Treaty of Versailles and World War 2?

Furthermore, Germany had surrendered as it was promised to make peace on the base of the 14 points. They were betrayed. They would not have done so knowing the results.

No they weren't promised anything. Wilson corresponded with the Kaiser with the 14 points in mind. Never the French promised anything to the Germans (and never did Wilson also, as he never signed anything like that). The german generals who signed the armistice knew what would happened and they believed the armistice conditions were too harsh but signed anyway, because their country was disintegrating fast.

And the USA would likely not have continued the war.

Yes the US would have continued the war. They didn't enter the war only to leave it a year later without anything to bring back home : americans expect a just deal, leaving after suffering thousand of death and getting nothing is not what the americans signed for.

Your points are wrong.

Please explain to me how.

In which case no war guilt clause

There is no War Guilt clause and there was never any war guilt clause ! it is a myth created by the German right.
 
Text always fails to get across the tone of voice and facial expressions that we use as part of communication. However you do seem to be wilfully misreading what the other is saying.
Thats why I asked to explain it to me, saying I is only cynical is hardly worth it. I really doubt that kalamona really believes that genocide would have been a great idea for peace in Europe, but he dont say the opposite either. Thats why I am asking. When nothing comes, well there you have your answer.

As mentioned before Versailles was either too harsh or not harsh enough. Nobody was willing to dismember Germany back to the 1870 kingdoms (and it would have probably needed the 1815 boundaries to really work) as it would have needed Armies of occupation which neither Britain nor the US were willing at that time to supply. Also there had to be a bulwark against that Bolsheviks in Russia, and AH was with the Dodo, so that left Germany. In which case no war guilt clause and limited reparations and the Germans could have lived with it (not liked it).
Agreed.
 
But this is what you said:
If thats only cynical its really bad taste.

What worked? Genocide? I cant remeber a genocide in that time against Germans, care to explain?

Okay, lets start it over. Possibily my fault.

Base is, that the ToV was not harsh enough to make the germans, as a nation, Germany, as a country to cripple to a level of second rate/tertiary power in europe, uanbel to cause any problems for the winning powers. But they were hars and most importantly, humilitating enough to make the gemans angry and revanchist.
Question is, could it be harsher? IMHO, not. I do not think, that any division would be long lasting, so if you really want to cripple germany, you have to destroy the infrastructure, the industry and a good portion of the population - well, thats genocide (and bad taste or not, it works - even today, just check the news). Luckily, no one besides Morgenthau was in a position to do so - even his plan gone down the gutter, where it belongs.


And for about a thousand years, Germany, as HRE or not was always an important (well, maybe the most important) factor east of the Rhein. We could live with a strong germany.
 

Tyr Anazasi

Banned
Oh for ***** sake shut up the pair of you. Text always fails to get across the tone of voice and facial expressions that we use as part of communication. However you do seem to be wilfully misreading what the other is saying.
As mentioned before Versailles was either too harsh or not harsh enough. Nobody was willing to dismember Germany back to the 1870 kingdoms (and it would have probably needed the 1815 boundaries to really work) as it would have needed Armies of occupation which neither Britain nor the US were willing at that time to supply. Also there had to be a bulwark against that Bolsheviks in Russia, and AH was with the Dodo, so that left Germany. In which case no war guilt clause and limited reparations and the Germans could have lived with it (not liked it).

The French wanted to redo the German unification, but got no support.
 
Okay, lets start it over. Possibily my fault.
We will see.:rolleyes:

Base is, that the ToV was not harsh enough to make the germans, as a nation, Germany, as a country to cripple to a level of second rate/tertiary power in europe, uanbel to cause any problems for the winning powers
Agreed.

But they were hars and most importantly, humilitating enough to make the gemans angry and revanchist.
True.

Question is, could it be harsher? IMHO, not. I do not think, that any division would be long lasting, so if you really want to cripple germany, you have to destroy the infrastructure, the industry and a good portion of the population - well, thats genocide (and bad taste or not, it works - even today, just check the news). Luckily, no one besides Morgenthau was in a position to do so - even his plan gone down the gutter, where it belongs.
I think I understand your argument. When your goal is to weaken Germany to a point of utter weakness, than such a cruel plan would have worked.

And for about a thousand years, Germany, as HRE or not was always an important (well, maybe the most important) factor east of the Rhein. We could live with a strong germany.
True.

