744; The Alids, A Better Caliphate

[z.g.a.]

What about the religious development? How would the demographics look like and how would the different sects of islam develop? also what would the caliphs religious views and approaches to other sects be like?

 

[wakobear]

What about the religious development? How would the demographics look like and how would the different sects of islam develop? also what would the caliphs religious views and approaches to other sects be like?

Basically, there would be no major Sunni-Shia split.

Upon taking power, the messianic fervour of the revolution would begin die down, as the new regime seeks to gain support of the moderate Muslim masses. As occured with the Abbasids OTL.

Though, this disappointed the Shia supporters of the Abbasids, who wished to see a divinely appointed messianic Caliph who would usher in a just Islamic society upon the earth.
Mansur was the complete opposite of this ideal, styling himself as a secular monarch, like that of the Umayyads, not appealing to the messianic imam-caliph the Shia were looking for. Leading them to look to the Alids to bring about the ummah led by a divinely guided imam. Though Mansur's son alMahdi and later Ma'mun pushed more for the religious connotations of their rule to win support of the Alids. Eventually leading to the state enforced Mutazila school, which gave the caliph ability to interpret the Qur'an and sunnah independently.


But ITTL, Abdullah alKamil had been cultivating the messianic/Mahdi status of Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah for decades. So they would have more messianic overtones than the Abbasids.
Perhaps a 2 faced situation could occur, with Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah appearing moderate in public, but to his private supporters being more messianic - these would be his bodyguards and most loyal troops, since they would see him as their Mahdi and be more than willing to sacrifice their lives, sort of like the Qizilbash to Shah Ismail. Overall, giving them a far more loyal powerbase than the Abbasids who only had the Khurasani who were mostly under Abu Muslim.....

This messianic and divinely appointed claim as well as the ability to interpret Qur'an and sunnah independently, would result in a much more authoritarian and despotic Caliphate. With no limits whatsoever on Caliphal power, due to it being perceived as divine will. Objectors may be put down by the zealots, since objecting to their Mahdi would be a form of blasphemy.....


OTL Jafar as-Sadiq taught Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik. ITTL, he could be appointed as the grand judge, thereby unifying schools of jurisprudence even more.


Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah would try to include all branches of the Hashimids. Hassanids, Husainids, Abbasids and even descendants of Jafar ibn abi Talib whose great grandson Abdullah ibn Muawiyah led a major Alid revolt in the 3rd fitnah in 747.
With the majority of all governors throughout the Caliphate being from amongst the Hashimids - making the Caliphate based on the unity of the Hashimids family. (Saffah did the same thing, but kept it only within the Abbasid family)

By doing this, Shia disappointed with the regime don't have another major Hashimids to turn to, since they are all integral parts of the Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah's government.
They may find a stray Hashimid from a small cadet branch and push their ideology upon him. But this wouldn't gain much support from the Shia masses, let alone the rest of the Muslim world.
Overtime these small groups around obscure Alids would become more ghulat/extreme like the Alawites or Druze or Qizilbash etc. But as they become more extreme, they would gain more opposition from the government who would eventually have to confront them.

A much larger problem would be succession disputes. Causing not only a political rift, but also an ideological one as occured with the Fatimid Caliphate. Which could result in completely different sects forming like the Nizari-Musta'li schism. Which may begin to split apart theologically too and if left long enough to fester could potentially break the state apart.
But generally, this Alid Caliphate would be less Shia than the Fatimids, since Shi'ism is still in its formative stages, and much of Fatimid Shi'ism's beliefs haven't been invented yet, and since the Alids rule the Caliphate said beliefs are unlikely to ever emerge.


The Khawarij would reject the Caliphate of Muhammad Nafs Zakiyyah, since they consider Ali as Kaafir. With the Shia outlet gone, this would probably be the dominant sect for ideological dissenters of the regime. Though I still see them as quite small, since kharijism never gained much popularity.

The Khawarij of the Maghreb (Sufris and Ibadis) would've already been co-opted into the regime by Ibrahim ibn Abdullah. Leaving their only dominant position in isolated Oman and Sistan.



Due to the significant Umayyad remnant ITTL, I could see the Umayyads developing an AbdManaf-id ideology. Since AbdManaf is the Father of Banu Hashim, but he's also the grandfather of Umayyah progenitor of the Banu Umayyah. Thereby including both Hashimids and Umayyads. This ideology becoming dominant amongst the Syrians who were the 3rd military power within the state after Berbers and Khurasani.
A few decades after the revolution, when the Umayyad rule is becoming a distant memory to the Shia, perhaps pressuring the government to adopt a portion of the AbdManaf-id ideology so that Umayyads are more integrated into the ruling class....



If the state tries to push Shi'ism too much, imposing an inquisition like the mihna, then there would likely be mass protests and civil unrest, as occurred with OTL mihna. Potentially the staunchly anti Shia Syrians could cause an armed revolt. So i don't see them pushing it too hard.



But overall, I see Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah being accepted by the majority of the Muslim world. With no major ideological objections. Unless succession disputes result in theological schisms....

Demographics:​

After the conquest of the Gangetic, Hinduism would be the largest religion in the Caliphate. Followed by Christianity, then probably Buddhism (Central Asia would Buddhist. While Sindh and Bengal were also Buddhists though with significant influence from Hinduism) then Zoroastrianism or Islam, then Judaism then small religions like Manichaeism etc.

Not including north India, the population is probably around 50 million. The conquest of North India probably doubles that to 100 million. Over 1/3 of the world.



Of the Muslims, the Arabs are the majority, but second are the Amazigh/Berbers.
Their islamification was a unique process, mainly done by Abu Muhajir Dinar in 670s and Musa ibn Nusayr in the early 700s due to his manpower shortages. By 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad's invasion force being almost solely Berber. And by 740 all the Berbers seem to have embraced Islam, at least nominally, despite very few of them having ever met an actual Arab, since the Arabs were centred on Qayrawan, with almost zero settlement in the central or western maghreb (Algeria and Morocco respectively).

This means they were barely Arabised, knowing very little Arabic. Since they would be the largest army in the Caliphate, and dominate the entire west (from Andalus all the way to Egypt and Syrian coast), this could lead to tensions between the Arabs and their Berber overlords.
By comparison, the Khurasani army was mainly made up of Arab settlers who lived in Khurasan. While there was a significant portion of Iranians, these would've been much more Arabised than the Berbers, since Arab settlement was much larger and more dispersed in Khurasan, and marriage/integration of Arabs with locals seems to have been more common.

Though overtime, as cities are developed in the western and central Maghreb as well as maritime trade and industry, a large number of Arabs would migrate from the middle east to the rich Maghreb and Iberia. Which OTL didn't happen, since the abbasids didn't control past Ifriqiyah. Leading to urban Arab centres, which would gradually Arabise the berbers.

Since something like the Banu Hilal invasions wouldn't happen, as the Maghreb is much stronger and unified, the rural and Saharan populations of the Maghreb would probably remain much more Berber than OTL.




In India, it is an Arab Islam which has conquered northern India. Not the Persianate Islam of OTL under Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Delhi Sultanate and Mughals, who used Arabic as a liturgical language and Persian as the high culture language.
The sheer wealth of India would mean that much of the formative Arabic cultural efflorescence would occur in the metropolises of India, on par with the Iraqi contribution. With Indian Cultures heavily influencing early arabic culture, much more so than Persian culture, which would be relegated to Transoxiana/Khurasan and the poor and arid Iranian plateau, being on the receiving end of Indian cultural influences, instead of the giving end. Which is completely different to OTL.

This would mean Indian sciences, particularly the Hindu numerals, mathematics and astronomy of Brahmagupta, would enter the Muslim world much faster. Similarly the brilliant linguistic works of Panini would make Arabic linguistics more developed, as Panini came up with many advanced concepts which other linguists didn't come up with until the 19th century.
And Indian philosophies would be given more weight than OTL. Though as the Greek works are translated Indian philosophical though will have to compete with that of the Greeks. Perhaps creating more interesting and dynamic philosophies.


Islamification of India would be slow and gradual. With Muslims only being dominant in the cities, as in most regions. Though conversion would probably faster among the already declining Buddhist populations of Sindh and Bihar/Bengal, whose urban trade networks were being usurped by the newly arrived Muslims.

If a major Arab Bedouin migration (similar on scale to Banu Hilal) to the Thar desert, then much of Rajasthan, Sindh, southern Punjab, northern Gujarat and other regions surrounding the Thar desert would arabise and islamify significantly faster. Fromwhich regions surrounding those would also Arabise and so on.
Bedouin typically had little Islamic knowledge, and followed tribal law. So in India, after mixing and integrating with the local Hindus, perhaps some aspects of Hinduism or Rajput tribal law will affect these Bedouin?

Much of India at this time was covered in this forest. So if a policy similar to that of the Mughals in East Bengal: clearing forest, establishing agricultural villages headed by a Muslim, underwhom the inhabitants of the village would islamify. Then much of India could be converted. But this would still take centuries.

Indian traders would probably dominate the city of Basra, and other Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and perhaps red sea ports. So there may some Hinduism practiced in those cities privately.


At the time, India had a huge connection to South East Asia, which had significant Buddhist Hindu influence. So Hindus may migrate to SEA in significant quantities to escape Muslim rule. Or Muslim traders may begin the islamification process of SEA centuries earlier. Or if a direct invasion of Srivijaya occurs from Caliphal Bengal, similar to the Chola's, for more control over the trade routes.

Then the Caliphate itself would be present in SEA, appointing governors and administering the region. Islam now challenging Hinduism and Buddhism, both of which were still in fairly formative stages, as was the political landscape with the first major kingdoms beginning to emerge now and most of their fertile farmland still being beneath dense forest, gradually being cultivated, increasing wealth, population and cultural developments as a whole. Islam being introduced now in such a formative era could potentially prevent the rise of Hinduism and Buddhism.

SEA seafaring technologies like the incredibly fast Trimarans and Catamarans could brought westwards along with Southeast Asian sailors, for much quicker communications between Andalus and the middle east or India and Iraq. Strengthening central control over these distant regions.


The early Caliphate having outposts in Sumatra and other regions of SEA would allow much more trade with China. As well as with Korea and Japan which OTL didn't receive many Arab traders. Japan was in quite a formative stage, so the interactions with Muslims traders could cause some significant butterflies, culturally and religiously


As for the court culture, then this would be heavily influenced by that of the Tang after the arrival of Princess Qizhaoyi and the Cui clan. Since they had the most developed court and administrative structure on the world at the time.
Probably with Chinese classics and Confucian texts being translated, affecting Arab culture




As for Europe, then most of it is still pagan: the Basques, all the Slavics, the northern and some of the eastern Germanics, Avars, Picts, Finno-Ugrics etc.
ITTL the united Caliphate controls Iberia and Maghreb, making their position in Europe much stronger. And could potentially aid these Pagans against their Christian enemies/neighbours in exchange for conversion.
As for the Basques, the perhaps using them as a minority rulers over the romance speaking Christian majorities of upper Spain and southwestern France, if they convert. Basque naval expertise could also come in great use to the Caliphate for Atlantic raids.

