Can the Philippines be saved 1941-42?

[Garrison]

So I'm curious if there are any solid possibilities for having the Japanese assault in 1941 fail? To narrow the parameters lets say the earliest you can make a change is June 1941, and that 'replace MacArthur' isn't not an answer in itself. My own reading is that much like Malaya the Philippines was at the bottom of the priority list for equipment and manpower. MacArthur's attitudes and pomposity might not help but I think you would have to have the islands get a higher priority for men and equipment. So any thoughts or suggestions?

 

[DougM]

Define saved…
If you mean that they are basically tossed off the beach, then no.
I suppose it would be possible to turn much of WW2 into a fight for the Philippines where the US and Japan toss everything they have both on shore and at sea into this one battle but it would be a meat grinder of an order never seen in history,
At the start the US would take major losses and most the the Islands would be controlled by Japan and the US would ultimately lose a LOT of ships. In fact this may be the closest to Japans ideal that the US would just give up.
But ultimately first the US Subs and then the US building program would just start to whittle the Japanese fleet down and then the lack of support and supplies would start hurting the Japanese troops.
The attrition would be insane and the civilians on the Island would suffer tremendously as they would be starving and at the mer of Japanese soldiers that are less than happy.
So this would be a truly horrible situation. And there were very good reasons the US didn’t do this. And frankly everyone on charge in the US would have had to be lobotomized and drinks a steady diet of lead paint for this to happen.
But yes it is theoretically possible for the US to fight it out with Japan over the Philippine islands but no it is not really poss for Japan to be kept off the Islands as long they attack in 41 or early 42. The US would have needed to reinforce the Islands more then they had and frankly need a better commander the they had.
Note: Personally I think Dugout Doug was the most overrated officer in the US and one of the top three or so in the whole war, and his only redeeming qualities was that he truly seamed to care.
And even then it will also needed a lot of good luck to not lose much of the US Pacific fleet while trying to support and supply the islands. And frankly the US would have to give up all the other locations that historically they protected or fought in. Because the US Navy in the start of WW2 was simply too stretched. Ultimately it was able to do everything everywhere all at once but not in Jan 1942 and certain ly not after Peril Harbor.

 

[Garrison]

Define saved…
If you mean that they are basically tossed off the beach, then no.
I suppose it would be possible to turn much of WW2 into a fight for the Philippines where the US and Japan toss everything they have both on shore and at sea into this one battle but it would be a meat grinder of an order never seen in history,
At the start the US would take major losses and most the the Islands would be controlled by Japan and the US would ultimately lose a LOT of ships. In fact this may be the closest to Japans ideal that the US would just give up.
But ultimately first the US Subs and then the US building program would just start to whittle the Japanese fleet down and then the lack of support and supplies would start hurting the Japanese troops.
The attrition would be insane and the civilians on the Island would suffer tremendously as they would be starving and at the mer of Japanese soldiers that are less than happy.
So this would be a truly horrible situation. And there were very good reasons the US didn’t do this. And frankly everyone on charge in the US would have had to be lobotomized and drinks a steady diet of lead paint for this to happen.
But yes it is theoretically possible for the US to fight it out with Japan over the Philippine islands but no it is not really poss for Japan to be kept off the Islands as long they attack in 41 or early 42. The US would have needed to reinforce the Islands more then they had and frankly need a better commander the they had.
Note: Personally I think Dugout Doug was the most overrated officer in the US and one of the top three or so in the whole war, and his only redeeming qualities was that he truly seamed to care.
And even then it will also needed a lot of good luck to not lose much of the US Pacific fleet while trying to support and supply the islands. And frankly the US would have to give up all the other locations that historically they protected or fought in. Because the US Navy in the start of WW2 was simply too stretched. Ultimately it was able to do everything everywhere all at once but not in Jan 1942 and certain ly not after Peril Harbor.

Yeah that makes sense, which then begs the question, suppose US intelligence had a greater insight into what the Japanese were planning and so Pearl Harbor goes badly and the US has reason to strengthen the Philippines? Realize this is stretching but I had already concluded it would need a serious change to make the situation salvageable, even assuming a long drawn out fight for the Philippine.