Well, thats clears it for me. Honestly, I reported your post some time ago, so we will see how a mod reacts. I dont think your are advocating genocide, you only speaked from a hypothetical pov.

Greetz, Haaki
 
The French wanted to redo the German unification, but got no support.
I think you mean undo but true they did want to dismember Germany but the UK and US would not agree to it. (Mainly because they suspected that France wanted to annex every thing west of the Rhine!)
 

Cook

Banned
The idea that this declared Germany "responsible" for WWI is a myth propagated in the 1920s and 30s...Nowhere does it say that Germany is guilty for or started the war...


Well no, actually there is in fact a war guilt clause.

Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII. Reparation, General Provisions:
Article 231.

'The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.'

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partviii.asp
 
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It was too harsh, it just made beaten young Germans into angry Germans looking for revenge.

Though that wasn't really the problem. The defeated power is rarely happy with the peace treaty, and it's not clear that the Germans were any more disgruntled than the French had been post-1871.

The problem was that, once the war fever had had a few years to fade, a lot of people in the Allied countries were rather ashamed of the ToV, which combined with the general war-weariness and "never again" attitude, meant that when the treaty was challenged, it would be very hard to arouse any will to fight to enforce it. As early as 1924, the French government which had occupied the Ruhr was ousted from power - and if France was unwilling to enforce the Treaty, Britain, safer behind her Channel, would of course be even less so.
 
The majority of the population was Polish, and thus was given to Poland. As it was understood in the 14 points. And i never said it was an overwhelming majority (and why are you pointing that ? do you believe that 45% of germans should be favorised over 55% of Poles ?).
That is not the whole truth though. The Polish had according to their own opinion, which counted in Versailles, a visible majority because they counted the Kashubians as Polish. Both in German census and in Kashubian self-perception that was not true. The Kashubian population was divided whether they prefered German or Polish rule. That is about 200 000 people which can be deducted from the Polish side (out of 900 000 total living in the corridore). Now saying that all of them would have voted in a plebiscite pro-German would be grossly wrong. There was a strong pro-polish movement, but also an anti-polish one, which preferred Germany as the minor evil. But you won´t even need half to vote German, which was well possible.
As it happend the "surpression" of Kashubians was a minor talking point of German nationalists, strangely enough one that had effects into the 3rd Reich: Unlike people of Polish descent the Volksliste classified the Kashubians as category III Germans, thus Germans who have been "polonified". The classification system is of course ridiculous, but it illustratess that and how the argument that the corridore was majority Polish was considered a blatant lie in Germany. Only a plebiscite could have changed that, regradless who would have won.
 
No they weren't promised anything. Wilson corresponded with the Kaiser with the 14 points in mind. Never the French promised anything to the Germans (and never did Wilson also, as he never signed anything like that). The german generals who signed the armistice knew what would happened and they believed the armistice conditions were too harsh but signed anyway, because their country was disintegrating fast.
Perhaps it is better to say that Germany entered the armistice under the impression that they had been promised that the 14 points would be the starting point for negotiations. It was what prompted the fall of the Kaiser and the army to support the republic in the beginning.
And no one told the Germans otherwise. The German delegation went to Versailles anticipating that they would negotiate on the base of Wilsons 14 points. Instead they got dictated something considerably worse.
Can you imagine the shock of a whole nation including its entire leadership which gets its expectations turned from "14 points is what we will talk about" into "take Versailles or die" within a single day? Some talking with, not to the Germans and gradually preparing them for what they would get could have greatly stabilised interwar Germany with almost exactly the same treaty. The way the treaty was presented was at least as much at fault for its failure as the content.
 
Perhaps it is better to say that Germany entered the armistice under the impression that they had been promised that the 14 points would be the starting point for negotiations. It was what prompted the fall of the Kaiser and the army to support the republic in the beginning.



And no one told the Germans otherwise.

And no one told the germans that they would be the basis of negociations.

The German delegation went to Versailles anticipating that they would negotiate on the base of Wilsons 14 points. Instead they got dictated something considerably worse.

No they didn't. It is what the german politicians told the German people. It was clear when the French gave their conditions for the armistice that the 14 points were not the only revendications (for example the armistice convention called for Germany to give reparations to the Entente).