Otherwise it would be slow and gradual. Though, being connected to the central Muslim world means more Arab/Muslim migration to iberia. Which history only seems to have received 2 influxes: in 711 initial invasion and 742 when Balj ibn Bishr escaped the Berber revolt. It wasn't centuries later when Berber migration took place in the late 900s, though solely as military forces. With larger migrations after the AlMoravids conquest.
Since it's connected, and the Maghreb is unified, safe and prosperous, more Muslims would migrate to Iberia, making its conversion faster.







Unlike OTL, in which post 13th century Sufi mystics mainly spread Islam to India and SEA, with a great deal of syncretism taking place until reform movements in the 19th century, early Islam was much less like that, so the Islam of these disparate regions would be more theologically similar to one another.
Thus, in a much more expanded and unified empire, the travels of hadeeth scholars in the 9th century would be much more extensive. Instead of being dominated by Persians (all 6 major hadeeth books are by Persians), other groups would take a much more important role. Especially the Berbers and northwest Indians. As well as the more distant Andalusis and the northeast Indians.

This greater interaction should unify Islam more on the whole. (It would also give some interesting Nisbas) As well as make it's judicial system more robust, since there are more people's living in varied lands and cultures which have different problems than what OTL peoples of the Islamic world.were going through. Problems/situations which would need to be addressed by Islamic jurisprudence.

 

[Nivek]

Nisbas

Very interesting the different nisbas and rulling, that alone is another Titanic butterfly

 

[wakobear]

Another point, Matrilineal lineage would be more important, since the Alids trace their lineage through Fatima, daughter of the prophet. It is this which makes their claim unique among other Hashimids. Otherwise, through Ali alone, the Abbasids, even Jafarids and other branches of the Banu Hashim have an equally strong claim.

OTL, the Abbasids tried pushing the superiority of patrilineal lineage, and weakened that of matrilineal to strengthen their claim. With female members of the Alids being less important thereafter, as mentioned by Teresa Bernheimer.


Stronger Matrilineal lineage means the role of women in the Islamic world would be more important. But overall the effect of this would probably be fairly small.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Have to say, looking back, I'm surprised this is pretty much the only thread with any discussion of the Alids coming to power in Islam's early history.

One thing I'd want to note here -- even putting the Sindh are India aside entirely, the vast majority of the Caliphate's population at this time was non-muslim; AIUI, Christian majorities in Egypt, the Levant, and Spain persisted for centuries after their conquest. Combine that with the Alids going with a more "divine right" approach to political governance likely tying into the role of scripture, and you very well may have a religion too tightly connected to elite government and trade to find the kind of mass appeal that allowed it to eventually become the majority in their realm OTL.

- - - - -

I don't think much would change to be honest.

Muhammad bin Abdullah "al-Nafs al-Zakiyya" was a supremely convincing candidate for an Hashemite Caliph, in some respects the great hope of that house. The sources make it pretty clear that Muhammad's father Abdullah was cultivating a messianic aura around his son from the day he was born. The boy sat at the very center of the Alid bloodlines, being descended from Imam Hasan paternally and Imam Hussein maternally; which meant (as he frequently reminded people) he counted the Prophet Muhammad as his ancestor twice over.

He was famously big and strong, handsome, had a egg-sized mole on his back (a characteristic shared with the Prophet Muhammad, whose mole was called the Seal of Prophethood) and a stutter that was compared to the Prophet Moses. Many of these traits (particularly the stutter) have found their way into general expectations for the Mahdi which are repeated by Islamic scholars to this very day. Just to illustrate how high hopes were, Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī recorded the following verse, written by an anonymous source about a newborn Muhammad b. Abdullah:

Another verse from Salama b. Aslum al-Juhanī reads:


Furthermore, Muhammad b. Abdullah assuming the Caliphate was probably the plan all along. Allegedly, the big men of the Banu Hashim, including Ibrahim 'al-Mahdi' of the Abbasids (but not Imam Jafar al-Sidiq), had paid him allegiance before the beginning of what we now call the Abbasid Revolution. In order to prevent a repeat of previous failed Hashemite rebellions, none of the leaders of the clan were actually fighting in the revolution. The whole thing was organized by a shadowy figure who called himself Abu Muslim Al-Khorosani (a name that literally just means 'Papa Muslim from the East') and the actual fighting was a confused affair, with the Umayyads not even really being sure whether they were fighting Iranian Muslims, Shi'i rebels, or Zoroastrians. Eventually once the Umayyads were beaten, the rampaging army (who dressed in black, mostly didn't speak Arabic and carried clubs they called "infidel-bashers") basically loitered around old Ctesiphon and al-Rumiyya (where the first Abassid palace would be set up) waiting for the redeeming figure of the Mahdi to appear. Only instead of the beautiful and charismatic Muhmmad the Alid arriving from Medina as planned, it was the Abd'Allah "al-Saffah" the Abassid who filled the power vaccuum.

Muhammad b. Abdullah was outraged and publically challenged the new Caliph in the form of a letter which was read publically and is recorded in Al-Tabari:


So all in all, it's not hard to imagine a scenario in which the Caliphate was claimed by an Alid in the time period you're talking about. In fact, one could argue it was more likely than what happend in OTL. Of the course the problem Muhammad b. Abdullah's rebellion was that he was trapped in the Hejaz which produces little manpower and almost no food. The Abbasid armies were centered in Iraq and cut him off from what should've been his real wellspring of power; the hordes of Khorosani Muslims, outraged over the death of Abu Muslim, who launched several rebellions of their own, and a few new religions like Khurramism.

But let's say the rebellion of Muhammad 'al-Nafs al-Zakiyya' suceeded, or that the alleged betrayal never occured and he took the Caliphate. What happens next?

It seems to me that at this stage Shi'ism and Sunnism don't really exist as theologies, but political idealogies on who should lead the Muslims and whence they should derive their authority. The common assumption is to view Sunni Islam as the original orthodoxy and Shi'ism as a heresy which branched off somewhere in the Rashidun period but it's more accurate to say that Sunnism and Shi'ism developed alongside each other in the early Abbasid period under the auspices of people like Imam Jafar al-Sidiq (imo the real founder of Shi'ism as we understand it today), Imam Malik (a student of Imam Jafar; founder of Maliki Sunnism) and Imam Abu Hanifa (another student of Imam Jafar; founder of Hanafi Sunnism). Before this period we should really see Muslims as fundamentally a single school without such formal divisions and ideas percolating among the proto-sects that would latter grow into Sunnism and Shi'ism. So if Muhammad b. Abdullah's rebellion suceeds the simple answer is the definition of Shia probably stops including people from the Hasanid line. This is the exact same as how early Shi'ite movements were mostly for keeping the Caliphate in the hands of the Banu Hashim, but once a Hashemite got the throne the definition changed to only mean the Alids (not the Abbasids who were actually ruling).

Shi'ism in it's early stage is fundamentally an ideology of rebellion against tyranny; all of the ideas in proto-Shi'ite groups at this stage center around the utopian age that will arrive when the rightful Imam is allowed to rule. Obviously when your Imam does get to rule, and inevitably falls short of those impossible standards, you either have to fold into the mainstream current of Islam (proto-Sunni; i.e. the Caliphate is working just fine at the moment thank you very much, please stop rebelling) or re-evaluate and throw your lot in with a different line of Imams. This is what happend in OTL as the mainstream Hashimiyya/Kaysanites basically disapeared in favour of the Imami (which became what we would now call Twelvers and Ismailis/Seveners) branch of Shi'ism, and exactly what would've happened if an Alid did end up becoming Caliph.

Very interesting! Thank you for such a detailed response.
So say the political disputes between Sunni and Shia then are likely mediated during Muhammad bin Abdullahs rule. In such a scenario I have a hard time seeing how Shia dissidents would appear or develop separately from the Caliphate (granted, I do have very limited knowledge of Islamic history). Wouldn't most, if not all, Shia Imams support bin Abdulah? As they come from his family and tribe I assume they would be granted political influence during his rule, enough power to placate them.

Not really, at this point there the Shi'i identity is still fluid. A modern analogy would be how the atrocities committed by the Soviet Union did not lead to the discrediting of socialism as a whole. When the first socialist revolution did not create the utopian society that socialists were expecting one would expect that would kill socialism forever, right? On the contrary, socialism still exists but modern socialists generally disavow Stalinist-style autocratic socialism in favour of more democratic flavours, even refusing to define Stalin's actions as socialism at all.

In the same way, the when Hashimiyya (who were the main branch of Shia before the Abbasid revolution) got their Imam on the throne, they were shocked and dismayed at the way he ruled as Caliph. His murder of Abu Muslim was the most obvious offence but really any ruler, including Muhammad "al-Nafs al-Zakiyya" bin Abdullah would've fallen short of the messianic expectations Shi'ites had for their Imams. When this happened (as it would inevitably happen ITTL) the Hashimiyya either abandoned the Shi'i idea of the utopian society (as some socialists abandoned socialism) and fell into Sunni streams of thought, or they disavowed the Hashimiyya line of Imams for a different flavour of Shi'ism (generally the Imami sect led by Jafar al-Sidiq), some of them even abandoned Islam as a whole in favour of Nativist Iranian movements (led mostly by associates of Abu Muslim, in Khorosan and Armenia).

So no, an Alid Caliph will not destroy Shi'ism; just redefine it.

Ascertaining the character of the early Shi’i is complex. Until the revolt of Al-Mukhtar during the Second Fitna, they constituted a unified group of those zealously loyal to the cause of Ali and his descendants (and family in general). It is understood that the fundamentals of Shi’i religious belief, as opposed to merely political opposition, became solidified with Imam Ja’far, nonetheless there is evidence to suggest a theological dimension being present as early as the actual reign of Ali as Caliph. The concept of hereditary sanctity within the Prophet’s family as well as Yemeni traditions of divine kingship would formulate a consensus amongst Ali’s partisans that the salvation and delivery from distress might best be guaranteed by following a charismatic leader in possession of certain divinely ordained or infallible attributes. Mu’awiya’s victory against Ali and his son Hasan compounded with Hasan’s martyrdom following Karbala, infused into the Shi’i community religious fevor as well as solidifying a sense of martyrdom and need for repentance. Although not fully distinguishable from the rest of the Muslim community, it is apparent that from inception there was at least some form of religious/theological dimension which distinguished the Shi’a from other political allies of the Banu Hashim.

In proclaiming Muhammad bin al-Hanifiyya, Ali’s son by Khawla of Banu Hanifa, as Mahdi (‘the divinely-guided one’), Al-Mukhtar spearheaded an important doctrinal innovation. Although have being previously utilised to denote Ali and his sons honorifically, it’s usage introduced (or at the least expanded upon) a messianic element within Shi’i belief, justifying Mukhtar’s revolt on the behalf of a saviour-imam who would establish justice on earth and thus deliver the oppressed from tyranny. Such rhetoric proved increasingly effective amongst the Mawali, a large discontented and disenfranchised milieux under Ummayad rule; they would be recruited into the ranks of the Shi’i, eventually serving as Al-Muktar’s final base of support as Kufan Arabs proved reluctant to support the integration of the Mawali and or defected to Al-Zubayr or the Ummayads. Even with his defeat and subsequent erosion of Shi’i leadership, Al-Muktar’s revolt propagated Shi’i tendencies amongst the Mawali populace, consequently resulting in the acculturation of old Babylonian, Judaeo-Christian, and Irano-Zoroastrian ideals into the Shi’i community, as well as transforming its base of adherents into a dynamic movement with some form of doctrine as opposed to the predominately Arab limited membership that had once defined it.