 

[Driftless]

If Pearl Harbor occurs as OTL, then I don't see how the PI can fight on indefinitely. I believe it would take the US fleet re-couping enough of their early losses to be able to break any kind of Japanese naval and air blockade. The US Army and Air Force, plus the Philippine Army would run out of ammo and fuel before re-supply in sufficient amounts could occur. The best the USN could do in early 1942 were the raids in the Marshalls and Gilberts, which were a long way from the PI.

Could the US-Philippine Armies have held out longer, maybe even much longer with better planning and re-locating of local supplies? Very probably.

 

[Rolf]

Even IF the US knew by June '41. What can they do. It is kind of too late to send weapons and ammo. The US army was in short supply of both. They tried to send a round out brigade of Artillery to the P.I. Granted way to late so maybe they can speed that deployment up.
The Rainbow plan wrote off the P.I. they already knew they could not hold it.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Yeah, the USN wrote-off the Phillipines in it's war plans as "indefensible, retake later". Too far forward and too exposed to both naval and air strikes from Japan for practical rebasing, the logistical implements for a cross-oceanic thrust were not there until the second year of a war. In fact, American naval leaders worst nightmare pre-war was the Japanese goading the political leadership to order them to rebase to the Phillipines prematurely in order to gain operational and tactical advantages.

 

[Rolf]

Wow was reading the US Army did not start to train or equip the Philippine army until the Summer of 41. You POD needs to be at least 12 Months earlier at the Minimum. I always thought they had started sooner than summer of '41. Seriously Lets embargo Japan, and maybe we should beef up the P.I. as well. DOH!!

 

[Rolf]

Yeah, the USN wrote-off the Phillipines in it's war plans as "indefensible, retake later". Too far forward and too exposed to both naval and air strikes from Japan for practical rebasing, the logistical implements for a cross-oceanic thrust were not there until the second year of a war. In fact, American naval leaders worst nightmare pre-war was the Japanese goading the political leadership to order them to rebase to the Phillipines prematurely in order to gain operational and tactical advantages.

The US Navy was upset about basing to Oahu, when all the major logistical facilities for the Pacific Fleet was on the West Coast. The P.I. was a write off.

 

[Garrison]

Okay then plan B, allowing a better performance at Pearl Harbor, most of the battleships aren't sunk, how early could they take the Philippines back, or would it be better to just bypass the Philippines altogether?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Okay then plan B, allowing a better performance at Pearl Harbor, most of the battleships aren't sunk, how early could they take the Philippines back, or would it be better to just bypass the Philippines altogether?

At the earliest? Late-1943. More probably 1944. That's when American industrial mobilization and build-up had fashioned the logistical train for the cross-oceanic drive.

Worth considering though: if Japan doesn't score as big at Pearl Harbor, they might not advance as far in the Central and South Pacific. That means they won't be as overextended and won't be frittering away their forces out on the periphery like they did during OTL 1942-43. That means a tougher fight once the American Central Pacific drive kicks off. That won't change Japan's ultimate fate - it's really re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic all told - but it may not allow for the retaking to be all that accelerated compared to OTL.

 

[Rolf]

I don't think it matters what happened at Pearl Harbor. The logistics just wasn't there to support a field Army in the Philippines. We barely supported forces stationed in Australia early on. Look at the shoestring budget of Guadalcanal, The US was scraping the bottom of the barrel in '42. Perhaps if the Philippines defense had been based on supporting a guerilla war from the outset vs stopping them at the beaches maybe they hold on longer. The Philippines Army plan of 2 infantry Divisions and 10 reserve Divisions was still 3-5 years from fruition of. They were still in the building of the support needed stage to train all the troops. Put off the war by 3-4 more years and Maybe the P.I. holds on longer.