Can you imagine the shock of a whole nation including its entire leadership which gets its expectations turned from "14 points is what we will talk about" into "take Versailles or die" within a single day? Some talking with, not to the Germans and gradually preparing them for what they would get could have greatly stabilised interwar Germany with almost exactly the same treaty. The way the treaty was presented was at least as much at fault for its failure as the content.

The leadership knew well enough that the 14 points wouldn't be the basis of negociations, as it already signed the armistice which didn't care about the 14 points. And basically the only thing that was to negociate outside the 14 points was the amount of reparations that Germany would give (but given that the german politicians would have disagreed to any amount of reparations, it was useless anyway). The whole mess after the treaty in Germany was due to German politicians (like the first hyperinflation phase was due to the halt in german industry when they refused to pay the reparations) lying to the people about the nature of the armistice (and about the true damage that was made in France and Belgium during WWI).
 

Tyr Anazasi

Banned
That is not the whole truth though. The Polish had according to their own opinion, which counted in Versailles, a visible majority because they counted the Kashubians as Polish. Both in German census and in Kashubian self-perception that was not true. The Kashubian population was divided whether they prefered German or Polish rule. That is about 200 000 people which can be deducted from the Polish side (out of 900 000 total living in the corridore). Now saying that all of them would have voted in a plebiscite pro-German would be grossly wrong. There was a strong pro-polish movement, but also an anti-polish one, which preferred Germany as the minor evil. But you won´t even need half to vote German, which was well possible.
As it happend the "surpression" of Kashubians was a minor talking point of German nationalists, strangely enough one that had effects into the 3rd Reich: Unlike people of Polish descent the Volksliste classified the Kashubians as category III Germans, thus Germans who have been "polonified". The classification system is of course ridiculous, but it illustratess that and how the argument that the corridore was majority Polish was considered a blatant lie in Germany. Only a plebiscite could have changed that, regradless who would have won.

Agreed. A plebiscite would have been pro German IMO in 1920. Later, however, this wasn't fair any more because of the Polonification and the expulsion of Germans.

BTW, nearly all Masurs and many Kashubians, who still have problems in Poland today, fled to Germany after ww2.
 
And no one told the germans that they would be the basis of negociations.

No they didn't. It is what the german politicians told the German people. It was clear when the French gave their conditions for the armistice that the 14 points were not the only revendications (for example the armistice convention called for Germany to give reparations to the Entente).

The leadership knew well enough that the 14 points wouldn't be the basis of negociations, as it already signed the armistice which didn't care about the 14 points. And basically the only thing that was to negociate outside the 14 points was the amount of reparations that Germany would give (but given that the german politicians would have disagreed to any amount of reparations, it was useless anyway). The whole mess after the treaty in Germany was due to German politicians (like the first hyperinflation phase was due to the halt in german industry when they refused to pay the reparations) lying to the people about the nature of the armistice (and about the true damage that was made in France and Belgium during WWI).
The contents of the armistice were considered as mere military precautions. The German delegation went to Versailles with several thousand pages of statistics reports and maps to dispute every minor border change or economic impact of reparations, plus several very moving speeches for the foreign minister. The German foreign minister considered a likely outcome that besides heavy (but not as heavy as they were) reparations, he would get the victors to agree to a plebiscite in Austria against plebiscites along the border with Poland and in Alsace-Lorraine. He even thought it perhaps might be possible to retain one or two colonies or at least to deduct them from the reparations.
More realistic members of his delegation considered the parts about Alsace-Lorraine and the colonies bullshit, but even they thought that at the end of very hard negotiations it would be possible to get plebiscites in Posen and Western Prussia and a delayed one in Austria and maybe a reasonable plan for Germany to pay reparations. They knew they would have to concede defeat, but Silesia or the Saar as concessions did not even appear on their mental radar. And those were informed people, not the man on the street!
 