Another consequence of Mukhtar’s revolt serves as the center of this discussion; the Shi’i community in the prelude to the Abbasid revolution. No longer bound by a uniform and coherent recognition of a line of Imams, internal divisions would emerge revolving around who constituted Ahl-Al-Bayt and was this qualified to lead the Muslim community under divine guidance. Shi’i branches were accordingly divided between Ali’s sons of Fatimid descent (themselves split with Hasanid and Husaynid branches), Ali’s Hanafid son, Ali’s cousins through his paternal uncles such as the Abbasids, even from his own Talabid nephews. Within this increasingly schismatic environment emerged two general trends including the radical Kasaniya and moderate Shi’i movement of Al-Baqir.

Dominated by the Mawali and predominately based in southern Iraq and the east, the Kaysaniya effectively evolved out of Al-Mukhtar’s revolt, being defined by the radical revolutionary flare that Al-Mukhtar had initially succeeded in arousing on behalf of Ibn Hanifiyya. Concepts such as the occultation and re-emergence of the Imam as well as a clearly eschatological definition of the Mahdi were formulated by early Kaysani writers, indeed the particularly radical strands of thought that developed would be designated even by other Shi’i scholars as ghuluw (exaggeration) due to their beliefs on divinity, superhuman qualities, designation of the Prophethood etc. Amongst the radicals numerous schisms would occur, indeed it would better to understand the Kayasaniyya as a set of inter-related groups. By the time of the Abbasid Revolution, most radicals had aligned themselves with the Abbasid branch of the Banu Hashim under the basis that Abu Hashim (Ibn Haniffiya’s eldest son and Imam of the Muslims according to most of his former followers) had pledged the Immate to the Abbasids upon his death in 716. Those who disputed the testament such as the Harbiya, Bayaniya and “pure Kasaniyya” etc, rapidly disintegrated or gradually integrated into Persian syncretic sects.

On the other hand, there was a small moderate faction of pious Arabs that coalesced around the quietist son of Husayn: Zayn Al-Abidin, following the death of Ibn Hanifiyya. Upon his own death, his son Al-Baqir would accede to the Imamate, not without challenge however from his half-uncle Zayd bin Ali and the Hasanid Muhammad bin Abdullah “Al-Nafs Al-Zakkiya.” Al-Baqir, leading this faction of moderate proto-Imamis, primarily focused on expanding the rudiments of Shi’i legal thought, teaching on legal and ritual aspects of Islam which would later comprise many of the features which were later regarded as distinctive aspects of the Imamiya. Following his death, his following (which comprised a number of Ghuluw theorists), fractured into those who awaited his return as the Mahdi, those who aligned with Nafs Al-Zakkiya and those who aligned with Al-Baqir’s eldest son, Ja’far Al-Sadiq. As the Ummayad realm became increasingly vulnerable, Zayd bin Ali would stage his failed revolt in 740. Zaydi groups would thus align themselves with Nafs Al-Zakkiya, as did the bulk of Ghuluw groups that had followed Al-Baqir.

Under the premise that it is instead Nafs Al-Zakkiya that accedes to the Caliphate, now presumably denoted as Al-Khilafa Al-Alawiya (Alid Caliphate), the trajectory of the Shi’i community is fundamentally altered. Perhaps Abu Salama lobbies Nafs Al-Zakkiya instead of the other reluctant Alid candidates to accede to the Caliphate, either way the Mawla radicals of the Kaysani/Hashmiya (aligned with the Abbasids and their Khursayni army) may prove to be obstructive and a potential threat to the new Caliph. Supposing that they are suppressed, or alternatively placated (granting their allegiance to the new administration), it is possible that these Shi’i groups may either align with the new Caliph or dissipate into syncretic sects as occurred in Persia. Anti-Bin Abduallah splinter groups may also maintain and develop radical ghuluw elements to form offshoots sects akin to Qarmatians, Druze or modern day Nusayri/Alawi community. Moreover, should the Alid Revolution represent the collapse of the Umayyad social order, predilected on Arab supremacy, the emancipation of the Mawali resolves one of the most pressing issues espoused by revolutionary Shi’i tendencies. In the case that it does not and instead the Mawali remain a discontented social class, the radical Shi’i may continue to identify with the aspirations of Non-Arab Muslims, perhaps coalescing around a, or even a number of, alternative Alid (or Hashemite) Imam(s).

Whether or not the new Alid Caliphate maintains its revolutionary zeal remains in question. Known for his militancy and messianic claims, Nafs Al-Zakkiya certainty commanded directly loyalty amongst the activist Shi’i, as opposed to the Abbasids who enjoyed revolutionary support through individuals such as Abu Muslim and Abu Salama. Nonetheless, practicality remains pivotal, upon their ascension the Abbasids disregarded and even persecuted Shi’i elements as a means of appealing to the wider Community. It would be plausible that this new Alid dynasty be compelled to carry out similar measures, yet perhaps not to the same extent. Alternatively, the position of Imam and Caliph may become synonymous, with a greater emphasis on the divine ordinance of Caliphal authority. Regardless, an Alid dynasty would most likely not go to the extent of the Abbasids in totally breaching with their Shi’i roots, particularly since they gain little benefit in forsaking their original narrative (unlike the Abbasids who under Caliph Muhammad Al-Mahdi proclaimed that the Caliphate had been endowed by the Prophet to his uncle Abbas).

Having averted the ultimate disappointment that was the Abbasid Revolution (as well as the precaution and murder of many Alid members of the Banu Hashim), the circumstances that permitted Imam Ja’far’s rise to pre-eminence amongst the Shia are stunted. With the Hanafid line extinct, the Abbasids likely suppressed and Nafs Al-Zakkiya now at the helm of authority, it is likely that the majority of Shi’a would at least initially coalesce around him. Nevertheless, Ja’far was already a prominent figure, renowned for his personality and intellect. Effectively, he would have been the second most notable Alid of the era, in such an environment his teachings could perhaps be actively propagated by the state. Such would not necessarily alienate other jurists and scholars considering that he was accepted as a teaching authority by quite a wide number of non-Shi’i partisans. Indeed, it is reported (although not without controversy and dispute) that Abu Hanifa and Malik bin Anas, the eponymous founders of the Maliki and Hanafi schools of fiqh respectively, studied under or consulted him. Nevertheless, the doctrine that Ja’far and his prodigies, many of whom were prominent Ghuluw theorists while others Mutkalamin (scholars of Kalam), developed, which effectively became the fundamentals of Shi’i religious thought, maintains principles such as the nature of the Immate and religious dissimulation (taqiya) that were far from amenable to many scholars in spite of the formative and fluid nature of Islamic theology of the era. Navigating the already complex religious environment may become further complicated with Ja’fari fiqh and theological concepts such as the Exoteric vs Esoteric (Zahir vs Batin) etc, infused into the crystallisatizing fissures between the Ulema.

There may, alternatively, be little impetus for Nafs Al-Zakiya to promote Ja’far, particularly since he represents a potential challenge to the title of Caliph/Imam in spite of his political quietism. In the case that Ja’far is disposed of, so is the nexus of Shi’i religious thought. Fundamentally, this could totally alter the religious and idea logical trajectory of the moderate proto-Imami branch, perhaps serving to the benefit of the radical/Kasaniya remnants. Considering, however, that Ja’far operated under the Abbasids (who had no qualm in persecuting Shi’i tendencies and Alid opposition) for up to two decades, it is perhaps more likely that he is permitted to continue his efforts. A clear schism could emerge between the lines of Imam, presuming that the new Alid dynasty even maintains such title, with Ja’far cultivating support from radicals aborting the cause of Nafs Al-Zakkiya. A re-ignition of the division between the Hasanid line, embodied by the new Alid dynasty, and the Husaynid line of Ja’far, raises interesting theological and religious possibilities.

Another avenue if speculation appears dependant on Alid policy. The socio-economic environment that permitted the proliferation of Ismailism for example was largely a result of the societal and economic shifts that had occurred under the Abbasids, in which the expansion of commerce and activity compounded with the erosion of the Arab tribal elite’s authority created an environment in which the former garrison towns transformed into flourishing urban centres ruled over by a multi-racial elite of religious intelligentsia, merchants, landowners, military men etc. This in turn exacerbated conflicts of interest as the interests of landowning urbanities became sharply divorced from those in the rural country, particularly those of landless peasantry and Bedouin settlers. The malcontented masses, including the urban proletariat, were thus naturally attractable to any movement opposed to the established order, as reflected by the propensity for revolt during the era. Millennialist tendencies rooted in Messianic rhetoric proved to enjoy significant appeal. Indeed, the Ismaili’s propagated a message a message centred on imminent emergence of the Mahdi who would establish the rule of justice in the world,a promise of effectively unrooting the oppression experienced. In light of these consequences, the question emerges on the religious character of potential anti-Caliphal dissent. If the Alid Caliphate experiences such an extensive shift, which is well within the realm of possibility, it could be the Zaydis who rise to become the most prominent of Shi’i groups, with the radical (and militant) Jurudiya amongst their ranks proliferating across disadvantaged communities within the Muslim world. The Kharijites also are obvious contenders. Indeed, it is likely that revolutionary Shi’ism may experienced a major rejuvenation.

Whether these Shi’i groups resemble OTL, I would postulate that they would not.

 

[wakobear]

Have to say, looking back, I'm surprised this is pretty much the only thread with any discussion of the Alids coming to power in Islam's early history.

There are some threads which deal with Alid victory in first and second fitnahs.
But after that they fizzle out. Which is surprising since I think this is the most realistic and plausible chance at the Alids winning the Caliphate. Just replacing abbasids with Alids.

One thing I'd want to note here -- even putting the Sindh are India aside entirely, the vast majority of the Caliphate's population at this time was non-muslim; AIUI, Christian majorities in Egypt, the Levant, and Spain persisted for centuries after their conquest.

Of course.
The only people's who have converted en masse are the Arabs, and the Berbers - who appear to have all converted, at least nominally, by 740, since in the aftermath of the great Berber revolt when almost every single Arab was expelled from central and western Maghreb they still retained Islam.

Everywhere else in the Caliphate would take centuries to convert. With Urban centres converting first.
Certain groups like the Transoxianans converted quicker than others, due to extensive Arab-native intermarriage. So Eastern Persia converted faster than western Persia, despite being closer.
Or the Buddhists of Sindh, whose urban commercial networks were being challenged by the Arab traders.

Most of greater Persia seems to have become Muslim by the 950-1000.
In Andalus this was reached around 1050-1100.
Egypt took longer probably around 1200, due to the small Arab settlement initially, as well as the tight-knit Coptic community.

Some regions like Armenia/Georgia never converted, due to lack of Arab settlement, with the Muslims restricted to the garrison cities of Dvin and Tbilisi.