 

[Draconis]

So I'm curious if there are any solid possibilities for having the Japanese assault in 1941 fail? To narrow the parameters lets say the earliest you can make a change is June 1941, and that 'replace MacArthur' isn't not an answer in itself. My own reading is that much like Malaya the Philippines was at the bottom of the priority list for equipment and manpower. MacArthur's attitudes and pomposity might not help but I think you would have to have the islands get a higher priority for men and equipment. So any thoughts or suggestions?

It's nearly impossible with the late POD date you're suggesting. Make it two years earlier and add some reason why more money will be spent on better defense for the Philippines.

fester's "Keynes Cruisers" story goes into this area in some detail. But even with better and earlier preparations most of the P.I. was lost to the Japanese advance. Plus other setbacks the Japanese forces encountered in this ATL helped prevent the IJA from taking the Bataan peninsula.

 

[Brak]

This is incredibly unrealistic but replace the ocean with lava? That might keep it safe, until the Japanese paratroopers arrive. I feel like there was no way to save the Philippines in 1941.

 

[MrHappy]

Okay then plan B, allowing a better performance at Pearl Harbor, most of the battleships aren't sunk, how early could they take the Philippines back, or would it be better to just bypass the Philippines altogether?

If you haven't used it as your starting point, look at "War Plan Orange," and some the historical analysis regarding that plan.

 

[MrHappy]

This is incredibly unrealistic but replace the ocean with lava?

Then replace MacArthur with this guy...

 

[Blue cat]

So I'm curious if there are any solid possibilities for having the Japanese assault in 1941 fail? To narrow the parameters let’s say the earliest you can make a change is June 1941, and that 'replace MacArthur' isn't not an answer in itself. My own reading is that much like Malaya the Philippines was at the bottom of the priority list for equipment and manpower. MacArthur's attitudes and pomposity might not help but I think you would have to have the islands get a higher priority for men and equipment. So any thoughts or suggestions?

As I understand things…

For treaty reasons and internal U.S. politics reasons, significant increases in U.S. forces on the Philippines were essentially a non starter during the 1930’s. There was little U.S. interest in sinking more money into remote (from the U.S. Mainland) islands that were expected to be independent and breaking treaties was also seen as a bad thing to do.

By the time the treaties and internal political issues didn’t really matter much the U.S. perhaps could have sent some more supplies, ammunition, fuel etc and perhaps with 20/20 hindsight the final stand(s) in Bataan and Corregidor might have been foreseen ? Perhaps a few more prepared fortifications might have been able to have been built, maybe some (more ?) mines could have been laid etc ?

Maybe Bataan / Coregidor holds on a bit longer and or ties down more Japanese forces ? Maybe the Japanese get frustrated and try and engage the Fortifications with warships and perhaps Fort Drum sinks or seriously damages a major IJN warship ?

Maybe a bit more prior planning allows a few more Americans to be evacuated before the defences fall ?

I suspect with hindsight there are / were some incremental things the US might have been able to have done but I doubt the overall outcome would have changed much ?

Just my opinions / .$02

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Mac refuses to declare Manila an open city and instead decides to fight for every house and street. PR disaster for America and collateral damage goes through the roof, but I have no doubt that it would bleed Homma's troops considerably.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

So I'm curious if there are any solid possibilities for having the Japanese assault in 1941 fail? To narrow the parameters lets say the earliest you can make a change is June 1941, and that 'replace MacArthur' isn't not an answer in itself. My own reading is that much like Malaya the Philippines was at the bottom of the priority list for equipment and manpower. MacArthur's attitudes and pomposity might not help but I think you would have to have the islands get a higher priority for men and equipment. So any thoughts or suggestions?

The USN had pretty much written off 'forward defending' the Philippines in any then future confrontation with Japan and instead was committed to the 'Mandates' plan of island hopping as they did after watchtower.

It was almost certainly the correct choice as the loss of the Philippines would not have been a deathblow to the USA (and so it proved) but heavy losses to a forward deployed USN might have been in the short term.

It is similar to the RNs plan of resorting to a distant blockade of Germany in WW1 and not the expected close blockade which was disappointing to the Germans as they had based their strategy over the British doing just that.

