrod, and Putnam all found themselves in the same situation. Despite fighting valiantly, they were horribly outnumbered, and though they sold their lives and their planes dearly, averaging 1.5 aerial victories per plane that day, within 30 minutes, all of them had been shot down thus satisfying the main objective of the Japanese raid (5)…
…The remainder of the raid was a bit of a letdown for the defenders of Wake. The Japanese bombers continued their runs on the now isolated airfield and destroyed what was left standing before turning and attacking the remnants of the Pan Am facility on Peale. No attempt was made on either the coastal or the AA batteries, even as the latter hammered away at the Japanese planes, often with surprisingly effective results…
…As the Japanese bombers retreated, the defenders of Wake took stock. They had lost their first line of defense, yet the island’s network of defenses remained intact. All of the island’s AA guns remained active and the total manpower losses were negligible. That being said, the pilots of VMF-211 did not fare nearly so well. Half perished in that final furious dogfight over Wake, including Major “Pounding Paul” Putnam who was unable to bail out of his critically damaged Wildcat. Those pilots that did survive such as “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and the newly christened “Battle-axe Tharin” joined the rest of VMF-211 in taking up arms and waiting for the inevitable Japanese amphibious assault…
…The effectiveness of VMF-211 would foreshadow the immense importance airpower would come to have in the Pacific War. Though small in numbers, the 12 fighters and the small number of support staff effectively stymied an exponentially larger Japanese invasion force. The forces used for the subsequent invasion of Wake had all been earmarked for other operations which were delayed out of necessity. Their aerial victory record was also quite impressive. Over the course of 12 days, they shot down 38 Japanese aircraft and damaged another 15, effectively destroying the 24th Air Flotilla…
…Yet without the distraction of VMF-211, Wake subsequently began to feel the full weight of the Imperial Japanese forces that had been brought against them. A second wave from the Soryu and the Hiryu arrived later that day to build upon the damage done by the first. The AA batteries received particular attention in this attack, as did the remaining structures on the island. Camp 2, housing the Marines, was almost completely annihilated as was the much nicer Camp 1. The Hospital was also hit resulting in the deaths of a dozen wounded men. Fortunately, the presence of civilian volunteers allowed almost all the valuable medical supplies to be saved from the conflagration that followed…
…As casualties began to mount, some of the men, especially the civilians, began to question their choice to come to and eventually stay on Wake. As night fell, burial details went out and were forced to bury the largest number of dead yet. However in spite of the loss of VMF-211, the defenders remained optimistic. The AA batteries had managed to be quite effective, shooting down another 5 Japanese aircraft of the 2nd wave. They figured that if they could outlast the Japanese bombardment they might be able to hold out until the Pacific fleet could finally send more substantial reinforcements…
…The next day, December 21st saw more of the same for the defenders of Wake. This time the planes from Carrier Division 2 were joined by those of the Chitose Air Flotilla having absorbed what was left of the 24th Air Flotilla. Finally free to fly unescorted over the island due to the destruction of VMF-211’s Wildcats, the twin engine bombers still suffered from the determined AA fire of the Marines. The raids of the 21st were mainly concerned with reducing the batteries of the island and to their credit they did score several direct hits on the batteries and the island’s radar station, effectively reducing the island’s AA capacity by about half…
…Having gained air superiority, destroyed most of the buildings on the island, and damaged what they thought to be the island’s defensive network, it was decided to begin landing troops at dawn on the 22nd. They erroneously believed that the Americans had allocated all of their efforts into anti-aircraft defenses and airfield construction. Having bombarded the island with impunity, they assumed, wrongly, that the coastal defenses of Wake had yet to be completed and were unable of responding to a landing attempt. Out of prudence they had targeted them on the 2nd day, but they saw no reason to waste another day of sorties bombing effectively useless installations, yet they would soon find out just how wrong they were…
Footnotes
1)A few things to keep in mind. First, that the Wildcats at Wake were nowhere near as durable as the F4F-4 used later in the war, they had no armor, or self-sealing fuel tanks. Thus some combat damage when going up against swarms of unescorted bombers is unavoidable. Secondly, the naval bombardment of the 10th in TTL, though inaccurate, did damage several of the Wildcats. Finally, consider that the Americans did far more with far less in OTL. Given their performance in OTL with far less personnel and tools, I see no reason why they couldn’t maintain VMF-211 in TTL given a far better combat environment.
2)OTL
3)In TTL the Niihau incident went slightly differently. Nishikaichi suffered a far more severe head trauma upon landing on the isolated Hawaiian island. Thus he was unable to burn his fighter, allowing it to fall into the hands of the Americans on the 14th.
4)Ammunition situation for the 3 inch guns is OTL up until the relief convoy. Given that the majority of the combat had been aerial, 3-inch ammunition is at the top of Devereux’ supply list after reinforcements to help alleviate the trained manpower shortage.
5)Some of these victories must be partially attributed to AA fire as well.
Admiral Halsey
Banned
So an Akutan Zero about 7 months early? Does this mean the F6F will make an earlier appearance as well?
Unlikely--the events were only tenuously connected IOTL. In fact, the F6F made its first test flight in June 1942, while the Akutan Zero wasn't found until July. Though the design was refined based on the lessons already learned flying the Wildcat against the Zero in combat, it actually was in-progress even before the start of the war.
So, myth about OTL aside, what does an earlier Zero intact mean? Well, while IOTL it's largely a myth that the Akutan Zero was critical to the ability of US pilots to engage the Zero on better-than-even footing and to the design of the F6F, while instead the benefits mostly came from smart pilots like Thatch and experience flying against the Zero, having a Zero to examine may speed that process up a bit.
I'm not sure it's possible for the Hellcat to come much sooner, but it may effect the training and use of Wildcats already in the field--and that's significant. Reading books like Lundstrom's The First Team, it's striking the difference this experience made: IOTL, even before the Hellcat, the Wildcat was beating Zeros by the middle of 1942. Having that kind of training advantage sooner...well, it doesn't bode well for the Japanese. But that's kind of the rule in any fiddling with the Pacific War.
The Marines of VMF-211 gave as good as they got. Giving the fact the lessons to defeat the Zero will becoming the second wave of pilots making harder of the Japanese to attack. I see once again Wake is becoming the Medal factory for the US.
iddt3
Donor
Were Zeros actually just a bad plane once you took it's maneuverability into account? In 1942 the Japanese pilots were still very well trained and experienced, certainly more so than the Americans facing them, yet the Americans were already getting superior kill ratios. How much of that is due to the planes they were flying?
A fair amount. American aircraft tended to mount more guns typically also of heavier caliber, carry more armor, and have better damage resistance features (like self-sealing fuel tanks). The Zero was faster and more maneuverable, but it had serious issues hitting hard enough to down even Wildcats without ammo for its 20mm cannon, which ran out very fast during fights and lacked almost all of the damage-resistance of American planes.
Until American pilots adapted, the speed and aerobatic advantages were deadly. Once American pilots began to get the Zero's number, developed tactics to minimize the effect of the Zero's superior maneuverability (such as the Thatch weave) while pitting their plane's strengths against the Zero's weakness, the loss ratios got a lot more balanced, and even shifted in the American's favor.
Still, IIRC, Lundstrom makes some claims that at least part of the difference was down to was pilot training, though--while the Japanese were more experienced, American pilots apparently had a lot more doctrinal training on deflection shooting, meaning they could snap off some shots the enemy would have difficulty with.
If you havent to much changes to the first version, copy and past the updates here
I think the deeper he gets into this the more the changes will be seen from Mark 1 and Mark 2.