Combine that with the Alids going with a more "divine right" approach to political governance likely tying into the role of scripture, and you very well may have a religion too tightly connected to elite government and trade to find the kind of mass appeal that allowed it to eventually become the majority in their realm OTL.

- - - - -

OTL, in early Islam, religious beliefs were very decentralised, with individual scholars of diverse social backgrounds (many being freed slaves) influencing Islamic thought. Not the state/Caliphs.

The first and only major attempt to impose a belief by the government was the Mutazila inquisition (Mihna), to try and allow the Caliph himself to interpret Islamic law, without need of the scholars. But it was only accepted by the elites largely to show loyalty to the regime.
With the masses and the sidelined elites (the Khurasanis of Baghdad [Abna] who had been dropped by Mutasim in favour of Turkic slaves) vehemently opposing the inquisition.
And the vastness of the Abbasid realm meant that they were only able to enforce it in the capital Baghdad/Samarra. With Samanids, Aghlabids and other provincial governors being anti-mutazila.



But ITTL, the Alids have a much larger support base than alMutasim. So the increasing of the sanctity/holiness of the Caliphal office would probably be widely accepted.
But if the Caliph tries to enforce his personal interpretation of the Qur'an, and downplay the role of Hadeeth, the Sunni majority would riot.
The Anti-Alid Syrian armies, though defeated are still formidable, supporting the Sunnis similar to how the Abna did during the Mihna.
Similarly, the Berber half of the Caliphate would still have significant khariji tendencies, specifically egalitarianism, opposing the enforcement of the Caliph's religious opinions.
This would probably even stir discontent among other Alids, such as Jafar ibn Abi Talib who taught both Abu Hanifa and Malik.


So I think it wouldn't be pushed that far, leaving it to the scholars.



But I don't think the Caliph pushing a more divine right policy would affect the appeal of Islam.

Since Fatimid Ismailism pushed for an extreme divine right policy, with their succession disputes resulting in religious schisms (Mustali Vs Nizari). But in spite of that, they managed to spread their faith quite widely such as the conversion of Hindu Gujaratis and creation of the Bohra community.
And the Byzantine emperors who were the heads of the Orthodox church managed to spread their faith to the Slavs.

And there are a few million Muslims by this point, most of them have no connection to the government.



Rather the greater religious unity afforded by lack of the Sunni-Shia split would reduce internal religious argumentation, allowing for more focus on Dawah/proselytising.
And a religion with many sects can be off putting, due to difficulty of choosing which one to follow, the lack of this ITTL would make it more appealing.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

OTL, in early Islam, religious beliefs were very decentralised, with individual scholars of diverse social backgrounds (many being freed slaves) influencing Islamic thought. Not the state/Caliphs.

The first and only major attempt to impose a belief by the government was the Mutazila inquisition (Mihna), to try and allow the Caliph himself to interpret Islamic law, without need of the scholars. But it was only accepted by the elites largely to show loyalty to the regime.
With the masses and the sidelined elites (the Khurasanis of Baghdad [Abna] who had been dropped by Mutasim in favour of Turkic slaves) vehemently opposing the inquisition.
And the vastness of the Abbasid realm meant that they were only able to enforce it in the capital Baghdad/Samarra. With Samanids, Aghlabids and other provincial governors being anti-mutazila.

But ITTL, the Alids have a much larger support base than alMutasim. So the increasing of the sanctity/holiness of the Caliphal office would probably be widely accepted.
But if the Caliph tries to enforce his personal interpretation of the Qur'an, and downplay the role of Hadeeth, the Sunni majority would riot.
The Anti-Alid Syrian armies, though defeated are still formidable, supporting the Sunnis similar to how the Abna did during the Mihna.
Similarly, the Berber half of the Caliphate would still have significant khariji tendencies, specifically egalitarianism, opposing the enforcement of the Caliph's religious opinions.
This would probably even stir discontent among other Alids, such as Jafar ibn Abi Talib who taught both Abu Hanifa and Malik.

So I think it wouldn't be pushed that far, leaving it to the scholars.

What's interesting about this is that you could make the case that it was that very power play by the Abbasids (ie Mutazilism) that actually ended up destroying the actual authority of the Caliph in the Muslim world, leading to the fracturing of authority in the realm (only further exacerbated by the Sunni-Shia split) that ended the Islamic Golden Age. If you happen to take that perspective, it's not too hard to see how the Alids could botch things up similar to how the Abbasids eventually did OTL, and notably earlier; though I suppose it may also be possible for them to avoid such a blunder.

But I don't think the Caliph pushing a more divine right policy would affect the appeal of Islam.

Since Fatimid Ismailism pushed for an extreme divine right policy, with their succession disputes resulting in religious schisms (Mustali Vs Nizari). But in spite of that, they managed to spread their faith quite widely such as the conversion of Hindu Gujaratis and creation of the Bohra community.
And the Byzantine emperors who were the heads of the Orthodox church managed to spread their faith to the Slavs.

And there are a few million Muslims by this point, most of them have no connection to the government.

Rather the greater religious unity afforded by lack of the Sunni-Shia split would reduce internal religious argumentation, allowing for more focus on Dawah/proselytising.
And a religion with many sects can be off putting, due to difficulty of choosing which one to follow, the lack of this ITTL would make it more appealing.

That's a very good point too.

--- CONSOLIDATE ---

So curious here - - does this mean TTL is unlikely to see an equivalent to what OTL calls the “Islamic Golden Age”? (For our purposes - - the period between the founding of the House of Wisdom to the Anarchy at Sammara.)

 

[wakobear]

What's interesting about this is that you could make the case that it was that very power play by the Abbasids (ie Mutazilism) that actually ended up destroying the actual authority of the Caliph in the Muslim world, leading to the fracturing of authority in the realm (only further exacerbated by the Sunni-Shia split) that ended the Islamic Golden Age. If you happen to take that perspective, it's not too hard to see how the Alids could botch things up similar to how the Abbasids eventually did OTL, and notably earlier; though I suppose it may also be possible for them to avoid such a blunder.

​

Part 1: ​

The Decline of the Abbasid Caliphate​

TL;DR:
The main reason for the fall of the Caliphate and end of the Golden Age was the financial collapse of its bankroller: the agriculture of Iraq.

Brought about by violent civil wars caused by succession disputes as well as the Turks becoming kingmakers - due to Mamun alienating every former support base of the Caliphate (Mutazila was only a small part of this), resorting to Turkish slaves.



Detailed explanation:

Early Abbasids: ​

Early Abbasid government was a broadly based coalition of various groups with different interests, brought together by Mansur in the service of the dynasty, integrated into the regime, so that it was in their interests for the caliphate to succeed and thrive.

Even the Syrians, arch enemies of the Abbasids, launching a whole revolution against them were integrated into and had a palace in the Abbasid system.
It was an era of peace and prosperity. With the only significant rebellions being from the sidelined Alids.

Unlike the Umayyad who relied solely on the Syrians, to the exclusion of all others. Or the middle Abbasids who relied on an even smaller group of Turks to the exclusion of all others. Causing resentment and civil war.



A few decades later Harun arRashid, tried to give the landowning class (Dehqans) greater influence, specifically the Barmakid family, sidelining the traditional Abbasid support base, the Abna (descendants of the Khurasanis who spearheaded the revolution).
The Barmakids/Dehqans were excellent bureaucrats, greatly improving the administration and centralisation. But they had very little military support, especially compared to the Abna.
Their centralising policies also caused discontent and rebellious against their rule, which due to their lack of military strength they couldn't contain properly. Eventually, Harun had to backtrack on his decision and rely once more upon the Abna.




Then the worst decision Harun ever made was his succession plans.
Amin was the Caliph and given Iraq and the west and was supported by the Abna, while Mamun received the east, supported by the Dehqans and was basically entirely independent, with many restrictions put on Amin in his conduct with Mamun.

4th Fitnah (Amin-Mamun civil war)​

After Harun's death in 809, the viziers of both Amin and Mamun were pushing for civil war, leading to a battle near Tehran in May 811. Which to everyone's surprise was a victory for Mamun, leaving the path to Baghdad clear.

Amin showed little leadership in wake of this major defeat, leading to many of his supporters abandoning him, and his remaining supporters fighting between each other. So much so that on 29 March 812 their was a brief coup against Amin by some factions within Baghdad, before being reinstated a few days later...



A few months later on 25 August 812 Tahir began the Siege Of Baghdad. Due to most of Amin's supporters abandoning him, the defense of the metropolis was in the hands of the common people and urban proletariat of Baghdad. Despite having no military experience, armour or even proper weapons they defended with a fierce and determined resistance, and occasionally manage to push back the professionally trained attakers and even briefly captured the major general, Harthama. Hugh Kennedy compares it to the 1871 Paris Commune.

The fighting was vicious and brutal, the breakdown of law and order leading to criminal gangs. Unlike previous Muslim civil wars, women and children were often the victims. Food became scarce, even for the Caliph. Tahir went as far as digging trenches to secure and fortify the parts of the city he had already taken. The mangonels, fires and ferocity of fighting had led to the destruction of most of the formerly glorious city, in what Hugh Kennedy calls a sort of Medieval Stalingrad

Throughout all of this, Amin had abandoned himself to drink, while many of the wealthier citizens disassociated themselves from the mob and defected to Tahir's side. Eventually, in September 813, after over a year of brutal fighting, and briefly considering fleeing to Syria, Amin decided to surrender. Unexpectedly he was killed by Tahir, becoming the first Abbasid to be killed in such a way, reducing the sanctity of spilling royal blood....

Incompetence of Mamun​

But this didn't end the conflict. Mamun made the unbelievably stupid decision of attempting to rule the Caliphate from Merv (Turkmenistan). Throwing Iraq and everything further west into complete anarchy, prolonging the civil war an extra 6 years.

Part of this was due to the appointment of the dehqan Hassan ibn Sahl and dismissal of Tahir. Like the Barmakids before him, Hassan had a lack of military support. Shortly after his appointment a massive Alid rebellion under ibn Tabataba broke out. Managing to take most of southern Iraq, including the major city of Basra, which was only put down with great difficulty.


Seeing Hassan's incompetence and inability to pay the Abna their salaries, as well as the provincialization and decline of their formerly great city, the disparate factions of Baghdad united to restore their city to its former glory, beginning to oust Hassan from the city.


The final straw came in 817 when Mamun made another unbelievably stupid decision; to appoint Ali alRida as his successor, alienating the entirety of the Abbasid house and further alienating the Baghdadis, leading them to appoint their own Caliph, Ibrahim ibn Mahdi. Even in Marw the policy caused disturbances.

And ironically the Iraqi Shia who Mamun was trying to gain favour from by this move were skeptical of his ploy since Mamun's "heir" was 20 years older than him, so probably would never become Caliph. After a few months Ibrahim ibn Mahdi defeated the Shi'ites and took back Kufa, making the policy a complete and utter failure, without the slightest positive outcome.....



It was then that Mamun finally decided to move back to Baghdad, but first murdering his vizier of Marw. But the journey to Baghdad was extremely slowly, taking a year and a half to reach the city. En route he poisoned his heir Ali alRida, alienating what little Shi'ite support he had gained....