So we can not expect the USN to save them (and even with out the losses of Pearl Harbour given the disproportionate losses in surface actions between the USN and IJN in many of the surface actions of the pacific war probably a good thing).

What could be done is an earlier expansion of the Philippines army from less than a division (effectively a Militia police force) to a 10 Division force far earlier and the equipment sent far earlier.

Particularly heavier equipment - Artillery, AAA, command vehicles, mobile STD clinic etc

But therein lies the riddle - why?

When would the US decide to stand up a Philippines Army many many times the strength of the peacetime force - for me there is no real reason to start this process before 1939 and arguably not before the partial Japanese invasion of FIC in July 1940 (which at the time was only really intended to block a major source of arms to the Chinese) and far more likely the subsequent total occupation of the French Colony in mid 41.

It does not give those planning such a force a lot of time and so it proved with all 9 of the planned divisions each only having one of its 3 Regiments stood up before 7th Dec 1941 with the planned 2nd regiments in each called up for training as the Japanese attacked and the 3rd if at all while the campaign was under way.

Most of the equipment planned for this army was still in US Warehouses stateside come April 1942.

It was the same with the air force stood up in the Philippines - a lot of what had arrived had only arrived recently and was pretty green.

And there was a large burden on US production for the at war Democracies in 1939-41 and while the USA did become the arsenal of democracy etc it was not yet that in this period - the UK still was and was struggling to supply enough stuff for its own needs and a lot of what teh USA was producing was for its own expanding military with a great deal of kit going to the British who were actually fighting.

So low hanging fruit then.....

An earlier conscription effort with better arms and equipment ordered earlier - with perhaps a more realistic mobilisation plan (not the unworkable nothing to 10 divisions ASAP) that allows Staff and field Officers to be educated and NCOs to be discovered and gain experience etc.

This process takes time but even an earlier limited conscription would pay dividends to a later larger call up if it can be managed as there would be a far large 'estate' of educated officers and NCOs than was the case OTL

The air force perhaps organise the airfield better - I mean just look at what the British were doing with their bases - revetments and dispersed and often camouflaged deployment of aircraft with satellite airfield and even decoy sites.

A chain home system and fighter command system is almost certainly beyond the Philippines during this time but a system of coast watchers with a centralised command structure to control everything.

And leadership - I am not sure swapping Big Mac for anyone else is going to make things better.

He was well known and trusted within the Philippines elite, and I understand that he was something of a poster boy for the Republicans and Southern Democrats back in the USA so would have the connections to get stuff moving etc that another choice might not have.

So he even though we all hate on him, and while his military leadership was found to be seriously lacking he is probably the correct choice certainly to start an earlier building of a Philippines military.

Lastly....racism - the powers that be have to accept earlier that the Philippines can be good soldiers and appreciate earlier that the Japanese are peer opposition and that their equipment is as good as their own.

It is probably the hardest thing to fix.

 

[MrHappy]

This isn't my list, but some military historians made the following list of suggestions that would have made the PI very painful for the Japanese without the US needing to go "all in" in the PI's defense:

1. 1-2 years in advance. Start stock piling supplies on Bataan. Start building more lateral military roads across Bataan.
2. 6 mos. in advance. Start fortifying some of the strategic hilltops, natural choke-points, and the few beach landing zones on Bataan. Concentrated ground forces on Luzon so that the US can launch quick counter-strike against the main Jap landing when it occurs. MacArthur knew or suspected this would likely be at Lingayen Gulf.
3. Within an hour of learning about the attack at PH. Have the US aircraft dispersed or into whatever hardened facilities they had.
4. Within hours of the PH attack. Permit Far East Air Force to attack Jap airfields o Formosa.
5. Counter-attack at the Lingayen Gulf when Gen. Homma's landing is underway.

 

[Garrison]

Interesting responses, but overall shaping towards it can't be done without a near clairvoyant sense of what's coming at least a couple of years in advance. That brings me to the other question. There was definitely opposition to retaking the Philippines in the USN, wanting to focus the if they had gotten their way would that have shortened the war?