Some border area for germany which had already all the coal and iron it wanted, and 20% of the French coal and Iron production before 1870. Also, no one in Alsace-Moselle wanted to be part of Germany in 1870. Source? Alsace was over 70 percent German so.... And yes, the 14 points were enforced for Germany (except in Eupen Malmedy and exclaves and Danzig which was also in the 14 points) in regard of nationalities. Also, ethnicities had not much to do with what the people wanted. There were poles who wanted to be part of Poland, and Alsatian are linguistically Germanic, but still wanted to be part of France. Please tell me where outside of the few things i pointed before (Eupen Malmédy, Danzig, exclaves) the 14 points weren't respected for Germany ? There were Poles who wanted to be in Germany, see Upper Silesia plebicite, still Poland got them. Germany lost Southern Sleswig which is mahority German to a neutral nation. Memel, also pro German, was given to Lithuania. Saarland went to France. The Germans didnt get the right of self determination anywhere in Versailles



The majority of the population was Polish, and thus was given to Poland. As it was understood in the 14 points. And i never said it was an overwhelming majority (and why are you pointing that ? do you believe that 45% of germans should be favorised over 55% of Poles ?). You forgot the Kashubians and Pommerians. Also there are many enclaves. If Germany got the 14 points according to you then why didnt draw the border around the exclaves? It works in Baarle Nassau so...[/QUOTE]

See answers in red
 
The contents of the armistice were considered as mere military precautions. The German delegation went to Versailles with several thousand pages of statistics reports and maps to dispute every minor border change or economic impact of reparations, plus several very moving speeches for the foreign minister. The German foreign minister considered a likely outcome that besides heavy (but not as heavy as they were) reparations, he would get the victors to agree to a plebiscite in Austria against plebiscites along the border with Poland and in Alsace-Lorraine. He even thought it perhaps might be possible to retain one or two colonies or at least to deduct them from the reparations.
More realistic members of his delegation considered the parts about Alsace-Lorraine and the colonies bullshit, but even they thought that at the end of very hard negotiations it would be possible to get plebiscites in Posen and Western Prussia and a delayed one in Austria and maybe a reasonable plan for Germany to pay reparations. They knew they would have to concede defeat, but Silesia or the Saar as concessions did not even appear on their mental radar. And those were informed people, not the man on the street!

If it had not occurred to them at all that Upper Silesia was populated mostly by Poles and might therefore be lost, then I daresay they weren't very well informed at all. Or too blinded by pride to be able to accept reality.
 
If it had not occurred to them at all that Upper Silesia was populated mostly by Poles and might therefore be lost, then I daresay they weren't very well informed at all. Or too blinded by pride to be able to accept reality.

Silesia as a whole had been taken by Prussia from the Habsburg Empire in 1740 and ceded by the latter in 1742; it had not been part of the Polish state that was partitioned 1772-1795. So, why should anyone in Berlin suppose that Upper Silesia might be given to the new Poland? A lot of Poles were living in Greater Berlin and the Ruhr area, nobody ever considered that a reason to give these areas to Poland either.
 
If it had not occurred to them at all that Upper Silesia was populated mostly by Poles and might therefore be lost, then I daresay they weren't very well informed at all. Or too blinded by pride to be able to accept reality.
To be fair Silesia had been part of the HRE since the 14th century and because of its importance for Prussian/German history was seen as an integral part of Germany. They have anticipated that some borders would be redrawn there as well to accomodate the Polish population, but that someone could consider the entire region Polish was as if someone would question whether Virginia was genuinely American.
 
Silesia as a whole had been taken by Prussia from the Habsburg Empire in 1740 and ceded by the latter in 1742; it had not been part of the Polish state that was partitioned 1772-1795. So, why should anyone in Berlin suppose that Upper Silesia might be given to the new Poland? A lot of Poles were living in Greater Berlin and the Ruhr area, nobody ever considered that a reason to give these areas to Poland either.

Any areas in Berlin and the Ruhr which might have had significant Polish populations were not right next to the area which even the Germans considered Polish, and are therefore rather difficult to compare with Silesia.

Reality is that which, once you stop believing it, doesn't go away. I understand that some Germans could not accept the thought that even a slice of Silesia was not rightfully and eternally German, but that did not retroactively adjust reality so as to make them well-informed.

that someone could consider the entire region Polish was as if someone would question whether Virginia was genuinely American.

Nobody did. The plebiscite area was the maximum Polish demand in Silesia.
 
Also the Czechs were living very well with a free harbour in Hamburg as their harbour. A direct access was never needed.

Try telling the British that they can cede their coastline to a stronger power which highly dislikes them with no adverse effects :) My point being, such comparisons can be very misleading.
 
Nobody did. The plebiscite area was the maximum Polish demand in Silesia.
With the entire region I meant the entirety of Upper Silesia, which in the first draft of the ToV would have gone directly to Poland. Allowing plebiscite and participation there was the biggest amendment that was made to the "proposal" first presented to Germany.
 
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