Finally in August 819, Mamun arrived in Baghdad, after a long and devastating decade ending the fourth fitnah.

​

But the Caliphate was in tatters. Most regions had become independent under local warlords, Mamun and his dehqan allies lacked military support, but the Abna couldn't be trusted due to siding with Amin and then Ibrahim, and the finances were strained after a decade of civil war, making the raising of a new army a difficult task...


The pillars of the Caliphate Mansur had created had been shattered: The cadet branches of the Abbasid family were now excluded from political power, no longer given governorates or leading armies. Similarly other great houses, such as the Muhallabids or sons of Ma'n b.Za'ida were also excluded. The Abna, descendants of the original revolution 70 years earlier and backbone of the state lost their elite position with many being demilitarised and other groups such as the Mawaali also lost influence.



In place of the previous foundations, Mamun built his Caliphate on two new ones: the Tahirids and the Slave army of his brother Mutasim.

Tahir had managed to efficiently use the limited military resources of Mamun as well as diplomacy/compromise to successfully restore Caliphal rule over Syria in 825 and Egypt the next year (Andalusi pirates had managed to take Alexandria, after being pushed out they founded the Emirate of Crete...). As a reward, he and his descendants then became the hereditary governors of Khurasan, and head of the armed forces of Baghdad.

Mamun's success in the west wasn't reflected in the east, where a massive rebellion had sprung up in Azerbaijan. The lack of military resources and finances meant Mamun had to resort to a series of commanders who offered to raise and pay armies at their own expense in exchange for the revenues of the province. All of these failed, and the Tahirids were reluctant to get involved in a difficult and costly battle. It wasn't until 838, after 20 years of rebellion, that Mutasim managed to defeat Babak....

Rise of the Slaves​

Speaking of Mutasim, he had begun collecting Turkish slaves in 815. By the end of Mamun's reign they only numbered around 4,000 but were highly disciplined and efficient troops, known for their horse archery.

This was the beginning of the demilitarisation of the Arabs and the emergence of a military caste seperate from the rest of society, they didn't have relatives running shops, teaching in schools or working in the city. Most of them, even Ashinas one of the highest ranking generals couldn't even speak Arabic properly, making interaction with the populace difficult. Similarly most of them had only converted to Islam recently if at all. Overall the people saw them as brutal barbarians.

An army drawn from the masses wants the state to thrive, since they have friends, family and dependants living in the state. Thus they want the state to be peaceful and prosperous so their family can benefit.
Unlike foreign troops, who have no attachments to any denizens of the state and are often despised by the populace. Though this characteristic is seen as increased loyalty, since they are wholly dependant on the state, without connections to call upon to plot a rebellion like an army drawn from the masses.

However said loyalty is only when the Caliph is acting in their interests. As soon as he begins to veer from that path they act desperately and violently, since their livelihoods and existence depend on the goodwill of the Caliph towards them and their continued military monopoly. Leading to them murdering Caliphs hostile to them and becoming the new kingmakers to ensure their interests. As shown by the anarchy at Samarra.


The move to Samarra was due to the discontent between the Turks and the Baghdadis, who saw the Turks as barbarians and the Abna saw them as usurpers of their rightful position as the military of the state. Leading to the Turks being beaten up and even murdered in their barracks. Requiring to Mutasim founding a new capital for his supporters. Further isolating the regime. (Though Samarra seems a poor choice, lacking naturally flowing water supply and with poor river communications. Becoming mostly abandoned soon after the Caliphs left it... If he wanted a new capital, a better choice may have been Raqqa, which would strengthen Abbasid control over the west and the frontier, with a fertile hinterland, thriving glass industry and would harken back to the glory days of Harun arRashid when it was his capital)


The Turks showed their military superiority in their successes against Babak in Azerbaijan, Mazyar in Tabaristan and the Byzantines in the siege of Amorion. On the way back from Amorion, Mutasim coordinated a massive purge against the remnants of the Abna, killing over 70 of their officers, as well as Mamun's son Abbas over a coup attempt and highlights the insecurity of Mutasim's claim to the Caliphate.


Mutasim's reign also led to a great increase in the centralisation of the state. With the provinces remitting more money to the centre than ever before. Even the governors of the provinces were centralised, since most of them didn't actually visit their governorates, instead delegating that to others while they lived in Samarra.


So by the end of Mutasim's reign the Caliphate was being run by a few thousand Turks and bureaucrats, with basically no popular support. A far cry from the broad based Caliphate of alMansur...

The Mihna was just another part of this, further alienating the populace via the brutal inquisition. With an attempted rebellion in Baghdad in April 846, headed by Ahmed ibn Nasr, a senior figure of the Abna. Against the inquisition and as a form of protest against the Samarra regime in general.

The Reign of Mutawakkil ​

After Mutasim, his son Wathiq succeeded him and maintained the status quo, leaving all the officials Mutasim had appointed in their places, then dying suddenly 5 years later. His brother alMutawakkil succeeded him in 847, but unlike alWathiq he want to leave Mutasim's cabal in place, and was determined to assert his control over the Caliphate.


Just six weeks after his accession, he killed the cruel vizier ibn Zayyat who had humiliated him a few years prior. Then he tried to break the Turkish monopoly, moving on their most senior commander, Itakh, getting the Tahirids to assassinate him in 849. The removal of these two broke the back of the old guard.


Beyond that, Mutawakkil ended the inquisition, winning support among the traditionalists. Then in 858 he tried to move the capital away from Turkish dominated Samarra. Oddly he chose Damascus, spending 38 days in the city, before huge opposition from the Turks, recognising the move as a ploy to undermine their power, forced him to return to Samarra.
(Why didn't he move back to Baghdad? Which be understandable to the Turks and much less suspicious than Damascus. Baghdad also houses power bases Mutawakkil could draw upon like the Tahirids, Abna remnants and traditionalists. As well as giving him the support of the massive Baghdadi populace.......)


He was also an extravagant builder, trying to outshine Mutasim's already huge 125 ha palace by building the staggeringly gigantic Jafari palace, covering some 211 hectares! (3x larger than Forbidden Place. Third largest palace in all human history after Weiyang and Daming palaces of ancient China) As well as the iconic grand mosque of Samarra with its spiral minaret, the largest mosque in the world until the late 20th century covering 165,886m2 in total.


The problem is that Mutawakkil didn't learn from his grandfather Harun arRahsid's mistake, and tried to give all 3 of his sons a share in the succession. Muntasir was to be Caliph and received Egypt, Iraq and western Iran. Mutazz received Khurasan, Armenia and Fars, while Muayyad received the Levant. Though all 3 never actually visited these provinces, and stayed in Samarra delegating their rule. This created tension in the family and the court.

For some unknown reason, Mutawakkil treated his heir apparent Muntasir with open contempt and frequently humiliated him. To the extent he ordered his courtiers to slap him on the head...
Finally on the last Friday of Ramadan, 5 December 861, Muntasir was supposed to deliver the public sermon and lead the prayer, but his brother Mutazz was appointed for it instead, with Muntasir being obliged to remain in the palace. It was huge public humiliation, and gave Muntasir the clear impression that his father would drop him from the succession.

Due to this, Muntasir teamed up with the other major group threatened by the regime; the Turks.
In October 861, Wasif, last of Mutasim's original generals, learned of a plot by Mutawakkil to confiscate his estates. Making them feel they had little to lose by supporting a coup.
While the rank and file Turks also felt their position threatened by Mutawakkil recruiting North Africans and Armenians to undermine them.
Though for some reason, the Turks still formed the palace guard, despite Mutawakkil actively threatening their interests, which was to prove fatal for him.... (Why wasn't the palace guard changed???)

Finally, on Tuesday 10 December 861, Mutawakkil was murdered by the Turkish guards at the age of 38. Muntasir immediately set about finding Mutazz due to fears of him rallying the non Turkish troops against him. But he managed to secure Mutazz's oath of allegiance, and become the unchallenged Caliph.

The Anarchy at Samarra ​

This event was catastrophic for the future of the caliphate, since it made clear to all that the Turks were the ones in charge and any Caliph who opposed their interests could be easily murdered.

In fact, Muntasir publicly recognised this, when he announced that the reason why he breached the succession protocol of his father and removed Mutazz and Muayyad from the succession was due to the demands of the Turks, and his fear that they would kill them if he did not agree. Publicly admitting his weakness against the Turks...


But he died only 6 months later. Throwing the entire Caliphate into chaos. He left no succession plans. So 3 Turks, Bugha the Elder, Bugha the Younger and Baghir, appointed the Caliph of their choosing for the entire Muslim world. The Caliphate of the Rashidun, of Muawiyah, Ibn Zubayr, Umar II, Mansur and Harun was now being decided by 3 Turkish slaves, who barely speak Arabic and know little about Islam...
To emphasize the humiliation of the caliphate, these 3 had been personally involved in murdering Mutawakkil.

They appointed Musta'in, a young man with no military experience, entirely beholden to the Turks. (Apparently Bughä the Elder argued against this: 'We should appoint someone we fear and respect because then we will remain with him. If we appoint someone who fears us, then we will compete among ourselves and end up by killing each other........)
Beyond that, a Turkish vizier was appointed for the first and only time in the history of the Caliphate, showing the complete monopoly on power the Turks had....


But during the coronation procession of the new Caliph, a group of Tahirids and sons of Mutawakkil started a massive armed riot against the Turks. Throwing all Samarra into chaos.
But the biggest problem was the financial situation, which meant the state was unable to pay the salaries of the troops. This also created a divide between the commanders who had vast estates and the rank and file, who weren't even getting their salaries.

Eventually they mutinied and slaughtered the vizier, and we're determined to murder the Caliph, Bugha and Wasif. So those three fled, abandoning Samarra for Tahirid Baghdad. In response, the Turks appointed Mutazz, despite him being the figurehead of the anti-turkish party. Having two Caliphs meant civil war....

Mutazz and the Turks took the initiative and put Baghdad on the defensive. On the 10th of March 865 the second siege of Baghdad began, with the Turks led by the determined Abbasid prince and later Caliph alMuwaffaq, though only had some 19,000 men. The Baghdadis were led by Ibn Tahir and massively outnumbered their enemy. But lacked military experience. And Ibn Tahir led from his palace, as opposed to Muwaffaq on the front lines....
Initially the Baghdadis won massive victories, but ibn Tahir refused to follow it up with an offensive attack, sticking to his defensive policy, that was the main reason for their defeat.

Eventually hunger set in, in November the Baghdadis protested, demanding food. On January 7th 866, ibn Tahir negotiated with Muwaffaq about betraying Musta'in. On 25th of January Mutazz was acknowledged and the siege ended.

But the civil war, crippled the irrigation systems of Iraq leading to major financial problems. And like previous Amin-Mamun civil war, instability in the centre meant collapse of authority in the provinces, with dozens of new independant dynasties popping up. (With ibn Tulun becoming the first independent ruler of Egypt since Cleopatra...) Which meant the loss of provincial tax revenues, even nearby Baghdad wasn't forwarding any taxes, making the financial crisis worse.

The total payments of military amounted to 200 million dirhams annually, equivalent to two year's taxes for the entire realm. But the Turks were determined to get their pay. Eventually the rank and file Turks murdered their commanders, Bugha and Wasif and due to Mutazz's attempts to curb the military, they turned on him too, killing another Caliph on 16 July 869.
He was succeeded by Muhtadi, who tried to emulate the pious and austere rule of Umar II, to win the support of the masses. Unfortunately Samarra was a government city so it didn't have the demographic Muhtadi was trying to appeal to. Perhaps if he was in Baghdad he would've had more success.

The financial crisis worsened, and the Turkish infighting continued. Eventually Muhtadi tried to undermine one of the Turkish generals by getting his subordinate to betray him. But this failed. So the Turks killed him on 20th June 870 by Crushing His Testicles.....

The Revival ​

After this the 9 year long Anarchy at Samarra ended due to the rise of Muwaffaq, the only Abbasid with military experience and rapport among the Turks, having led the army in the siege of Baghdad as well as opposing the policy of Mutazz to curb the military.

Muwaffaq assured the Turks of their place as the unchallenged military of the Caliphate. With no more attempts to curb or undermine their military monopoly. The various factions of the Turks had also finished their feuds, leaving Musa ibn Bugha the unchallenged leader, with whom Muwaffaq had very strong ties.

Though he didn't claim the Caliphate for himself, instead allowing the appointment of his brother Mutamid as his puppet Caliph, while he de facto ran the Caliphate.


His strong and personal control over the military, as well as that of his son and grandson, along with some excellent financial administrators and a close connection between the civilian adminstration and military leaders, allowed the an Abbasid revival.

The most immediate concern was to deal with the Saffarids, a Persian coppersmith who had taken all Sistan in 865. Then taking the Tahirid capital, Nishapur in 873 ending their rule. Then pushing westwards into Fars and Ahwaz. Before in 876 marching on Baghdad itself. Muwaffaq and Musa ibn Bugha met their advance at Dayr Aqul, only 75 km from Baghdad. With this the Saffarid threat to Iraq ended.

Next was the massive Zanj Slave revolution, all of Southern Iraq was in the hands, unchallenged, between 869 and 879. Who brutally sacked Basra in 871, from which the great city, founded by the companions, has never recovered. (Old Basra is modern azZubayr).
Muwaffaq began the advance in 879, with 50,000 men, the vast marshes which enabled Zanj guerilla warfare, were impenetrable to the Turkish cavalry armies. So initially the focus was on destroying their ships to reduce their mobility in the mashes. Gradually they pushed to the Zanj capital, Mukhtara, besieging it for 2 and a half years from February 881 to August 883, killing their founder Ali ibn Muhammad ending the revolt. Though this devastated southern Iraqi agriculture, from which it has never recovered.

(@John7755 يوحنا has some good posts on the Zanj)

After some failed campaigns against the Tulunids, Muwaffaq died in 891. His son Mutadid succeeded him, continuing to puppet Mutamid until his death in 892, when he became Caliph himself.
He had a strong personality and was incredibly effective, spending the most time on campaign out of any Caliph. Through a mixture of campaigning and diplomacy, he restored Abbasid rule to Western Iran, Jazira, Northern Syria, Cilicia and setting up the conquest of Egypt for his successor.
While the capital was moved back to Baghdad after almost 60 years, rebuilding the war-ravaged city. The administration was further developed, with reforms to taxation, although beginning Tax-farming, which was later incredibly destructive to the realm. The chief civilian administrator participated actively on campaigns and was good friends with the Mutadid's main commander, strengthening the ties between the civilian adminstration and the military.

After a decade of successful rule, he died in 892. Succeeded by his adequate son, Muktafi, continuing the policies of his father, though he had none the brilliant energy of his father, exercising less direct control and not campaigning in person. Similar to Wathiq after Mutasim.
Muktafi's reign faced the threat of the Qaramita, a large Bedouin coalition based in the Syrian desert and East Arabia who threatened Aleppo, Damascus and Iraq. But in late 903 they were decisively defeated near Hama, greatly reducing their threat.
From there, marching on Tulunid Egypt which had been weakened by internal strife and the Qaramita. 10,000 men and a fleet from Tarsus managed to restore Abbasid control over the province in 905/6 after 40 years.
In 908, after a short but successful reign, Muktafi died, leaving the treasury full and the army in the hands of the capable civilian administrators.

The Precipitous Decline and Collapse​

But his successor was the worst Abbasid, and perhaps worst Caliph in all history, alMuqtadir. He undid all the work of his predecessors, being constantly manipulated, exploited and deceived by his advisors for his entire 23 year reign.

Muktafi left no succession plans, but instead of the military choosing the successor as had been the case for Wathiq, and during the anarchy at Samarra, this time it was the bureaucrats of the civilian adminstration who chose the next Caliph. Showing just how far they had taken control of the state.
But they were split between 2 factions. One who wanted the competent and experienced Ahmed ibn alMutazz, and another who wanted the 13 year old brother of Muktafi so that they could manipulate him to their benefit, it is this faction which won out. Though there was a brief coup to install ibn al Mutazz, which nearly succeeded...
(https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/908-continuation-of-the-abbasid-resurgence.545191/ made a TL about this. But need to remaster it, many things are glossed over and lacking...)



Muqtadir lived a life of decadence and immoral extravagance. Rarely leaving the palace and usying himself with the concubines and singing girls of the harem. The other Abbasid princes did similar.
alMuwaffaq, Mutadid and Muktafi, all had strong, personal involvement in the military, allowing them to prevent army mutinies and rebellions. But the new Caliph could do no such thing, nor could any other member of the abbasid house.
Similarly without the strong hand of the previous Caliphs, the bitter rivalries of different factions of the bureaucrats flourished unchecked, damaging the administration.



But the biggest problem was the financial catastrophe which plagued the Caliphate, which I have detailed the cause of which below. The result was viziers brutally torturing other officials to extract money out of them, the spread of exploitative tax farming and the Iqta/fiefs. All exacerbating the problem.
Yet despite the Caliphate being near bankruptcy, the Caliph insisted that his extravagant lifestyle pe paid for with public funds. Any vizier who tried to oppose this was dismissed. Particularly Ali ibn Isa, who repeatedly tried to reduce the Caliph's allowance, with the support of the main military leader, Mu'nis, but to no avail.
Meanwhile, the financial problems meant that the salaries of the troops couldn't be paid properly, causing great discontent among the army.

Next there were external foes. Particularly the Qaramita bedouin. Although defeated in Syria, from their new base in Bahrain they began to attack Iraq in 923. Once again sacking Basra, 50 years after the Zanj sack. At this, Mu'nis executed the vizier, ibn al Furat. Beginning the end of the bureaucrats dominating government.
 In 927, the Qaramita marched towards Baghdad itself, and it seemed like the city would fall, but managed to hold out. Then in 930, they Sacked Makkah, shattered the Black stone and took it to Bahrain for 21 years. An unbelievable blow to Caliphal prestige. But the Qaramita now busied themselves with internal disputes, reducing their threat.
Mu'nis now set about gaining complete control over the civil administration. Leading to coups and counter-coups, resulting in Muqtadir's death in 932, the first Caliph to die a violent death since Muhtadi, 60 years earlier.....
The military appointed alQahir as Caliph. Who tried, publicly, to show a pious image in contrast to Muqtadir's immoral decadence, but he was seen as brutal and disliked. Resulting in his vizier organising a coup in which Qahir was blinded. Then came alRadi.
Meanwhile, with all the intrigues and coups in the capital, the rest of the Caliphate became independent once more. Egypt and Syria going to the Ikhshidids in 935, while northern Iraq went to the Hamdanids, Western Iran went to the Zoroastrian revivalist ibn Mardavij, in 934 he took nearby Ahwaz, intent on taking Baghdad and reforming the Sassanian empire, though his grand dreams were shattered by his murder by his own slaves... Then succeeded by the Buyids.
Even in Baghdad's backyard, Wasit refused to pay taxes and in Basra independent lords were negotiating alliances with the Buyids.

All this meant that almost no money was coming into the Caliphate....


In 936 ibn Ra'iq came to Baghdad and took over both the civilian and military administrations. The army of the Caliph, built up since Muwaffaq was completely disbanded, leaving the Caliph completely helpless, with no soldiers or administrators. It was at this point that the political Caliphate ended.
The vizierate, established by the Barmakids almost 200 years earlier, was also disbanded, the last great Abbasid vizier, having his tongue torn out and hands chopped off. The administration was reduced only to its most basic functions.

Beyond that, the new military of Ibn Ra'iq was no longer paid and dependant upon salaries, like all previous Caliphal armies. Instead they were rewarded with fiefs, so it was in their interest that the central government collapse, so they can seize more land for themselves. Making their interests antithetical to that of the Caliphate. (Unlike earlier military coups, who still wanted a strong and prosperous Caliphate to pay their salaries).



In 944, the Ikhshidid tried to persuade the Caliph to move to Egypt, which would've been somewhat like the Mamluk Cairo Caliphate, but 300 years earlier (it would've been interesting to see if this may've prevented the Fatimid conquest, perhaps taking over after Kafur....?) But the Caliph refused, and returned to Baghdad where his military deposed and blinded him...

Finally in January 946, the Buyids entered Baghdad...

The Financial Catastrophe ​

Southern Iraq/Sawad is probably the most fertile region of Western Eurasia. And it is this tremendous agricultural wealth that created the world's first empires like Akkadians and Babylonians, then under Assyria unified the entire fertile crescent. The Achaemenids used it's great wealth and fairly central position to unify the entire middle east and Seleucids had a large chunk of it. The reason the Persians had their capital so close to the Roman border was due to the immeasurable wealth of Iraq, providing almost 40% of total sassanian taxes.

But Iraqi agriculture is quite fragile, requiring a stable state to invest huge sums into the maintenance and upkeep of the immense canal and irrigation network. Lest the canals be breached, turning the region into salty and uncultivateable marshland.
During the late Sassanian era, Iraqi agriculture seems to have reached its peak at over 200 million dirhams. Perhaps as high as 340 million... [Probably highly exaggerated] Though these improvements increased the interdependence of the system, making it more fragile to instability and neglect.
In 627 Heraclius' campaigns in the region devastated much of the irrigation systems. Followed by an enormous flood in 628-29 wherein the Tigris shifted from its eastern/modern course to the Gharraf river. Submerging vast swaths of the central Sawad in marshlands for the next few centuries, making it unusable for agriculture. (As i covered here:https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/744-the-alids-a-better-caliphate.548484/post-24687484) Then internal politcial instability hit the Sassanids, before the Arab invasions began in 633.

The Arabs were initially busy with the conquests, though under Umar 128 million dirhams were collected. It seems like Muawiya's reign is the first time irrigation projects to reclaim land from the marshes began. Khalid alQasri is said to have attempted. Continuing throughout Umayyad rule and the early Abbasid era. During this time, the Sawad of Iraq provided around 100-120 million dirhams, a fifth of the Caliphate. If Ahwaz and Hulwan are included, Southern Iraq produced close to 165 million dirhams, 4x the revenues of Egypt.
It is this enormous wealth with funded the Abbasid Golden Age.


But the Mamun-Amin civil war greatly damaged the irrigation network, as commanders purposely breached canals for military advantage.
And for some reason, we no longer hear of new land reclamation projects after the reign of Harun. Only occasionally hearing of repairing existing systems. Yet despite the neglect and continued deterioration of the irrigation network, lifeblood of the Caliphate, the Abbasids were spending hundreds of millions of dirhams in founding Samarra, with alMutawakkil alone spent over 275 million for his gargantuan palaces.............
(Had they instead invested hundreds of millions into the irrigation network of the Sawad, they may've been able to reach the 200+ million dirham rates of the Sassanians. Greatly reducing the financial crises of later decades)

The true catastrophe came during the Anarchy at Samarra, due to the second siege of Baghdad causing much more damage to the irrigation. Then for 14 years from 869 onwards, the Zanj wreaked havoc throughout all southern Iraq.
The 4 decades of Muwaffaq, Mutadid and Muktafi were using all their resources to expand the state, and didn't have time to invest in irrigation systems, and needed money more immediately. So they resorted to Tax farming. Which extracted as much money as possible, with no care whatsoever for the long term, further deteriorating irrigation systems and encouraging emigration of the exploited peasantry. This practice got worse during the reign of Muqtadir, and was accompanied by Qaramita raids and severe military infighting.
By the 919, the Sawad only produced 31 dirhams, with that figure falling even more as the years progressed.

The last death knell to Iraqi agriculture was 937 the intentional breaching of the gigantic 300km Nahrawan canal, that had taken centuries to build. At this, most of southern Iraq was no longer being cultivated and still isn't to this day (most of modern Iraqi agriculture coming from the northern Jazira regions). In the coming centuries the heartland of civilizations became pastures for the bedouin....



Without wealthy Iraq in the middle, the link between the eastern Islamic world and the western Islamic world is largely severed. Making any later attempts at reforming the Caliphate incredibly difficult. Egypt is too westerly to attempt to extert control over Iraq let alone Iran. Syria is too poor, western Iran isn't quite wealthy enough whilst also being too far from Egypt.
Though, if steppe nomads based in Iran and Jazira/East Anatolia, can take Egypt, like the Mongols and to a lesser extent Seljuks almost did, they might be able to re-establish a good chunk of the Caliphate...



Many PoDs could've avoided this:

• WI Harun didn't make such stupid succession plans, allowing Amin or Mamun sole rule. Preventing the 4rd Fitnah (and maybe preventing fall of Barmakids). Thereby preventing the collapse of the Abna armies of the Abbasids.
• WI Mamun move to Baghdad in 813 instead of moving to Merv and needlessly extending the civil war, leaving the Abna in a stronger position
• WI Abbas ibn Mamun succeeded in overthrowing Mutasim and the Turks?
• WI Mutawakkil acted more covertly against the Turks, changed his palace guard and didn't humiliate his heir apparent? Perhaps allowing him to reign another 30 years
• WI Muntasir didn't die suddenly and reigned for decades?
• WI Musta'in and the Tahirids defeated the Turks?
• WI Mutadid/Muktafi reigned longer or ibn alMutazz became Caliph instead of incompetent Muqtadir, continuing the revival? (https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/908-continuation-of-the-abbasid-resurgence.545191/ made a TL about this. But need to remaster it, many things are glossed over and lacking...)

TLDR:
The main reason for the fall of the Caliphate and end of the Golden Age was the financial collapse of its bankroller: Iraq.
Brought about by violent civil wars caused by succession disputes and the Turks becoming kingmakers. As well as lack of investment in irrigation networks.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Excellent analysis @wakobear !

OK, so the early Alids certainly aren't going to be anything so bad as al-Muqtadir, but they will be starting with far less widespread support than the early Abbasids of OTL. What does this mean for the Caliphate as a whole?

Well, like you say, it seems to come down to whether they're able to make full economic use of Mesopotamia -- which might seem straight-forward at first glance, but quickly gets tangled in a sort of chicken-or-egg question. On the one hand, if they have less expensive palace costs, that could mean more resources for developing irrigation, which means more agricultural returns; on the other hand, if they have thinner support, would they be able to afford putting money into development in the first place? Then again, as long as they have at least some base of support, how challenging could it really be to divert some needed money to redevelopment? But against that, you have to figure how likely it is they'd have to deal with uprisings, which means civil wars, which means irrigation projects getting disrupted or even destroyed. And who's even to say they'll be able to keep their supporters united in the longer term?

My impression here -- the Alids TTL aren't able to rebuild the Caliphate, or Iraq in particular, as quickly as the early Abbasids did OTL; this could mean the equivalent "Golden Age" just begins later than OTL, or it could also mean that the Alid Caliphate runs into their own problems long before even getting a chance to mess it up.

 

[wakobear]

So curious here - - does this mean TTL is unlikely to see an equivalent to what OTL calls the “Islamic Golden Age”? (For our purposes - - the period between the founding of the House of Wisdom to the Anarchy at Sammara.)

Part 2: This Timeline​

This timeline is quite different from what the early Abbasids had.
Namely by the fact that it has 2 power bases Khurasani and Berber, and has a stronger connection to the Syrians, due to the marriage ties with the Umayyads before the revolution.
This means that even if a civil war were to break out, the Alid military power bases are much larger than the Abna. So it probably wouldn't be possible to thin their ranks so much that the state needs to resort to slave soldiers.

Similarly it doesn't have any strong external ideological opposition, since they are the Alids - the main revolutionaries of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates. While the Khawarij weren't that popular after the fall of the Umayyads.




The main challenge for the regime would be the Berber-Khurasani divide. With the Berbers dominating the majority of the Mediterranean, while the Khurasanis dominate everything east of the Zagros. Though not that strong in Sindh, Azerbaijan and Southern Iran.
Muhammad anNafs azZakiyyah would have to somehow unite these two completely different people's to create a more unified empire.

Overall, it seems like the Berbers are the more difficult foe. Since OTL 759, Abbasids sent 40,000 Khurasanis to take just Ifriqiyah (Tunisia only). Yet by 771 they were completely ousted from the province. Requiring a further 60,000 to retake it, an enormous force. But these still couldn't control it, resulting in Aghlabid independence, who in turn were also defeated by the Fatimid Berbers in the early 900s.

ITTL, it's not merely the Berbers of Ifriqiyah the Khurasanis have to deal with, instead they control the entire Maghreb, Iberia, Egypt, Levantine coast, Cilicia, Hejazi and Yemeni coasts. And later Sicily, Southern France and West African gold fields.
Their maritime hegemony would make it incredibly difficult for the land based Khurasanis to attempt to oust them from Egypt and Syria, let alone further west.
But they may be able to use the strong Arab supremacist sentiments of the Syrian tribes to gain their support against the much less arabised Berbers (Khurasan had over 50,000 Arab settlers and extensive intermarriage, making them more arabised than the Berbers who had far fewer settlers, and basically none beyond Tunisia, before the great Berber revolt kicked out those too)This coalition might be enough to push them out of most of Egypt and Syria, though lengthy sieges would be needed for the coastal cities. And tensions between Syrians and Khurasanis would make the coalition fragile.

On the otherhand, the Khurasani are much weaker. Firstly there are fewer of them, controlling a smaller territory that is much closer to Baghdad, and thereby easier to control. Secondly they are deeply divided, split between the Dehqans and the Abna which caused the Mamun-Amin civil war. And OTL, the Abbasids defeated a large scale Khurasani revolt under Abd alJabbar ibn Abd arRahman alAzdi in 759, showing they aren't that strong.
But the predominantly Khurasani conquest of India in the 760s, would give them access to immense wealth and resources.




So in hindsight I probably should've had Muhammad anNafs azZakiyyah himself travel to the Maghreb, making the Berbers personally loyal to him instead of Ibrahim, who goes east to Khurasan.

Otherwise, Berber loyalty attached to Ibrahim would make it difficult for Muhammad to control his brother and the west.
Let alone after these two pass away, when their sons would likely be far more aggressive against one another, leading to civil war, which would probably result in a division of the Caliphate into a Berber Mediterranean dominated half. And a Khurasan-Indian half...

Whereas if Muhammad Nafs Zakiyyah personally controls the Berbers, he can use their strength over the Khurasanis to better control Ibrahim. With the Berbers expanding their naval expertise into the Persian Gulf, dominating Basra and the Persian coast, where they would be able to push towards Fars and Kerman. Making contacts with their fellow Kharijites of Sistan. While using their non-arab ethnicity to gain support of the Iranian Dehqans, against the mainly Arab Abna. Then in 760s, Berbers playing a significant role in the Indian campaigns, to to prevent the Khurasanis having a total monopoly on its vast resources.
Muhammad Nafs Zakiyyah's heir apparent would be appointed to govern the Maghreb, and take charge of the campaigns into southern Italy and southern France. So that when he becomes Caliph, he too has a strong connection with the Berber armies.

Golden age?​

As for whether or not this will result in a Golden Age, this depends on your definition.
The OTL Golden Age of the unified Caliphate as a whole in terms of peace, prosperity and economic flourishing - especially for Iraq - was from the founding of Baghdad in 763 to the the end of Harun's reign in 809. Whereafter the long decline began.

But scientifically (which you seem to be alluding to by saying it started with the House of Wisdom) the Golden Age took off with Mamun.
Translations of Greek texts had already begun in Umayyad times, but was very small scale done by private individuals. It is Mamun who's personal enthusiasm for the Greek sciences made it a part of Abbasid high culture, from there spreading to the rest of the Islamic world.

But this didn't end with the Anarchy at Samarra, the bureaucracy reached its peak during the reign of Mutadid to the end of Muqtadir. When for the first and perhaps only time in all Islamic history, the civilian administrators dominated the military, not the other way round. The reason why know so much about the intricacies of Muqtadir's reign is because many of the officials during his reign personally wrote histories about their experiences, such as Miskawayh, as a culmination of the literization of Arabic. Even after the end of Iraqi agriculture in 937 and the mass exodus of the peasantry which resulted, Baghdad itself remained an important cultural and scientific centre.

And political fragmentation can sometimes be beneficial for cultural development as the various dynasties such as Samanids, Buyids, Fatimids, Cordoba, Ghaznavids etc all complete with one another to fill each of their courts with the best scientists and intellectuals of the age. Similar to how the Renaissance occurred when Italy was incredibly fractured, enabling intellectual competition and flourishing.
It was this era of fragmentation which produced Ibn Sina, Ibn alHaytham and alBiruni. Some of the most influential and unique thinkers of their age, surpassing those of Mamun's era.

Instead it seems like the beginnings of the decline of the scientific Golden Age in the eastern Islamic world was during the devastations of the Seljuks throughout the mid-late 11th century. While in the west it was the sudden collapse of the alMohads after 1212.
By this point, most of Greek scientific works had already been translated. And Ibn Sina replaced Aristotle as the dominant philosopher of the Islamic world.
After this, court culture begins to shift away from patronage of the sciences. And the creation of the Nizamiyya universities made knowledge a little more static. Both in the sciences as well as religion, which is why ibn Taymiyyah (early 14th century) heavily criticized taqlid of Madhhabs and a return to Ijtihad

Egypt reached its economic peak under the early Mamluk Sultanate until the black death, but the high culture there had shifted to favour literature, poetry, monumental architecture and other such pursuits, instead of scientific works. Similarly for the incredibly wealthy Indian kingdoms.
While the barbarous Mongol Ilkhanate founded the Maragheh observatory producing Nasir udDin Tusi, and the Timurids founded the Ulugh Beg Observatory.
So it's highly dependent on court tastes.



But much of this was quite theoretical and metaphysical, with little practical benefit for the Muslim world.

Much Worse for the Muslim world was the decline of industry, which went hand in hand with decline in agriculture, unlike science which was tied to court tastes. This resulted in the Muslim world going from exporting goods to Europe, to becoming reliant on imports. Such as the Mamluks post Black death.
A significant factor in this was due to the Iqta system, which was not hereditary. So, they had no incentive to invest in expensive but long term improvements such as watermills, windmills or animal mills, since the fruits of that would benefit the next Iqta holder, not his own descendants. Instead they extracted and exploited as much as possible while they still held the Iqta, which would be rescinded as soon as the individual lost favour with the ruler. But this system prevented the emergence of hereditary lords would greatly weaken the central governments.
Another factor is the government exclusion from obeying property laws. So that when it was strapped for cash, it would torture wealthy individuals for their money and confiscate their lands, which discouraged investments in mills.
Which resulted in many of the Mills of Iraq disappearing by the 10th century. As is mentioned in "Mills, cranes, and the great divergence"








But ITTL, the Alids have many factors which could allow for an even greater golden age. Most importantly weath:

Firstly, The Alids, control more land than the Abbasids. Since they control the Maghreb and Andalus. OTL, Abbasid Ifriqiyah was a massive drain on the rest of the Caliphate, both in manpower as mentioned previously, as well as wealth. Providing no taxes, instead needed to be subsidized 100,000 dirhams a year by Egypt...
ITTL, the Berbers are heavily integrated into the regime, and so the entire Maghreb as well as Andalus would pay taxes to Baghdad.


Secondly, the Alids' would have more than double the manpower of the Abbasids, due to the Berbers, allowing for continued expansion.

The Khurasanis, not tied up with governing the west, are able to send almost 100,000 men into the unfathomable riches of India following the deaths of Lalitâditya and Nagabhata in 760. The death of the former leaving the entire Gangetic plain vulnerable, down to Bengal. Which are some of the most fertile, densely populated and richest regions of the pre modern world. Bringing in unfathomable sums of wealth, perhaps Tens Of Billions of dirhams.
While the death of Nagabhata weakens the Gurjaras, allowing expansion into Gujarat after taking the Gangetic. Which makes Malwa/Madhya Pradesh and the Deccan vulnerable. While not as rich as the Gangetic, they are still immensely wealthy.

While in the west, the Berbers would focus on unifying the Mediterranean. Starting with Sicily, Cyprus and Balearics shortly after the end of the revolution. While the Andalusi army and navy extend Septimania to Marseille and the Provence coast. In the 760s, taking Sardinia and Crete beginning raids on the Aegean, while the Cilician and navy extends control to Antalya and the Cibyrrhaeot coast. Then in the 770s, establishing outposts in Dalmatia and the Adriatic and invading southern Italy. turning the Mediterranean into an Alid lake. Allowing the rejuvenation of Trans-Mediterranean trade, making the Caliphates Mediterranean provinces richer.
While integration of the Saharan Berbers like the Tuareg, would allow expansion into the vast gold fields of West Africa. And after some decades becoming a significant agricultural and industrial region too.


Thirdly, if the Alid invest hundreds of millions of dirhams into the irrigation networks of the Sawad, instead of building palaces like Mutawakkil, particularly focusing on redirecting the Tigris out of the Gharraf river, back to its Eastern/Modern course, greatly reducing the size of the marshlands, and bringing water back to the eastern Sawad. Bringing millions of acres back into cultivation.
Allowing the 200+ million dirham yields of the Sassanians. Perhaps eventually even the sassanian apogee of 340,000,000 dirhams.......

This doubling or even tripling of the Sawad's revenues would mean that it produces close to half the entire Caliphate's wealth.
This enormous wealth right at the centre, means the Caliphate can allow the provinces to forward less wealth to the centre, keeping more of it for local use, easing provincial tensions and rebellions. And allowing the provinces to use that money to invest and become richer themselves. Increasing the overall wealth of the Caliphate further.


All of this immense wealth could allow for much more investment into acquiring, translating and disseminating the ancient texts.
But this depends on whether or not the Caliph personally promotes this. Without the personal enthusiasm of Mamun prompting the Greek sciences as high culture, there may not have been a scientific golden age. On the other hand, if an Umayyad like AbdalMalik promoted translating Greek sciences, then it could've begun over a century earlier...

I will assume that Muhammad anNafs azZakiyyah is interested in translating the Greek sciences for the practical benefits they could bring in medicine, engineering, mathematics, astronomy, logic etc.

But unlike the OTL translation movement, the Caliph would also take an interest in translating the Greek histories to take heed from the rise and fall of the previous empires which ruled the lands of the Caliphate. Translating Herodotus, Thucydides Xenophon, Ctesias, Apollodorus, Ephorus, Timaeus, Plutarch, Arrian, Polybius, Megasthenes, Procopius, Diodorus, Strabo, Cassius Dio, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Procopius etc.

While in the west, his brother Ibrahim, not wanting to be outdone, but without as much access to Greek works, translates the Latin histories like Livy, Pompeius Trogus, Tacitus, Sallust, Ammianus Marcellinus, Suetonius, Pliny etc (OTL the only major Arabic-Latin translation was that of orosius in the late 900s)
[]

Learning a great deal about the governance of the Romans, and the social problems they faced. As well as about the historical Alexander. And learning of Parthian, Seleucid, Greco-Bactrian, Achaemenids, Medians etc. Since the Medieval Persians had lost all historical memory of their mighty forebears due to Sassanian rewriting of history.
[The early Sassanians like Ardashir seem to have decent historical knowledge of the Achaemenids. With Ardashir styling himself as their successor and refering to specific details of their deeds. (Ardashir itself comes from the word Artaxerxes) But later on under Shapur ii, of the fourth century, Zoroastrianism was made the state religion to combat Christianity being made state religion of the Romans. To add to their prestige and legitimacy, they tried linking the Mythical Kayanian Dynasty, who had assisted Zoroaster, to Ardashir I. In doing so, getting rid of the Achaemenids.

After Islam, the Persians adopted the Alexander Romance of Pseudo-Callisthenes which paints him in a heroic light. Despite Alexander being despised beforehand. But this meant they had a fair idea of Alexander. (Though Dara ii/Darius iii is Alexander's half brother.....
As for the Seleucids, they have almost no mention of them, and the Parthians were actively written out of history for Sassanian legitimacy.

Bizarrely, this meant that Medieval Christians who had access to Greco-Roman historical texts had more knowledge of Medians Achaemenids, Seleucids and Parthians than the Persians themselves.....]
Later on, this may expand beyond to Greco-Roman literature, poetry, theatre etc. Heavily influencing all of Islamic culture.
A translation of Vitruvius' De Architectura would result in more aspects of classical architecture influencing Islamic architecture. And may lead to the adoption of the crane, allowing the building of taller buildings much more efficiently. (OTL Muslim world had individual components of a crane (hoist, pulley, rope) but never combined them to form a crane. But as early as 11th century western Europe was using them, in 13th century upgrading to treadwheels and harbour cranes)

The immense wealth of the Caliphate in preserving these texts, instead of small monasteries scattered throughout dark age Europe, would mean much less of these works would be lost. Filling in some blanks we have today for classical history.

Another note would be that translation of Latin and influence of Roman culture, would result in Muwalladi converts of Iberia, Ifriqiyah, Southern Italy and France would take greater pride in their cultures. Especially since Berber rule wouldn't be Arab supremacist unlike OTL Caliphate of Cordoba. So this would probably result in Muwaladi dynasties like Banu Qasi using their native vernaculars as their court languages and styling themselves as heirs to Rome. Just as the Samanids used New Persian and styled themselves as successors to Sassanians...




Returning to scientific golden age, the conquest of India would allow Indian mathematics and Hindu numerals to gain widespread adoption sooner. And the increased trade and ties to China would allow Chinese technologies to reach the Muslim world such as the blast furnace for steelmaking, mouldboard plough for more effective agriculture, tea cultivation as a cash crop in the Caspian region, rice cultivation in marshy regions, and improved watermill efficiency.

Most importantly the block print. OTL, the Islamic world did have a block print called the Tarsh used between the 9th and 14th centuries, but it was only used for talismans and hajj certificates, never gaining widespread adoption for printing books.
But ITTL, the contact with China would show the practical benefits of block printing, allowing mass adoption by the government in printing books. Thereby allowing books to be far cheaper and more accessible, increasing literacy, and knowledge generally. Allowing a much greater scientific golden age.

 

[Nivek]

ost importantly the block print. OTL, the Islamic world did have a block print called the Tarsh used between the 9th and 14th centuries, but it was only used for talismans and hajj certificates, never gaining widespread adoption for printing books.
But ITTL, the contact with China would show the practical benefits of block printing, allowing mass adoption by the government in printing books. Thereby allowing books to be far cheaper and more accessible, increasing literacy, and knowledge generally. Allowing a much greater scientific golden age.

This one would be a big butterfly, alongside the extra funds coming from better management

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

OK, so the Alids did definitely manage to rebuild Mesopotamia and kick the agricultural revolution off roughly as early as OTL's Abbasids did; that's good. As a bonus, the Alid claim of "divine right" to interpret the Word of God effectively sidesteps the whole Mutazilist conundrum around the revealed word versus human reason; meaning there's no tension between being open-minded about ideas and being open-minded about other people having ideas that OTL produced the mihna. Plus, as you say, no becoming dependent on a slave army, meaning no "Anarchy of Samarra" type situation.

So the Alids are poised to be every bit as great as the Golden Age Abbasids in their heyday, likely even greater; now it's just a question of when and how they screw it up (and, of course, the legacy of this "greater greatness").

 

[idontwantthis]

What would the Mongols do in this timeline? They have two very powerful neighbors, and they would still attempt to raid Chinese cities and possibly Caliphate cities. How does this change the peception of the Mongols as a whole and do they remain insignificant?

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

What would the Mongols do in this timeline?

Dude, this is half a millennium before the Mongols were a major factor in world history. And Transoxiana still falls to Muslims TTL, ostensibly. Yeah, the Oghuz Turks played a role in the decline of the Abbasids OTL, but it wasn’t the strength of their khanate, it was the use of slave soldiers by the caliphs. So I’m kind of confused on what you mean here…

 

[idontwantthis]

Dude, this is half a millennium before the Mongols were a major factor in world history. And Transoxiana still falls to Muslims TTL, ostensibly. Yeah, the Oghuz Turks played a role in the decline of the Abbasids OTL, but it wasn’t the strength of their khanate, it was the use of slave soldiers by the caliphs. So I’m kind of confused on what you mean here…

I'm considering that several empires such as the Khitan Empire, Liao and Balhae existed at the time, as well as several mongol polities. While they were not the ruling class, they were a huge impact on China, especially in the north by OTL.